Chapter 7 Moderate Ecocentrism What would a
Description: Chapter 7 Moderate Ecocentrism What would a satisfactory general theory of environmental ethics look like? According to Bassham, above all: a) It would be realistic (avoiding the kind of utopian or extreme thinking characteristic of so many
Related Topics
Download Presentation
"Chapter 7 Moderate Ecocentrism What would a" is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this website for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.
Presentation Transcript
slide1. Chapter 7 Moderate Ecocentrism<br>
slide2. What would a satisfactory general theory of environmental ethics look like?<br>
slide3. According to Bassham, above all: a) It would be realistic (avoiding the kind of utopian or extreme thinking characteristic of so many leading theories).<br>
slide4. Features of a satisfactory environmental ethic (cont’d): In short, it must be one that could appeal to working environmental scientists and policy makers, as well as to ordinary citizens.<br>
slide5. Features of a satisfactory environmental ethic (cont’d): b) it would reject the kind of extreme anthropocentrism that has long characterized Western thinking about the Environment.<br>
slide6. Bassham argues that the best general environmental ethic would be a form of “moderate ecocentrism.”<br>
slide7. Such a theory would feature four basic claims:<br>
slide8. four basic claims (cont’d): 1. All living things have inherent worth and deserve moral respect and consideration.<br>
slide9. four basic claims (cont’d): 2. Some living things have greater inherent worth than others. In particular, human beings have a special dignity and inherent worth.<br>
slide10. four basic claims (cont’d): 3. Some ecological wholes, such as species and ecosystems, have inherent worth.<br>
slide11. four basic claims (cont’d): 4. in environmental matters, Our primary concern should be with the health and well-being of ecological wholes.<br>
slide12. Support for claim 1, that all living things have inherent worth: All living things are complex miracles of evolution and “teleological centers of life” with a good of their own.<br>
slide13. Support for claim 1 (cont’d): That all life forms have inherent (i.e., intrinsic) value is supported by “the last man” thought experiment (see page 108).<br>
slide14. Support for claim 2, that some living things have greater inherent worth than others:<br>
slide15. Support for claim 2 (cont’d): 1. While all living things have inherent worth in virtue of having-a-good-of its-own, there are other attributes that confer intrinsic value (e.g., sentience, rationality, moral awareness, and a capacity for aesthetic appreciation). Some living things have such qualities, others lack them.<br>
slide16. Support for claim 2 (cont’d): 2. recognizing that not all life forms have equal inherent worth allows us to make commonsense distinctions (e.g., that chimpanzees should be favored over pathogens that threaten their extinction).<br>
slide17. Support for claim 2 (cont’d): 3. That humans have a particular dignity in earth’s community of life is rooted in our possession of higher capacities (e.g., rationality and moral awareness) and in our ability to create higher forms of value (e.g., scientific understanding, self-awareness, and moral growth).<br>
slide18. Support for claim 3, that some ecological wholes have inherent value: 1. Ecological wholes often have greater value than individual living things.<br>
slide19. Support for claim 3 (cont’d): why? A) Preserving a species is more important than preserving an individual member of that species. When we lose a species, we lose a “form,” a unique and irreplaceable biological template.<br>
slide20. Support for claim 3 (cont’d): B) Ecosystems are the engines of evolution, the womb of life. Destroying an ecosystem is thus a kind of “superkilling” with consequences far greater than the loss of an individual organism.<br>
slide21. Support for claim 4, that our primary concern should be with the health and well-being of ecological wholes:<br>
slide22. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): 1. As with claim 3, claim 4 is supported by the fact that ecological wholes often have greater value than individual organisms.<br>
slide23. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): 2. Focusing on ecological wholes simplifies environmental policymaking and generally produces better outcomes.<br>
slide24. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): why? 1. We usually have a pretty good idea what benefits species and ecosystems, but are often quite wrong about what would benefit an individual organism.<br>
slide25. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): 2. Because “everything is connected to everything else” in ways that are often complex or unknown, we often mess things up when we focus on the welfare of individual organisms.<br>
slide26. Final issue: How well does Bassham’s moderate ecocentrism stand up to standard criticisms of ecocentrism?<br>
slide27. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Criticism #1: Only individual organisms can have interests or moral standing.<br>
slide28. Standard criticisms (cont’d): response: Both species and ecosystems have interests and moral standing.<br>
slide29. Standard criticisms (cont’d): They have interests because they can be healthy or unhealthy, sick or thriving.<br>
slide30. Standard criticisms (cont’d): They have moral standing because they have interests and in virtue of the unique forms of value noted earlier (e.g., ecosystems are “wombs of life”).<br>
slide31. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Criticism #2: Ecocentrism is an indefensible form of “environmental fascism” (Regan).<br>
slide32. Standard criticisms (cont’d): response: Moderate ecocentrism embraces sensible holism, not eco-fascism.<br>
slide33. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Moderate ecocentrism does not claim that: * ecological wholes must always be favored over individual organisms.<br>
slide34. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Moderate ecocentrism does not claim that: * all organisms have equal inherent value (thus allowing us to favor certain species even at the cost of some environmental harms).<br>
slide35. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Moderate ecocentrism does not claim that: * Humans should regard themselves merely as co-equal “plain citizens” of earth’s biotic community. For reasons noted, humans have a greater inherent worth that allows us—in environmentally responsible ways—to prioritize human interests, even in ways that may sometimes harm the environment (e.g., by building cities and dams).<br>
slide36. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Criticism #3: Ecocentrism is “misanthropic” (i.e., hostile to humans) because if “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community,” as Leopold says, huge sacrifices of human welfare would be required.<br>
