Linguistic Intuitions - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Linguistic Intuitions

Michael JohnsonSlide2

Outline

0. Outline

1. Metasemantics

2. Intuitions

3. A Puzzle about Intuitions

4. Confronting the Puzzle

5. A Realist Solution

6. ConclusionsSlide3

1. MetasemanticsSlide4

Lexical vs. Meta- Semantics

Lexical Semantics

Answers the question:

What do individual words mean?

Metasemantics

Answers the question:

In virtue of what do individual words mean what they do, rather than something else, or nothing at all?Slide5

Today’s Talk

Today I’ll be concerned with

metasemantic accounts of reference

: that is, accounts of why words have the referents they do, rather than other referents or no referents at all.Slide6

The Descriptive Theory of Reference

According to Descriptivism, names are disguised definite descriptions.

Descriptivism

: A name refers to the object, if there is one, that uniquely satisfies the description whose disguise it is.

Tired example: ‘Aristotle’ might be associated with the description ‘last great philosopher of Antiquity.’ So ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle because Aristotle is the last great philosopher of antiquity.Slide7

Causal Theories of Reference

According the Causal Theories, causal, lawful, or informational connections between word and world make it the case that words mean what they do.

One example of a causal theory is this dumbed-down version of Evans:

Evans

: A name N in a society S refers to the object that is the dominant causal source of S’s N-involving beliefs.

Example: ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle because it is largely Aristotle’s doings and goings that are the cause of our ‘Aristotle’-involving beliefs.Slide8

2. intuitionsSlide9

The Final Frontier

Let’s

suppose that most

Americans believe all & only

the following about Neil Armstrong:

H

e

was the first man in

space.

H

e

was an American.

In this scenario, most Americans are wrong. Yuri Gagarin was the first man in space.Slide10

The Anti-Descriptivist Intuition

If you accepted my last claim, that in the scenario described, most Americans are wrong that Neil Armstrong was the first man in space, then you have anti-descriptivist

intuitions. There

are only two candidates for the description ‘Neil Armstrong’ is a disguise for:

1. ‘The first man in space’

2. ‘An American who was the first man in space’Slide11

The Anti-Descriptivist Intuition

1

. ‘The first man in space

’

If (1) determines the referent of ‘Neil Armstrong,’ then most Americans are right, because Yuri Gagarin was the first man in space.

 Slide12

The Anti-Descriptivist Intuition

2

. ‘An American who was the first man in space’

If

(2) determines the referent of ‘Neil Armstrong,’ then most Americans are neither wrong nor right, because no one was an American who was the first man in space.Slide13

3. A puzzle about intuitionsSlide14

The Evidential Relevance of Intuitions

Many philosophers have found this sort of argument compelling. Many have converted to some or another causal theory of reference because of just such arguments.

But why? Why are intuitions about these cases

any

sort of evidence at all?Slide15

The Evidential Relevance of Intuitions

After all, nothing about Evans’ theory predicts, entails, or even suggests that if it’s true, we should have intuitions that accord with it

.

And nothing about Descriptivism says we can’t be convinced it’s false, even when it’s

true.

Both theories are equally compatible with the fact that we have the intuitions we do. So the intuitions just don’t seem to be evidence one way or another

.Slide16

Today’s Talk

In this talk, I am going to claim that

our intuitions

are

evidence

for which theory is true. But also, in a deeper sense, I’m going to claim that

neither theory is true

.Slide17

A Crude Model of Semantic Intuitions

We are given a story, S (e.g. the Neil Armstrong Story).

We are asked to decide on the basis of the story whether some conclusion C follows, e.g. whether most Americans’ beliefs are wrong.

We take S, add to it our background beliefs B, and answer:

“Yes” if we compute C from S & B.

“No” if we compute not-C from S & B.

“I don’t know/ underspecified” if we cannot compute either C or not-C from S & B.Slide18

A Reconstruction

Add in the background beliefs B

1

and B

2

to the Neil Armstrong story S:

B

1

: Neil Armstrong is the dominant causal source of most Americans’ ‘Neil Armstrong’ involving beliefs.

B

2

: A name N in a society S refers to the object that is the dominant causal source of S’s N-involving beliefs.

S

& B

1

& B

2

entail C, that most Americans are wrong.

So, assuming everyone believes B

1

, the fact that we are inclined to answer “C is true” is evidence that we hold B

2

. If we didn’t, we wouldn’t have the intuitions we do.Slide19

Halfway There

We’re closer now to solving our puzzle. Now we can see how our intuitions about cases are evidentially relevant to what metasemantic theories we (tacitly) believe.

