Concepts and proto-concepts - PowerPoint Presentation

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Concepts and proto-conceptsin cognitive science

Ron ChrisleySackler Centre for Consciousness ScienceCentre for Research in Cognitive ScienceSchool of InformaticsUniversity of SussexSweCog Summer School in Cognitive ScienceMarston Hill, August 9th-13th 2010Slide2

Overview 1The concept: The workhorse of orthodox cognitive scienceConcepts are constituents of mental content that are:

ArticulableRecombinableRationalDeployableBecause of these features, concepts present the objective world as the objective worldOften thought to be required for any intentional explanation of cognitive phenomena2SweCog Summer School 2010Slide3

Overview 2However, there seem to be mental phenomena not adequately characterized in terms of concepts:the fineness of grain of experience

the incorrigibility of illusionnon-circularity requirements on a theory of perceptionthe graded nature of development and evolutioncommonalities in perception for those who do not share the same conceptsthe minds of animals and infantsthe context-sensitivity and situatedness of some cognitive processesthe phenomenology of non-objectual thought

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Overview 3Proposal: Employ a notion of non-conceptual content that does not suffer from these limitationsNon-conceptual constituents of content can be called

proto-conceptsChallenges for non-conceptual content:SpecificationRelation between conceptual and non-conceptual content (McDowell)Conceptual objections (McDowell)Empirical objections (e.g., Clark)4SweCog Summer School 2010Slide5

Fineness of grainThe content of our perceptual experience seems to outstrip our perceptual conceptsE.g., we can experience many more shades of colour than we have colour terms (or colour

concepts) for (Peacocke 1994)Violates criterion 1

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The incorrigibility of illusionConsider, e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion:

The illusion persists, even after one is told (and believes) that the central line segments are of the same lengthThus, the content of one’s perception is not rationally revisable (contra criterion 3)

Consider, e.g., the

Müller-Lyer

illusion:

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Non-circularity requirements on a theory of perceptionTo possess a perceptual concept, such as red, a subject must be disposed to apply red to an object under the right conditions. Which ones?Not: only when the object

is red. Too strong: requires us to be infallibleRather: when the object looks red.But how are we to understand this?How something looks is a matter of contentBut the content in question cannot involve the concept red, on pain of circularityOne would have to already possess the concept red (cf the Possession Principle) in order to possess (a fortiori, to acquire) the concept red

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The graded nature of development and evolutionTo explain the evolution of some trait, need to construct a an ordered chain of traits in which each preceding trait is a more primitive version of its successor (e.g., the eye)So this must be true of conceptual traits; an evolutionary explanation of a fully Articulable

, Recombinable, Rational and Deployable concept requires the notion of a sequence of content constituents that are more primitive (e.g., not fully recombinable)8SweCog Summer School 2010Slide9

The graded nature of development and evolutionBut concepts cannot provide this sequence, since concepts are by stipulation already fully recombinable, etc.A similar point can be made concerning development, and learning (Cussins 1996)

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Commonalities in conceptually distinct perceptionsConsider two subjects:Both are looking at the same electron microscope, from the same perspective, under same lighting conditions, etc.But only one of them has the concept

electron microscopeIntuitively, there is something shared (although something not shared) in the contents of the experience of the two subjects10SweCog Summer School 2010Slide11

Commonalities in conceptually distinct perceptionsBut this commonality of content is not a matter of the same conceptual content:What concepts could they be?Whatever they putatively are, the same thought experiment could be raised for those concepts,

ad infinitum11SweCog Summer School 2010Slide12

Animals and infantsIntuitively, animals and infants have mindsBut also intuitively, they lack conceptsFor example, if they were to have mental content, it seems unlikely their content constituents meet the Articulability constraint

Infants before the stage of object permanence fail to meet the Recombinability constraintTypically, neither animals nor infants justify the attribution of an ability to Deploy these contents in aid of their goals; rather, if they have any content, it is are foisted upon them by their environmentThus, the question of Rational justification would not apply to them12SweCog Summer School 2010Slide13

The need for an alternativeSome might take these limitations of the conceptual approach as a basis for intentional eliminativism of some kindE.g., one might think that they imply that we should dispense with content-based explanations altogetherBut the plausibility of such a view would be removed if one could instead find an alternative form of content-based explanationThis alternative could replace conceptual explanation, or merely augment it

Proposed alternative: Non-conceptual content and proto-concepts13SweCog Summer School 2010Slide14

Non-conceptual contentA standard definitionCommon definition:A content N is non-conceptual iff:

N is canonically specified in terms of (a set of) concepts CIt is possible for a subject to entertain N (be in a state that has content N) without possessing all of the concepts in CCf Bermudez, Cussins, Peacocke (previously), etc.14SweCog Summer School 2010Slide15

Problems withthe standard definitionAssumes there is a unique, canonical specification of each contentEven if true for conceptual content, assuming it for content in general is unmotivatedNotion of non-conceptual content should determine what is a canonical specification of it, not vice versa

Requires dropping the Possession Principle (≈ Bermudez’s “Conceptual Constraint”)Assumes, but does not explicate, the prior notion of conceptBut if one already has a robust notion of concept in place, can use it to give a simpler definition of non-conceptual content, viz.:15SweCog Summer School 2010Slide16

Preferred definitionContent that has at least one or more constituents that is a proto-concept…where a proto-concept is a content constituent that does not meet some or all of the conceptual criteria:Deployable: Passive, perceptual content is “the given”, not under the endogenous control of the subject…

Rational: …who is therefore not responsible for the content, so no question of justification arisesRecombinable: Unlike linguistic content, not arbitrarily combinable…Articulable: …and therefore not expressible via langugeIf earlier claims are true, then such content will therefore not present the objective world as the objective world16SweCog Summer School 2010Slide17

Fineness of grainThe set of non-conceptual states that we can be in is not bounded by the concepts or colour terms we possessExplains why our experience seems to be (at least partly) ineffable, contra the Articulability criterion

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N

on-conceptual content need

not

is not obliged to be rationally revised (as per criterion 3)

Thus

there is no problem

with the idea that

the

illusion

consists in being in an

experiential state with

non-conceptual content

Such a state can

persist, even after one is told (and believes) that the central line segments are of the same length

The incorrigibility of illusion

Consider

again

the

Müller-Lyer

illusion:

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Non-circularity requirements on a theory of perception“Perceptual states with nonconceptual content make… general concepts available to a thinker by providing the canonical, non-inferential basis for the application of these concepts to things given in experience.”“The nonconceptual

contents that make available these various perceptually based conceptual contents cannot, however, be identified with any of the conceptual contents that they make available.” (Peacocke 2001)Since they are not concepts, but proto-concepts, there need be no justification of their use19SweCog Summer School 2010Slide20

The graded nature of development and evolutionRecognizing the existence of contents that do not meet the criteria, permits the notion of contents that approximate the criteria to varying degreesE.g., the degree of recombinability (contra criterion 3)

This permits, in theory, the construction of a sequence of content constituents where each is more primitive than its successorWhich in turn permits a non-catastrophic, evolutionary explanation of mental faculties20SweCog Summer School 2010Slide21

The graded nature of development and evolutionSimilar non-conceptual explanations can be made concerning development, and learning (Cussins 1996)Especially concept learning: allows one to avoid an implausible nativism (e.g., Fodor)

Also: conceptual change, creativity…21SweCog Summer School 2010Slide22

Commonalities in conceptually distinct perceptionsConsider two subjects:Both are looking at the same electron microscope, from the same perspective, under same lighting conditions, etc.But only one of them has the concept

electron microscopeTheir experiences can be analyzed as having the same (or similar) non-conceptual content, while also differing in their conceptual content22SweCog Summer School 2010Slide23

Animals and infantsThe notion of non-conceptual content allows us to make sense of animals and infants minds:The infra-verbal status of animals and infants poses no difficulties for contents that do not respect the Articulability constraintNon-

Recombinable content can capture pre-objectual cognitionNon-conceptual content need not be actively deployable, which fits well with the largely passive content of animal/infant perceptionThat non-conceptual content can provide Rational justifications without requiring them permits a grounded account of the development of conceptuality23SweCog Summer School 2010Slide24

Challenges for non-conceptual content in cognitive scienceSpecificationExplicating the relation between conceptual and non-conceptual content (McDowell on justification)Conceptual objections (McDowell on spontaneity)Empirical objections (e.g. Clark on dorsal vs. ventral pathways)

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Alternative specifications Therefore, an alternative means of content specification is neededA point not fully appreciated in literatureHas restricted non-conceptual content research to theoretical, general discussions, rather than explanatory applications of particular non-conceptual contents Alternatives have been proposed by

Peacocke (scenarios)Bermudez (augmented success semantics)Chrisley (various, including enactive depictions)Gives purpose to the debate25SweCog Summer School 2010Slide26

Thank you.

Comments welcome:

ronc@sussex.ac.uk

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