Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology - PowerPoint Presentation

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Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology

American Physical SocietyDr. Daniel GersteinUnder Secretary (Acting)Science & Technology DirectorateNovember 3, 2013

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-- National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, November 2009

“The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within an unprotected population could place at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The unmitigated consequences of such an event could overwhelm our public health capabilities, potentially causing an untold number of deaths. The economic cost could exceed one trillion dollars for each such incident.”

Dimensions of Emergencies

2LowHigh

Existential

LowPsycho-Social Impact(Fear, Societal Cohesion, Survival)HighExtremeExtent of Damage (Life, Property, Economic)SLTT ResponseFederal Lead

Disasters

(big emergency)

Catastrophes

(really big emergency)

1

State threatening

(ability of government to function/survive in doubt)

2001 Anthrax

9/11

Katrina

*

*

Spanish Flu

*

*

2009 Flu Pandemic

Chernobyl

*

Haitian Earthquake

*

2003 SARS

*

Japanese Earthquake & Tsunami

*

2

3

4

Cyber Dimensions of Possible Future Emergencies

Minor

Emergencies

*

*

2001 UK Foot & Mouth Disease Outbreak

*

1995

Aum

Shinrikyo

Aerosol Release

2001 Anthrax Attacks

Number that received antibiotic treatment

30,000Number of illnesses22Number of deaths5Decontamination6 Buildings

Direct Economic Cost

>$1 B

Number that will need antibiotic treatment

1.9-3.4 M

Number of illnesses

~450,000

Number of deaths

~380,000

Decontamination

City wide

Projected Economic Cost

>$1.8 T

1 gm

via letters

1-2 kg

via cropduster

Biological Weapons Present Diverse Risks

3

Nature of the Biological Threat

4

4

Historical Perspective

Biotech & Dual Use Concern

Likelihood of Event

BWC EIF

Rajneeshee

Attack

Aum

Shinrikyo

Inspire

Magazine

Advanced Manufacturing

Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)

Human Genome Project

Amerithrax

Attack

First Synthetic Cell

Recombinant DNA

Gene Modification

Open-Source

Biosynthetics

Poliovirus Synthesized

Synthetic Pathogens

Selective DNA Isolation

H5N1 Articles

UK FMD Outbreak

SARS

H1N1 Pandemic

Zaire

ebolavirus

(ZEBOV)

West Nile Virus in USA

Insider Threat

E. Coli (Germany)

State –like capabilities in hands of non-state actors

Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release

“Proliferation” of BSL-3+ labs

DIY Bio

State-Sponsored BW Programs

State BW Use

Accident, Misuse or Bioterror

Naturally Occurring (perhaps Black Swan) Biological Event

1975

1985

1995

2000

2005

2010 Future

Rapid naturally occurring disease spread

Role of Bioinformatics

H7N9

MERS-

CoV

Examining the Potential for Bioterror

5

-20 Years -10 Years Today + 10 Years +20 Years +30 Years

Why did the Rajneeshes fail?Why did Aum Shinrikyo fail?

What did we learn from the Anthrax attacks?

P

Viable Attack

1.0

P

Viable Attack

=

f

{Capabilities, Intent, Knowledge}

What does this tell us about the potential for a bioterror attack in the future?

Project

Bacchus

Dr. Eckert Wimmer

Dr. Mark Butler

Dr. Steven Kurtz

Amerithrax

77 BW events in over 100 years

Dr. Jerzy Mierzejewski

Dr. William Patrick

task

(-)

(+)

Agriculture Threat Space

Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs) are endemic, spreading, and emerging globally on six continentsFADs could be easily introduced intentionally (agroterrorism) or accidentally (food imports, foreign travelers)FMD is widely considered to be the number one agricultural threat to the USAn “across the nation” outbreak of a FAD like foot-and-mouth disease could result in losses of up to $60 billion (USDA, 2005) resulting from control measures and protective embargoes6

