Chris Fraser 方克濤 Associate Professor Department of Philosophy HKU PhD from HKU won the 1999 Li Ka Shing prize Author of The Philosophy of the Mozi The First Consequentialists ID: 659528
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Slide1
Paradoxes in the School of NamesSlide2
Chris Fraser 方克濤
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, HKU
PhD from HKU, won the 1999 Li
Ka Shing prizeAuthor of The Philosophy of the Mozi: The First ConsequentialistsSlide3
The School of Names
M
ing
jia 名家, Warring States (479–221 B.C.E.) thinkers who shared an interest in language, logic, and metaphysics.Not really a “school”: the individuals lived centuries apart, in different regions of China, with distinct interests.Mostly no surviving original texts.Slide4
The School of Names
Intellectuals
known as the
bian zhe 辯者 or “dialecticians.”Deng Xi 鄧析
Yin
Wen
尹
文
Hui
Shi 惠施Gongsun Long 公孫龍Slide5
Mohist Dialecticians
In addition, some of the paradoxes we will be concerned with come from the
Mohist
dialecticians, who operated in the same general time period (Warring States) as the School of Names.Slide6
Identity and PredicationSlide7
The Xunzi
荀
子3rd century philosophical work.In particular, written long after the dialecticians we’re studying.Written by a school surrounding the philosopher
Xunzi
.
Disliked paradoxes (a “great depravity”) and had a “general disdain for intellectual curiosity.”
One of few sources of info about the School of Names.Slide8
The Xunzi
荀
子The Xunzi argues that the correct use of names “is necessary to clarify social ranks, distinguish similar from different things, communicate intentions, and carry out
tasks.”Slide9
Mohist Robber Paradox
“Disliking
there
being many robbers is not disliking there being many people.”“Desiring there be no robbers is not desiring there be no people.”
“Not-caring
about robbers is not not-caring about
people.”
“Killing robber-people
is not killing people” (
Mozi 45/16–17).Slide10
A Fallacious Argument
God is love.
Love is blind.
Ray Charles is blind.Therefore, Ray Charles is God.Slide11
IndividualsSlide12
Proper Names
A proper name picks out an individual.
MichaelSlide13
KindsSlide14
Predicates
A predicate picks out a kind of individuals.
humanSlide15
Truth Conditions: PN + PRED
A proper name + predicate sentence is true if the individual named by the proper name is in the kind named by the predicate.
Example: ‘Michael is human’ is true if
is in:Slide16
Identity vs. Predication Statements
Not every ‘is’ statement in English is a predication statement. We also have the ‘is’ of identity. Compare:
Michael is human.
Michael is the instructor of PHIL 2511.The second statement has no predicate, but two “proper names” (singular terms). Slide17
Truth Conditions: PN = PN
A proper name = proper name sentence is true if the individual named by the first proper name
is identical to
the individual named by the second proper name.Example: ‘Michael is the instructor of PHIL 2511’ is true if =Slide18
A Fallacious Argument Analyzed
God
PN
is lovePN.LovePN is
blind
PRED
.
Ray
Charles
PN is blindPRED.Therefore, Ray Charles
PN
is
God
PN
.Slide19
GodPN
is
love
PN.This is an identity statement, so it gets us: =Slide20
LovePN
is
blind
PRED.
is inSlide21
LovePN
is
blind
PRED.
is inSlide22
RayPN
is
blind
PRED.
is inSlide23
Ray
Charles
PN
is
God
PN
?Slide24
Paradox Resolved
The argument hinges on a confusion between identity statements and predicate statements.
If all the statements were identity statements, it would work:
God = Love = Blind = Ray CharlesSlide25
The White Horse ParadoxSlide26
Gongsun Long
Lived c
. 320–250 B.C.E
.He was a retainer to the Lord of Pingyuan (d. 252 B.C.E.) in the state of Zhao.Only member of the School of Names that we have texts from.Slide27
White Horse Paradox
The white horse paradox consists of several arguments for the following claim:
“White horses are not horses.”Slide28Slide29
White Horse Paradox
Consider the following sentence:
“Michael wants horses.”
‘Michael’ is clearly a proper name, but ‘horses’ is clearly not. So it must pick out a kind.Slide30Slide31
White Horse Paradox
Now consider this sentence:
“Michael wants white horses.”
By similar reasoning, ‘white horses’ picks out a kind.Slide32Slide33
White Horse Paradox
The kinds picked out are different kinds. This is clear enough:
“
If someone seeks horses, brown or black horses can comply. If someone seeks white horses, brown or black horses cannot comply.”Slide34
Gongsun Long’s Interpretation
=Slide35
More Semantics: QuantifiersSlide36
Quantifiers
So far we’ve considered statements like:
Michael is human.
Michael is the instructor of PHIL 2511.But what about:All dogs are animals.No dogs are humans.Slide37
Quantifier Semantics
In contemporary semantics, quantifiers like ‘all’, ‘no’, and ‘some’ express relations among kinds:
All Fs are
Gs means every member of the kind F is also a member of the kind G.Some Fs are Gs means there is an individual that is in kind F and also in kind G.No Fs are
Gs
means there are no individuals that are in kind F and also in kind G.Slide38
‘All Dogs are Animals’Slide39
Bare Plurals: Four Interpretations
[ALL]: Dogs are animals.
