B ased T rain C ontrol Systems IRSTE Seminar NEW DELHI 28 th AUG 2015 Topics for discussion Introduction High Level System Architecture Operating Modes CBTC Functionality Hyderabad Metro Rail Project over view ID: 549478
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Slide1
Communication Based Train Control Systems
IRSTE Seminar NEW DELHI
28
th
AUG 2015Slide2
Topics for discussion.IntroductionHigh Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide3
Topics for discussion.IntroductionThales.CBTC.High Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide4
Mission statement
WHEREVER SAFETY AND
SECURITY ARE
CRITICAL, THALES DELIVERS.
TOGETHER, WE INNOVATE WITH OUR CUSTOMERS
TO BUILD SMARTER SOLUTIONS. EVERYWHERE.Slide5
Our mission
Get
the most out
of
our
infrastructure
Optimise operational efficiency
Increase passenger satisfaction
Stand-alone products/solutions:
Signalling
or Supervision or Telecoms or Ticketing
or Road tolling, etc.
Integrated solutions for turnkey projects:
Signalling
/Supervision/Telecoms/Fare Collection
including interfaces with equipment and vehicles
Thales can address 2 different types
of customer requests:Slide6
Our core values
Going
for the
long
term
Nurturing
a
partnership
approach
with
customers
Reliable
and
trusted trustworthy
Cultivating
expertise
In-
depth
knowledge
of
customers
’ operating
parctices
An international pool of
experienced
technical
specialists
Managing
complexity
Ability
to design and
deliver
complex
engineering
projects
Project management
skills
and
processes
to
tackle
successfully
the most
complex
turnkey
implementations
Human
and
financial
resourcesSlide7
Thales
Employees
61,000
billion euros
Group
Revenues
in 2014
13
countries
Global
presence
56
Self-
funded
R&D
675
m
illion euros
GROUND TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS
A WORLDWIDE PRESENCE
Over
100
Customers
in more
than
50 countries
26
Large local centres all over the world
7,000
Employees
worldwide
5
CAPABILITiES
FOR A COMPLETE TRANSPORTATION OFFER
5
SIGNALLING FOR MAINLINES
REVENUE COLLECTION SYSTEMS
SIGNALLING FOR URBAN RAIL
SERVICES
INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPERVISION
THALES GROUND TRANSPORTATION MARKETS
URBAN RAIL
BUS
MAINLINE RAIL
TRAMWAY AND LRT
ROADSlide8
Thales Ground Transportation Systems by the numbers60 metro lines over 30 major cities secured
by the Thales Seltrac® CBTC systems
3 billion
passengers
carried
annually
by the
ThalesSelTrac
®
CBTC systems
Thales supervises more than
100 metro lines in 46 cities
throughout the world
16,000
km of track equipped with the Thales AlTrac ETCS
solutions .
219,949
Thales rail
field
equipment
installed worldwide.15% traction energy savings with Thales train management system.
ARAMIS
Traffic
Management System
is
currently
controlling
:
72,000
kms of route,
52,000
trains per
day in 16 countries of which 4 are total national
networks.
Up to
500,000 control points supervised from a single OCCReal-time video surveillance transmission to OCC
from all transport modes.Over 50 million ticketing transactions in 100
cities processed daily by Thales.Slide9
Thales worldwide Main Line references
Austria
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Finland
France
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
In Europe
Algeria
Australia
China
India
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Tunisia
Outside
EuropeSlide10
Urban Transportation References.