What remains is to provide a bridge between what metasemantic theories we (tacitly) believe and what metasemantic theories are actually true. Why is believing a certain metasemantic theory evidence of its truth?Slide20

The Synthetic A Priori

The reason the gap seems difficult to bridge, though, is that it’s an instance of a much older problem.

How could our intuitions, which are supposedly a priori, and not derived from experience, provide us knowledge of which metasemantic theory was true, which is a synthetic fact.

How is the synthetic a priori possible?Slide21

4. Confronting the puzzleSlide22

Four Ways to Bridge/ Trivialize the Gap

Anti-Intuitionist Realism

: Deny that our intuitions have any evidential relevance to what metasemantic theory is true.

Semantic Skepticism

: Deny that there are facts about reference and truth, explain our intuitions in a way that doesn’t advert to ‘tracking the truth.’

Intuitionist Realism

: Claim that we have genuine knowledge of mind-independent semantic facts without empirical investigation and explain how this is so.

Idealism

: Claim that the semantic facts are constituted/ determined by mind-dependent facts like our intuitions/ our dispositions to have certain intuitions.Slide23

Option 1: Anti-Intuitionist Realism

“I,” says the anti-intuitionist, “don’t think that intuitions have any evidential relevance to what metasemantic theory is true. You have to go investigate the facts before you can know what things mean or why they mean

it…Slide24

Option 1: Anti-Intuitionist Realism

“You

think ‘cow’ applies to those brown mooing things because they’re what normally cause you to say things like ‘Look at that cow!’ But you don’t know that. ‘Cow’ could be true of all and only isosceles triangles, because it’s most frequently spoken on a Wednesday.

What

metasemantic theory is true is an a posteriori matter completely. You don’t know what ‘cow’ means or why until you have a PhD in linguistics and have done fieldwork in English-speaking countries.”Slide25

Here’s what I meant by giving the anti-intuitionist that farcical

speech

:

If

intuitions are evidentially irrelevant to which metasemantic theory is true, then those things that are evidentially relevant had better be close by, noticeable, and ubiquitous, otherwise we risk concluding that none of us know what ‘cow’ means. Slide26

Now I don’t actually know of any Anti-Intuitionist Realists, because the intuition haters I’m acquainted with are all skeptics.

I’m happy to join the anti-intuitionist if no other option on my list pans out.

But, in the absence of a

really

good story about what

other than

intuitions is evidence for which metasemantic theory is true, the view

does sound a little… crazy. Slide27

Troubles for Anti-Intuitionist Realism

Suppose a descriptivist traveler visits a “causal” community and attempts to learn the correct metasemantic theory for the natives.

What differences will he notice about their behavior that will “tip him off” that they’re not

descriptivists

?Slide28

Troubles for Anti-Intuitionist Realism

At least in the literature (e.g.

Machery

, Mallon, Nichols & Stich, 2004), when it’s claimed that two communities instantiate different metasemantic theories, the only difference described is the intuitions of the communities. But again, that is at best evidence of what the speakers

believe

.Slide29

Option 2: Semantic Skepticism

“I,” says the Semantic Skeptic, “don’t accept that intuitions have evidential relevance to which metasemantic theory of reference is true.

In fact, I don’t accept that anything has evidential relevance to which metasemantic theory is true, because

none of them are

.

There is no reference and thus there is no true theory of why things refer to what they do. They don’t.” Slide30

Inverting the Theory of Reference

Hartry Field (1990) has proposed a particularly “

Humean

” skeptical solution to the problem of the synthetic a priori in linguistic intuitions.Slide31

Inverting the Theory of Reference

Field’s idea is that we accept a primitive inference rule: from “x is the dominant causal source of our N-involving beliefs” to derive “N refers to x”Slide32

Inverting the Theory of Reference

But

that’s the

whole

story.

Just as Hume thought there was no causation, but we were primitively disposed to reason as if there were, Field thinks there is no reference, we just reason as though there is.Slide33

Semantic Skepticism

I’ll reserve comment until later as to what reasons there are or at least could be to reject

Semantic Skepticism

.Slide34

Option 3: Intuitionist Realism

“I,” says the Intuitionist Realist, “am exactly the person for whom this problem is a problem for. So I must say something about it. Let me see here…”Slide35

Realist Response #1 (not a real Williamson quote)

“Look, linguistic intuitions are intuitions (duh). If you’re

gonna

start being skeptical about some intuitions, you won’t have any principled place to stop. So unless you’re prepared to doubt all of science, why not just accept linguistic intuitions?”Slide36

Realist Response #1

But

I

am not an intuition skeptic.

