Introduction the fabrication of persons and thingsBook sectionPublished Version Original citation riginally published in Pottage RAMundy M edsLaw anthropology and the constitution of the ID: 400737
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Alain Pottage Introduction: the fabrication of persons and thingsBook section(Published Version) Original citation: riginally published in Pottage, R.A,Mundy, M. (eds.)Law, anthropology, and the constitution of the social: making persons and thingsCambridge, UKCambridge University Press2004, pp. 139. ISBN 0521539455Cambridge University Press This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/7797/ Availablein LSE Research Onlinearch 2012LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output ofthe School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by theindividual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or printone copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or forcommercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. 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Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social Making Persons and Things Edited by Alain Pottage, Martha Mundy Book DOI: Online ISBN: 9780511493751 Hardback ISBN: 9780521831789 Paperback ISBN: 9780521539456 Chapter 1 - Introduction: the fabrication of persons and things pp. 1-39 Chapter DOI: Cambridge University Press CHAPTERONEINTRODUCTION:THEFABRICATIONOFPERSONSANDTHINGSAlainPottageEachofthecontributionstothisbookaddressesthequestionofhowlegaltechniquesfabricatepersonsandthings.Inexploringthatques-tion,andinaskingjustwhatfabricationmeans,eachchapterfocusesonaspeci“chistorical,social,orethnographiccontext.Giventhatthesecontexts,andthemodesofinstitutionalorritualactionwhichtheydisclose,arequitevaried,thisbookdoesnotaimtoprovideageneraltheoreticalaccountofthefabricationofpersonsandthingsinlaw.Indeed,thetermfabricationischosenpreciselybecauseitsuggestsmodesofactionwhicharelodgedinrich,culturally-speci“c,layersoftexts,practices,instruments,technicaldevices,aestheticforms,stylisedgestures,semanticartefacts,andbodilydispositions.Eachcontributionshowshow,inagivensocial,historical,orethnographiccontext,ele-mentsofthisrepertoirearemobilisedbylegaltechniquesofpersoni“-cationandrei“cation.Thespeci“ccharacterofthesemodesofactionwouldbelostinageneraltheoryoflawasanagentofsocialconstruc-tion.Yet,diverseastheymaybe,ourapproachestothequestionoflegalfabricationarebroughttogetherasresourcesforre”ectionuponaspeci“cinstitutionalpredicament.InWesternlegalsystems,personsandthingsarenowproblemsratherthanpresuppositions.Onecouldpointtotechnology,andbiotechnologyinparticular,asthemainfac-torhere,butthereareotherreasonsfortheimplosionoftheoldlegaldivisionbetweenpersonsandthings.Forexample,thoseinstitutionswhicheffectivelynaturalisedlegalartefacts(notably,theinstitutionofinheritance)havelosttheircentralroleinlawandsociety.Forthepurposesofanintroduction,theimportantpointisthatthecomplex Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEtechniqueswhichlegalinstitutionstraditionallyusedtofabricateper-sonsandthingsnolongerfunctionsilentlyandreliably.Thelegalboundarybetweenpersonsandthings,ratherlikethatbetweennatureandculture,isnolongerself-evident.Inmanyareas,legalformshavebeencolonisedbyethical(orsimilarlyregulatory)modesofdecision-making,whichimplicitlyacknowledgetheimpossibilityofbeginningwithinanaturalorderofthings.Collectively,thecontributionstothisvolumegivehistoricalandcomparativedepthtore”ectiononthisThequestionofhowlegalinstitutionsconstructthecategoryofthepersonhasbeenaskedoftenbefore.Forexample,agreatdealofattentionhasbeengiventothestatuseswhichWesternlegalsystemsattributed(ordenied)tomarriedwomen.Manyofthesestudiesimag-inelegalpersonalityastheinstitutionalclothingofareal(natural,biological,orsocial)person;and,howevercriticaltheymightbeinotherrespects,thedistinctionbetweenpersonsandthingscontinuestofunctionasanuntheorisedpremise,muchasitdoesinorthodoxlegaldoctrineandtheory.Insomecases,whatisinquestionisonlytheproperattributionofphenomenatoeithersideofanostensiblynaturaldivisionbetweenpersonsandthings.Elsewhere,animmanentcritiqueoflegalconstructsisunderpinnedbytheuntheorisedassump-tionthatlegalrulestonaturalorsocialfacts.Ofcourse,therearestudiesofthelegalstatusofwomenwhichdevelopsophisti-catedanalysesoflegalcategoriesasideologicalconstructs.Butevenwherethelegalpersonisanalysedintheseterms,thedivisionbetweenpersonsandthingsremainsasilentpremise;itresurfacesasamethod-ologicalcommitmenttoadistinctionbetweenconstructionandreality;or,inMarxistterms,betweenscienceandideology.Thecontributionstothisbookapproachthequestionoffabricationwithoutassumingadivisionbetweenpersonsandthings,eitherasabasictruthaboutthenatureofphenomenatheyobserve,orasamethodologicalpostulateAsinM.DaviesandN.Naf“ne,ArePersonsProperty?(Dartmouth,Ashgate,2001).See,e.g.,atp.99:possessiveindividualisminlaw,thoughstillrobustincontempo-rarylegalthinking,failstosupplyasensible,credibleunderstandingofourembodiedselves;and,onthesamepage,possessiveindividualismissaidtodealpoorlywiththefactsoffemaleembodiment.SeenotablyMaryPoovey,UnevenDevelopments:TheIdeologicalWorkofGenderinMid-VictorianEngland(Virago,London,1989).See,e.g.,theobservationsonsocialconstructivismthataremadeinBrunoLatour,Chapter3. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 whichstructuresobservationitself.ThedistinctionbetweenpersonsandthingsmaybeakeystoneofthesemanticarchitectureofWesternlaw,butouraccountsoffabricationdistinguishbetweenthesemanticandpragmaticdimensionsoflaw.Fromthatperspective,thedistinc-tionbecomesacontingentform,whichissustainedbymodesofsocialactionwhichareproductivelymisunderstoodbylegalsemantics.Thedistinctionbetweenpersonsisinterestingnotbecausethereissomecriticaldiscrepancybetweenthelegalconstructionoftheper-sonandthenaturalrealityofhumanindividuality,butbecauseitisbecomingclearthattheactofdistinguishingbetweenthesetwoordersisitselfradicallycontingent.Inotherwords,thequestionnowisnothowto“tentitiesintotherightcategory,buttoexploretheemergenceanddeploymentofthecategoryitself.ItisbecomingincreasinglyclearthatinWesternlegalsystems,aselsewhere,theorderofthingsisdeter-minedbydecision,adistinction,thatitselfisnotordered.So,whereascritiquesoflawhavesofartreatedthecategoryofperson/thingasanembeddedfeatureoftheworld(eitherinthesensethatitmirrorstheontologicalstructureoftheworld,orinthesensethatitde“nesthetermsinwhichweapprehendtheworld),theapproachtakeninthisvolumetreatsitasapurelysemantic,aesthetic,orritualform,whichisproducedbyparticularperspectivesortechniques.Thedistinctionisnotitselforderedbecauseitisreferabletotheseemergentwaysofsee-inganddoingratherthantotheontologicalarchitectureoftheworld.Notallofthecontributorstothisvolumesharethevocabularyofdivi-sionsanddistinctions(whichisdrawnfromsystemstheory)orthetheoreticalapproachwhichitexpresses,butallareconcernedtoappre-hendlegalandsocialactionwithoutpresupposingacategoricaldivi-sionbetweenpersonsandthings.Moreimportantly,perhaps,allofthecontributionsdropthetheoreticalprejudicebuiltintotheoldcate-gory,which,atleastinthecaseoflaw,tookthepersonastheprivi-legedterm.Whereastraditionalaccountsoflawwereconcernedonlywiththequestionofhowpersonswereconstructed(thingsbeingtheimplicitantithesisofpersons)ourinquiryissymmetrical,beingasmuchconcernedwiththefabricationofthingsasofpersons.Forthisideaofproductivemisunderstanding,see,e.g.,GuntherTeubner,Contract-ingWorlds:TheManyAutonomiesofPrivateLaw(2000)9(3)SocialandLegalWilliamRasch,IntroductiontoNiklasLuhmann,TheoriesofDistinction:RedescribingtheDescriptionsofModernity(StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,2002),p.24. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEThedistinctionbetweenpersonsandthingshasalwaysbeencentraltolegalinstitutionsandprocedures.TheinstitutionsofRomanlaw,totheextentthatRomecanbetakenastheoriginoftheWesternlegaltradition,attachedpersons()tothings()bymeansofasetoflegalformsandtransactions()whichprescribedalloftheirpermissiblecombinations.Inthecommonlawtradition,thissortofdivisionisnotaspreciselydrawnasitisinEuropeancodi“edsystems,butthecontinuingimportanceofHohfeldinAnglo-Americanlegaltheorytesti“estothefactthatthecommonlawalsoassumesthisfun-damentaldivision.Itmayevenbethat,havingbeenconstructedandre“nedinRomanlegalinstitutions,thebasicdivisionwastakenupinotherbranchesofsocialtheory.ThereisaverypowerfulargumentthattheinstitutionalarchitectureofRomanlawstillstructuresourappre-hensionofsociety,andthatsociologyandpoliticaltheoryaremorepro-foundlyjuridicalthantheyimaginethemselvestobe,preciselybecausetheypresupposeabasicdivisionbetweenpersonsandthings.ornotonesubscribestothatargument,itremindsusthatthedistinc-tionbetweenpersonsandthingsisafoundationalthemeinWesternsociety,andthatlegalinstitutionshaveplayedanessentialroleincon-stitutingandmaintainingthatdistinction.Con“denceinwhatBrunoLatourcallstheoldsettlementisnolongerasstraightforwardasitmightseem.Withtheadventofbiotechnologypatents,biomedicalinterventions,transgeniccrops,andnewenvironmentalsensitivities,thedistinctionbetweenpersonsandthingshasbecomeafocusofgen-eralsocialanxiety.Ineachofthesetechnologicalareas,personsbecomeindistinguishablefromthings:genesequencesareatoncepartofthegeneticprogrammeofthepersonandchemicaltemplatesfromwhichdrugsaremanufactured;embryosarerelatedtotheirparentsbymeansofthecommodifyingformsofcontractandproperty,andyettheyarepersons;dependingontheusestowhichtheyareput,thecellsofembryosproducedbyinvitrofertilisationmightbeseenashavingeitherSeeW.T.Murphy,TheOldestSocialScience(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1997),ch.1.TheclassictextsareW.N.Hohfeld,SomeFundamentalLegalConceptionsasAppliedinJudicialReasoning(1913)26YaleLawJournal16;SomeFundamentalConceptionsasAppliedinJudicialReasoning(1917)26YaleLawJournalThemostsophisticatedargumentisfoundinGillianRose,DialecticofNihilismBlackwell,Oxford,1984). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 thenaturaldevelopmentalpotentialofthehumanpersonorthetech-nicalpluripotentialitythatmakesthemsuchavaluableresourceforresearchintogenetherapies.Ineachofthesecases,thecategorisationofanentityasapersonorathingisdependentuponacontingentdis-tinctionratherthananembeddeddivision.Accordinglytopopularperception,legalinstitutionsaresupposedtobebasedonanaturaldivisionbetweenpersonsandthings,andyetnowtheyseemsystematicallytotransgressthatnaturalordering.Forexample,intellectualpropertylawsreinforcethegripofpharmaceu-ticalscorporationsonhumantissues,familylawtoleratesorendorsesthecommodi“cationofgametesandembryos,andbio-ethicallegisla-tionallowsvariouskindsoftherapeuticresearchon(human)embryos.Attentionis(again)directedtothequestionofhowtodistinguishper-sonsfromthings,anditisoftenarguedthatnewdevelopmentsimplyafundamentaldeparturefromtheoriginallegalconstitutionofthetwocategories.Inthesecircumstancesitseemsespeciallyappropriateto(re-)considerthemakingofpersonsandthingsinlegalsettings.WhateveronemakesoftheideathatwestillhavetoreckonwiththelegacyofRomanlaw,contemporarycritiquesoftechnologyimplicitlyappealtosomenotionofatraditionconservedbylaw.Itisthereforequitetimelytoexplorethefabricationofpersonsandthingsfromahistorical-anthropologicalperspective,bypayingattentiontothedif-ferentcontextsinwhichtheselegalcategorieshavebeendeployed,andbyextendingtheinquirybeyondWesterninstitutions.Thecon-tributionstothisbooksuggestthatpersonsandthingshavemultiplegenealogies,andthattheirusesaretoovariedtobereducedtoonesingleinstitutionalarchitecture.Eachformortransactionconstitutespersons/thingsinitsownway.Thishassomeimportantimplications.Althoughthethemeofslaverystillinformscritiquesofcontemporarytechnology(itisoftenasked,forexample,howtheownershipofgenesorembryosisdifferentfromtheownershipofslaves)therealproblemisthatwecannolongerdividetheworldintothetworegistersthatarepresupposedbyanyargumentagainstslavery.Now,theproblemisthathumansarething,orsimultaneouslypersonsothatlawquiteliterallythedifference.ThisbookdevelopsaThisistheperspectiveadoptedbythelegalanthropologyofPierreLegendre,whichispresentedinhisDelasociecommetexte(Fayard,Paris,2002).Thereisaresonancebetweenemergentsocialanxietiesandtherecentquestioningofthedistinctionbetweenpersonsandthingsinsciencestudies(e.g.,BrunoLatour,Politiquesdelanature(LaDecouverte,Paris,1999),esp.chs.1and2). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEnumberofperspectivesonthekindofin-betweenactionwhichpro-duceslegalform,andespeciallypersonsandthings:networkactionandcirculatingreference,institutional“ctions,indexesofattachment,themanipulationofsemanticpotential,andsoon.Andthisispreciselywhereethnographicobservationcomplementslegal-theoreticalanaly-sis.AlthoughnotalloftheessaysareaboutWesternlaw,andalthoughoneortwohavelittletosayaboutlegalinstitutionsassuch,eachoffersaresourceforre-thinkingthecompositionofpersonsandthings,themodesinwhichtheyaredistinguishedand(re-)combinedbylegalinsti-Oneparticularsub-institution…ownership…iscentraltothetreat-mentofpersoni“cationandrei“cation.Tosomeextentthismaybeinevitable,becauseownershipissooftentakentobethekeystoneoflegalandsocialinstitutions.Certainly,ownershipisthecontextinwhichlegaldoctrineandlegaltheoryhaveworkedoutthecapacitiesorcompetencesofpersonsinrelationtothings,andownershipisthethematicchannelthroughwhichthesedoctrinalglosseshavemadetheirwayintogeneralcirculationinsociety.Ownershipisthesettinginwhichthelegalconstitutionofpersonsandthingshasbecomemostvulnerabletosocialandtechnologicaldevelopments.Throughtheuseofbiomedicaltechnologies,humanbeingshaveacquiredpotentialitieswhichareactualisedinanewsetofclaimsandattachments.Law,andpropertylawinparticular,isaskedtoconstrueclaimsforwhichnopriortransactionalidiom[exists].Thisisnotjustavariationontheoldargumentthatlawlagsbehindsociety(inanycase,weshouldnowcon-ceiveoflawsocietyratherthanlawWesternlaw(or,moreprecisely,adjudication)hasalwaystakenshapebetweenconven-tionandinvention;theparadoxarisesfromthemannerinwhichlegalproceduresinventthetraditionwhichtheypurportonlytocontinue.Thetroublewithbiomedicineandbiotechnologyisthattheyexposetheparadoxforwhatitis,andanumberofourcontributorsidentifyreasonswhyWesternlawis“ndingitincreasinglydif“culttomanagecontingencyinthetraditionalways.ThetensionbetweentraditionMarilynStrathern,PotentialProperty:IntellectualRightsandPropertyinPersons(1996)4SocialAnthropology1,17…32,atp.18.SeegenerallyNiklasLuhmann,DasRechtderGesellschaft(Suhrkamp,Frankfurt,ThereisawonderfulillustrationofthisinF.W.Maitland,WhytheHistoryofEnglishlawisNotWritteninH.A.L.Fisher(ed.),TheCollectedPapersofFredericWilliam(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1911). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 andmodernity,asitaffectsthecentralcontextsoflegalpersoni“cationandrei“cation(kinship,ownership,production),isanimportantthemeincontemporaryanthropology.And,eventhoughitisnotexplicitlyaddressedbyallofourcontributors,itisanessentialthemeinthecol-lectionasawhole;forexample,YanThomasanalysisoftheRomanlawrelatingtodeadbodiesiswrittenagainstthebackdropofdevelop-mentsincontemporarylawrelatingtothelegalstatusofthebodyanditstissues.Thisisjustonesenseinwhichourre”ectiononpersoni“cationandrei“cationinlawbringstogetherlawanthropology.Thequestionsraisedbybiotechnologyandbiomedicinearecompoundedbytheeffectsofglobalisation.Tobeginwith,theextensionofcorporateandinsti-tutionalnetworksre-contextualisesculturalforms;thepointisnotthattheworldisbecomingprogressivelymoreuniform,butthatglobalisa-tionbringswithitnewsensitivitiestothedistinctionbetweenlocalandglobal.Thisisananthropologicalquestion:whetheronelivesinPapuaNewGuineaorinBritain,culturalcategoriesarebeingdis-solvedandre-formedatatempothatcallsforre”ection,andthat,Iwouldadd,callsforthekindoflateralre”ectionaffordedbyethno-graphicinsight.Butthesesensitivitieshaveimportantimplicationsforthe(self-)conceptualisationoflaw.Theexpansionoflegaldiscoursesbeyondtheirnationallimitselicitsnewconceptionsoftheagencyorfabricationoflaw.Howshouldlawbeidenti“ediftheoldemblemsofstatepowerarenolongeravailable?OneresponseisgiveninGuntherTeubnersinterpretationofgloballawintermsofautopoietictheory,whichdevelopstheoldanthropologicalthemeoflegalpluralismintothemodelofalegaldiscoursethatsustainsitselfwithoutreferencetoalocal,national,authority.Legalactionisre-de“ned.Inplaceofhier-archy,sovereignty,anddomination,lawisconstruedasadiscoursethatconsistsonlyinactualisation(itsuseincommunication)ratherthanThecomplexitiesofthismediatingandcannotbediscussedextensivelyhere.See,AnneliseRiles,RepresentingIn-Between:Law,Anthropology,andtheRhetoricofInterdisciplinarity(1994)3UniversityofIllinoisLawReviewArecentissueoftheFrenchlegaljournalArchivesdelaPhilosophieduDroitwasenti-tledLamericanisationdudroit.SeeMarilynStrathern,Property,SubstanceandEffect(Athlone,London,1999),p.24.OnthisthemeseegenerallyA.Riles,TheNetworkInsideOut(MichiganUniversityPress,AnnArbor,1999).G.Teubner(ed.),GlobalLawWithoutaState(Dartmouth,Aldershot,1997). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEinsubstance(acorpusoftextsoraninstitutionofdomination).Again,theimplicationsofglobalisationaremoreexplicitlyaddressedincer-taincontributions,notablythosebyMurphy,Strathern,andKuchler,butthenewcontextsoflegal-culturalidiomsde“neanotherofthemajorthematichorizonsofthecollectionasawhole.Globalisationjoinsbiotechnologyinelicitingnewconceptionsofthefunctioningoflegalinstitutions.Moreabstractly,theseessaysonpersoni“cationandrei“cationaresituatedataparticularjunctureinsocialtheory.ToborrowNiklasLuhmannscharacterisation,onemightsaythatcontemporarytheo-riesofsocietyarefacedwiththedif“cultyofchangingtheirtheoreticalinstrumentationfromaschemaofdivisiontoaschemaofdistinc-Classically…fromAristotletoHegel,thatis…theoriesdividedtheworldintofoundationaloppositions,whichwereinscribedintheverytextureoftheworldorinthecategoriesthroughwhichtheworldwas(necessarily)experienced;asin,forexample,thebasiccategoriesofspace(near/far),time(past/future),oraction(intention/effect).Tak-ingtheexampleoftime,theclassicalschemetakesthedivisionbetweenpastandfuturetobeembeddedinthecategoriesofexperienceinsuchawaythatthepresentmomentfromwhichtheworldisobservedislodgedinasuccessionofmodalpresents:pastpresent,actualpresent,andfuturepresent.Thepredicamentinvolvedintransformingdivision-basedschemesintodistinction-basedformsarisesfromtherecogni-tionthatthislinearschemehasbecomedis-embedded,sothatthepresentbecomesreferabletoaparticularobserverratherthanaposi-tionembeddedinalinearsuccession.Inotherwords,theformofthedistinctioniscontingentontheobserverwhodrawsit:inthecaseofdistinction,everythingdependsonhowtheboundarythatdividestwosides(thatis,thedistinction)isdrawn.Inthecaseoftime,thisisexempli“edbytheemergenceofthepredicamentofrisk,whicharisesNiklasLuhmann,ObservationsonModernity(StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,1998),esp.ch.4.Luhmannmaybemorefamiliarinlegaltheorythaninanthropo-logicaltheory,butsee(e.g.)SariWastell,PresumingScale,MakingDiversity(2001)CritiqueofAnthropologyForafullerdiscussion,seeLuhmann,ObservationsonModernitySeealsoJacquesDerrida,SpectersofMarx(Routledge,London,1994).ObservationsonModernity,atp.87.Thisisnotjustanotherformofrelativism,ifonlybecausethedistinctionbetweenrelativismandobjectivitylosesitspertinencewhentheorybeginsfromthepremiseofself-referenceratherthancor- Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 whenactorsbecomeawarethatdecisionsmadeinpresentwillhaveconsequenceswhichwillbecomeapparentonlyinthethatwillbegeneratedbythedecisionitself.InLuhmannsterms,timeandspaceareonlymediaforpossibledistinctions,mediaforpossibleobservations,butareasunobservableasistheworldasaworld.characteroftimeasadis-embeddedmediumisillustratedmoreexpres-sivelyinMarilynStrathernsre-interpretationofthefamiliarlegal-historicaldivisionbetweenstatus(tradition)andcontract(modernity).Whereasthetradition(sic)presentsthisdivisionintermsoflinearhis-toricalevolution,Strathernsuggeststhatweareatbothendsofthecontinuumatthesametime,sothatwemightbesaidtohavetraditionandmodernityatthesametime.Aformwhichwasconstitutedasthehistoricityoftheworldbecomesthemediumforgen-eratingamultiplicityoftemporalschemata.Andthesemodesoftem-poralisationbringwiththemmodesofpersoni“cationandrei“cation.Whereaspersonsandthingsweretheprincipalexemplarsoranchorsofdivisionismorasymmetry,theincreasingrecognitionthateachhumanbodyorindividualispotentiallyeitherpersonthingbringswithitanawarenessthattechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationareconstitutiveratherthandeclaratoryoftheontologyuponwhichtheyarebased.Thispointstoanotherthematichorizonofthecollection:theques-tionofpotentiality/actuality.Thepropositionthatlegalandsocialcon-ventionsconstitutetheontologicalformswhichtheyclaimonlytorecogniseisclearlyinconsistentwithdoctrinalandlegal-philosophicalunderstandingsofsocialaction.Thishasparticularimplicationsfortheconstrualofownershipclaims.Theeconomicunderstandingofprop-ertyisbasedonthenotionofmaterialscarcity;transactionsinpropertyareeitherconcernedwithextracting,processing,dividing,ortrans-ferringthe“nitesubstanceoftheworld.Inthecaseofintellectualproperty,thisunderstandingimpliesthatthespontaneityofmentalcreativityhastobematerialisedbeforeitcanconstituteproperty;ObservationsonModernity,atp.87.Unobservablebecause,asschemeswhichinformobservation,theycannotbepresenttotheobserverinthemomentofMarilynStrathern,EnablingIdentity?Biology,ChoiceandtheNewReproductiveTechnologiesinStuartHallandPaulduGay(eds.),QuestionsofCulturalIdentity(Sage,London,1996).Thelawtakesanintangiblethingandbuildsarounditapropertystructuremodelledonthestructurewhichsocialandlegalsystemshavealwaysappliedtosometangible Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEsubjectivityisonlylegibleinmaterialembodimentsorsupports.Intermsofthequestionofpotentiality/actuality,thisimpliesthatown-ershipconventionsarecoupledtoaparticularconceptionofasthemeansbywhichpotentialitiesaremadeactual.Thiscon-ceptionofproductionattributesallcreativeororiginatingactiontooneorotherpoleofthedivisionbetweenpersonsandthings.How-ever,claimstobiotechnologypatents(totakeoneexample)confrontlegalconventionswithakindoforiginatingactivitywhichdoesnotbelongtothatcausalscheme.AsIobserveinmycontribution,exper-imentsinmolecularbiologysuggestthatlivingorganismsemergefromprocessesofself-production(autopoiesisorepigenesis).Farfromcon-formingtothejuridicalparadigmofproduction,whichwouldrequirethepotentialityoforganismstobelodgedinageneticorevolutionaryprogramme,thesemodesofself-productionsuggestthatorganismsareformedinandbythemetabolicprocesseswhichsustaintheirpro-cessesofontogenesis.Organicproductionresonateswiththosemodelsofsocialactionwhichhaveattemptedtoexplaintheparadoxofemer-gence(namely,theparadoxofself-production).MycontributionandthatofSusanneKuchlersketchoutsomeofthewaysinwhichnewconceptualisationsofbiologicalprocesssuggestnewwaysofconceiv-ingattachment,production,creation,andactualisation.Manyoftheessaysdescribelegaltechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationwhich,preciselybecausetheydoexpressamorefundamentaldivisionoftheworldintothetworegistersofpersonsandthings,suggestthatlawmakespersonsandthingsbyactualisingundifferentiatedpotentialities.Andifnothinginthismediumhasanessential,ontological,vocationtobepersonorthing,thisinturnsuggeststhattheactualisationofpoten-tialitiesisaradicallycreativeoperation.Theessaysinthebookdescribethiskindofcreativityfromdiffer-entperspectivesandwithreferencetodifferentcontextsorquestions.The“rstsectionofthebookexploresthethemeofinstitutionalpro-duction.Thequestionofinstitutionalcreativityistrackedthroughthethings.Byinstitutingtrespassoryruleswhosecontentrestrictsusesof[an]ideationalentity,intellectualpropertylawpreservestoanindividualorgroupofindividualsanopen-endedsetofuse-privilegesandpowersofcontrolandtransmissioncharac-teristicofownershipinterestsovertangibleitems:J.W.Harris,PropertyandJustice(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1996),p.44.Insocialtheorytheobviousexample(again)istheworkofNiklasLuhmann,butthequestionincreasinglyarisesinthe“eldsofaccounting,management,operationalsystems,biology,andsoon. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 historicalanthropologyofRomanlaw(Thomas),throughanethnogra-phyofFrancesConseildEtat(Latour),toanexaminationoftheroleofmass-productioninlaw(Murphy).Thesecondsectionconsidershowlegaltechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationactualisethepoten-tialitiescontainedin,respectively,semanticformsandthehumanbody.MundyandAkarlšanalysetheconstructionofpersonsandthingsinOttoman-Islamiclegalsettings,whileStrathern,Kuchler,andIdevelopthethemeofbodilypotentialasaresourceforthefabricationofpersonsandthings.PERSONSANDTHINGSASINSTITUTIONALARTEFACTSIfthemakingofpersonsandthingsisapproachedbywayofare”ectiononinstitutionalcreativity,twogeneralissuespresentthemselves.First,thetechniquesbymeansofwhichthelawmanufacturesanddeploysthecategoriesofpersonandthingcanbeseenasde“ningthepeculiarnatureof(legal-)institutionalaction.FollowingtheexampleofRomanlaw,onemightsaythattheidentityoflegalinstitutionsconsistsinthewaytheybuildconventionsandtransactionsroundthecardinalpointsofpersonandthing.Butthismodeofinstitutionalactionalsoidenti-“eslawinthesenseofdistinguishingitfromothersocialdiscoursesorinstitutions.Inthatsense,andatleastinthe“rstinstance,thereisnowarrantforextendingtheactionofthepersonsandthingsinventedbylawbeyondthehorizonoftheinstitution.Minimally,andmostimpor-tantly,thismeansthatthelegalpersonhasnonecessarycorrespondencetosocial,psychological,orbiologicalindividuality.Inanagewhichstillidenti“espersonalful“lmentoremancipationwiththeacquisitionanddefenceoflegalrights,thismightseemalmostperverse.Thecon-structionofthelegalpersonaoftheauthorillustrateshowlegalper-sonalityistakenasanattributeofrealindividuals,andhowinturnlegaldoctrinereinforcesthoseexpectations.Forexample,byconsti-tutingtheauthorasanownerofideas,intellectualpropertylawsta-bilisedandnaturalisedtheromanticconceptionofthespontaneouslycreativeindividual,andthisrelationbetweenlegalpersonalityandTheprincipalinstitutionalembodimentoftheauthor-workrelationiscopyright,whichnotonlymakespossiblethepro“tablepublishingofbooks,butalso,byendow-ingitwithlegalreality,producesandaf“rmstheveryidentityoftheauthorasauthor...Whatwehereobserveisatwinbirth,thesimultaneousemergencein Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEnaturalindividualitystillseemsself-evident.Oneoftheadvantagesofanthropologicaldistantiationisthatitproblematisesassumptionsofthissort.Forexample,theanthropologyofRomanlawrevealsamodeofinstitutionalaction…or,moreprecisely,atechniqueofpersoni“ca-tionandrei“cation…whichsuggeststhatwhataretakenasoverarchingcategories(thesex,gender,kinship,capacity,orcreativityofper-sons,andthequiddityofthings)arespecialisedartefactswhicharenotpredicatedonsomegeneralsocialontology.InstitutionalfictionsYanThomasessayonthecategoryofthepureinRomanlawproposesthemostrestrictivespeci“cationoflegalinstitutions.Thiscontribu-tionshouldbesetinthecontextofThomashistoricalanthropologyofRomanlaw,whichhasbeendevelopedthroughanumberofnowcel-ebratedstudiesininstitutionaltechnique.Reductively,onemightsaythecentralorfundamentalquestionisthatofinstitutionalreference:howdolegalcategoriesrelatetotheworldoutsidetheinstitution?ForThomas,thecharacteroflegalinstitutionsisexpressedbytheRomanlawtechniqueof“ctions.Accordingtothemoderndoctrinalunder-standingofproofandprocedure,“ctionsandpresumptionsaredeviceswhichassistinmakingdecisionsinconditionsofuncertainty.Typi-cally,presumptionsarepresentedascrude,pragmatic,instrumentsofprobabilisticreasoning:asencryptedexperience.Forexample,theoldthediscourseofthelawoftheproprietaryauthorandtheliterarywork.Thetwoconceptsareboundtoeachother.Toassertoneistoimplytheother,andtogether,likethetwinsunsofabinarystarlockedintoorbitabouteachother,theyde“nethecentreofthemodernliterarysystem:MarkRose,TheAuthorasProprietor:Don-aldsonv.BecketandtheGenealogyofModernAuthorshipinBradShermanandAlainStrowel(eds.),OfAuthorsandOrigins(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1994),p.23,atpp.28and39.DavidSaunderssummarisesthispointofviewasfollows:Acertainhabitofmindremainsattachedtothenotionofanessentialperson,onewhichintermsofthehistoryofauthorshipwouldtypicallybemoraloraesthetic,thelocusofasubjectiv-itydeeperandmoregeneralthanmereinstitutionalconstructssuchasthejuridicalpersonsofcopyrightholderorobscenelibeller.Unlikethem,soitmightseem,thissubjectivitywouldnotdependonattributesformedinatechnicalapparatusrest-ingonexecutedstatutesandjudicialdeterminations...Surelytherehastobeafundamentalpersonality,thepersonitself,thatconstitutesthenecessarygroundoflegalpersonalities,theanchorageonwhichtheyultimatelydepend:Authorshipand(Routledge,London,1992),p.12.YanThomas,Fictiolegis:Lempiredela“ctionromaineetseslimitesm(1995)21 Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 repertoireofpresumptionsusedinfamilylawtodeterminepaternity…anexamplewhichisespeciallyappositebecausechangesintheuseoftheoldpresumptionshaverenewedanthropologicalinterestsinlegaldeterminationsofkinship…canbeseenasattemptstosecond-guessbiology.Theprobabilisticqualityofpresumptionsbecomessomewhatmoretenuousinthecaseofsomethingliketheanditdisappearsaltogetherwhere(irrebuttable)presumptionsareusedtoimposenormativeobjectives.Moreover,onemightsaythat,pre-ciselybecause“ctionsandpresumptionsareusedintheabsenceofanydeterminatefactsfromwhichtodrawevidentialinferences,theyarenotreallyevidenceorargument.Buttheimportantpointisthatwhethertheyareseenasprobabilisticdevicesorasnormativetrumps,theirroleisunderstoodintermsoftheidealofaproperrelationofcorre-spondencebetweennormandnature.Fictionsandpresumptionsworkthedivisionbetweenlawandfact,orbetweenlegalpropositionsandthethingstowhichtheyrefer.Againstthisbackground,Thomasfocusesonthetechniqueoflegal“ctionsinRomanlaw,andproposestwocorrectivestothemodernunderstanding.First,thereisacategoricaldistinctionbetween“ctionandpresumptions:presumptions(evenirrebuttablepresumptions)areusedwherethereisuncertaintyastothetruefacts;“ctionsareusedwherethereiscertaintyastotheofthepropositionassertedbythe“ction.Theeclipseofthisclassicaldistinctionbetween“c-tionsandpresumptionshasobscuredourviewoflawsoriginalinsti-tutionaltechnique.Preciselybecausetheytookshapeagainstaback-groundnegationofreality,“ctionsinRomanlawimpliedsomethingverydifferentfromthemodernideaofacorrespondencebetweennormandnature.Rather,theconstructionofRomanlawwasbasedonaradicalnon-relationbetweentheinstitutionandtheworldofnaturalSee,e.g.,JanetL.Dolgin,De“ningtheFamily:Law,Technology,andReproductioninanUneasyAge(NewYorkUniversityPress,NewYork,1997).Wheretwoheirsdietogetherincircumstancesinwhichitisimpossibletoestablishwhichofthetwopredeceasedtheother,thedescentofpropertyfollowsthenaturalprinciplethattheelderofthetwodied“rst.Oneexampleisthetraditionalpresumptionofcriminallawthatboysundertheageof14areincapableofrape.Theupshotisthatpresumptionsarenotamodeofevidentialreasoning:Presump-tionsarenotinthemselveseitherargumentorevidence,althoughforthetimebeingtheyaccomplishtheresultofboth:JamesBradleyThayer,APreliminaryTreatiseonEvidenceattheCommonLaw(Boston,1898),p.336. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEfacts[laradicaledeliaisondelinstitutionnalitedaveclemondedeschosesdelanatureTheinstitutionhadeffectsintheworld,butthesewereachievedbyanongoingnegationofreality.Theoperationof“ctionsinRomanlawcanbeillustratedbyreferencetothetechniqueofnega-tive“ctions;thesewere“ctionswhichdeclaredthatreal,actual,eventshadnotoccurred(asdistinctfrompositive“ctions,whichdeclaredsomethingtoexistwhichhadnoexistenceinfact).Forexample,thelexCorneliaof81BCheldthat,despitethegeneralrulethatRomancitizenslosttheirtestamentarycapacitywhentheyweretakencaptivebyanenemy,citizenswhodiedascaptiveswereneverthelessdeemed,byoperationof“ction,nothavebeencapturedatall,tohavediedasfreemen,andthereforetohaveretainedtheircapacitytomakeavalidWhatisessentialisthatthelawdidnotjust“ctionalisethefactssoastodenythetruthofcapture,butthatthe“ctionalsoeffectedakindofinstitutionaldoublenegation.Theroleofthe“ctionwastocoun-termandthepriorruleastotestamentarycapacity,sothatthe“ctionnegatedapre-existinglawbywayofadeclarationastothefacts.Inasenseonemightsaythatthe“ctionarticulatedarelationoftheinstitu-tiontoitself:the“ctionequiparatestheinstitutionitselftoanexter-nalrealitywhich,ostensibly,itnegates.Fictionsthereforeperformedakindofinstitutionalinvolutioninwhichdifferencesordistinctionswereinternaltotheinstitutionitself:Thedifferencebetweenlawandfactisnotadifferenceoffactbutoneoflaw,andthisiswhatde“nestheessenceoftheinstitution,andwhatmakes“ctionssorevelatoryofthearti“cialityoftheinstitution.Theaxisrelaystheinstitutiontoitselfratherthantotherealworld.So,althoughitmighthavebeeneasiersimplytovalidatethewillsofcitizenswhodiedincaptivity,withoutemployinganykindof“ction,Romanlaw“ctions.Witheachsuccessiveinvolution,thelawbecameincreasinglyisolatedbytheseevermorecomplexconstructions,alwayswideningthegapbetweenitselfandreality[lerBymeansoftheseconcatenatednegations,“ctionspreservedthenotionofexter-nalreference,butonlyasaresourceforanevermoreinvolutedprocessofinstitutionalself-reference.Thomas,Fictiolegis,atp.20.Ibid.atpp.22…4.Equiparationbeingitselfalegaltechniqueof“ctionalisation.Thomas,Fictiolegis,atp.35.Ibid.atp.34. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 Thomassapproachtolegalinstitutionshassomeaf“nitywiththestyleoflegalanthropologydevelopedbyLouisGernet.Forexample,Gernetscelebratedessayontimeandtemporalityinancient(GreekandRoman)lawdemonstrateshowtheseinstitutionalregimeswereindifferenttowhatwouldnowberegardedasrealfactsintheworld.OneoftheexamplesgivenconcernstheRomanlawactionofwhichwastheformulausedtoclaimownershipofsomeobject.Itwasthereforeoneofthekeytechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationinRomanlaw,aninstitutionaldevicewhichdelimitedtherespectivecapacitiesandcompetencesofpersonandthing.Themoderninter-pretermight“ndtheformulafortheactionofentirelyabsurd.Whenheischallengedbyhisadversarytoshowcauseortitle(Iaskyoutojustifyyourclaim[postuloannedicasquaexcausavindicaveris]),theclaimantmerelyreferstotheritualwordswithwhichheinitiatedhisaction(Iestablishedmyrightbyimposingmyclaim[iusfecisicutvin-dictamimposui]).So,whereaswewouldexpecttheclaimanttoinvokesomeprioractoreventasthewarrantofhisclaim,theclaimantgroundsthesubstanceoftheclaimwithintheconventionitself,ratherthanintheworldoffactslyingoutsidetheinstitutionaldramaoftheaction.Lawconsistedinaction[ledroitestessentiellementactionrights…and,importantly,theirrelationtothefactswhichweretheirwarrant…hadnoontologyotherthatwhichwasgrantedtothembythedramaofthetrialprocess.Thomasemphasisesthehistoricaloranthropologicalspeci“cityoftheinstitutionthebettertodemystifymodernexpectationsofwhatlawcanachieve.Althoughthereisastrongerclaim…impliedinthepropo-sitionthatlegaltechniquewasthemostdurableandthemosthistor-icallyadaptableformofintelligenceproducedbytheRomanworld…thepolemicalchargeofhisaccountisessentiallydirectedagainstanyassumptionthatthelegalformsofpersonandthingcansomehowThereisoneveryimportantquali“cationtobemadehere.Gernetsdoctoralthesisof1917(recentlyrepublishedasRecherchessurledeveloppementdelapenseejuridiqueetmoraleenGr(AlbinMichel,Paris,2001)citesDurkheimasitsprincipalin”uence.HislateressaysarecollectedinDroitetinstitutionsenGreceantiqueParis,1982)andAnthropologiedelaGreceantique(Flammarion,Paris,1982).TimMurphyobserves(Chapter4)thatDurkheimisamajorproponentoftheviewthatlawisoneofthemostimportant,orthemostinstitutionalised,wayinwhichthefea-turesofsocietyareapprehendedinthought.ThomassviewoflawssocialfunctionsisclearlynotDurkheimian.DroitetinstitutionsenGreceantique,atp.122. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEembodyorimplementgeneralsocialobjectives.Contrarytothegen-eralpoliticalexpectationthatthelegalde“nitionofpersonsorthingsmightsecuretheintegrityofenvironments,genes,orembryos,andcon-trarytothetheoreticalunderstandingoflegalinstitutionsasdiscur-sivepalimpsestsinwhichsucceedingsocialideasinscribethemselves,Thomasinsistsonthecold,technicalcharacteroflegalrationality.Inhisessayonresreligiosae,thiscriticalapproachisfocusedontheinterpretationofthecategoryof(im)purityincertainversionsoftheanthropologyofreligion.Theessayisacasestudyofaparticularformresreligiosa…thetomb.Whereasonewouldexpectthelawsrelat-ingtotombsanddeadbodiestobesaturatedwithsocialandreligiousmeaningssurroundingdeathandtheafterlife,Thomasshowshowtherelevantprescriptions,whilenotbeingentirelyindifferenttogener-alisedbeliefs,weredevelopedautonomously.Thetombanditscontentswerede“nedbyaninstitutionaltechniquethatwasconcernedwithtwointerlinkedquestions:“rst,theproblemoffabricatingapermanentinstitutionalentityfromthevariouscontingencieswhichsurroundedthepracticeofburial;and,secondly,thatofde“ningthisinstitutionalinsuchawayastosecureanddelimittheperpetualmemorialfoun-dationswhichwereattachedtotombs,andwhichbene“tedfromsig-ni“cant“scalconcessions.Crudely,onemightsaythatthelegalcon-stitutionoftombshadmoretodowithtaxavoidancethanreligiousbelief.AsThomasputsit:InRome,lawandlegalruleswerenottheexpressionof[religious]taboos.Rather,theywereinstrumentsbywhichtaboosweretransformedintoasetoftechniquesforthemanagementofinheritancefunds(YanThomas,Chapter2).The“rst,ostensiblyunremarkable,observationisthatatombwasconstitutedasaresreligiosabytheinscriptionorincorporationofabodywithinit.InRomanlaw,atombwasnotapprehendedasapurelyincor-porealsymbolorsignofthedeceasedperson;rather,theinquestionbeinganeminentlycorporealithadtobepredicatedonamate-.InRomanlawdoctrine,thiswaswhatmadethedifferencebetweentheconstitutionofaresreligiosaasdistinctfromaressanctaHowthenwasthematerialityofbodyde“ned?Manyofthedif“cultiesofreifyingbodyhavebeenaccentuatedormultipliedbytheadventofmoderntechnologies,andareexempli“edindebatesconcerningtheremovaloftissuesorgametespostmortem.InthecaseofRomanlaw,thedif“cultiesarosefromthecircumstancesofdeathorthepeculiarityofculturalpracticesrelatingtodeadbodies.Forexample,inthe(notunusual)caseofabodywhichhadbeendismemberedonthebattle Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 “eld,whichpart,orwhatproportionoftheparts,suf“cedtoconstituteabody?Again,thiswasinpartaquestionofsocialbelieforinterpre-tation(intheRomanimaginationtheheadwasthechiefelementofthebody)andinpartaquestionof“scalpolicy…ifasinglebodywereallowedtogenerateanumberof(protected)tombstherewouldclearlybeanumberofconsequences.Atwhatpointdidthelegalprotectionsassociatedwiththestatusofabodyasaresreligiosabegin?IntheRomanworld,abodymightbedetainedbycreditorsofthedeceased,andheldasaformofillegitimatelienorsecurityforrepaymentoftheallegeddebt.Couldaregimeofprotectionbasedupontheritesofburialbeextended(anticipatedly,asitwere)toprotectabodythathadnotyetbeensanc-ti“edormemorialised?Moregenerally,howwasthelawtodealwiththeorganicprocessofdecay?Atombhadtocontainthematerialcor-thatwasthebody,buttheactualsubstancewasvariable:ashes,bones,decaying”esh.Clearlytheproblemofde“ningwhatcountedasbodyhadpracticalimplications.Lawyersmighthavetodeterminewhetherbodiescouldbeexhumedandre-interred,andgraves(andthebodiestheycontained)mighthavebeenviolatedinsomeway.Butthemorefundamentalquestionwashow,doctrinally,thetowhichlegalprescriptionsreferredshouldbede“ned.Grantedthatamaterialcor-wasessentialtotheconstitutionofaresreligiosa,howshouldthismatterbede“ned?Whatisimportanthereisthatlegaltechniqueby-passedanyre”ectionontheactualconditionoftheremainsfoundintombs,andreducedtheproperlyburiedbody,whateveritsactualcon-dition,toastateofpermanence.Thebodywasinstitutedinthesensethatinstitutionaltechniqueabstracteditfromthe”uxofreal(thatis,social,biological,orhistorical)timesoastoimmobiliseit:theimpres-sionofpermanencethatwasproducedbytheRomanlawrelatingtotombs,bymeansofitsnormsofinviolability,inalienability,andimpre-scriptibility,clothedacorporealentity,therebyrenderingitimmunetothedepradationsoftime(Thomas,Chapter2).Thebodywas,onemightsay,aformofinstitutional“ction.Thiswasanessentialtechniqueofrei“cation,bywhichbodilyremainswereturnedintoinstitutionalthings.So,farfromcon“rmingthesupposedresponsivenessofRomanlegalinstitutionstosocialbeliefs,thisexampleoftombsanddeadbodiessug-geststhatlawwasoperationallyautonomous.Althoughthecategorisa-tionoftombsasresreligiosaeimpliedtheircategorisationasimpureinRomanlaw,thishadlittletodowithreligiousbeliefsortabooscentredontheimpurityofdeadbodies.Inlaw,thedistinctionbetweenpureand Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEimpurewasdeployedtodifferentiatethoseobjectswhichwereopentocommercialexchangefromthosewhichwerenot.Inotherwords,theywereinstitutionalcategorieswhichdidnomorethatfacilitateparticu-lartransactions:TheprofaneŽorthepureŽwerenotimmediateandintuitiveobservationsofreligiousconsciousness,nomorethanwerethesacredŽ,thereligiousŽortheholyŽ,whichwerestrictlyde“nedinstitutionalcategories(Thomas,Chapter2).Thequestionofthe(im)purityofthebodywaselidedbymeansofatechniquewhich,having“ctionalisedthe,thenfocusedontheconstitutedbyitsinscription:thetomb.Thisinstitutionalarrangementwascharacter-isticallyRoman;thelawprotectedthetombratherthanthebody,thecontainerratherthanitscontents:Thejurisprudencerelatingtotheviolationoftombselaboratedthebasicprinciplethatitwasthetomb,ratherthanthebodyitcontained,thatbene“tedfromreligioussta-tus.Theseillustrationsgiveaclose-texturedpictureofthefabricationofthingsinclassicalRomanlaw,andexemplifythekindofinnatethatcharacteriseditsinstitutions.ReferenceandproductionBrunoLatoursapproachtolegalreferenceisadevelopmentofhisethnographyofthescienti“claboratory,inwhichtheoldcon“gura-tionofpersonsandthings,orsubjectsandobjects,isdisplacedbytheconceptsofhybrids,translation,humans/non-humans,andassociativeTheseconceptshavenowbecomequitein”uential,soitmaybesuf“cienttopointtooneparticularillustration;namely,thecon-ceptofcirculatingreferencethatisdevelopedinLatourscasestudyofsoilcollectionintheAmazonbasin.Thisaccountofthecollec-tionandanalysisofsoilsamplesdescribesaprocessofdisplacement,inwhicheachsuccessiveinscriptionbecomesareferentforthenextSeegenerallyThomas,FictiolegisTheclassictextisBrunoLatour,WeHaveNeverBeenModern(Harvester,London,BrunoLatour,CirculatingReference:SamplingSoilintheAmazonForestindorasHope:EssaysontheRealityofScienceStudies(HarvardUniversityPress,Cam-bridge,MA,1999),p.24:Theoldsettlementstartedfromagapbetweenwordsandtheworld,andthentriedtoconstructatinyfootbridgeoverthischasmthroughariskycorrespondencebetweenwhatwereunderstoodastotallydifferentontologicaldomains…languageandnature.Iwanttoshowthatthereisneithercorrespondence,norgaps,noreventwodistinctontologicaldomains,butanentirelydifferentphe-nomenon:circulatingreference. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 signifyinginscription:thesetofsuperimposedmaps,photographs,andcoloureddiagramswhichdomesticatetheforestterrain,turningitintoarudimentarylaboratorywithcontrollableparameters;theextractionofsamplesbyreferencetothisrudimentarygrid,bymeansofadevicewhichalwaystakessamplesofthesamesize;theimmediatelocalisationofeachsamplebymeansofarecordofprovenancebasedondetailedco-ordinates;thecollectionofthe“nalarrayofsamplesintoasortofmulti-sectionedcabinetorspecimenboxinwhichsoildistributioncanbeappreciatedsynoptically,andfromwhichhypotheticalpatternscanbeelicited;and,“nally,theclassi“cationofsoilsaccordingtoacolourchart,whichagainaccommodatesthefactsprecipitatedsofartoanewmediumofsigni“cation…thecolourcodeusedtodeterminehowrichinaclayagivensamplemightbe.Thisisastoryofcontinualdisplace-mentortransportation,oftheproductionofreferencebymeansofthegradualprecipitationofanevermoredeterminatefactfromthetrans-portationofreferencethroughachainofinscriptions:Ourphilosophicaltraditionhasbeenmistakeninwantingtomakephe-nomenathemeetingpointbetweenthings-in-themselvesandcategoriesofhumanunderstanding...Phenomenaarenotfoundatthebetweenthingsandtheformsofthehumanmind;phenomenaareallalongthereversiblechainoftransformations,ateachsteplosingsomepropertiestogainothersthatrenderthemcompatiblewithalready-establishedcentersofcalculation.Insteadofgrowingfromtwo“xedextremitiestowardastablemeetingpointinthemiddle,theunstablereferencegrowsfromthemiddletowardtheends,whicharecon-tinuallypushedfurtheraway.Latoursnotionoftransportationexpressesamodeofemergenceinwhichthereferencepotentialofwordsandthingsisnotinnate,butisconstitutedbytheprocesswhichactualisesthatpotential:Knowledgedoesnotre”ectarealexternalworldthatitresemblesviamimesis,butratherarealinteriorworld,thecoherenceandcontinuityofwhichithelpstoensure.ThisisthesciencestudiesversionofThomasanal-ysisoftheinvoluted“ctionswhichde“nedtheautonomyofRomanlaw.Interestingly,ThomasanthropologyofRomanlegalinstitutions“g-uresinLatoursapproachtosciencestudiesbecauselegaltechnique…or,moreprecisely,proceduralorlegalrhetoric…suppliesaprototypeofthekindofhybrid(ising)actionthatisatworkincirculatingreference.Latour,CirculatingReference,atpp.71…2.Ibid.atp.58. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEThings,and,forthatmatter,persons,areessentialtothisconnection.Thomasgenealogyofthetermthing(inFrench,butonecandosimilarthingswiththeEnglishwordthing)tracesitsemergencebackthroughtheRomanlawconceptionofatotheterm,whichsigni“edanissue,debate,ormatterathand.Thepointisthatatermwhichnowsigni“esanontologicalformwasoncethenameforaprovi-sionalnexuswhichheldsocialorlegalactorstogetherinakindof”uidoremergentbond.Inthatsense,wasthenameforaprinci-pleofemergentassociationbetweenactors;or,touseLatoursfavouredterminology,betweenhumansandnon-humans.Thus,Thomaslegal-anthropologicaletymologyrevealstheroleofthethingasanindextotheparticularcollectivethatoneisseekingtobringtogether[lindiceducollectifqueloncherchearassemblerToreturntothestartingpointoftheintroduction,onemightsaythatjuridicalform,farfrombeingthecon“rmationoflong-standingmodelsofactionandcreation,illustratesthemodesofnetworkedassociativeactionwhichanimateslaboratories,andsocialnetworksingeneral.Butatthesametime,Latoursethnographicattentiontolawsuggestslimitationstothisanal-ogybetweenlegalandscienti“cproduction.Bothmaybeanimatedbyhybridisingaction,butconventionsofpersoni“cationandrei“cationaredeployedverydifferentlyineachdomain,sothathumansandnon-humanstakeondifferentrolesorfunctionsineach.Latoursessayinthisvolumesuggeststhatthedistinctionbetweensubjectivity(persons)andobjectivity(things)marksthedifferencebetweenlawandscience.Infact,givenLatoursnotionofhybridisingassociationsofhumanandnon-humanagents,neithersubjectivitynorobjectivityisquiteright.Theessaytalksaboutsubjecti“cationandobjectity;thetermsevoketwocontrastingtechniquesforapprehendingandtransportingfacts.Inonesense,theproductionofpersonsandthingsinlegalsettingsisanexampleofcirculatingreference.ThelegallaboratorytowhichLatourturnshisethnographicattention…theConseildEtat…isaverypeculiarkindoflegalinstitution.AsFrancessupremeconstitutionalcourt,itisauniquefusionoflegal,political,andadministrativecul-tures.AcourtcanbealaboratoryinthesamewayasanareaoftheforestSee,e.g.,MartinHeidegger,TheThinginPoetry,Language,Thought(Harper,Row,NewYork,1971).SeeBrunoLatour,Politiquesdelanature,pp.88…9andnoteatp.316,citingYanThomasRes,choseetpatrimoine:notesurlerapportsujet-objetendroitromainArchivesdelaphilosophiedudroitLatour,Politiquesdelanature,atp.351. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ”oorcanbealaboratory:assoonasonehastheingredientsofcirculat-ingreferenceasanaccumulationoflayersofsigni“cationonehastheelementsofalaboratory.Butinthecaseoflaw,theprocessofaccumula-tionlargelyhappensbetweenthecoversofa“le:theeffectivemodesoftransportationare“les,more“les,nothingbut“les.Thescopeoflawsreferentialchainsiscon“nedtowhatcanbeencompassedandappre-ciatedbyperusingthe“le.Andthisistheessentialpointofdifferencebetweenscienceandlaw.Scienceisalsoatextualactivity…itsmodesoftransportationdependupontheaccumulationandtransformationofinscriptions.Butinscienceresearchersarealwaysconcernedwithmultiplyingtransformations,ofgainingadditionalperspectivesontheoriginalfactsconstitutedbycirculatingreference,whereasinlawthechainsofreferencearesharplycutdownbytheproceduralde“nitionsofrelevance(whatLatourcallsthelimitsimposedbytheadversariallogicofthecase)andbytheavailabilityoftechniquesofstandardisationwhich,thankstoitshistoryofprofessionalisationandroutinisation,allowthelawtoresolvethefactsbyreferencetodevicessuchasthesig-nature.TotakeoneofLatoursexamples,thereisaworldofdifferencebetweenestablishingwhetheradrugsdealerthreatenedwithdeporta-tionreallyhasdependentchildren,andaskingwhetherhislawyershadmadeaclaimtotheexistenceofchildrenindueproceduralform.Inlaw,factsarethingsthatonetriestogetridofasquicklyaspossi-ble,inordertomoveontosomethingelse,namelytherelevantpointoflaw(BrunoLatour,Chapter3);thatiswhylawyersandjudgesworkonlywiththeworldrepresentedinthecase“le.Likethemorecomplicatedlayeringofscienti“cinscriptions,thecase“lecouldbedescribedasamapoftheworld.Butinsciencealloftheactiontakesplaceinthemiddle,mapandterritory,sothatthereisadynamictensionbetweenthetworegistersofreference.Anytopo-graphicsignisliabletobere-contextualisedorre-drawninthelightofnewinformationabouttheterritory.Inshort,scienceisaprocessofre”exive.Inthecaseoflaw,bycontrast,themapentirelysupplantstheterritory,andinformationabouttheterritoryisadmittedonlyinsuchawayastopromptaninvolutionaryre-compositionofthefabricofthelaw.Latourdescribesinvolutionintermsofamodelofratherthan“ctionalisation.Theformulaforquali“cation(AisaninstanceofBasitisde“nedbyarticleC(Latour,Chapter3))describesadiscursiveoperationinwhich,ratherliketheRomanlawtechniqueof“ctiolegis,apprehensionofthefactsisalwayscondi-tionedbyanormativepremise.Inquiryintothefactsiscon“nedtothe Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEquestionwhetherthefactsaresuchastotriggertheapplicationoftherule;and,asLatourobserves,thisisamodeofinvolutionratherthanjustamodeofclassi“cationbecausequali“cationislessaboutcognitionthanitisaboutsteeringinstitutionalaction:thiskindoforderingisofassistanceinlogisticsratherthaninjudgment(Latour,Chapter3).Thisiswhatmakesthedifferencebetweenscienti“cobjectityandlegalobjectivity.Theengagementofthescientistisbasedonapecu-liarlycircularformofobjectrelation;adifferentandmuchmoreexpan-sivemodeofinvolution,onemightsay.Ifthereisajuridicalcharactertolaboratoryscience,itisnotthatscienceful“lsthecommonlegalisticnotionofwhatobjectiveknowledgeis.Rather,itisthattheobject…ornon-human…playsaquasi-judicialrole;itultimatelypassesjudgmentonwhatissaidofit.Thatis,theobjectisintwoplacesatonce.Inoneroleitisthethingstudied…theobjectthatisframedandanimatedbythetextualandtechnicalapparatusofthelaboratory.Inanother,itdeterminesthetruthoftheclaimsmadeinrespectofitbylaboratoryresearchersintheirscienti“carticles.Here,theparticularcharacterofcirculatingreferenceinscienceisimportant.Inscience,themovementofreferentialtransportationisreversible.Theaccumulationofinscrip-tionsisrelayedinsuchawaythatanysubsequentcriticoftheexperi-mentinquestioncouldrecreatethearrayofinstruments,reagents,com-puters,andexpertisethatenabledthebehaviouroftherelevantfacttobeobserved,scrutinisingtheprocessforassumptionsortolerancesthatmighthaveinducedtheobjecttoperforminonewayratherthananother.Indeed,untilthisprocessofreconstructionhastakenplace,thetruthvalueofexperimentalconclusionsorhypothesesremainsinde-terminate.Truthissettledaftertheevent,oncetheexperimenthasbeenwrittenupandpublished,bymeansofaprocessinwhichitscon-clusionsaretestedbyreturningtotheoriginalobject.Tosharpentheanalogybetweenthetribunalandthelaboratory,Latourdescribesthedualroleofthescienti“cobjectbyreferencetotheancientormedi-aevaljudicialordeal,inwhichthebehaviourofanobjectrevealedtheinnermosttruthaboutanaccused.Similarly,thesubjectiveexpecta-tionsandattachmentsofthescientisthangontheresponsegivenbytheexperimentalobject.Latourcharacterisesthismodeofengagementasobjectity.Bycontrast,thestrangethingaboutlegalobjectivityisthatitisquiteliterallyobject-less,andissustainedentirelybytheproductionofamentalstate,abodily(Latour,Chapter3).Thisaddsanother Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 dimensiontothethemeofthefabricationofpersonsandthings.Thecontrastbetweenlawandscienceisalsoethologicalinthesensethatitdrawsouttwowaysofbeingintheworld,twokindsofbehaviouralstanceorattitudeonthepartofthehumansengagedinthetworespec-tivepractices.Latournicelycapturesthedifferencesbetweenthetwoenvironments,beginningwithlaboratoryscientists:Theyresembleagroupofgamblershuddledaroundacock“ghtonwhicheachhasstakedhisfortune;theymaynotbeshoutingorscreaminglikemadmen,buttherecanbenoquestionbutthattheyareinterestedinthefateoftheirneuron,andinwhatitmighthavetosayforitself...Ontheotherhand,passionistheleastappropriatetermtodescribetheattitudeofjudges[]inthecourseofahear-ing.Thereisnolibidosciendi.Nowordispronouncedmoreloudlythananother.Leaningbackintheirchairs,attentiveorasleep,interestedorindifferent,thejudgesalwayskeepthemselvesatadistanceLaboratoryscientistsareentirelyinthethralloftheexperimentalobject,somuchsothattheirownsubjectiveaffectsandexpectationsareinvestedinthetextureoftheobjectitself.Thatisobjectity:amodeofengagementthatisstrangelysubject-less.Law,ontheotherhand,producesobjectivitybyknowingaslittleaspossibleabouttheobject.Objectivityisanethologicaleffectbecauseitconsistsintheproduc-tionofaparticularkindofbodilyandenvironmentaltone.Forexam-ple,theideaofduehesitation:thechoiceofphrases,tonesofvoice,orproceduralformulaeintheConseildEtatisinformedbythesilentstrategyofalwaysappearingtogivethefullestconsiderationtoacase(accordingtotheformulaofquali“cation)beforethe“naljudgmentfalls.Butconsiderationisaneffectofinstitutionalaestheticsandbod-ratherthanagenuinelycognitiveenterprisebecauseitisgen-eratedbytheaccumulationofmicro-procedureswhichmanagetopro-ducedetachmentandkeepdoubtatbay(Latour,Chapter3).Inthatsense,objectivitydependsuponamodeofsubjecti“cation:thefabrica-tionofthings(objectivefacts)inlawcorrelatestotheproductionofpersons(institutional).Bothscienceandlawareconstitutedbyhybridisingactionandcirculatingreference,buttheyaredifferen-tiatedbytheirrespectivewaysofsculptingtherolesofhumansandnon-humans.Inthatsense,thecontrastbetweenlegalandscienti“claboratoriessharpensLatourstheoryofassociativeaction.InTimMurphysessay,thedifferencebetweenscienti“candlegalreferenceisjustasessential.CitingNiklasLuhmann,Murphyobserves Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEthatthelawcannotbeusedasamachinefortheinvestigationoftruths,orforthediscoveryofintelligentsolutionstoproblems(TimMurphy,Chapter4).Intermsofthequestionofmakingpersonsandthings,thispromptsasomewhatpolemicalengagementwiththeques-tionofwhatactuallyconstitutesmakinginlegalsettings.Ratherthanemphasisingthepeculiarityoflegaltechnique,Murphysuggeststhatlawhastobeseenasaninstanceofamoregeneralformofproductionortechnology;becauseproductionincontemporarysocietyimpliesmass-production,muchofmodernlawisitselfmass-producedand/orposi-tivised.Whatisimportant,ifonedevelopsthesub-themeofinvolu-tion,recursion,orre-potentialisation,isthatmass-productionimpliesacollapseofthedivisionthatunderwritestheclassicalunderstandingofproduction.Ordinarily,industrialproductionisunderstoodasaprocessinwhichaninventivedesignoranauthorialintentionisgivenshapeinamechanicalform.Thisimpliesarelationinwhichtheoutputoreffectiscommandedbythedesign,accordingtoalinearprocessofcau-sation.Machines,ormechanically-producedartefacts,arede“nedbytheirmakers.However,Murphysapproachtomass-productionimpliesarelationinwhichtheessenceofeachproductorartefactislodgedinfeedbackloopsorprocessesofre-entry.Thenatureoftheprod-uctoroutputisde“nedbyadesignwhichisalwaysintheprocessofbeingre-designedinthelightofinformationgatheredfromtheper-formanceoftheproduct.Thebestexampleisthatofbiotechnolog-icalmass-production.Similarly,theautonomyoflegalinstitutionsordiscourseshastobeseenasaprocessinwhichlegalartefacts(per-sonsandthings,onemightsay)arejustnexesinanongoingprocessofre-potentialisation,inwhichtheformativedesignoftheartefactisalwayshostagetotheevaluationoftheperformanceoftheartefact.ThisiswhatMurphysuggestsinhisreferencetothemobilityoflegalMobilegridsaresetinmotionor,moreexactly,areinmotionallthetime…thereisnobeginningandnoreasontosupposeanendtothiskindofprocess…andthesegridsandtheirshiftingcontentsarewhatthelawanditsessentialtechnologiesofreports,indexes,computer-baseddatastorageandretrievalmakes.Thesegridformationsandclassi“catoryschemesfeedbackintotheprocessesofadjudicationandlegislatingandlawteachingviatextbooks,readinglists,journalarticlesandtheworldHere,MurphycitesKnorr-Cetina(Chapter4atp.). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 wideweb.Sowecansaythatoneanswertothequestionwhatdoesthelawmakeisthatitmakesgrids…waysoforganisingwhatthroughitsepistemic“ltersitconsiderstobefacts,includingfactsaboutthestateofthelaw.Inonesense,thisideaofmobilityimplieslearning,andthereforeagreaterdegreeofopennessoftheinstitutiontothesocialthanissuggestedbyThomasanalysisofRomanlaw(thoughhere,opennessshouldbeunderstoodintermsofthesystemstheoryformulathatopen-nessispossibleonlyonthebasisofclosure).THEPERSONIFICATIONANDREIFICATIONOFTheremainingcontributionstothevolumeexploretheconstructionoflegalconventionsortransactionsbydevelopingtworelatedthemes.The“rstconcernsthewayinwhichsocialthemesoreventsarefoldedintolegaldiscoursestodevelopwhatmightbecalledthesemanticpotentialityoflaw.Secondly,withreferencetotheroleplayedbybiotechnologyandbiomedicineintheproblematisationoftraditionallegalconventions,ourcontributorsdevelopanalogieswhichexplorethemediumorsubstancewhichhasbecomemostproblematic:namely,bodyasapeculiarstockofpotentiality.SemanticpotentialThomastheoryoftheinnateautonomyofRomanlegalinstitutionsdevelopsthenotionthatlegalconceptsorcategoriesaretheresourcesfromwhicharefabricated.Thecompetencesandcapac-itiesofpersonsandthingsarecontainedinthesemanticpotentialofthesecategories,andaredrawnoutbyrhetoricaltechniqueswhichactualisethepotentialofagivenconventionorformulabymeansofargumentation.Inthatsense,theentitiesthatsurfaceinlegalproce-durearereallyartefactsoftheprocedureitselfratherthandescriptionsofexternalsocialorpsychologicalevents.Onemightsaythattheinsti-tutionalforceofRomanlawconsistedinitscapacitytocapturerealSeeMurphy,Chapter4.SeegenerallyNiklasLuhmann,SocialSystems(StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,1997),ch.5.Droppingthearticle,inthemannerofCarolineWalkerBynum,TheResurrectionoftheBody(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1988)isonewayofhighlightingthispotentiality. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEpersonsandthingsintheseconventionalartefacts.So,forexample,theimpositionoflegalliabilitydependednotuponsomeexplorationofthepsychologicalmotivationsorprocessesoftheindividual,butupontheabilityoftheadvocatetoensnareanindividualinaformulawhichwasprefabricatedinthesensethatitwaspreparedbyrhetoricalinven-tionentirelywithinthetimeofthetrial:TheveryideathatonemightbeboundbyonesactionswasforeigntoRomanthought,whichtreatedsubjectsastheaccessoriesofactions.Therelationshipimpliedbytheformulanoxaeseobligare(meaningtobindonesactionandnotonesaction)isquitetheoppositeofthatwhichde“nespersonalobligationsinthecontemporarysense.Themisdeed()tightenedretroactivelyaroundtheguiltyperson.Thelatterwasnotsomuchanagent,asthecaptivesubjectofthewrong,tiedorboundtohisaction;thepointisnotthathewasnotrequiredtoanswerforit,butthatinaveryspeci“csensethathewasheldinthegripofthelaw:actioneteneri,meaning:tobeheldbyalegalThus,theRomanlegalimaginarywasoneinwhichpersonsandthingswerethe(semantic)incidentsoflegalformulaeorconventions.Theactionofpersoni“cationandrei“cationhappenedentirelywithintheinstitution,andtheyexpressedwhatmightbecalledencryptedinstitutionalpotential.EnginAkarlšsandMarthaMundysillustrationsfromOttoman-Islamiclawsuggestvariationsonthisnotionofsemanticpotential.IncontrasttoThomaspictureofastrictlyautonomousinstitution,AkarlšemphasisesthattheplaceofadjudicationintheOttoman-Islamiclegalethoswassuchthatcourtsmadeandremadethelaws,inthepracticalsenseofthewordasbindingprovisions,withtheparticipationofthoseactorstowhomtheprovisionswouldapply(EnginAkarlš,Chapter6).Thelegalrecordssuggestthatevenintheimperialcourt,doctrinalformsandconventionswerethemediathroughwhichlawaccommo-dated,andthroughwhichitaccommodateditselfto,theincreasingsocialcomplexityofclaims.ThestudyfocusesonthecategoryofinOttomanjurisprudenceandpractice,describingtheprocessofevolu-tionthroughwhichtheconceptwasloadedwithasemanticpotentialwhichallowedittoholdanumberofquiteheterogeneouselements.describedthetoolsofanartisanstrade,themarketpositionYanThomas,Acte,agent,socie:Surlhommecoupabledanslapenseejuridiqueromaine(1977)24Archivesdelaphilosophiedudroit63,atp.71. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 enjoyedthroughtheuseofthosetools,theparticipationoftheartisaninaguild,thecerti“catewhichconstitutedsecurityfordebtscontractedbytheartisan,oranitemofinheritance.Thecomplexityoftheclaimswithinthisarrangement,theshiftingmatrixofpersonsandthings,isillustratedbytheexampleoftheproblemsfacedbymerchantsdealingwithartisanswhodefaultedontheirobligations.Inthesecircumstancescerti“catemightturnouttobeaworthlesssecuritybecausenothinginthestructureofguildspreventedanartisanfromalienatingtheassetsindexedbythecerti“cateorfromleavingtheguildtosetupasanartisanelsewhere.Thedoctrinalconstructionoftherightsandobligationsarticulatedbythecategoryofthereforeimpliedtheprecipitationofpersonsandthingsoutofaformwhichcouldbeeither,dependingonthenatureoftheclaim.Forexample,aswithanycorporateentity,thisinvolvedacomplexbundleofpersoni“-cations:theagencyofthecorporatepersonaactingassuchvis-a-vistheoutsideworld,theagencyofthatpersonwithrespecttoitsmembers,thetakenonbymembersinterse,thecapacitiesandcompetencesofartisansvis-a-vismerchantsorsecularandreligiousinstitutions.Thiswasnotjustaquestionofresolvingthecorporationintoitscomponentelements,becausethatisamorecomplexbusinessthanamereenu-merationofrolesmightsuggest.Ratheritisaboutthecreationofper-sons/thingsoutofwhatmightbetermedamultiplicity.Forexample,indeterminingtherighttoinherita,legaldoctrinehadtoreckonwiththefactthatanartisanastheholderofamemberoftheguild,aneconomicactorinhisownright,amemberofafamily,andarepresentativeofalineage.Thepersonalrelationsandattachmentscompressedintothismultiplicitycouldbeactualisedbytechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationwhichwouldbedeployeddifferently,andtodifferenteffect,wherethenatureoftheclaimwasdif-ferent.Thatisthesenseinwhichthewas(likethehumanbodyinthecontributionsdiscussedbelow)asemanticformfromwhicheitherpersonsorthingscouldbeactualised.MarthaMundysessayisacompanionstudyintheconstructionofsemanticpotential.Itconcernsaquestionofdoctrine:didtheholderofanadministrativegrantoflandinMamluk/OttomanEgypthaveaprop-ertyrightwhichwascapableofalienation?ThegrantsinquestionwereForanexampleofhowasinglecanbesplitintoanumberofdifferentexis-tences,seethediscussionofMarxandRousseauinGillianRose,TheBrokenMiddle(Blackwell,Oxford,1992). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEusuallymadetomilitaryof“cersorreligiousfunctionaries,whowereallowedtotakeaproportionofthetaxrevenuesduetothesovereign.Inthatsense,thegrantcouldbeseenasremunerationforservice,andasarightrevocablebythesovereignatanytime.Inthesecircumstances,couldamilitaryholderalienatehisrightbyrentingitout,effectivelytreatingitasausufructuarypropertyright?Twoclosely-relateddoctri-nalissuesaroseatthatpoint.First,wastherighttobeconceivedintermsofpropertyorof“ce?thatis,wasitarightattachedto(orrei“edin)theland,orwasitanincidentofthegranteesof“ce?Thisques-tionwascomplicatedbythefactthatthegrantmightberevokedbythesovereignatanypoint,sothattheinquestionwasofprecariousstatusandunde“nedduration.Secondly,ifitwastobeseenasarightintheland,howcouldthebede“nedwhereitsessencewascon-stitutedbythetripartitepersonalrelationsbetweensovereign,grantee,andtheactualcultivatoroftheland?Thefactthattheessenceofthingwassothoroughlypersoni“edraisedthetensionbetweenthebasicidiomsofownershipbyanindividualofathingandtheof“ce-likehierarchyofthethree(ruler,granteeandcultivator)whoallholdrightsinthesameland(MarthaMundy,Chapter5).Thepointisthatthespeci“cationoftherightsandresponsibilitiesattachedtolandimpliesthe(re)constructionofdoctrinalmodelsofpersonsandthings.Thesemodelsarenotjustfoundinsociety;theyhavetobecon-structedconceptuallyorsemanticallybylaw,fromitsownresourcesofmeaning.Inonephase,thisimpliesreachingbeyondtheinstitutiontoformulaterepresentationsofevolvingsocialrealities.So,forexample,thelegaltreatisethatiscentraltoMundysaccountlooksbeyondthebarelegalconventionstothereal,social,characteroftheroleoftheright-holder(themilitarygrantee),andthenatureofagriculturalpro-duction(thesocialstatusofagriculturallabour)toargueforthepropo-sitionthatanabstractusufructuaryrightshouldberecognisedbythisbranchofIslamicjurisprudence(Mundy,Chapter5).Butinanotherphase,theseinfusedmeaningshavetobeexpressedintraditionalidiomsandconventions.Theabilitytoformulatenewmodelspresup-posesanabilityto“ndsemanticprototypeswithinthedoctrinaltra-dition.Inthiscase,theprototypeforanabstractusufructuaryrightisfoundinexistingconceptionsofslavelabour:thepotentialityarisingfromthelabourofaslaveallowsthedevelopmentofmorecomplexformulationsofrightsoverrealproperty(Mundy,Chapter5).Atthisjuncture,thesemanticpotentialofdoctrinalcategoriesmergeswiththepotentialityofbody,andthereferencetoslavelabourcanbeseenas Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 drawingonwhattheremainingcontributionsdescribeasthepeculiarlyequivocalcharacterofthehumanbody.ActualisingbodilypotentialConventionaltechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationareopeneduptoethnographiccomparisonbyexploringthepotentialitiescon-tainedinbody.MarilynStratherntakesthequestionofbodilyformasthebasisforananalogybetweenWesternandMelanesianconven-tionsofpersoni“cationandrei“cation.Whatisinquestionisthepro-ductionofbodilywholeness,thatis,thewayinwhichthebodyis…orisnot…rei“edasadeterminatething.Wholenessinthissenseisoneparticularaspectoreffectofthoseconventionswhichshapethemannerinwhichpeoplemakeclaimsonothers,thoughatleastinthecaseofMelanesiatheseconnectionsmightbeofapolitico-ritualratherthanlegalnature(MarilynStrathern,Chapter7).Theques-tionishowthepotentialitiesassociatedwithbodyareactualisedinsuchawayastogiveeffectiveformandforcetoownershipclaims.InthecaseofWesternlaw,thismightimplyanoscillationbetweenper-sonandthing.Forexample,Strathernhasdescribedelsewherehowafrozenembryochangesitspotentialitydependingonwhetherornotithasbeendefrosted,referringtotheontologicalchoreographybywhichembryoscangofrombeingapotentialpersonŽwhentheyarepartofthetreatmentprocesstonotbeingapotentialpersonŽaswhenithasbeendecidedthattheycanbefrozenordiscarded,orevenbackagainaswhentheyaredefrosted.Thus,dependingonthenatureoftherelationactualisedbytheclaim,bodyitselfcanbeactualisedasdiffer-entkindsofform.Andthisisnotjustamatterofrecordingbiologicalfacts:oneeffectofunansweredquestionsaboutwhetherornotbodypartsconstitutepropertyistherealisationthatdetachmentmustbefabricatedconceptuallyaswellasphysically(Strathern,Chapter7).BodilypotentialposesparticularproblemsforWesternlegalconven-tions.AsStrathernobserves,thebodyseemstobetakenasentireinthedoublesenseofbeingacompletefunctioning(oroncefunctioning)organism,andofbeingofapiecewiththeindividualpersonassub-jectandagent.Thissenseofbiologyasbeingofapiecewithpsy-chicorsocialindividualityisanunexaminedpresuppositionofmodernlegaldoctrine.YanThomasanthropologyofRomanlegalinstitutionsProperty,Substance,andEffect,atp.175,citingCussins.MarilynStrathern,Chapter7. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEsuggeststhatlawoncerecognisedthatpersonalitywasmultipleandcontingent.First,therewasnosuchthingasaunitarylegalinsteadRomanlawdealtinalargenumberofdifferentiatedtransac-.Secondly,thelegalqualityofpersonalitywasnottakentobedescriptiveofbiologicalorsocialindividuality.Soahumanbeingmightbeclassedasathing()forsomepurposes;forexample(leavingasidetheobviousbutproblematicexampleofslaves)grandparentscountedaspartoftheinheritance()towhichtheincomingheirsucceeded.OnlymuchlaterinthetraditionofRomanlawwerethevarioustransactionalconstitutedbylegaltechniqueamalga-matedintotheformofasinglelegal,andonlywiththeinfusionofChristiandoctrine(speci“cally,thedoctrinalconjoiningofmortal,perishable,bodyandimmortalsoul)didthisarti“cialpersonmergewithitsbiologicalsubstratumtocomposeawholeform.Initially,onemightsaythatthisgaveaparticularimportancetothebody,whichencom-passedbothpersonandthing.Inthatsense,thebodyuni“edthedis-tinctionbetweenpersonandthinginthesensethatitwasthethirdtermwhich,logically,guaranteedthedistinction.Atthesametime,thebodywasthemediumorcurrencyinwhichthedistinctionbetweenpersonandthingwasnegotiated;dependingontheconditionofthebody,ahumanbeingmightbesaidtobeeitherapersonorathing.Hencetheprominenceofthequestionofslaveryinlegaldoctrineandphilosophy.Ifsomecompulsioncouldbeexercisedoverthebodysoastoreduceittosubjectionorturnitintoacommodity,thehumanbeingathing.Thiswasaone-wayroute:personslapsedintothings,nottheotherwayaround.Inotherwords,personwastheweightedsideofthedistinction,andthebodywasjustthemediumthroughwhichthepersonwasexposedtothedangerofbecomingamerething.So,forexample,inFrenchlawthebodyistreatedasaveryspecialsortofentitynotbecausethelawrespectsthebodyassuch,butratherbecausethebodyisaformwhichengagesrespectfortheperson.Inthistra-ditionalarrangement,thebodywasneitherpersonnorthing…itwasjustthegagethroughwhichthepersonstakeditspersonhood.Thiswassustainablepreciselybecausethebodywasalwayswhole,sothatthedis-tinctionbetweenpersonandthingalwayspassedbetweentwowholeforms(bodies)ratherthanthroughthewholeformofthebody.Forpresentpurposes,whatissigni“cantaboutthisfabricationofwholenessisthatthebodywastheforminwhichthepotentialityorequivocationofthedistinctionbetweenpersonandthingwasactualisedormade Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 TheproblemforcontemporaryWesternlegalconventionsisthatthedistinctionnowpasseseachindividualbody(atleastpotentially).Bodyparts,genes,andgametesarenowdetachable,andmightcir-culateindependentlyofanywholebody.Inthesecircumstances,bodycontinuestofunctionasauni“cationofthedistinctionbetweenpersonandthing,andastheforminwhichthepotentialitiesofthatdistinc-tionareactualised.Butthegeometricpointofunityoractualisationhaschanged.Wholenesshastobefabricatedbymakingbodyabstract,byexploitingitsequivocalstatusasbothpersonandthingto“ction-aliseitscontinuingintegrity.ThisiswhatStratherncallsfabricationbydefault.InherdiscussionoftheNuf“eldCouncilonBioethicsReportof1995onthestatusofbodytissues(atextwhichshetakesasatrea-tiseonthemakingofthings)Chapter7)Strathernillustrateswhatthismodeoffabricationinvolves:Inawonderfullyillogicalbutperfectlysensibleway,attheveryjuncturewhenthroughdetachmentitcouldberegardedashavingceasedtobeapartofthebody,thetissueororganisreconstitutedneitherasawholeentityinitselfnorasanintrinsicpartofapreviouswhole.Colloquially,itis,somehow,afree-standingpart.Sowhatiskeptaliveinthisnomen-clatureistheprocessofdetachmentitself:itwouldseemthatforsolongasitsdetachabilityfromthepersonremainsevidentitcanbethoughtofasathing…butnottothelengthsofawholething.Eachdetachedpart…preciselybecauseitisstillcharacterisedpart…remainscharacterisedbythewholeofwhichitwasonceanintegralpart.Bykeepingtheprocessofdetachmentalive,bio-ethicsholdsinsuspensethequestionofhowtodifferentiatepersonandthingwithrespecttothebody.Moreimportantly,thisfabricationofwhole-nessallowsthebodytocontinuebeingthegageuponwhichperson-hoodisstaked,andasaresultthedistinctionbetweenpersonandthingremainscastasanasymmetrical.Thesenseinwhichfabrica-tionbydefaultkeepstheoldcon“gurationofperson/thing/bodyaliveisperhapsclearerinanotherlegalstrategy,basedonanextrapolationofanintellectualpropertyright(or,inthiscase,adroitdauteur).Thesug-gestionisthatbodypartsshouldremainattachedtotheirqualifyingwholesbymeansofadroitdedestination,whichistherightattributedtoauthorsinFrenchintellectualpropertylawtodeterminetheconditionsunderwhichaworkcanbepublishedorexploited.BodytissueswouldSeeJean-ChristopheGalloux,Lutilisationdesmaterielsbiologiqueshumains:versundroitdedestination?(1999)ReceuilDalloz(Chronique) Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 12:27:22 GMT 2012. Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEremainattachedtotheoriginalwholebythecontinuingattachmentimpliedintheconsentwhichauthorisesanddelimitseachparticularuse.Tomakeabodypartaseparate,distinct,entitywouldmeanhavingtomakeadecisionastopreciselywherethelinebetweenpersonandthingshouldbedrawn,whichwould,inturn,unraveltheproductiveequivocationcomprisedinbody.Fabricationbydefaultismotivatedbyanxietiesabouttheowner-shipofpersons:slavery.Butinrealitytheoldproblemofslavery,andtheconjunctionsofpersonandthingwhichwereimpliedinpolitical-philosophicaldiscussionsofslavery,havebeensuperseded.Theethno-graphicanalogywhichStrathernconstructsonthebasisofexamplesfromMelanesiashowsacontextinwhichpersonsareowned.Theanalogyisnecessarilyaconstruct;itappearsasaresultofrender-inganthropologicalmaterialaslike…ratherthanunlike…Euro-Americanassumptions.TheMelanesianexamplesshowshowpersonscanappearasdistinct,whole,thingsandthereforeasobjectsofowner-ship.Wholenessinthiscontextisabodilyquality.IftheMelanesianpersoniscomposedofmultiplerelations,thenthemomentinwhichtheybecomeathingandhenceanobjectofownershipisthemomentinwhichtheirrelationalpotentialityisentirelyeclipsedbytheiden-tityandrelationwhichisbeingactualisedinthepresentmoment.ThispropositioncondensesStrathernsrenderingofthevirtualmultiplicityoftheMelanesianperson.Althoughthetheoryistoocomplextobeaddressedhere,itisimportanttosaysomethingabouthowthethemeofownershipsetsupananalogybetweenMelanesianfabricationsofbodilyformandWesternanxietiesabouttherei“cationofthebody.IntheMelanesiancontext,bodilyformcanbedescribed(byanalogy)asthesubjectmatterofownershipbecauseeachrei“cationiselicitedbytheperson(s)towhomitisaddressed(Strathern,Chapter7):Whenamaleinitiatestepsforwardalldeckedoutinhistransformedbody,anewmemberoftheclan,hisclansmenownsotospeakthecon-ceptofthispersonasamaleclansman.Hehastolook,actandbehavelikeone.Hisclanmatesacknowledgehimbyclaiminghim;theyseeinhim,atthatmoment,theembodimentofaconcept.Theconceptinquestionisaconventionalformorrole…thatofthemaleclansman…whichhastobeactualisedinabodilyperformance.Thede“nitiveaccountofthefractalnatureofMelanesianpersonsisgiveninMari-lynStrathern,TheGenderoftheGift(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1988). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 Effectshavetobecontrived;or,touseStrathernsterminology,con-ventionsareconstitutedthroughinvention.Aconventionisarecipeforsocialaction,butarecipeinthissenseisavirtualschemewhoseeffectiveformisconstitutedbytheactionsthatitelicits.TheMelane-sianconventionofcompensationsuppliesanexcellentillustrationbecausethecompensationprocessitselfde“neswhatistransactable.Thepointisthatthesubstantialelementstowhichacompensationclaimrefersareactualised…thatistosaygiveneffectiveformandforce…intheoftheclaim.Inthecourseofmakingtheirclaim,socialgroups(andpersons)actualisethemselves,resolvingthemselvesintotheformappropriatetotheclaimtheyseektosustain:collectivitiesdifferentiate,identify,and,inshort,describethemselvesbytheirroleincompensation.Eachactualisationofaconventionisasingulareventbecauseitconsistsentirelyintheaestheticandcorporealeffectachievedbyactorsintheverymomentofexchange.Unlikethefabri-cationofwholenessexempli“edintheNuf“eldCouncilsreport,thismodeofdetachmentisdecisive:thepersonappearswholeandentirefromtheperspectiveofaspeci“cother.Wholenessiseffectedinform,sothatrei“cationoractualisationis,sotospeak,aneffectofcorpo-reality.Ontheothersideoftheanalogy,theWesternunderstandingofownership(andhenceslavery)ispredicatedonanantitheticalrela-tionbetweenpersonsandthings,anantithesiswhichstrategiesoffab-ricationbydefaulttrytosalvage.ThemodelofanantitheticalorIbid.atp.271.CompensationasitisgenerallyunderstoodinPapuaNewGuineadoeseverythingwhichanEnglish-speakermightimagine,andmuchmore.Itrefersbothtothepay-mentowedtopersonsandtotheproceduresbywhichtheycometonegotiatesettle-ment.Itcanthuscoverrecompenseduetokinfornurturetheyhavebestowed,asinbridewealth,aswellasdamages,asinreparationstoequalisetheftsorinjuries.Itcansubstituteforalife,inhomicidecompensation,orforlossofresources.Carfatalities,warreparations,miningroyalties:allpotentiallyfallunderitsrubric,althoughsinceitisgenerallyagreedthatpeoplefrequentlymakeexorbitantdemands,compensa-tionisseenastheenemyaswellasthefriendofpeace-makingceremoniesandofcommercialexploitationalike.Itsoutcomeis,fromaEuro-Americanpointofview,hybrid,insofarasitconsistsinanequallyeasytranslationofpersonsintothingsandthingsintopersons.Anditsproceduralcapabilityisofutmostsimplicity.Liabilitiesandclaimsarede“nedbythepositionspartiestakeinrelationtooneanotherovertheissuesofcompensationitself(MarilynStrathern,Property,SubstanceandEffect(Athlone,London,1999),p.188).Ibid.atp.190.Ibid.atp.191. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEasymmetricalrelationbetweenpersonsandthingsimposesaparticularunderstandingoforiginatingaction(production).Atthelevelofcon-tent,theWesternidiomofownershipconstrues(proprietary)agencyintermsofwhatpersonsdotoorwiththingsbymeansoftheirlabourorknowledge.Thebodypresentsaspecialproblemfortheseconven-tionspreciselybecauseitrepresentsthepointatwhichthetermsofthisdivisionbecomeindistinguishable.Butuntilthequestionofbodypresentedthisnewissueofpotentiality,Euro-Americanconceptionsofpropertyimposedanunderstandingofcause/effect,orpotentiality/actuality,inwhichsocialactioncouldbereferredtothecapacitiesofthingsorthesubjectivecompetencesofpersons.Thisisoneimplica-tionofwhatBrunoLatourcallstheoldsettlement;thedivisionoftheworldintotwoontologicalregisters.TheeffectofsuperimposingWesternmodesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationontheMelanesianexamplesistorevealamodeoforiginatingactionbasedonsymmet-ricalrelationsbetween.Thebasicunitsofsocialactionarejustpersons:personscanberei“ed(inwholebodyform)andthingscanbepersoni“ed,inwhichcasetheyembodyoneofthevirtualrelationswhichcomposetheMelanesianperson.Inthissensethesocialworldisnotdividedintotworegisters,butiscomposedofrelationsandattach-ments(distinctions,onemightsay)whichareelicitedfromthesym-metricalplaneofpersonality.Socialactionisnotpredicateduponthepotentialitieslodgedinsomeoriginaldivision.Instead,itconsistsinmodesofwhichconstitutetheircorrelativepotentialities.Atthispoint,Strathernsethnographicanalogysuggestsaresonance…ifnotaproximity…betweenMelanesianandEuro-Americancontexts.Thestrategyoffabricationbydefaultisonewayofcopingwithaworldwhich,throughtheagencyofbiomedicine,isincreasinglyrecognisedasasingleplaneofpotentiality.Wherebodycanbetheoldasymmetrybecomesdis-embedded,motivatedonlybyemergentregulatoryobjectives(witnesstheshifttoriskanalysisandprocedural-isationinbio-ethics).SusanneKuchlersessaysketchesanotherapproachtotheactuali-sationofattachments.Herapproachcanbeseenasanin”ectionofatheoryofartwhichmergesseamlesslywiththesocialanthropologyofpersonsandtheirbodies,allowingforthepossibilitythatanythingcouldconceivablybeanartobject,includinglivingpersons.Re-thinkingSusanneKuchler,Chapter8. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 attachmentistherubricunderwhichthequestionofpersoni“cationandrei“cationisaddressed.Attachmentevokesthearrayofrelations(betweenpersons/things)indexedbyartobjects,andtheagencyoftheseobjectsinelicitingandexchangingpotentialitiesper-sons/things.Thethemeofpotentialityiscentraltotheinquirybecausethequestionofattachment…posedinthisway…opensupethno-graphicanalogiesbetweentheunderstandingsoforigination,genera-tion,reproduction,andreplicationwhichsustainWesternidiomsofintellectualpropertyand(inthiscase)Melanesianmodesofconnec-tivity.Inthatsense,theessaycanbereadasacontributiontocontem-poraryanthropologicalengagementswithWesterndiscoursesortech-nologiesofintellectualpropertyrights(copyrightandpatent).speci“cally,itdevelopssomeofthethemesintroducedinKearlierworkonMalanggancarvings.TheMalangganinquestionareproducedasembodimentsof(orfor)thelifeforceofanancestor.Every-thingturnsonwhatembodimentmightmeaninthisinstance.ThepeculiarityofMalanggancarvingsisthattheirroleasvesselsorembod-imentsisshort-lived;theyaredestroyedordiscardedimmediatelyaftertheiruseinmemorialceremonies,atwhichpointthelifeforcecon-densedinthemisreleased.Whatkindofagencyisimpliedinthisartic-ulation(embodimentandrelease)?Intheprocessofbeingproducedasanembodiment,theMalanggantakesontheform(s)oftheMelanesianperson.Thecarvingisanassemblageofdesignmotifs,sometransmit-tedfromthepast,othersdrawnfromneighbours,andyetotherswhichareaddressedtofutureowners(andwhichinsodoinganticipatetheirfutureapprehensionascommunicationsfromthepast).Thisnexusofrecollectionandanticipationinstantiatesthepotentialityofbody:aMalangganconvertsexistingrelationshipsintovirtualones,matterintoenergy,andlivingintoancestralagency…heraldingthereversalofthesetransformationsatafuturestageinthereproductivecycle.WhatisSeethenowclassicarticlebySimonHarrison,IntellectualPropertyandRitualCulture(1991)21(n.s.)435.SeeespeciallySusanneKuchler,Malangan:ArtandMemoryinaMelanesianSociety(1987)22238;MakingSkins:MalanganandtheIdiomofKinshipinNewIrelandinJ.CooteandA.Shelton(eds.),Anthropology,Art,andAesthetics(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1992);ThePlaceofMemoryinA.FortyandS.KuchlerTheArtofForgetting(Berg,Oxford,1999).MarilynStrathern,ThePatentandtheMalanggan(2001)18(4)Theory,CultureandSociety1,atp.7. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEessentialhere(atleastasregardstheissueofintellectualproperty)isthemodeofpotentialityorpotentialisationwhichthisimplies.Ingivingaformulationtopastattachments,theMalangganisanarticulationwhichcarriesthoseattachmentsforward,intoafuturewhichithasinsomesensecon“guredthroughitsownagency,sothatitfunctionsasanagentofrestlesstransformationoremergence.Thisis,onemightsay,are-potentialisationofthepastinanticipationofitseffectsinafuturepresent.Ifoneneededanexampleoftheinapplicabilityofdivisionsbetweentraditionandmodernity,itwouldbedif“cultto“ndabetteronethanthis.TheanalogywithWesternidiomsofintellectualpropertytakesshapeatthispoint.Inpatentlaw,therei“cation(embodiment)ofanindus-trialconceptturnsitintoanobjectorwhichcanthenbelicensedforuse,orusednegativelybycompetitorstryingtoinventaroundthepatent.Inthatsensetheintangible…thepatent…isalsoatransformativearticulationbetweentwoskeinsofattachment(s).Thecon“gurationor(re)collectionofonesetofattachments(thenetworkgatheredintothepatent,onemightsay)occasionstheopeningofanothernetwork,whichtransformstheoldnetworkbyholdingituptothenewcontextintowhichithasopened.AswiththeagencyoftheMalanggan,thepointisthatthepotentialthatis(provision-ally)actualisedinthepatentisalwaysbeingre-made,orre-actualised.Contrarytotheimageoforiginationwhichsustainstheidiomsofintel-lectualpropertylaw,andpropertylawingeneral,theworkofactualisa-tionconstitutesthepotentialthatitactualises.That,atleast,isonesenseofthevirtualityoftheMalangganasanembodiment.Butatthesametime,proximityopensupanalogicaldistance.TheagencyoftheMalangganbecomesonesideofananalogywhichrelativisesWest-ernidioms.TheMalangganiswhatKuchlerdescribesasaninherentlyrecallableimage;thedestructionofthecarvingafteritsceremonialmeansthatitcontinuestoexistonlyastheconceptofthedesign.InthissenseagainonemightsaythatMalanggandesignscirculatewithinaregimeofintellectualproperty.Thepersontowhomthedesignisentrustedhastherighttoreproduceit.However,thisopensupananalogicaldistancebecausetheconceptisnotunderstoodasanintel-lectualcreationofanoriginatingauthor(eveniftheauthorisnottheAgain,theessentialreferenceistotheworkofMarilynStrathern,notablyCuttingtheNetwork(1996)2JournaloftheRoyalAnthropologicalSocietyForphilosophicalaccountsofthis,seeGillesDeleuze,Lepli(Minuit,Paris,1988);GiorgioAgamben,(StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,1999). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 currentholderoftheright).Thedesignissimplyheldintheheadthepersonauthorisedtoreproduceit.Again,thisisamodeofembodi-mentthatissustainedwithoutreferencetoadivisionbetweenpersonal,subjective,agency,andmaterialcapacity.Inhercontributiontothiscollection,Kuchlerelaboratesthisnotionofatransformativearticulationbyelaboratingthethemeofsurfaceasanaspectoftheallureofartobjects.Surfacewasalreadyanimpor-tantpartofKuchlersinterpretationofMalangganasexemplarsofaplanar(asopposedtolinear)conceptionofsurface.Here,thesur-facesinquestionaretextiles:techno-textiles,Yupnoknottedcords,andquiltsfromtheCookIslands.Intheseexamples,thethemeofsurfacelocatesapointinwhichpotentialityandactualitybecomeco-extensive,existinginthesameplaneordimension,andarticulat-ingemergentrelationswhichcannotbe“xedasownershiporposses-sion.Theoftechno-textilesdrawsthepolesoftheWest-erndivisionintoadynamicmiddle:ateachpoint,“xedantithesesbecomeemergentforms.Forexample,thesearetextileswhichbehavelikeorganisms,displayingasecondnaturecomprisedofrule-orderedhumanconstructionswhilemirroringthegiven,pristinenatureofphys-icalandbioticprocesses,lawsandforms(SusanneKuchler,Chapter8);inthatsense,theyplayonthedivisionbetweenrealandarti“cialbydissolvingitintoaprocessinwhichtheregistersbecomeindistinguish-able.AsKuchlerobserves,thesetextilesarelikethesyntheticvital-ityofarti“ciallifeprogrammes.AsIsuggestinmycontribution,thismodeofsymmetryisexpressedinGillesDeleuzesconceptofasim-ulacrum:asimulacrumisnotanimperfectcopy[unecopieditcontainsapositivepowerthatnegatesbothoriginalandcopy,bothmodelandreproduction.AsimilarargumentisexpressedinKobservationthattechno-textilesturntailoringintoaproblemof“bre,not“gure(SusanneKuchler,Chapter8).Fibreliesbetweenthetworegisterswhichtraditionallyde“netheplaceoftailoring:“gureandfunction,substanceandornamentation,bodyandapparel.Intelligent“bres,whichcanrespondtoenvironmental(thatis,physicalconditionsby(forexample)changingtheirheat-retainingcapacitiesortheirsensitivitytolight,orbychangingpatternsorcolours,effectivelyThephraseisfromMarilynStrathern,DividedOrigins(ms.).SusanneKuchler,BindinginthePaci“c:TheCaseoftheMalanggan(1999)69(3)GillesDeleuze,Logiquedusens(Minuit,Paris,1969),p.302. 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 ALAINPOTTAGEmodulatethedistinctionbetween“gureandclothing,actualisingtheirrespectivepotentialities.ThiskindofongoingmodulationofrelationsandattachmentsisalsoevidencedbytheMelanesianexamples.Yupnoknottingsholdpoten-tialityintheirtexture;theyarestringsofknotsrepresentingancestralplacenames,eachknotbeingadeterminaterepresentationandyetitbeingunclearwhichplacenameitrepresents,sothatthetopologyrep-resentedbythenameshastobeactualisedbyeachreader.Andyetareadingcanmakeorbreakalife.Thequiltsarelayeredwith”owermotifs,allheldtogetherbythestitchedlinesofthreadvisibleasacontinuouslineontheundersideofaquilt(SusanneKuchler,Chapter8).LiketheMalanggan,theyalsoarticulateco-existingprop-ertyrights,becausethedesignofeachlayerbelongstoadifferentwoman,household,orclan.Inthecaseof,whichtransposetheoldlayeringsofbarkclothwithlayeringsofcotton,itisnoexaggerationtosaythattheavailabilityofanewclothwithnewtensilequalitiesfacilitatedadevelopmentofsurfaceandofnewformsofprop-erty(emphasisadded)byenablingmanylayersorattachmentstobe(re)collectedtogether.Butinsomerespects,thesurfaceofthequiltsisdifferentfromthesurfaceoftheMalanggan.Butthefactthatorderedrelationsare(re)collectedinasinglesurfacetransformstheirpotentialities.Farfrombeingthe“xedco-ordinatesofaterrain,theybecomeliketheknotsinYupnocord;thatis,theyacquiretherelationalvaluethatisattributedbyeachreadingofthesurface,oreachtimeafreshattachmentismadethroughthesurfaceofthequilt.Soalthoughinonesensethequilttellsanorderedstoryofproprietaryorpos-sessoryattachments,inanothersenseitisaresourceormediumthroughwhichtheseconventionalisedattachmentsaredissolvedintoa”uxthatis“xedonlybythemakingofnewattachments.Thecomplexagencyofbody,astransposedtotheagencyoftheMalanggan,islocatedinthemediumofsurface.Inmycontribution,theexplorationofbodilypotentialandimagesoforganicactionshiftsfromsurfaceplanestointeriorisedprocesses.Variouslegislativeandbio-ethicalinterventionshavesoughttoinsti-tutegenesequencesastheheritageofhumanity.ThisnotionofgeneticpatrimonyattemptstodomesticatethepotentialitieselicitedbybiotechnologybycharacterisinggenesintermsoftheolddivisionForacritiqueoftheattributionofintelligencetomaterials,seeBernadetteBensaude-Vincent,Elogedumixte(Harmattan,Paris,1998). 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Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 betweenpersonsandthings.Ironically,theold(Western)legalinsti-tutionsofinheritancefreelydeployedsomequitesophisticatedtech-niquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationwhichenabledthedivisionbetweenpersonsandthingstobeaf“rmedasaprimordialcondi-tionwhileatthesametime,inpractice,thatdivisionwassupersededbyciphers(intention,money,writing,blood,andland)whichwereequivocalorhybridinthesensethatciphersfromeitherregistercouldbeactualisedeitheraspersonsorasthings.Buttheargumentforgeneticpatrimonypassesoverthisalternativehistoryofinheritance.Indeed,Isuggestthatgenesareapprehendedastheultimateobjectsofinher-itance.Whereastheoldinstitutionsofinheritancewerethoroughlyimprobableconstructions,whoseapparentstabilitywassecuredbytheircapacitytometabolisethecontingenciesofkinshipandsociety,ourgeneticinheritanceisbasedonanaturalforceratherthananinsti-tutionaleffect(Kuchler,Chapter8).Thisrepresentationdependsonwhatcouldbecalledthejuridi“cationofgeneaction;thatis,therep-resentationofgenesasnormativeforces.Thealltoofamiliarcharacter-isationofthehumangenomeasthealphabetofhumanlifecollapsesbodiesintogenesbythefamiliarrouteofalinearprocessoftransla-tionandtranscription:thepersoncomestoincarnateasupra-individualvalue.Thisgivesrisetoacomplexchoreographyofpersoni“cationandrei“cation,andmycontributionfocusesonthemodelofinstitutionaltimewhichorganisesthatchoreography.Thetemporalschemeofinher-itancepre-exists(andperhapsinforms)thescienceofgenetics,sothatajuridicalmodeloftimeislocatedbothinnormandnature,lawandbiology.Castintheconceptuallanguageusedatthebeginningofthisintroduction,onemightsaythatthetemporalorderoftheinstitutionisstructuredbydivisionsratherthandistinctions.But,althoughtheinsti-tutionpresupposesanexternal,objective,temporalhorizon,ineffecttheinstitutionthehorizonuponwhichitfoundsitsoperations.Theprototypeforthisoperationisfoundintheprimordiallegalmythofinstitutionalorigin…authochthony…inwhichtheessentialoriginoftheinstitutionisconstitutedbyitscurrentoperations.And,farfromreinforcingtheoldfantasyofinheritance,lawsencounterwithgenes,andhencewithmolecularbiology,confrontsitwithamodelofself-productionwhichhasalwaysbeenthemotorforceoflegalinstitutions.Lawmightbedescribedastheoriginalbiotechnology,butonlybecauseitproducedhumanlifebytechniquesofpersoni“cationandrei“cationwhichwerejustasradicallycreativeasthetechniquesofcommercialbiotechnology. 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