Santiago
Panama
Mexico
Vancouver
San Francisco
Las Vegas
Sao Paulo
Santos
Santo Dominguo
Montreal
Toronto
New York & JFK
Cairo
Mecca
Algiers
Johannesbourg
Caracas
Dubaï
Istanbul
Ankara
Mumbai
Hyderabad
New Delhi
Bangalore
Sydney
Auckland
Brisbane
Bangkok
Manila
Kuala Lumpur
Singapore
Taïwan
Budang
,
Busan
, Incheon
China
Beijing
Chongqing
Guangzhou
Hefei
Hong
Kong
Nanjing
Nanchang
Shanghai
Shenzhen
Wuhan
China
USA LRT
Detroit
Newark
Orlando
Tampa
Washington & Dulles
Jacksonville
Edmonton
Ottawa
Tokyo
Doha
100 CBTC
projects
in 46
cities
THALES
provides
supervision and communications solutions in more
than
20 countries
Signalling
Integrated
Communications
and
Supervision
Ticketing & Tolling
Dublin
London
Manchester
Newcastle
Bergen
Oslo
Copenhagen
Lisbon
Coimbra
Bilbao
Madrid
Marseille
Paris
Strasbourg
Brussels
Lausanne
Turin
Brescia
Palermo
Napoli
Florence
Milan
Thessalonica
Istanbul
Ankara
Palermo
Athens
Denmark
Netherlands
Mt St Michel
Lyon
Nantes
CBTC signalling
Integrated Communications and Supervision
Fare collectionSlide11
Thales, a trusted partnerSlide12
Topics for discussion.IntroductionThales.CBTC.High Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide13
Introduction - Public Authorities Challenges
2,5
b.
7
9
28 %
50
%
77
%
Urban
population
(billions
)
World
population
(billions)
Urbanization ratio
Source : UNDESA
Growing urbanisation
1950
2010
2050
Train control for urban railSlide14
Introduction - Metro Operators ChallengesIncrease public transport attractivenessOffer appealing comfort & designIncrease service quality (punctuality, frequency, reliability and availability) Highest safety levelReduce life cycle costsLess trackside infrastructure to reduce maintenance costs
Scalable systems and expansion capabilitiesFace traffic increaseBuild reliable and efficient new lines
Improve capacity of existing lines
Control & optimise the cost per passenger
Unattended operations
Reduce labour costs with increased automation
Increase performance, cost effectiveness & Services
Train control for urban rail
Reduce energy consumption
Optimized braking curves
Regenerative braking
Smooth driving modeSlide15
Introduction - Thales SelTrac CBTC
Meets diverse requirements including continuous ATP,
cab-signaling
, or driverless operations
Applies to new infrastructures or
resignaling
Applicable to any type or size of rolling stock
Incorporates built-in computer redundancy
Can deliver headways of under 60 seconds, safely
Provides high reliability and availability
Optimizes maintenance and life-cycle costs
Energy saving functions
Fully automated integrated and upgradeable Communications Based Train Control solutions
Train control for urban railSlide16
Introduction - CBTC Applications
Heavy urban rail lines:
Dense traffic, dedicated & separate lines
Light rail:
Medium traffic, dedicated lines
Automated People Movers
(APM)
Urban monorails
Tramways :
Semi-dedicated
lines with high density
traffic
Urban & suburban networks:
Shared
with main lines traffic.
Train control for urban railSlide17
Introduction - CBTC: Benefits
Ensure safe train
movement with or with out Driver
Maximise line throughput/capacity & quality of service
San Francisco’s
MUNI Metro:
from 23 trains per hour to a sustained
48
with the overlay of CBTC
Train control for urban rail
Reduce overall energy consumption
Energy savings of up to
18
%
Sky Train
in Vancouver delivers
9.5
passenger
kilometers
for every kilowatt-hour, against the North American average of
5.2
Slide18
CBTC: Benefits
Reduce Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
2004 APTA subway per passenger operating cost data
Average cost per passenger:
US
$2.39
Vancouver
Sky Train
cost
per passenger
US $0.86
Train control for urban rail
Facilitate overall metro system operationSlide19
Thales CBTC Proven Performance
Vancouver
, Detroit, London DLR,
Kuala
Lumpur, New York JFK Air Train, Las Vegas Monorail, Hong Kong Disney Resort, Dubai Red and Green Line, Mecca,
Istanbul , Washington Dulles Airport APM, Seoul Sin Bundang ..
