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Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur

Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur - PowerPoint Presentation

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Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur - PPT Presentation

and What to Do about Them A Study of the German Power Market Maria Woodman Student Economics Department New York University Research Motivation The German Power Market and Negative Wholesale Power Prices ID: 567142

demand wind price prices wind demand prices price negative power market wholesale supply retail hours curve elasticity generation infeed

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Slide1

Negative Wholesale Power Prices: Why They Occur and What to Do about Them

A Study of the German Power Market

Maria Woodman, Student

Economics Department, New York UniversitySlide2

Research Motivation:The German Power Market

and Negative Wholesale Power Prices

Market Anomaly

Electricity doesn’t obey traditional commodity price behaviors

Negative wholesale prices can result

Three Causes

Increases in wind

infeed

when demand is low

Government

incentives to favor wind producers

Flat rate prices cause customers to consume electricity regardless of the value of each MWSlide3

Wind BehaviorSlide4

[

ALZ1]

 

 

[ALZ1]

FIX THESE!!!!

Power Prices and Wind GenerationSlide5

Power Generation Supply (without Wind)

Hydro

Nuclear

Lignite Coal

Bituminous

Coal

Gas Turbine

Wholesale clearing price

MW of Capacity

Marginal Cost

Demand

Supply

Merit Order Curve

Combined Cycle Gas TurbineSlide6

Nuclear

Lignite Coal

Bituminous

Coal

Wholesale clearing price

MW of Capacity

Marginal Cost

Demand

Supply – with Wind

Shifted Merit Order Curve

Combined Cycle Gas Turbine

WIND

0

Power Generation Supply (with Wind)

Supply – No WindSlide7

Increased Wind Infeed

An influx of wind power shifts that merit order curve rightward, which drives prices downSlide8

Flat Rate Retail Prices

Retail prices don’t represent a consumers true willingness to pay

In the case of negative wholesale prices, they grossly overpay in the retail market.

D

Retail Market

S

L

P

Wholesale Market

0

P

L

S

D

DSlide9

Is Dynamic Pricing the Answer?

What is dynamic (“time-of-day”) pricing?

Allows retail prices to match wholesale prices in real time

Stimulates a demand side price response

How can it impact negative prices

?

The solution isn’t simple

An estimated retail demand curve isn’t defined when prices are negativeSlide10

Existing Studies of Dynamic Pricing

Studies evaluating

the results of implemented programs have returned varied ranges of

end-user

price response

Long Run Elasticity – 0.3-0.5 (

Borenstein

, 2005)

Short Run

Industrial End-User Elasticity – 0.01-0.27 (

Boisvert, 2007; Neenan, 2004; Braithwait and Sheasy, 2002; Patrick and Wolak, 1997)

Using these ranges, the studies focused on the use of dynamic pricing to reduce peak price and loadSlide11

Method for Analyzing RTP

Construct

wholesale supply

and demand curves for a set of hours representing different combinations of demand and wind infeed

Construct demand curves representing different levels of price response using differing price

elasticities

Induce an increase in wind power by shifting the supply curve

Solve for the new equilibrium points given the new supply and demand curvesSlide12

Allocation of Hours

It was found that a necessary condition for negative prices appeared to be either high wind in-feed ( >12 GW) coupled with moderate system demand (40-50 GW) or low system demand ( <40 GW) coupled with moderate wind in-feed (5-10 GW) (Genoese, 2010).

Using these

metrics,

I was able to disaggregate the hours into their respective buckets for

analysis

High Wind Infeed

Low Wind Infeed

High

Demand

Jan 12 - 7 PM - Weekday

Oct 7 - 8 PM - Weekday

Wind MW: 12594.75

Wind MW: 2361.5

Total Demand: 72826

Total Demand: 65847

Low

Demand

Mar 8 – 9 AM - Weekend

May 17 – 5 AM - Weekend

Wind MW: 9914.25

Wind MW: 2276

Total Demand 43358

Total Demand: 33394

Hours of focusSlide13

Constructing the ModelSlide14

Preliminary ResultsFor the hour type

of low demand and high wind infeed,

on average, a

price elasticity of at least

-

0.14

was needed to have a market clearing price of €

0.00

For the case of increased wind generation

Following

the same logic, a price elasticity of approximately -0.44 was necessary to raise the price to equal the existing retail flat rate price. The elasticity value is unrealistic given previous estimates of consumer price responseSlide15

Occurrence of Negative Prices

Weekday

Weekend

Grand Total

Early Morning

14.08%

36.62%

50.70%

Mid Day

2.82%

1.41%

4.23%

Night

21.13%

23.94%

45.07%

Grand Total

38.03%

61.97%

100.00%

Negative Prices: Hours of Occurrence

Of the 1% of hours that were affected in 2009

The vast majority fell during early morning and weekend hoursSlide16

Conclusions

RTP

may not have a significant effect and in some cases might even be a hindrance to the market.

Othe

r demand side management techniques may be more effective in mitigating the market inefficiency of negative prices

Additional R&D in electric vehicles, smart grid

technology

and implementation, and smart appliances could aid in making demand side management viableSlide17

Thank You!

Questions?

Maria Woodman, New York University

Email: mjw399@nyu.edu