Foot and Mouth Disease - 2010

Massively lethal, proven to work – with 1960s technology

Essential materials, know-how cheap, widely available, dual-use: hard to track, easily hiddenAttribution issue – Difficult for states to respond to attacksReload potential: self-replicating organisms; risk multiple attacksMitigation requires specific countermeasures quickly and in quantityContagious disease introduces new dynamicPotency, diversity, and accessibility of biothreats

will increase as bioscience advancesBioweapons are a Strategic Threat

7State-like capabilities in the hands of small groups and individuals …

U.S. Government & DHS Biodefense Programs

8

One Health

BSAT RegulationsDual Use Research of Concern (DURC)Export ControlsNunn-Lugar Cooperative Engagement (State & Defense)Biorisk Management: Biosafety, Biosecurity, BioethicsBWCWHO International Health Regulations (IHR)UNSCR 1540Australia GroupBilateral arrangements

Laboratory Response Network (LRN)

Biological

Threat

Spectrum

Natural Disease Outbreak

Unintended Consequences

Accidents

Negligence

Vandalism, Sabotage

Deliberate Use of BW

Biodefense issues are:

International & Interagency

Complex & Multidisciplinary

Inherently dual use

FAO & OIE

PPD-8 National Preparedness System: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery

DHS Interest in Countering WMD 9Laws & Treaties

UNSCR 1540

NPTOther International INTERPOLAustralia GroupCoalition of the WillingProliferation Security Initiative (PSI)U.S. InitiativesExport Control & Border Security (EXBS)Counter Terrorism (CT)

Layered defense

Shared Outcomes

Build Partner Capacity

Catch Cheaters

Deterrence

Goals

WHO International Health Regulations

Wassenar

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

BWC & CWC

HSPD-10 Biodefense

GNDA

“Beyond the Border”

DHS Initiatives

Bilateral arrangements

SAFE Port Act

Department of Homeland Security

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The DepartmentOrganizations: 22 to 1 …

Personnel: DHS = ~230K; HSE = ~3.5MCulture of law enforcementCoordination vs. directionDepartment of Homeland SecurityFirst Responders across U.S.Critical InfrastructureHomeland Security Enterprise (HSE)Federal

State

Local

Tribal

Territorial

International

… the 16 critical infrastructure sectors

One of 10 DHS Components

Provides key technical & analytical capacity for DHSSupports DHS, Component and HSE requirements with innovation Operationally focused S&T statistics:~1.2% of DHS Budget~1,100 personnelFederal, contractor, IPAsHighly technical staffSix primary

commodity areasFirst responders, borders & maritime, cyber, chem-bio defense

, explosives, resilienceHighly collaborativeComponents & HSEState & LocalInteragency & InternationalIndustry & Private sectorLaboratories5 Internal LabsExplosives, biodefense, chemical, urban environmentAdding new agricultural biodefense labResponsible for usage of DOE Labs & FFRDCsS&T At A GlanceDHS S&T Mission: Strengthen America’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE)11

Systems Analysis – Biodefense Example

DeliverablesMaximizing Operational & Technology Returns in Challenging Fiscal Times12

What is a comprehensive biodefense strategy?

How does the Department of Homeland Security fit into the national biodefense architecture?What are the seams and gaps in the architecture?Identify Threats, Risks & Opportunities.Develop Objectives & PrioritiesFill Requirements & Gaps

S&T’s Value Added Proposition

From R&D to

r&D

A

B

Operationally focused

… focused technology options & operational process enhancements

Innovative

… develop innovative, systems-based solutions to complex homeland security problems

Building Partnerships

… technical depth and reach to leverage technology solutions from federal, state, local and tribal governments, universities, and the private sector - across the US and internationally

DHS Biodefense: Strategy to Capability

13Strategic

Guidance

OperationalDirectivesHomeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-10RequirementsHSPD-18Medical Counter-Measures Against WMD (2007)PPD-8National Preparedness(2011)PPD-2National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (2009)HSPD-9Defense of U.S. Agriculture & Food

(2004)

HSPD-10

Biodefense for the 21st Century

(2004)

Prevention

, Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery

Biological Select Agent & Toxin Executive Order (2010)

DHS Concerns

Knowledge Management

Threat Characterization

Detection & Surveillance

Forensics & Attribution

Response & Recovery

Bioterrorism

Foreign Animal

Disease

Food Contamination

Emerging Infectious Disease

Interagency & International

Collaboration

Homeland Security Act 2002

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (2010

)

Countering Biological Threats (2009)

