Approximately StrategyProof Voting Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass Cornell Unive - PDF document

Approximately StrategyProof Voting Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass Cornell Unive
Approximately StrategyProof Voting Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass Cornell Unive

Approximately StrategyProof Voting Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass Cornell Unive - Description


cornelledu Abstract The classic GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem estab lishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy proof under any other voting rule players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences We consider a new approach for c ID: 2308 Download Pdf

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cornelledu Abstract The classic GibbardSatterthwaite

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