PPT-Part 1: Optimal Multi-Item Auctions

Constantinos Daskalakis EECS MIT Reference Yang Cai Constantinos Daskalakis and Matt Weinberg An Algorithmic Characterization of MultiDimensional Mechanisms STOC 2012 httpeccchpiwebdereport2011172. Robust Approximation Bounds for . Equilibria. and Auctions. Tim . Roughgarden. Stanford University. 2. Motivation. Clearly: . many modern applications in CS involve autonomous, self-interested agents. A Lesson in . Multiagent. System. Based on Jose Vidal’s book. Fundamentals of . Multiagent. Systems. Henry . Hexmoor. SIUC. Auction . Private value function = utility of owning an item. . Example: Gasoline. Ramki. . Gummadi. . Stanford . University. . (Based on joint work with P. Key and A. . Proutiere. ). Overview. Introduction/Motivation. Budgeted Second Price Auctions. A General . O. nline . B. udgeting . & . Combinatorial Auctions. Adapted from notes by Vincent . Conitzer. . Auctions Assumption is – . If you buy the item for exactly what it is worth, there is no utility.. Yale slides bring this home – especially if your evaluation isn’t correct.. Abert. . Plà. eXiT. – University of . Girona. Advisors: Beatriz . López. & Javier Murillo. 1. LIP6 . Seminar. – . Université. Pierre et Marie . Curie. Paris VI (12-2-2012). eXiT: Control Engineering and Intelligent Systems. Part II: The Smoothness Framework. Jason Hartline. Northwestern University. Vasilis Syrgkanis. Cornell University. December 11, 2013. Part II: High-level goals. PoA. in auctions (as games of incomplete information):. Xiaohua. Li and . Jeong. . Kyun. Lee. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering . State University of New York at Binghamton . {xli,jlee54}@binghamton.edu . Major contributions. Develop efficient algorithm to construct optimal multi-hop path in arbitrarily large wireless networks. and Matroids. Soheil Ehsani. January 2018. Joint work with M. . Hajiaghayi. , T. . Kesselheim. , S. . Singla. The problem consists of an . initial setting . and a . sequence of events. .. We have to take particular actions . ver.1.1. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.. 2. Contents. □. . Access Route. □ . Company Info. □ . Doc Management. □ . Audit Management. □ . Part Management. □ . Vendor Q&A. - Self Audit . Vasilis Syrgkanis. Microsoft Research, New England. Non truthful auctions are ubiquitous. We need to develop theoretical tools to analyze the quality of their outcomes. Three Challenging Settings in Auction Analysis. Item-Scale Correlations and . Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Ron D. Hays, Ph.D. . (. drhays@ucla.edu. ). RCMAR Methods Seminar. June 18, 2012, 3-4pm. Drew Cobb Room 131/Broxton 2. nd. Floor Conference Room. Tim . Roughgarden. . (Stanford). 2. Motivation. Optimal auction design: . what's the point?. One primary reason: . suggests auction formats likely to perform well in practice.. Exhibit A: . single-item . System. Based on Jose Vidal’s book. Fundamentals of . Multiagent. Systems. Henry . Hexmoor. SIUC. Auction . Private value function = utility of owning an item. . Example: Gasoline. Common value function = resale value of an item. . over Social Networks. Jason Hartline (Northwestern),. Vahab Mirrokni (Microsoft Research) . Mukund Sundararajan (Stanford). Network Affects Value. JOHN. VAHAB. JASON. zune. $20. A person’s value for an item depends on others who own the item.