Geopolitics, state capture and peak corruption.
Description: Geopolitics, state capture and peak corruption. Whats next for anticorruption in the Western Balkans? 12 October 2022, Brussels Daniela Mineva Senior Analyst Center for the Study of Democracy Zero hour: the war in Ukraine and the promise
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slide1. Geopolitics, state capture and peak corruption. What’s next for anticorruption in the Western Balkans?
12 October 2022, Brussels
Daniela Mineva
Senior Analyst
Center for the Study of Democracy<br>
slide2. Zero hour: the war in Ukraine and the promise of enlargement Geopolitics of anticorruption: how to help when no help is (officially?) requested?
Anticorruption should not slip from the agenda
The integrity of WB governments remains under serious stress.
Stalled momentum of anticorruption reforms.
State capture is influencing drafting, adoption and enforcement of government rules and regulations.
Yet, Western Balkan anticorruption strategies and EC’s assessment reports rarely address it.<br>
slide3. Official documents and institutions abound, unlike results AC strategies from the late 2010s are not updated and are of general nature, with no measurable targets.
New laws target sophisticated forms of corruption
However, law drafting is not sufficiently inclusive and transparent
Broad-mandated anticorruption institutions are vulnerable to:
being overwhelmed by complex enforcement tasks;
being captured by special interests.
Lack of reliable information to identify the reasons for the handful of convictions.
CSOs are among the few running engines of anticorruption, but used as a token of “inclusiveness” rather than a stakeholder.
Dominant role of oligarchs in domestic media -> low media freedom.<br>
slide4. Principle corruption assessment indexes from the Corruption Monitoring System<br>
slide5. Corruption pressure: up it goes again Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2021.<br>
slide6. State Capture Assessment Diagnostics (SCAD)<br>
slide7. State capture vulnerability is high Source: SELDI SCAD, 2020.<br>
slide8. Public procurement: a high-risk zone High share of restricted procedures.
Frequent use of emergency procedures, especially during the pandemic.
Using lowest price as main criterion is prone to abuse (best price-quality ratio criterion rarely used).
In cases of “strategic” interest contractors of public works are awarded preferential treatment.<br>
slide9. Turning the tide: how to regain the anticorruption momentum Prioritise the dismantling of state capture
Tackle illicit finance flows (dirty money that crosses an international border, illegally earned, moved, or used)
Target media capture, using the European parliament drive
Measure effect of evidence-based anticorruption policies, not intentions.
Focus on outputs (actual impact) not inputs (regulations, procedures, resources).
Work with civil society<br>
slide10. Thank you! www.seldi.net<br>
12 October 2022, Brussels
Daniela Mineva
Senior Analyst
Center for the Study of Democracy<br>
slide2. Zero hour: the war in Ukraine and the promise of enlargement Geopolitics of anticorruption: how to help when no help is (officially?) requested?
Anticorruption should not slip from the agenda
The integrity of WB governments remains under serious stress.
Stalled momentum of anticorruption reforms.
State capture is influencing drafting, adoption and enforcement of government rules and regulations.
Yet, Western Balkan anticorruption strategies and EC’s assessment reports rarely address it.<br>
slide3. Official documents and institutions abound, unlike results AC strategies from the late 2010s are not updated and are of general nature, with no measurable targets.
New laws target sophisticated forms of corruption
However, law drafting is not sufficiently inclusive and transparent
Broad-mandated anticorruption institutions are vulnerable to:
being overwhelmed by complex enforcement tasks;
being captured by special interests.
Lack of reliable information to identify the reasons for the handful of convictions.
CSOs are among the few running engines of anticorruption, but used as a token of “inclusiveness” rather than a stakeholder.
Dominant role of oligarchs in domestic media -> low media freedom.<br>
slide4. Principle corruption assessment indexes from the Corruption Monitoring System<br>
slide5. Corruption pressure: up it goes again Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2021.<br>
slide6. State Capture Assessment Diagnostics (SCAD)<br>
slide7. State capture vulnerability is high Source: SELDI SCAD, 2020.<br>
slide8. Public procurement: a high-risk zone High share of restricted procedures.
Frequent use of emergency procedures, especially during the pandemic.
Using lowest price as main criterion is prone to abuse (best price-quality ratio criterion rarely used).
In cases of “strategic” interest contractors of public works are awarded preferential treatment.<br>
slide9. Turning the tide: how to regain the anticorruption momentum Prioritise the dismantling of state capture
Tackle illicit finance flows (dirty money that crosses an international border, illegally earned, moved, or used)
Target media capture, using the European parliament drive
Measure effect of evidence-based anticorruption policies, not intentions.
Focus on outputs (actual impact) not inputs (regulations, procedures, resources).
Work with civil society<br>
slide10. Thank you! www.seldi.net<br>