[GEN]: Birds fly.
[SOME]: Mosquitos carry the West Nile Virus.[KIND]: Dinosaurs are extinct.Slide40
Interpretations Determined by Predicate
[ALL]: Dogs
are animals
.ALL-interpretation from individual-level predicate.[GEN]: Birds fly.GEN-interpretation from individual-level predicate.[SOME]: Mosquitos carry the West Nile Virus.
SOME-interpretation from stage-level predicate.
[KIND]: Dinosaurs
are extinct
.
KIND-interpretation from KIND-level predicate.Slide41
White Horse Paradox
‘Are horses’ is an individual-level predicate.
So ‘white horses are horses’ receives the interpretation ‘ALL white horses are horses.’Slide42Slide43
(You can probably see how we’d handle the robber paradox too.)Slide44
Problems for Extensional Semantics: Three ParadoxesSlide45
Three Paradoxes
While the white horse paradox and the robber paradox can be resolved with the tools of modern semantics, a few other paradoxes from the school of names show the limitations of those tools.
Mountains and gorges are level. (Hui Shi)
Dogs are not hounds. (Mohists)White dogs are black. (Mohists
)Slide46
Xunzi’s World
T
he correct use of names “is necessary to clarify social ranks, distinguish similar from different things, communicate intentions, and carry out tasks.”
This assumes that there is a correct classification scheme imposed by the meanings of words.Slide47
Xunzi’s World
T
he correct use of names “is necessary to clarify social ranks, distinguish similar from different things, communicate intentions, and carry out tasks.”
This assumes that there is a correct classification scheme imposed by the meanings of words.Slide48
KindsSlide49
Mountains and gorges are level.
“By
everyday standards, mountains
and abysses or the sky and the earth are different in height, but from some sufficiently distant
standpoint or by some sufficiently vast standard, the difference between
them may
be insignificant, such that they count as level or beside each other
.”Slide50
‘Big’, ‘Small’, etc.Slide51
Relativization
The standard method of solving this sort of problem is
relativization
to a context.Remember temporal relativism: Nobody just sits or stands, you sit-at-a-time and you stand-at-a-time. So we say nothing is ever just big or small. Things are big-in-one-context and small-in-another.Slide52
“
One common interpretation of Hui Shi’s theses is
that… [they] attempt
to show that the similarities and differences by which we distinguish things can be identified in indefinitely many ways, depending on one’s standpoint. Apart from the standpoints we take up, there are noindependent, preexisting standards by which to identify a scheme of privileged, correct distinctions
. The world in itself fixes no particular way of drawing distinctions
as correct.”Slide53
Response 1: Natural Kinds
This idea certainly has Western parallels.
Some philosophers have said there
are natural ways of dividing up the world: “natural kinds,” or “joints of nature.” Slide54
Response 2: (Scientific) Anti-Realism
On the other hand, some philosophers have said there are no such privileged carvings, and thus things like the objects of scientific inquiry (like electrons or dark matter) only exist from our conceptual scheme: there’s no sense in which someone with a different scheme is missing important truths.Slide55
Dogs are not hounds.
“In
the
Mohist Canons, ‘dog’ and ‘hound’
(or
‘pup’
and
‘dog’)
are stock examples
of coextensive terms, of which a speaker might know one without knowing the other. A speaker unaware that the two terms are coextensive could know about dogs and yet say without error that he didn’t know about hounds (Canon B40).”Slide56
Frege’s Puzzle
This paradox shows a shortcoming in our extensional semantics.
The kind dog = the kind hound, but it seems that ‘dog’ and ‘hound’ have different meanings (cognitive significance). Slide57
Frege’s Puzzle
Frege, for example, introduced a two-tiered semantics.
Words referred to individuals and kinds, but they also had senses, and the sense of ‘dog’ and ‘hound’ were distinct.Slide58
White dogs are black.
“[I]n
determining the application of a compound
name such as “black person,” one must fix what part of a person is the criterion for
deeming the
person “black.” Presumably it is the person’s skin color, not hair color, for
example. If
one chooses an unorthodox criterion for deeming a dog black, such as the dog’s
nose, dogs
with white fur might be deemed ‘black.’”Slide59
Charles Travis, “Pragmatics”
“Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is
colour
of leaves, she paints them. Returning, she reports, ‘That’s better. The leaves are green now.’ She speaks truth.A botanist friend then phones, seeking green leaves for the study of green-leaf chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia speaks falsehood.”Slide60
The Point
For Travis, we’re talking about the same leaves (individuals) and putting them in the same kind (green), but the truth-values are different.
For Frege, extensional semantics didn’t capture the whole meaning, but it did at least capture the truth-value. Travis (and the
Mohists?
) challenge this.Slide61
The Point
For Travis, we’re talking about the same leaves (individuals) and putting them in the same kind (green), but the truth-values are different.
For Frege, extensional semantics didn’t capture the whole meaning, but it did at least capture the truth-value. Travis (and the
Mohists?) challenge this.Slide62
ConclusionSlide63
Conclusion
The members of the School of Names– like
Kongzi
and Xunzi– were interested in how we use words to “carve up” the world and make distinctions.Unlike those other schools, however, the School of Names was interested in challenging ordinary or naïve assumptions that we make about the use of words.I think contemporary semantic technology can help us see both where the dialecticians went wrong and how they got it right.