London
DLR
Revenue
1992
San
Francisco Muni
Revenue
1992
London Tubes Lines
Jubilee line
Revenue
2009
Northern
line (phase 1)
Revenue
2014
Paris Line 13
Revenue 2015
Paris Lines interlocking replacement (L11, 3bis, 1…)
Revenue
2006
Santiago L1 & 5 interlocking replacement
Revenue 2009
Edmonton
Revenue
2015
Singapore
Revenue
2016
New York Flushing line
Revenue
2014
Ampang
line Revenue 2016
Disney World Florida Revenue 2015
Proven for High Reliability Driverless Operations
Proven
Resignaling
Experience
Train control for urban railSlide20
Operational Flexibility: Rolling Stock Independence
Additional
rolling stock, with significantly different performance characteristics, can be easily integrated, with no changes to existing infrastructure.
Signal
design not constrained by worst-performing train.
Adtranz, Alstom, Ansaldo-Breda, Bombardier, CAF, ChangChun,Cammell, Kawasaki, Kinki Sharyo, Mitsubishi, Rotem, Siemens,
Vossloh
, Von Roll, etc.
SelTrac CBTC runs each train in accordance with its performance characteristics
SelTrac CBTC Systems are installed on, and control rolling stock from many suppliers:
Train control for urban railSlide21
Topics for discussion.IntroductionHigh Level System Architecture, System Components, Automatic Train Supervision (ATS), and
Zone Controller (ZC),
Solid State Interlocking (SSI) Overview,
Data Communication Subsystem (DCS)
Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC),
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide22
High Level system Architecture - CBTC .High Level Architecture.
DCS - Data communication system, ZC – Zone controller,
SSI – Solid state Interlocking,
VOBC – Vital Onboard Computer,
AP – Access Point,
IFB – Interface BoardSlide23
System Components
Primary Components: Automatic Train Supervision (ATS),
Typical Equipments:
Redundant Central ATS Servers
Redundant Local ATS Servers
ATS Workstations
ATS Timetable Compiler Workstation
ATS Maintenance Workstation
ATS MIMIC Workstation
ATS Datalogger
ATS Playback Server
DCS Backbone (Server, Switch)
ATS Over view
Top level management component performing
Schedule and headway regulation
Automatic and Manual routing
Data logging
Interfacing with external systems
Operator control
Responsible for monitoring
System status and display.
Configuration
Redundant Central Servers per Corridor (located in CER)
Redundant Depot Servers (located in DER)
Redundant Local Servers at IXL (located in SER)
Non-redundant Server per Corridor (located in RSS/BOCC)
Workstations (located in OCC, DCC, SCR, RSS/BOCC)Slide24
System Components – Way SideZone Controller/Solid State Interlocking (ZC/SSI), Typical Equipments:Redundant Zone Controller
Redundant Solid State Interlocking
Input/Output Ports
Changeover Switch
Interface Board
ECPC
DCS Backbone (Server, Switch)
Field Elements (Signals, Points,
Transponder Tags, Proximity Plates)Slide25
System Components - Zone Controller Over view.
Core component of wayside vital train control performs
Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
Movement Authority determination
Interlocking functions (in CBTC mode)
Responsible for controlling and monitoring:
Status of field devices in its territory using IFB
Trains in its territory via continuous communication with CBTC on-board equipment and DCS network
Trains’ access entering or exiting its territory from neighboring Zone Controllers or Solid State Interlocking area
Redundancy architecture with 2x2oo2 configuration
Redundant 2 times 2oo2 (2x2oo2) ensures high availability of at least two CPUs
Notion of Active & Passive ZC (ZCa, ZCb)
Automatic switchover from Active to Passive for instance of CPU failure(s)Slide26
System Components - Way SideSolid State Interlocking
SSI Over view
Core component of wayside vital train control performing
Interlocking functions (in Fallback mode)
Responsible for Interlocking Functions:
Route setting, locking, releasing
Point movement, locking, and position monitoring
Flank protection
Approach locking
Others…
Responsible for controlling and monitoring:
Status of field devices in its territory using Interlocking Module (IM) and Field Element Controller (FEC)
Status of block occupancies using Axle Counter Evaluator (ACE)
Trains’ access entering or exiting its territory from neighboring Zone Controllers or Solid State Interlocking area
2oo3 Architecture
IM operates in 2oo3 architecture
