Andrés Pérez Orduz Advisor to the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce POWERS OF THE SIC REGARDING COMPETITION PROTECTION POWERS OF THE SIC POWERS OF THE SIC POWERS OF THE SIC INSTRUMENTS ID: 797469
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Slide1
POWERS OF THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE
Andrés Pérez Orduz
Advisor to the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce
Slide2POWERS OF THE SIC REGARDING COMPETITION PROTECTION
Slide3POWERS OF THE SIC
Slide4POWERS OF THE SIC
Slide5POWERS OF THE SIC
INSTRUMENTS
By
virtue of Decree 2153 of 1992 and Law 1340 of 2009,
the SIC has
the following instruments for the purposes of carrying out
investigations
on restrictive trade
practices:
POWERS OF THE SIC
By virtue of Decree 2153 of 1992 and Law 1340 of 2009,
the SIC has
the following instruments for the purposes of carrying out
investigations
on restrictive trade practices (agreements, abuse of dominance, and other unilateral acts)
:
POWERS OF THE SIC
AMOUNT OF FINES FOR COMPETITION’S REGIME INFRINGEMENTS
SANCTIONS
Slide8POWERS OF THE SIC
Slide9POWERS OF THE SIC
The Competition Protection Division
initiates cartels’
investigations
ex officio
based on information derived from a variety of sources,
including:
Slide10POWERS OF THE SIC
Slide11POWERS OF THE SIC
Slide12POWERS OF THE SIC
Slide13POWERS OF THE SIC
Analyzed
Market
Alerts
Recomendations
Automotive Sector in Colombia
(June 2012)
Absence of a consolidated data base which allows to easily monitor the dynamics of prices, sales policies and incidence data.
Promote international exchanges of information between Control Authorities.
Telecommunications
Sector in Colombia (
September
2012)
Significant
concentration
and
dominance
.
Formulation of scenarios for the bidding process for the 4G spectrum.
Slide14POWERS OF THE SIC
Analyzed
Market
Alerts
Recomendations
The fertilizer sector in Colombia (October 2013)
A set of products that are offered in the market require detailed analysis of prices.
Detailed analysis of prices.
Pesticide industry in Colombia
(December 2013)
Evidence of concentration and dominance
markets that are analyzed should not be isolated.
Slide15PRACTICAL CASES
Slide16CURRENT
EX OFFICIO
CASES
GROUP
FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION
(Ex Officio Investigations)
Anticompetitive
Conduct
Number
Uninformed mergers
5
Failure to comply with SIC instructions
12
Abuse of dominance
2
Cartel (price fixing)
1
Slide17CURRENT
EX OFFICIO
CASESBID RIGGING GROUP
(Ex Officio Investigations)
Ex
Officio
By
complaint
Ex
Officio
By
complaint
Preliminary
Inquiries
Investigations
Slide18NULE GROUP’S CASE
Members
of the NULE GROUP engaged in bid rigging on two public tenders conducted by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) for the adjudication of contracts related to provision of food (
Bienestarina
) and household (
Hogares
) to children under the ICBF care. As result of the investigation, the SIC determined that the NULE GROUP participated in both tenders through several companies simulating competition between them, thereby increasing the chances of the Group of being granted the contracts, as indeed it happened.
By Resolutions 54693 and 54695 of 2013, the SIC imposed fines up to a total of 51.000 monthly minimum wages (approx. USD$ 15 million) to several members of
that economic group.
Slide191. NULE GROUP’S CASE
The SIC opened the NULE GROUP’S investigation based on news that were published by EL TIEMPO:
“Another
Nule’s
contract
with ICBF appears
(...)
TIEMPO.COM
established that
(..) they
were given the technical and administrative supervision of the provision of children's breakfasts and emergency rations for group homes, children's homes, boarding schools and emergency centers
(…).
The
contract was
awarded to
the c
onsortium named “
Supervisores
Inter-ICBF-2007”, composed by
the company
“Ponce
de
León”
and
the firm “
Hidrotec
”, the same of the
Bienestarina’s
contract. (...).
In
both
tenders the
Nule
Group
presented more than one
proposal. (...)”
Slide20PAVIGAS’ CASE
During the pre-contractual stage of a public tender conducted by the NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ROADS (INVÍAS), many similarities were identified in the offers that were submitted by PAVIGAS LTDA., GISAICO S.A., ESTYMA S.A., and the consortium “VÍAS NARIÑO 2500”.
Because of that, INVÍAS declared the annulment of the bidding process, and decided to give notice of the irregularities to the General Attorney’s Office. Criminal proceedings could not succeed and were filed because the facts happened when Law 1474 of 2011 (Anti-Corruption Statute) had not been issued (that statute establishes criminal penalties for bid rigging practices).
However, the General Attorney’s Office, based on the atypical coincidences that were identified, sent the case to the SIC.
Slide211. IDU’S CASE
This investigation started
from a report called
"monitoring committee to the district
procurement“
, which was published
by
the City
Councel
.
In
its “
mobility sector
” chapter, the report said that the
Institute of Urban Development (IDU) was developing road infrastructure
works in
three major fronts:
(
i
)
Transmilenio
phase,
(ii) six
districts of
Bogota,
and
(iii) a phase of recovery work that was stablished in an administrative act.
According to this report,
the infrastructure works of those three fronts were awarded, in more than 60%, to five or six family or business groups, including
the group of Mr.
HÉCTOR JULIO GÓMEZ and
EMILIO JOSÉ TAPIA
.
By
Resolution 61497 of 2012, the Deputy Superintendence for the Protection of Competition opened a formal investigation for possible bid rigging practices in the mobility sector.
Slide22AUTO PARTS’ CASE
By
Resolution 61570
of
2012, the Deputy Superintendence for the Protection of Competition opened an
investigation to determine if Japanese companies FURUKUWA ELECTRIC CO. LTD., DENSO CORPORATION,
YAZAKI CORPORATION
, LTD FUJIKURA.,
YAZAKI CIEMEL S.A.,
and
YAZAKI CIEMEL FTZ LTDA, made agreements between them to fix the
selling price of electrical kits, electrical wiring
and
electrical installations
of motor vehicles. Those
products were imported
to Colombia
by the
referred entities
.
The
administrative
proceedings initiated
ex officio
,
based on some
news that made reference to the alleged existence of an international price
cartel in the auto parts’ market
. According to
the news,
the anti-competitive conduct
had been recognized in plea
agreements
that such
undertakings held with the Department of Justice of the United States.
Slide23Thank
you