Loose Routing in Mix-Nets Mitchell Artin
Description: Loose Routing in Mix-Nets Mitchell Artin MitchManiaLabs.com Approach Can we use loose routing in a mix network to increase anonymity of a standard mix network? Can we defeat n-1 attacks? Standard mix network Sender picks route of mixes,
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slide1. Loose Routing in Mix-Nets Mitchell Artin
MitchManiaLabs.com<br>
slide2. Approach Can we use loose routing in a mix network to increase anonymity of a standard mix network? Can we defeat n-1 attacks?
Standard mix network
Sender picks route of mixes, encrypts for each mix, sends packet, all mixes follow this route
Loose routing
Mixes may not follow the route chosen by the sender
If sender choses to route with N mixes, message will be routed with at least N mixes, maybe more!<br>
slide3. Standard Route<br>
slide4. Loose Route Mix 1 flips a coin, gets a 1, picks a new next hop, encrypts message for mix 3 Mix 3 flips a coin, gets a 0, uses original next hop Mix 2 flips a coin, gets a 0, uses original next hop (destination)<br>
slide5. Downsides Increased delays
Depending on the coin we use (could be incredibly biased) messages may see significantly increased delays<br>
slide6. More Work to Be Done So far I have researched and discussed this topic with network engineers at UF
Plan to implement this overlay network in python as a proof-of-concept<br>
slide7. References Chaum, David. "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms." Communications of the ACM (1981): 84-88. Web.
Serjantov, Andrei, Roger Dingledine, and Paul Syverson. "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types." (2002): n. pag. The Free Haven Project. Web.
Newman-Wolfe, Richard. "High Level Prevention of Traffic Analysis." Computer Security Applications Conference (1991): 102-09. Web.<br>
MitchManiaLabs.com<br>
slide2. Approach Can we use loose routing in a mix network to increase anonymity of a standard mix network? Can we defeat n-1 attacks?
Standard mix network
Sender picks route of mixes, encrypts for each mix, sends packet, all mixes follow this route
Loose routing
Mixes may not follow the route chosen by the sender
If sender choses to route with N mixes, message will be routed with at least N mixes, maybe more!<br>
slide3. Standard Route<br>
slide4. Loose Route Mix 1 flips a coin, gets a 1, picks a new next hop, encrypts message for mix 3 Mix 3 flips a coin, gets a 0, uses original next hop Mix 2 flips a coin, gets a 0, uses original next hop (destination)<br>
slide5. Downsides Increased delays
Depending on the coin we use (could be incredibly biased) messages may see significantly increased delays<br>
slide6. More Work to Be Done So far I have researched and discussed this topic with network engineers at UF
Plan to implement this overlay network in python as a proof-of-concept<br>
slide7. References Chaum, David. "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms." Communications of the ACM (1981): 84-88. Web.
Serjantov, Andrei, Roger Dingledine, and Paul Syverson. "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types." (2002): n. pag. The Free Haven Project. Web.
Newman-Wolfe, Richard. "High Level Prevention of Traffic Analysis." Computer Security Applications Conference (1991): 102-09. Web.<br>