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Game Theory I This module provides an introduction to game theory for managers and includes Game Theory I This module provides an introduction to game theory for managers and includes

Game Theory I This module provides an introduction to game theory for managers and includes - PowerPoint Presentation

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Game Theory I This module provides an introduction to game theory for managers and includes - PPT Presentation

Author Neil Bendle Marketing Metrics Reference Chapter 7 2014 Neil Bendle and Management by the Numbers Inc Game Theory studies competitive and cooperative interactions Despite often using terms such as players and games the ideas apply to markets and managers ID: 681015

manager game sell action game manager action sell sum management chooses mbtn games dominant theory oranges apples numbers alfred

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Slide1

Game Theory I

This module provides an introduction to game theory for managers and includes the following topics: matrix basics, zero and non-zero sum games, and dominant strategies.

Author: Neil BendleMarketing Metrics Reference: Chapter 7© 2014 Neil Bendle and Management by the Numbers, Inc.Slide2

Game Theory studies competitive and cooperative interactions.

Despite often using terms such as “players” and “games”, the ideas apply to markets and managers.Core idea: Examining incentives allows us to predict what will happen in interactions if people and companies respond “correctly”.

What is Game Theory?2What is Game Theory?MBTN | Management by the Numbers

Insight

To understand an industry, a manager must comprehend how each participant views the market and their strategic options. In order to do this, managers should consider their partners’ and competitors’ incentives.Slide3

Game Theory and managementGame Theory and Management

3Game theory applies to a wide range of managerial situations and choices.

“If I drop my price what will my competitor do? How will this impact my profits?”“Should I invest in proprietary technology or license it from a rival?”“Should I enter this new market?”Game theory is also commonly applied to advertising planning, product launches and promotional spending.InsightGame theory has wide managerial application especially in pricing.

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide4

Why study simple Games?

4Why Study Simple Games?

MBTN | Management by the NumbersIn game theory, it is helpful to simplify a complex decision process by focusing on other people’s incentives.We consider simple games:2 players and 2 possible actions; called a 2x2 game,Single period,Simultaneous (all choose at the same time).

Where the payoff covers everything important to a decision maker. Profits are just one example of an objective.

Definitions

Single Period Game

= Choice with no impact on later choices.

Payoff

= What manager cares about expressed in numbers.Slide5

The Downside of SimplicityThe Downside of Simplicity

5We

simplify situations to help us clarify our thinking and options, however, the world is not simple and game theory doesn’t capture some important dimensions to strategy. For example:Strategy is Dynamic. In simple game theory, my actions today don’t change the future. Not necessarily the case:My actions affect my competitor’s actions which in turn impact my next decision (pricing, product enhancements, etc.)Considering the future may promote cooperation (i.e. I don’t want to annoy you today if I may need your help tomorrow)Simple game theory assumes no communication between parties. Communication

is often incomplete or misleading, but it can impact outcomes.

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide6

Beth

Alfred

Sell Apples

Sell Oranges

Sell

Apples

Sell

Oranges

The matrix below describes the managers (e.g.

Alfred

&

Beth

) & their possible actions (e.g. Sell Apples or Oranges). The cells represent choice combinations i.e. outcomes.

Alfred

chooses: Sell Apples

Beth

chooses: Sell Oranges

Read across row for

Alfred’s action

& down column for

Beth’s

.

Example Game Theory Matrix

Example Game Theory Matrix

6

MBTN | Management by the Numbers

OutcomeSlide7

Example Game Theory MatrixExample Game Theory Matrix

7

BethAlfred

Sell Apples

Sell Oranges

Sell Apples

+2

-2

-2

+2

Sell Oranges

-1

+1

+1

-1

Matrix shows each manager’s payoff for choice combination. Payoffs for each manager in a cell

are

color coded.

e.g. if

Alfred

chooses to sell apples while manager

Beth

chooses to sell oranges (highlighted cell in upper right)

Alfred

gets a payoff of

+2

. This is his best possible payoff.

Beth

gets

-2

her worst possible payoff.

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide8

Making The Best ChoiceMaking The Best Choice

8

BethAlfred

Sell Apples

Sell Oranges

Sell

Apples

+2

-2

-2

+2

Sell

Oranges

-1

+1

+1

-1

What is

Alfred

’s best choice to get the highest payoff?