Fully operational in case of failure of one unitSlide27
System Components - DCS OverviewCore Component of CBTC communication responsible for Secure, bi-directional, and dependable communication between subsystems
Transfer of data and information between subsystem using wired and/or wireless means using Security protocol
Utilizing security protocol to protect CBTC equipment from potential attacks
DCS
Blocks
Wayside
Wired Network
Interconnection of LANs at each station for wayside-to-wayside communication
Provide access to radio network for communication with trains
On-Board Network
Provide VOBC access to radio network for communication with wayside
Provide VOBC access for on-board to on-board communication
Radio Network
Consists of Wayside Radio Unit (WRU) on trackside and Mobile Radio Unit (MRU) on-board trainSlide28
System Components - DCS Overview On BoardPrimary Component: Data Communication System (DCS)Typical Equipments-On BoardRedundant Mobile Radio Unit (MRU)Antenna at each end .Typical Equipments -Track side:
Access Points (Antenna)
Wayside Radio Unit (WRU)Slide29
Redundancy ArchitectureWayside Radio Unit (WRU) layout provides geographical redundancy
Onboard
radio provides diversity through antenna on each end
System Components - DCS Overview On BoardSlide30
System Components - Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC)
Typical Equipments:
-
Redundant VOBC,
Train Operator Display (TOD), Transponder Interrogator Unit (TIU),
Local Data Collector (LDC),
Speed Sensors, Accelerometers, Proximity Sensors.
VOBC Over view.
Core component of onboard vital train control performs
Driverless Train Operation
ATP & ATO functionality
Safe train movement in Controlled mode
Automatic
Turnback
Station stopping
Responsible for
Generating safe stopping location from destination and/or obstruction
Commanding Emergency Brakes for violation of Movement Authority and ATP
Automatic Door Operation.
Redundancy architecture with 2x2oo2 configuration
Redundant 2 times 2oo2 (2x2oo2) ensures high availability of at least two CPUs
Notion of Active & Passive VOBC
Automatic switchover from Active to Passive for instance of CPU failure(s)Slide31
Topics for discussion.IntroductionHigh Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC/Fallback)
CBTC/Fallback Switchover,
ATP Functionality.Slide32
Operating Modes - CBTC/FallbackPrimary Operating Mode: CBTC (ZC active, SSI inactive)ATS used to send commands to ZC, and receive status from ZC
ATS used to send commands to VOBC, and receive status from VOBC
ZC responsible for determining all routing and interlocking decisions within its territory
VOBC is responsible for operating according to define route and adhering to ATP & ATO
Train operation can occur in Controlled / Non-Controlled modes
Secondary Operating Mode: Fallback (ZC inactive, SSI active)
ATS u
sed
to send
commands
to SSI, and receive status from
SSI
ECPC used to send route and point commands to SSI, and receive status from SSI
SSI responsible
for determining all routing and interlocking decisions within its
territory
Train operation can occur in Non-Controlled mode onlySlide33
Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback SwitchoverCBTC Fallback Transition StepsObjective: To provide capability of operating the Metro with Primary system down
Transition is necessary as a result of non-recoverable complete ZC failure (
eg
. redundancy failure)
Controlled mode trains are Emergency Braked
Non-Controlled mode trains are requested to stop from OCC
ZC is powered down and CBTC change-over box is switched from CBTC to Fallback at Interlocking station
SSI (IM) is started by powering on the CPUs
After startup, SSI will provide status of field elements to ATS
For previously Controlled trains, Control Operator re-arranges train spacing according to fixed block operating rules
Control Operator sets the appropriate route and follow Manual Operating procedures to continue operation in Fallback mode (line-of-sight)Slide34
Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback SwitchoverFallback CBTC Transition StepsObjective: To revert System back to Primary mode once failure has been normalized
Transition
is mandatory* once ZC failure has been
normalized
Trains are requested to stop by Control Operator
SSI (IM) is
powered down and CBTC change-over box is switched from
Fallback to CBTC at
Interlocking
station