slide37. Standard criticisms (cont’d): response: Moderate ecocentrism, while recognizing that all life forms have value and that ecological health should be a prime concern, allows us to favor human interests in ways that make a high quality of human civilization possible.<br>
slide2. What would a satisfactory general theory of environmental ethics look like?<br>
slide3. According to Bassham, above all: a) It would be realistic (avoiding the kind of utopian or extreme thinking characteristic of so many leading theories).<br>
slide4. Features of a satisfactory environmental ethic (cont’d): In short, it must be one that could appeal to working environmental scientists and policy makers, as well as to ordinary citizens.<br>
slide5. Features of a satisfactory environmental ethic (cont’d): b) it would reject the kind of extreme anthropocentrism that has long characterized Western thinking about the Environment.<br>
slide6. Bassham argues that the best general environmental ethic would be a form of “moderate ecocentrism.”<br>
slide7. Such a theory would feature four basic claims:<br>
slide8. four basic claims (cont’d): 1. All living things have inherent worth and deserve moral respect and consideration.<br>
slide9. four basic claims (cont’d): 2. Some living things have greater inherent worth than others. In particular, human beings have a special dignity and inherent worth.<br>
slide10. four basic claims (cont’d): 3. Some ecological wholes, such as species and ecosystems, have inherent worth.<br>
slide11. four basic claims (cont’d): 4. in environmental matters, Our primary concern should be with the health and well-being of ecological wholes.<br>
slide12. Support for claim 1, that all living things have inherent worth: All living things are complex miracles of evolution and “teleological centers of life” with a good of their own.<br>
slide13. Support for claim 1 (cont’d): That all life forms have inherent (i.e., intrinsic) value is supported by “the last man” thought experiment (see page 108).<br>
slide14. Support for claim 2, that some living things have greater inherent worth than others:<br>
slide15. Support for claim 2 (cont’d): 1. While all living things have inherent worth in virtue of having-a-good-of its-own, there are other attributes that confer intrinsic value (e.g., sentience, rationality, moral awareness, and a capacity for aesthetic appreciation). Some living things have such qualities, others lack them.<br>
slide16. Support for claim 2 (cont’d): 2. recognizing that not all life forms have equal inherent worth allows us to make commonsense distinctions (e.g., that chimpanzees should be favored over pathogens that threaten their extinction).<br>
slide17. Support for claim 2 (cont’d): 3. That humans have a particular dignity in earth’s community of life is rooted in our possession of higher capacities (e.g., rationality and moral awareness) and in our ability to create higher forms of value (e.g., scientific understanding, self-awareness, and moral growth).<br>
slide18. Support for claim 3, that some ecological wholes have inherent value: 1. Ecological wholes often have greater value than individual living things.<br>
slide19. Support for claim 3 (cont’d): why? A) Preserving a species is more important than preserving an individual member of that species. When we lose a species, we lose a “form,” a unique and irreplaceable biological template.<br>
slide20. Support for claim 3 (cont’d): B) Ecosystems are the engines of evolution, the womb of life. Destroying an ecosystem is thus a kind of “superkilling” with consequences far greater than the loss of an individual organism.<br>
slide21. Support for claim 4, that our primary concern should be with the health and well-being of ecological wholes:<br>
slide22. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): 1. As with claim 3, claim 4 is supported by the fact that ecological wholes often have greater value than individual organisms.<br>
slide23. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): 2. Focusing on ecological wholes simplifies environmental policymaking and generally produces better outcomes.<br>
slide24. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): why? 1. We usually have a pretty good idea what benefits species and ecosystems, but are often quite wrong about what would benefit an individual organism.<br>
slide25. Support for claim 4 (cont’d): 2. Because “everything is connected to everything else” in ways that are often complex or unknown, we often mess things up when we focus on the welfare of individual organisms.<br>
slide26. Final issue: How well does Bassham’s moderate ecocentrism stand up to standard criticisms of ecocentrism?<br>
slide27. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Criticism #1: Only individual organisms can have interests or moral standing.<br>
slide28. Standard criticisms (cont’d): response: Both species and ecosystems have interests and moral standing.<br>
slide29. Standard criticisms (cont’d): They have interests because they can be healthy or unhealthy, sick or thriving.<br>
slide30. Standard criticisms (cont’d): They have moral standing because they have interests and in virtue of the unique forms of value noted earlier (e.g., ecosystems are “wombs of life”).<br>
slide31. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Criticism #2: Ecocentrism is an indefensible form of “environmental fascism” (Regan).<br>
slide32. Standard criticisms (cont’d): response: Moderate ecocentrism embraces sensible holism, not eco-fascism.<br>
slide33. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Moderate ecocentrism does not claim that: * ecological wholes must always be favored over individual organisms.<br>
slide34. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Moderate ecocentrism does not claim that: * all organisms have equal inherent value (thus allowing us to favor certain species even at the cost of some environmental harms).<br>
slide35. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Moderate ecocentrism does not claim that: * Humans should regard themselves merely as co-equal “plain citizens” of earth’s biotic community. For reasons noted, humans have a greater inherent worth that allows us—in environmentally responsible ways—to prioritize human interests, even in ways that may sometimes harm the environment (e.g., by building cities and dams).<br>
slide36. Standard criticisms (cont’d): Criticism #3: Ecocentrism is “misanthropic” (i.e., hostile to humans) because if “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community,” as Leopold says, huge sacrifices of human welfare would be required.<br>
slide37. Standard criticisms (cont’d): response: Moderate ecocentrism, while recognizing that all life forms have value and that ecological health should be a prime concern, allows us to favor human interests in ways that make a high quality of human civilization possible.<br>