If

Beth

chooses to sell apples

Alfred

might get -2 or +1

If

Beth

chooses to sell oranges

Alfred

might get +2 or -1

MBTN | Management by the Numbers

Insight

A person’s best choice often depends on the other player’s choice.Slide9

What If manager A Had a Spy?What If Alfred Had a Spy ?

9

BethAlfred

Sell Apples

Sell Oranges

Sell

Apples

+2

-2

-2

+2

Sell Oranges

-1

+1

+1

-1

The game is easy if

Alfred

has a spy who says:

Beth

will sell apples.

Alfred

can ignore

Beth

’s sell oranges column and so

Alfred

will sell oranges as

+1

>

-2Beth will sell oranges.

Alfred can ignore

Beth

’s sell apples column and so Alfred will sell apples as

-1<+2

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide10

What If Beth Had a Spy?What If Beth Had a Spy?

10

BethAlfred

Sell Apples

Sell Oranges

Sell Apples

+2

-2

-2

+2

Sell Oranges

-1

+1

+1

-1

The game is easy if

Beth

has a spy who says:

Alfred

will sell apples.

Beth

can ignore

Alfred

’s sell oranges row and so

Beth

will sell apples as

+2

>

-2

Alfred

will sell oranges.

Beth

can ignore

Alfred’s sell apples row and so Beth

will sell oranges as -1<

+1

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide11

The first question to ask is:

Are you competing for a fixed pie?The answer to this question falls into two broad categories:Is what I gain offset by an equivalent loss by the other party? (e.g. the size of pie does not change based on my choice because someone else loses the same amount I gain)

Fixed Pie = Zero Sum GamesOr, is what I gain from my choice different than what the other party loses (e.g. the size of the pie varies based on the choices made by the players) Variable Pie = Non-Zero Sum GamesZero Sum Game or Not?11Zero Sum Game or Not?

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide12

Zero-sum games are common in sport (e.g. darts, football)

They are less common in business but do exist (e.g. the award of a big contract)In zero-sum games if one person wins, the other must lose the same amount – the players’ payoffs in any cell total zero (i.e. if manager

A gets +1 manager B must get -1)Zero-Sum GamesDefinitionZero Sum Game = Payoffs in every cell total to zero12Zero-Sum Games

MBTN | Management by the Numbers

Insight

All fixed pie games can easily be recast as zero sum games by subtracting or adding a constant from all payoffs.Slide13

Example of a Zero-Sum GameExample of a Zero-Sum Game

13

MBTN | Management by the NumbersManager B

Manager A

Action X

Action Y

Action X

+1

-1000

-1

+1000

Action Y

-1000

+1

+1000

-1

If manager

A

chooses X and

B

chooses X:

-1

+1

=0

If manager

A

chooses X and

B

chooses Y:

+1000

-1000 =0

If manager A chooses Y and B chooses X:

+1000 -1000 =0If manager

A

chooses Y and

B

chooses Y :

-1

+1

=0

The game below is a zero-sum

game

stacked

against

B

Insight

Many zero sum games aren’t “fair”. Payoffs in this example add up to zero in any cell, however Manager A clearly prefers this game. Slide14

Winning a Zero-Sum Game“Winning” a Zero-Sum Game

14There is a “best way” to play zero-sum games.

Assume the other manager makes their best move and move to minimize the harm they cause you.Your opponent making their best move is a major assumption but this allows you to predict them.InsightIn a zero-sum game, assume your competitor will make the best move they can and minimize how much they can harm you.

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide15

Non zero-sum games

are when the payoffs to a given outcome don’t always total zero.The gain by one manager may not be equally offset by the loss by the other manager. In fact, both managers might do better or worse together.

Non zero-sum games dominate business.The classic example is a price war. Fighting a price war often destroys the profits of all the firms involved.Non Zero-Sum Games15Non Zero-Sum GamesMBTN | Management by the Numbers

Definition

Non Zero-Sum Game = Payoffs for one or more cells do not total zero.Slide16

Example of A Non-Zero Sum GameExample of A Non Zero-Sum Game

16

Manager BManager A

Action X

Action Y

Action X

-3

+1

+2

0

Action Y

0

+1

+1

+1

Total payoffs do not equal zero for all the given outcomes

If manager

A

chooses X and

B

chooses X =

+2

-3

= -1

If manager

A

chooses X and

B

chooses Y = 0 +1 = +1If manager A chooses Y and B

chooses X = +1

+0 = +1If manager

A chooses Y and B chooses Y = +1

+1 = +2

MBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide17

Winning a Non Zero-Sum Game

17Winning a Non Zero-Sum Game

MBTN | Management by the NumbersInsightNon zero-sum games are not simple win/lose situations. In this they mirror most business situations where competing firms often rise or fall at the same time.