ZC is powered on
After startup,
ZC will obtain status of field elements from FEC and will provide their status to ATS
Blocks occupied by Train will be displayed as Non-Communicating Obstruction (NCO) on ATS
NCO is cleared by driving train in Non-Controlled mode out of the affected block
Standard Operating procedure is followed to initiate movement in Controlled mode
*
Operation can continue in Fallback mode, but major Operator interventions in Central and Onboard are required. Transition to CBTC mode would eliminate the operator intervention. Slide35
Topics for discussion.IntroductionHigh Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
ATP
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide36
CBTC FunctionalitiesCBTC Functionalities.ATPATOATS.This presentation will discuss only the ATP functionality in detail, as the discussions can be useful in adapting the technology for the already dense Sub-Urban Services on metro cities like Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Delhi.Slide37
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality. Train Speed Determination Functionality.Wheel Diameter CalibrationUpon VOBC start up, default wheel size (defined in database) is used until wheel calibration is performed
Successful wheel calibration requires traveling through pair of calibration transponders 100m apartVOBC calculates wheel diameter through
inputs from two speed sensors (number of pulses measured), distance between transponders and pulse per revolution defined
Diameter is accepted if it is within tolerance (between 780mm and 860mm)
Wheel calibration is in effect when VOBC loses position
Wheel calibration is not in effect when VOBC is powered off, or is resetSlide38
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality.- (cont’d)Wheel Rotation & Travel DirectionDirection of wheel rotation is positive or negative, depending on the inputs from speed sensorsTravel direction is determined to be either:Guideway
Direction 0 (GD0)Guideway Direction 1 (GD1)
Direction is determined once VOBC has established position
Zero Speed, Stationary and Position Determination
VOBC provides zero speed indication to RS if speed is less than 0.5km/h for 200ms
Stationary is determined when zero speed is detected for 400msSlide39
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality (cont’d)Traveled Distance, Speed & AccelerationLoss of Position causes VOBC to apply Emergency BrakesTwo speed sensors and two accelerometers are used to:Calculate distance travelled
Calculate train speed
Calculate acceleration
Inputs from speed sensors and accelerometers are compared to previous cycle and with system valid ranges to check plausibility
Implausible data is logged by VOBC
Persistent implausible data will result in loss of position
Slip / Slide is detected by comparing speed from speed sensors and accelerometers
Accelerometer inputs are used to determine speed for slip/slideSlide40
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality (cont’d)Zero Speed, Stationary and Position DeterminationVOBC provides zero speed indication to RS if speed is less than 0.5km/h for 200msStationary is determined when zero speed is detected for 400ms
If difference between two wheel speeds is greater than 4km/h, then it will cause loss of position and EB.
If difference between two wheel speed is 2km/h for 1s (application cycle being 70ms), then it will cause loss of position and EB.
Resolution of speed is 10mm/s.
Maximum allowed change in speed in 0.196m/s (based on acceleration of 1m/s^2)
Max acceleration defined at 2.8m/s^2Slide41
ATP Functionality - Train Position Determination Functionality (cont’d)Position is determined based onLocation of last transponder read
Number of revolutions crossed since reading last transponder
Measured distance is compared with distance in database
Train traversal over Point with “disturbed” status will result in loss of position
Detection of first invalid transponder not in its path implies crosstalk
Detection of valid transponder concludes crosstalk
While the train position is established, if the VOBC detects a transponder and this transponder cannot be found on a possible path for the train that is consistent with its current, calculated position (within a reasonable distance), then the VOBC concludes that it must have detected transponder crosstalk from an adjacent track.