I like intuitions. Or at least, linguistic intuitions.

I just want to know

what justifies them

, and this response just says: “Stop asking so many questions!”Slide37

Realist Response #2 (not an actual

Bealer

quote)

“Look, linguistic intuitions are intuitions (duh). Intuitions are a basic source of evidence. They’re like seeing or smelling. You don’t go around doubting that a foul stench justifies the belief that there’s something stinky there. So don’t go doubting your linguistic intuitions either.”Slide38

Realist Response #2

The first thing to say is that this response is pure epistemic

mysterianism

. Not even Kant was satisfied with answers of that form, and he believed in the synthetic a priori.Slide39

Realist Response #2

The second thing to say is that the response isn’t just mysterian, it’s mistaken. If we could directly grasp the philosophical truths, we wouldn’t disagree with one another on philosophical matters so much.

For the intuition-defender, this is the problem of conflicting intuitions. Slide40

The Problem of Conflicting Intuitions

Machery

, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (

2004)

argue, from experiments they conducted on Western and East Asian subjects, that Westerners have intuitions that align with causal theories whereas East Asians have more descriptivist intuitions.

I won’t argue that

that

is

true, I’ll just point out that

if

it’s true, it gives the lie to the idea that we have direct intuitive access to the metasemantic facts.

Two people

with conflicting intuitions can’t both be right.Slide41

Option 4: Idealism

“I,” says the Idealist, “have no problem of explaining how our intuitions are evidence for the semantic facts.

According to me, the semantic facts depend upon, are grounded in, hold in virtue of, and are made true by our intuitions.

If we had different intuitions, the semantic facts would be different.”Slide42

Two Types of Idealist

Formal Idealist

: The formal (structural) facts about our intuitions ground the semantic facts for the language we speak.

Semantic Idealist

: The semantic facts about our intuitions (the content of those intuitions) ground the semantic facts for the language we speak.Slide43

Formal Idealism e.g. Conceptual Role Semantics

According to Conceptual or Inferential Role Semantics, a word means what it does because of the (formal) role it plays in inferences involving it. If you change those inferences– including the “intuition” inferences from a story to a judgment about the story– then you change what the word means. Slide44

Formal Idealism a.k.a. Conceptual Role Semantics

This would explain how the synthetic a priori is

possible

.

Unfortunately, CRS has to deny our intuitions: the anti-descriptivist intuitions are just as much anti-CRS intuitions. “Meaning

ain’t

in the head” is the slogan.Slide45

Semantic Idealism, e.g. Intention Based Semantics

“The intention theorist seeks

to reduce the having of content of marks and sounds to

the having

of content of psychological

states…”Slide46

Semantic Idealism, e.g. Intention Based Semantics

“Then

, having reduced all

questions about

the semantical features of public language items to questions

about mental

content, he sees his task as having to answer those further

questions, but

free now to pursue those answers without any further appeal to

public language semantical properties.” (1982)Slide47

Fodor against Semantic Idealism

“[W]

ords

can’t have their meanings

just

because their users undertake to pursue some or other linguistic policies; or, indeed, because of any purely

mental

phenomenon, anything that happens purely ‘in your head.’…Slide48

Fodor against Semantic Idealism

“…Your undertaking to call John ‘John’ doesn’t, all by itself, make ‘John’ a name of John. How could it? For ‘John’ to be John’s name, there must be some sort of

real relation

between the name and its bearer; and intentions don’t, per se, establish real relations…”Slide49

Fodor against Semantic Idealism

“…This is because, of course, intentions are (merely) intentional; you can intend that there be a certain relation between ‘John’ and John and yet there may be no such relation. A fortiori, you can intend that there be a semantical relation… and yet there may be no such relation…”Slide50

Fodor against Semantic Idealism

“…Mere undertakings connect nothing with nothing; ‘intentional relation’ is an oxymoron. For there to be a relation between ‘John’ and John, something has to happen

in the world

. That’s part of what makes the idea of a causal construal of semantic relations so attractive.”Slide51

5. A realist solutionSlide52

Twin Earth

Let’s consider another case where certain intuitions have been taken to support causal theories over descriptive ones: Putnam’s Twin Earth.

