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POWERS OF THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE POWERS OF THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE

POWERS OF THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE - PowerPoint Presentation

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POWERS OF THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE - PPT Presentation

Andrés Pérez Orduz Advisor to the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce POWERS OF THE SIC REGARDING COMPETITION PROTECTION POWERS OF THE SIC POWERS OF THE SIC POWERS OF THE SIC INSTRUMENTS ID: 797469

powers sic officio group sic powers group officio case nule investigations competition colombia sector protection investigation 2012 practices icbf

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Slide1

POWERS OF THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE

Andrés Pérez Orduz

Advisor to the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce

Slide2

POWERS OF THE SIC REGARDING COMPETITION PROTECTION

Slide3

POWERS OF THE SIC

Slide4

POWERS OF THE SIC

Slide5

POWERS OF THE SIC

INSTRUMENTS

By

virtue of Decree 2153 of 1992 and Law 1340 of 2009,

the SIC has

the following instruments for the purposes of carrying out

investigations

on restrictive trade

practices:

Slide6

POWERS OF THE SIC

By virtue of Decree 2153 of 1992 and Law 1340 of 2009,

the SIC has

the following instruments for the purposes of carrying out

investigations

on restrictive trade practices (agreements, abuse of dominance, and other unilateral acts)

:

Slide7

POWERS OF THE SIC

AMOUNT OF FINES FOR COMPETITION’S REGIME INFRINGEMENTS

SANCTIONS

Slide8

POWERS OF THE SIC

Slide9

POWERS OF THE SIC

The Competition Protection Division

initiates cartels’

investigations

ex officio

based on information derived from a variety of sources,

including:

Slide10

POWERS OF THE SIC

Slide11

POWERS OF THE SIC

Slide12

POWERS OF THE SIC

Slide13

POWERS OF THE SIC

Analyzed

Market

Alerts

Recomendations

Automotive Sector in Colombia

(June 2012)

Absence of a consolidated data base which allows to easily monitor the dynamics of prices, sales policies and incidence data.

Promote international exchanges of information between Control Authorities.

Telecommunications

Sector in Colombia (

September

2012)

Significant

concentration

and

dominance

.

Formulation of scenarios for the bidding process for the 4G spectrum.

Slide14

POWERS OF THE SIC

Analyzed

Market

Alerts

Recomendations

The fertilizer sector in Colombia (October 2013)

A set of products that are offered in the market require detailed analysis of prices.

Detailed analysis of prices.

Pesticide industry in Colombia

(December 2013)

Evidence of concentration and dominance

markets that are analyzed should not be isolated.

Slide15

PRACTICAL CASES

Slide16

CURRENT

EX OFFICIO

CASES

GROUP

FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

(Ex Officio Investigations)

Anticompetitive

Conduct

Number

Uninformed mergers

5

Failure to comply with SIC instructions

12

Abuse of dominance

2

Cartel (price fixing)

1

Slide17

CURRENT

EX OFFICIO

CASESBID RIGGING GROUP

(Ex Officio Investigations)

Ex

Officio

By

complaint

Ex

Officio

By

complaint

Preliminary

Inquiries

Investigations

Slide18

NULE GROUP’S CASE

Members

of the NULE GROUP engaged in bid rigging on two public tenders conducted by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) for the adjudication of contracts related to provision of food (

Bienestarina

) and household (

Hogares

) to children under the ICBF care. As result of the investigation, the SIC determined that the NULE GROUP participated in both tenders through several companies simulating competition between them, thereby increasing the chances of the Group of being granted the contracts, as indeed it happened.

By Resolutions 54693 and 54695 of 2013, the SIC imposed fines up to a total of 51.000 monthly minimum wages (approx. USD$ 15 million) to several members of

that economic group.

Slide19

1. NULE GROUP’S CASE

The SIC opened the NULE GROUP’S investigation based on news that were published by EL TIEMPO:

“Another

Nule’s

contract

with ICBF appears

(...)

TIEMPO.COM

established that

(..) they

were given the technical and administrative supervision of the provision of children's breakfasts and emergency rations for group homes, children's homes, boarding schools and emergency centers

(…).

The

contract was

awarded to

the c

onsortium named “

Supervisores

Inter-ICBF-2007”, composed by

the company

“Ponce

de

León”

and

the firm “

Hidrotec

”, the same of the

Bienestarina’s

contract. (...).

In

both

tenders the

Nule

Group

presented more than one

proposal. (...)”

Slide20

PAVIGAS’ CASE

During the pre-contractual stage of a public tender conducted by the NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ROADS (INVÍAS)​​, many similarities were identified in the offers that were submitted by PAVIGAS LTDA., GISAICO S.A., ESTYMA S.A., and the consortium “VÍAS NARIÑO 2500”.

Because of that, INVÍAS declared the annulment of the bidding process, and decided to give notice of the irregularities to the General Attorney’s Office. Criminal proceedings could not succeed and were filed because the facts happened when Law 1474 of 2011 (Anti-Corruption Statute) had not been issued (that statute establishes criminal penalties for bid rigging practices).

However, the General Attorney’s Office, based on the atypical coincidences that were identified, sent the case to the SIC.

Slide21

1. IDU’S CASE

This investigation started

from a report called

"monitoring committee to the district

procurement“

, which was published

by

the City

Councel

.

In

its “

mobility sector

” chapter, the report said that the

Institute of Urban Development (IDU) was developing road infrastructure

works in

three major fronts:

(

i

)

Transmilenio

phase,

(ii) six

districts of

Bogota,

and

(iii) a phase of recovery work that was stablished in an administrative act.

According to this report,

the infrastructure works of those three fronts were awarded, in more than 60%, to five or six family or business groups, including

the group of Mr.

HÉCTOR JULIO GÓMEZ and

EMILIO JOSÉ TAPIA

.

By

Resolution 61497 of 2012, the Deputy Superintendence for the Protection of Competition opened a formal investigation for possible bid rigging practices in the mobility sector.

Slide22

AUTO PARTS’ CASE

By

Resolution 61570

of

2012, the Deputy Superintendence for the Protection of Competition opened an

investigation to determine if Japanese companies FURUKUWA ELECTRIC CO. LTD., DENSO CORPORATION,

YAZAKI CORPORATION

, LTD FUJIKURA.,

YAZAKI CIEMEL S.A.,

and

YAZAKI CIEMEL FTZ LTDA, made agreements between them to fix the

selling price of electrical kits, electrical wiring

and

electrical installations

of motor vehicles. Those

products were imported

to Colombia

by the

referred entities

.

The

administrative

proceedings initiated

ex officio

,

based on some

news that made reference to the alleged existence of an international price

cartel in the auto parts’ market

. According to

the news,

the anti-competitive conduct

had been recognized in plea

agreements

that such

undertakings held with the Department of Justice of the United States.

Slide23

Thank

you