Once VOBC concludes crosstalk, any other crosstalk transponders detected later on are ignored. If crosstalk is not concluded, then another additional crosstalk transponder will result in unknown position (EB).Slide42
ATP Functionality - Train Position Determination Functionality (cont’d)Train Length and Train ImageActive Cab determines Forward travel directionVehicle type is determine based on VID plug
VID is checked with valid ranges in VOBC databaseTrain ID is determined based on VID
Information required for determining train length, front & rear upon entry
VOBC ID
Stationary status
Coupler status
Orientation
Reference position
Train Integrity must be established and train must be stationary to determine train length. Vital ID (VID) plug is located at back of VOBC rack. Loss of TI after establishing position results in train image being “unknown”. Once TI is restored, the image is restored.Slide43
ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality. (cont’d)Communicating Train (CT) TrackingVOBC reports position to ATS & ZCVOBC sends front & rear position, rollback distance and positional uncertainty to ZC
Concept of Extended CT positionPositional Uncertainty used to determine Extended CT position
Used to represent area that could be occupied by train
Example: exiting a block, traversing over Point
Concept of Contracted CT position
Position Uncertainty used to determine Contracted CT position
Used to represent minimum area that must be occupied by train
Example: sweeping a NCO
Extended/Contracted CT position is transparent to OperatorSlide44
ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)Non-Communicating Train (NCT) TrackingSecondary train detection is used to detect NCTTwo main components of NCT tracking:Vital tracking by ZC
Responsible for tracking obstructions using NCOs
Non-Vital tracking by ATS
Responsible for tracking train IDs on ATS line overview
NCT image timer used to provide capability of VOBC to recover communication with ZC
Example of NCT
CT loses communication and last known position becomes NCT position
NCT timer is run by ZC (60s)
Upon completion of NCT timer, ZC creates NCO on block occupied by NCT trainSlide45
ATP Functionality - Interlocking FunctionalityRoute LockingZC route reservation provides route locking where guideway elements within route are reserved.
Approach Locking
Element of the guideway authorized for a train cannot be released if the route is cancelled
When a route is cancelled, movement authority is pulled back to train front.
Approach locking will remain until train stops or timer expires
Point Locking
Point locking is activated based on route reservation over said Point
Overpoint locking may be activated when CT or NCT overlapping the Point Zone, or NCO overlapping overpoint blocks
Automatic point movement is prohibited if overpoint locking is activated
Manual point movement is permitted if overpoint locking is activated (
eg
: to sweep NCO)Slide46
ATP Functionality - Interlocking Functionality - (cont’d)Flank ProtectionLocking of point in a particular position to protect the flank of another route to prevent sideswipe hazard with a train
LMA will not be set if Flank conditions are not satisfied for the routePoint Control & Supervision
Position and status of Points are always monitored by IFB to ZC/SSI
ATS provides capability to move Points automatically or manually
Conflict Zone
Prevents simultaneous routing of multiple trains through a particular area of
guideway
Prevents conflicting train movements at
turnbacks
and crossovers
Two configurations
Single train reservation
Fleeting train reservationSlide47
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Overspeed ProtectionVOBC determines authorized speed based on ATP speed profile and defined speed restrictionsATP speed profile is calculated based on:
ATP speed profileTemporary Speed Restriction
Maximum speed for current train operating mode
End of movement authoritySlide48
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Overspeed ProtectionVOBC adheres to ATP speed profileViolation of ATP speed profile results in over speed, and a warning alarm is sounded on the TOD
Violation of EB curve results in application of Emergency BrakesOverspeed Alarms
Overspeed 1 Alarm: Raised for ATO train when speed is approaching Authorized Speed
Overspeed 2 Alarm: Raised for ATO train when speed is greater than ATO Target SpeedSlide49
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Rollback ProtectionVOBC supervises movement in opposite direction than commanded travel direction in Controlled and Non-Controlled modesRollback of more than 3m results in application of Emergency Brakes
Obstructed MotionVOBC detects motion obstruction if train does not travel a minimum of 1m within 5s after propulsion has been commanded
Emergency Brakes are applied when VOBC detects Motion Obstruction
Motion Obstruction is cleared when Emergency Brakes are resetSlide50
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Departure Interlock and AuthorizationVOBC provides Departure authorization in Controlled modeAuthorization is provided when the following conditions are met:
The dwell has expiredTrain Operator has pressed the departure button (for ATO mode only)
Train doors are detected as being closed and locked and disabled
PSD conditions are met