Twin Earth is a planet on the other side of the galaxy. In most ways, it is just like Earth, down to the smallest detail. You have a twin on Twin Earth who’s just like you, I have a twin who’s just like me, they’re sitting in a twin seminar room, and my twin is giving a talk just like this one to your twin. And so on and so forth.Slide53

Earth

Twin EarthSlide54

Twin Earth

There is however

one

difference between Earth and Twin Earth. On Earth, all the watery stuff is H

2

O. On Twin Earth, the watery stuff is composed of a complicated chemical compound we can abbreviate XYZ.

H

2

O and XYZ look and behave exactly the same. They taste the same, they boil at the same temperatures at the same distance above sea level, their conductance is the same, etc.Slide55

Twin Earth

Consider two twins, Arnold on Earth and Twin Arnold on Twin Earth.

Neither knows any chemistry. What they know/ believe about the stuff they call ‘water’ is the same. Q: Would it be true for Arnold to call the stuff on Twin Earth ‘water’?Slide56

Twin Earth

The intuition is supposed to be that, no, Arnold’s word ‘water’ is true of all an only H

2

O, whereas Twin Arnold’s word ‘water’ is true of all and only XYZSlide57

A Realist Explanation

Let me suggest the following explanation for the intuition.

The reason Arnold’s word ‘water’ is true of all and only H

2

O, and not true of any XYZ, is that

were he to know all the relevant facts

(about the chemistry and distribution of the two substances) and were in a position to distinguish samples of the two substances,

he would apply ‘water’ to H

2

O but not XYZ

. Slide58

A Realist Explanation

I want to emphasize that this is a Realist and not an Idealist story.

The reason why Arnold’s word ‘water’ means what it does is that

he would act in a certain manner if certain very specific circumstances obtained

. This could arise because he intended to act in that manner, but it is not merely his intention but his disposition to follow through on it that makes his words mean what they do (according to the claim).Slide59

A Realist Explanation

The view is this.

Suppose A’s and B’s both cause you to apply some term T.

However, were you to know about the difference between A’s and B’s and be able to distinguish A’s from B’s as such, you would apply T to A’s but not B’s.

Then, in that case, T would mean A-but-not-B.Slide60

How You Know What You Mean 1

So how can you know, without getting a PhD in linguistics and doing fieldwork, that your word ‘cow’ is true of cows and not, say, isosceles triangles?

Easy. You know that you

would

apply ‘cow’ to cow and

wouldn’t

apply it to isosceles triangles

were

you to be able to tell the difference between the two, because you

can

tell the difference, and you

do

apply ‘cow’ to cow and not isosceles triangles.Slide61

How You Know What You Mean 2

What if you’re like Arnold though. What if you can’t tell the difference between H

2

O and XYZ? Suppose someone confronts you with the Twin Earth case. How do you know your intuition is reliable– that under those circumstances, your word ‘water’ would mean H

2

O and not XYZ? Slide62

How You Know What You Mean 2

Recall that the prompt stipulates that you know all the relevant information. It tells you that there’s a difference between the watery substances on Earth and Twin Earth, and it tells you that H

2

O is what you’ve got on your planet.

If you intuit that ‘water’ only applies to the thing on your planet, that’s good evidence that were you to actually be in

epistemically

ideal circumstances, you would only use ‘water’ for the stuff on your planet.Slide63

6. conclusionsSlide64

Linguistic Intuitions and Metasemantics

So, can we use intuitions to tell us which metasemantic theory (descriptivism, Evans’ theory, my theory, etc.) is true?

My considered view is: it depends.Slide65

Linguistic Intuitions and Metasemantics

If I’m wrong, then since for

Williamsonian

reasons we shouldn’t be intuition skeptics, we can use intuitions as we normally would, which is: take them as evidence but not super-evidence.

However, it does seem that since most metasemantic theories outside of a small class (which includes my view) don’t have any plausible story to tell about the epistemology, we should probably correspondingly discount those intuitions.Slide66

Linguistic Intuitions and Metasemantics

And the intuitions are even less helpful if I’m right:

If my theory is true, then our linguistic intuitions are evidence for what our words mean. So we can know ‘a priori’ without empirical investigation, what we mean.

If

the theory is true.

But we cannot infer, from the meaning facts, to the theory that best fits them. Because we had to assume that theory in the first place to arrive at the meaning facts!Slide67

Sort of like this…Slide68

Linguistic Intuitions and Metasemantics

It follows, or so I claim, that metasemantic theorizing is not to be done by intuition. We can’t use Armstrong/ Gagarin, Gödel/ Schmidt, H

2

O/ XYZ, etc. cases to determine which metasemantic theory is true.Slide69

Metasemantic Theory-Building

Instead, we must establish the role that meaning plays in our ultimate theories of cognition and communication.

Until then, we are subject to attack from the Semantic Skeptic, who claims there is nothing to be explained by, and hence no reason to believe in, semantic properties construed Realistically.Slide70

Fin