U.S. Federal Law

Natural Disease Outbreak

Unintended Consequences

Accidents

Negligence

Vandalism, Sabotage

Deliberate Use of BW

Biological

Threat

Spectrum

HSPD 10: Biodefense for the 21st

Century DHS Efforts14

Biological Threat Characterization

Material threat assessmentsLab studiesBio-Defense Knowledge CenterRisk Assessments Threat Awareness Prevention & ProtectionDual-Use Research of ConcernFoot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) vaccineProtocols and Standards Compliance Assurance Program OfficePromoting international standards for BSAT and BWC complianceWhite Powder Sampling

BioAssays

& biological materials repository

Next Gen Bio Detection

Detect-to-Protect for high value assets

Rapid

Biodetection

Environmental sampling

National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC)

Surveillance & Detection Response & Recovery

Operational Tools for remediation & decontamination

Bioforensic Research and Development

Systems Approaches for developing guidance

Underground Transport Restoration

Anthrax

reaerosolization

to examine the properties of dry powder anthrax to determine guidance, countermeasures and decontamination strategies

Risk Assessment Technical Approach

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) MethodologyConsistent method for aggregating risk from a large set of scenarios with consideration of uncertaintyUseful for comparing risks against one another in a manner that captures uncertaintyProvides decision-makers with the opportunity to ask the ‘what-if’ questions. Can consider relative value of potential risk mitigation strategies

Consequences

are the expected public health and economic impacts of an attackRisk is a function of likelihood and consequences. Terrorism risk assessments are ‘end-to-end,’ integrating likelihood and consequences of terrorism eventsLikelihood is the probability that an adversary acquires, produces, and disseminates a weapon[Risk] = [Likelihood] X [Consequences]15

Enhanced

Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Process

Intelligence

and Scientific Communities expert elicitation Validate Input DataUse Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methodology to explore risk space 1

2

3

Identify and validate key scenarios within the risk

space

Range of outcomes by agent, scenario, etc.

Scenario of interest

4

Validate Results

5

Conduct sensitivity analysis – also provide to key external audiences for use in conducting further analysis

6

7

Publication of risk assessment document and briefing of results

Use of the Bioterror Risk Assessment for Interagency and DHS operational

planning and resource prioritization

16

Complicating Factor #1: Dealing with the Number & Diversity of Key Actors

17

Must develop common understanding of the threat, lexicon, plans, procedures, communications, etc.

17Non-state ActorsDepartment of Justice

Department of Homeland Security

Private Industry

Department of Defense

First Responders

Academia?

Others?

International

Complicating Factor #2: Requires a Systemic Approach to the Issue

18Zone 2: Finding & Securing

Materials In Transit

INTERPOLProliferation Security Initiative (PSI)International AgreementsPort & Maritime SecurityZone 3: Finding & Securing It in the HomelandFederal, State, Local assetsBorder SecurityPort SecurityUS Coast GuardOthers …

Zone 1: Securing

WMD Material

at the Source

Left of loss: “Is everything where it should be?”

Personnel Reliability

Access Controls

Inventory Management

Detection, Alarms

Physical Protection

Emergency Response

Towards a layered defense …

Complicating Factor #3: Need to Maximize Outcomes

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19

DHS S&T Contributions to Biodefense

International & Academic

S&T Labs

Successes (Examples)Chem-Bio Division …Save lives & protect Nation’s infrastructure against chemical, biological & agricultural threats & disasters. DOE National LabsDefense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)Department of AgricultureOthers …InteragencyFoot & Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine

Rapid point of care diagnosticsMedical Countermeasures Development (MCM) support

“White Powder” standard

Assay development standards

Threat characterization studies

Bioterror Risk Assessment (BTRA)

Bioforensics

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Areas of Concern (Examples)

Agricultural Vaccines

International BSAT Standards

Resilience Communication

Crisis Management

Local Response Capability

Forecasting Future Threats

Public Biothreat Education

Supply Chain Security

Int’l/Domestic Response Training

Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)

Decon of CI/KR (Ag & Bio)

All response is local! Feds will not arrive immediately and

state and locals will be overwhelmedUS health care system and 90% of critical infrastructure is in private handsWhat is appropriate investment in preparation for routine hazards vs. high consequence events of indeterminate probability?How can we educate and train responders and the public for rare events?How can we collaborate internationally more effectively?

Reality Check

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