LMA is provided and is greater than zero
“Train Hold” is not in effect
Emergency Brake is not commanded
Emergency Brake is not appliedSlide51
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Emergency Brake (EB) ControlOnce EB is activated, it can be released only when train is stationary and condition causing EB to be activated has been eliminatedConditions resulting in application of EB
Speed exceeding Target speed plus over speed tolerance
Train position is unknown in Controlled mode
Train passes LMA in Controlled mode
Rollback tolerance is exceeded
Loss of Train Integrity is detected
Invalid operating mode is selected
Unscheduled door opening
Uncommanded motion in ATO mode
Obstructed motion
Crawlback maneuver selected when Crawlback is not authorizedSlide52
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Crawlback FunctionalityCrawlback is a low speed maneuver in Reverse direction to align at platform in case of overshootOvershoot of less than 10m can be complemented with Crawlback. Train operator will be provided with message on TOD
System prevents Points within Crawlback area from being moved and prevents trains from being routed into Crawlback area
Train performing the Crawlback maneuver is fully protected by ZC
Crawlback speed is limited to 10km/h
Crawlback permitted when position is not established
Emergency Brakes applied when total distance travelled exceeds 10mSlide53
Topics for discussion.IntroductionHigh Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide54
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project.Thales CBTC System for Signaling.Project scope – design, supply, install, test and commission, provide training and DLP support for a radio based CBTC train control and signalling system for 3 new Corridors (lines) in Hyderabad India.Hyderabad Metro Lines 1, 2 & 3Greenfield project , 72 Km / 3 Lines/ 64 Stations
1 OCC / 1 BOCC / 2 Depots / 1 StablingRadio – based CBTC moving block solution with separate interlocking
Design headway 90 seconds
3 car Trains initially – 6 car Trains in future (mixed fleet). 57 Trains in initial fleet
Status of Works in progress, Thales have already demonstrated the successful operational trials of this system over the stage 1of the Hyderabad Metro rail Project between Nagole to Mettagudda, covering 10 Kms and with 7 Stations.Slide55
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project.Slide56
Topics for discussion.IntroductionHigh Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes
CBTC Functionality.
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Conclusion.Slide57
Conclusion - Communication Based Train Control solutions for IR.Indian Railways will in the future need to explore every technology and techniques in Railway signaling solutions to:Increase the Line capacity.Increase the Safety shield at higher speeds. Centralized control and management of Train operations.Provide/enhance the online Train running information to a passenger,
Integrate the Signaling, Telecommunication and Fare collection systems.While IR
already have plans to move from the fixed Block signaling to Automatic signaling in dense “A” routes, state of art proven technology will be needed to further increase the Train density and provide Automatic Train
Protection
As an overlay system on the existing signaling systems, ETCS Level 1 or Level 2 are available technologies that have been successfully implemented widely.
Radio based CBTC moving block provide an interesting option to consider on the Mumbai Metro system as an overlay on the existing system
.Slide58
Conclusion.Radio based Train Control technologies is a state of art and proven signaling solution for increasing the density (Reduction in headways, and increase in asset utilization capacity).The implementation of such systems for Metro Rail Projects should give the opportunity for the IR main line operators to explore these technologies and adapt it over the IR Mainline networks.Thales looks forward to sharing this knowledge and experience with IR in modeling solutions for the Indian railways.Slide59
Get the mostout of your infrastructureSlide60
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTIONSlide61
Back up slidesBack up SlidesSlide62
ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)Non-Communicating ObstructionsConditions when NCO is created:NCT train enters system where block adjacent to non-CBTC territory becomes occupied
NCT moves across blocks (a block is occupied and adjacent block has NCO)
CT loses communication with ZCSlide63
ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)Train Tracking FunctionalityCT NCT CTSlide64
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Train Tracking Functionality.NCT Tracking over Disturbed PointSlide65
ATP Functionality - Movement Authority Functionality. – (Cont’d) Limit of Movement Authority (LMA)LMA calculation with no Point
LMA calculation with PointSlide66
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Movement Authority FunctionalityLimit of Movement Authority (LMA)Conflicting bi-directional routingSlide67
ATP Functionality - Movement Authority Functionality (cont’d)Limit of Movement Authority (LMA)Two trains following each otherSlide68
ATP Functionality (cont’d)Movement Authority FunctionalityLimit of Movement Authority (LMA)Obstruction within route