N-Player Games Econ 171 The Mugger Problem See Game Tree on the Blackboard - PowerPoint Presentation

N-Player Games Econ 171

The Mugger Problem See Game Tree on the Blackboard How many different strategies are there for Simon? (Remember a strategy specifies what you will do at every information set.) A) 2 B) 3 C) 4 D) 8

3,2 3,2 4,5 4,5 3,2 5,43,25,42,66,32,66,3 Resist/Resist Resist/Give Give/Resist Give/Give Simon Mugger Show Gun Hide Gun No Gun Simon’s Strategy x/y means Do x if you see a gun, Do y if you don’t see a gun.

A Coordination game There are 4 possible parties that you could attend. One is on Picasso Road, one is on Trigo , one is on Sabado Tarde , and one is on Del Playa. Your payoff is equal to the total number of people who choose the same party that you do. Which party do you choose?A) PicassoB) Sabado TardeC) TrigoD) Del Playa

A Coordination game There are 4 possible parties that you could attend. One is on Picasso Road, one is on Trigo , one is on Sabado Tarde , and one is on Del Playa. Your payoff is equal to the total number of people who choose the same party that you do. Which party do you choose?A) PicassoB) Sabado TardeC) TrigoD) Del Playa

Modified Coordination Game Your payoff from attending the party at X is the number of people who choose this party plus Y(X) where Y(X) is written on the blackboard. Which party do you attend? A) Picasso B) Sabado TardeC) TrigoD) Del Playa

A congestion game There are 4 restaurants to choose from, A, B, C, and D. You think they are all equally good, but you prefer to go to one that is less crowded. Your payoff is 50-N where N is the number of people who go to the restaurant that you choose. Which restaurant do you choose? A) Restaurant A B) Restaurant B C) Restaurant C D) Restaurant D

What about Nash equilibrium in these coordination games? More than one Nash equilibrium. Some equilibria may be “better than others”. Any guarantee that the “best one” happens?

A commuting game. You have two ways to commute from home to work. The short way by narrow road The long way by freeway Commute time by freeway is always 30 minutes. Commute time by narrow road depends on how many others take narrow road.

Your choice If N people go short way, it takes 16+N/2 minutes to make the trip. Freeway always takes 30 minutes You hate commuting and want to minimize travel time.Choose your route using Clickers. We’ll do this repeatedly, simulating commuter days.

Your score You will get more points, the less your total time spent commuting. You must choose one way or the other. If you don’t click either option, you will be assessed 1 hour commuting time for that day .

Payments We will repeat this experiment 6 times (a 6-day work week). Your score will be 150 minus the total amount of time you spend commuting. I will randomly choose one of the persons with the highest score (least time spent commuting) and give that person a prize of $10.

This time I will travel by the A) Short way B) Freeway

Nash equilibrium In Nash equilibrium for this game, nobody would want to change strategies. This will happen if 30=16+N/2, which implies that N=28. So the Nash equilibrium is for 28 persons to use the short way and everybody to spend 30 minutes commuting. Is this efficient? What would be efficient?

An efficient solution would minimize total commuting costs. Suppose that the class has C members. Let x be the number of people who use short road and C-x the number who use the freeway. Total commuting costs are (C-x)30+x(16+x/2)= 30C-14x+x 2/2. When are they minimized?Hint: Use calculus.

Widening the short road What would happen if the local government spent some money and doubled the capacity of the short road. Then the time it would take to drive on the short road when N people use it would be 16+N/4 instead of 16+N/2. What would the new equilibrium be? Is anybody better off?

What if tolls were charged? Suppose that all people value their time at v per minute. What is the equilibrium outcome with a toll of T? Equalize costs going the two ways: 30v=(16+X/2) v+T. 30=16+X/2+T/vX=28-2(T/v).If v=.25 and T=$1.75, X=14.

A symmetric N-person game. All players have same strategy sets If you switch two players’ strategies, you switch their payoffs and leave other players’ payoffs unchanged. Special case of symmetric game—Your payoff depends on what you do and the sum of the actions taken by others. Symmetric N-person games

Weakest Link and Best shot Games Example: Airline Security Game- A weakest link game N players—Strategy set for any player is a list of possible levels of security {1,2,3,4, 5, 6, 7} action. Player i’s action choice denoted s iWeakest link version. Payoff to player i is 50 + 20 min{s 1,s_2,…,sN}-10 si.

Nash equilibria for Airline Security Weakest Link game No Nash equilibrium has any player choosing higher level of s i than any other player.Show that any level of security is a Nash equilibrium.Are some equilibria better for all airlines than others?

A Best shot Games Example: Airline Security Game- A best shot version N players—Strategy set for any player is a list of possible levels of security {1,2,3,4, 5, 6, 7} action. Player i’s action choice denoted s iWeakest link version. Payoff to player i is 50 + 20max{s 1,s_2,…,sN}-10si.

Equilibria Can’t have two players choosing more than the minimum. Can’t have all players choosing minimum. What are the equilibria ?

Evolutionary theory of Sex Ratios Why do almost all mammals have essentially equal numbers of sons and daughters? Every child that is born has exactly one mother and one father. Let C be the number of children born in the next generation. Let N m be the number of adult males and Nf the number of adult females. The average number of children for each male is C/Nm and the average number of children for each female is C/N f The rarer sex will have more children on average. If one sex is more rare, then mutations that make you have babies of that sex will prosper.