Winning is hard to define in non zero-sum games.

The “correct” way to play sometimes entails managers doing worse than if both were to play “incorrectly”.

Non zero-sum games fall into categories with very different outcomes and recommendations for action. We outline these in Game Theory for Managers Part 2.Slide18

That all play the best way they can (optimally) is a major, but useful, assumption. This allows us to determine what should happen in a game. This is sometimes called a "no regrets” solution, i.e. where the person can’t do any better given what the other person does.

The solution of a game will be as follows:Look for dominant options, assume dominant options are chosen and ignore dominated options

Try to find a solution when ignoring dominated optionsUse a mixed strategy if the game cannot be solved using dominant optionsSolving Games18Solving GamesMBTN | Management by the NumbersSlide19

A Dominant Action19

A Dominant Action

MBTN | Management by the NumbersDominance is when one action is best for a manager regardless of what the other manager does.This makes the game simple: No prediction of the other manager’s action is needed when a dominant action exists.Strong dominance is when one

action is

always best.

Weak

dominance is when

one

action

is sometimes better and never worse than the other action. In the case of weak dominance, you should take that action as you will never be worse off and may be better off.Slide20

Example of a Dominant ActionExample of a Dominant Action

20

MBTN | Management by the NumbersAction X is strongly dominant for A as 3>2 and 2>1Q: Is there a dominant action for Manager B?Action Y is strongly dominant for

B

as

-2

>

-3

and

-1

>

-2

Manager B

Manager A

Action X

Action Y

Action X

-3

-2

3

2

Action

Y

-2

-1

2

1

Insight

In a situation where one action is dominant, the other actions are referred to as “dominated” actions. Slide21

Solution If manager Has A Dominant Action

21Solution If Manager Has A Dominant Action

MBTN | Management by the NumbersAssume any manager with a dominant action chooses it. Ignore the dominated optionIt is tempting to hope a competitor will take a dominated action if you’d get a big payoff if they did: e.g. “maybe they will do something foolish”

In game theory we assume others act correctly, don’t change this assumption however tempting.

When an option becomes best only after removing an other player’s option this is called iterated dominance. (This does

not

count as dominance in the initial matrix).Slide22

Solving Games With Two Dominant SolutionsSolving Games With Two Dominant Solutions

22

MBTN | Management by the NumbersAction X is strongly dominant for A as 3>2 and 2>1Action Y is strongly dominant for B

as

-2

>

-3

and

-1

>

-2

So ignore action Y for

A

and action X for

B

A

will choose X and

B

Y. Manager

A

will win

2

and

B

will lose

2

each time they play this game. (

B

hates this game)Manager BManager AAction XAction YAction X-3-232

Action Y-2

-1

2

1

SolutionSlide23

Manager B

Manager A

Action X

Action Y

Action X

+2

-1

+2

0

Action Y

0

0

-1

+10

Solving Games With

One Dominant Solution

23

Solving Games With

One

Dominant Solution

MBTN | Management by the Numbers

What should manager

A

do?

A

’s best choice isn’t clear

But manager

A

knows

B

won’t choose

Y as it is weakly dominated by X

+2>1 & 0=0

Ignore manager B choosing Y

Given manager

B

will choose X

manager

A

should choose

action X,

+2

>

-1

The solution is that both choose X.

Note although both choosing Y gives

A

a

tempting payoff of

10

it simply won’t happen and should be ignored.

SolutionSlide24

Mixed StrategiesMixed Strategies

24

MBTN | Management by the NumbersMixed strategies involve a manager being deliberately unpredictable, using a random strategy. Sometimes tax authorities audit, sometimes they don’t.Mixed strategies are useful when predictability can be taken advantage of, or if everyone using same strategy is ruinous, e.g. think advertising wars when no one backs down.Mixed strategies are when no dominant strategies exist: You find no (strongly or weakly) dominant solutions.

Calculating correct mixed strategies is tricky. In this tutorial just identify when a mixed strategy is appropriate.Slide25

What is

A’s best choice? X is better than Y if B

chooses X But Y is better than X if B Chooses YWhat will manager B choose? It isn’t clear either. X is better than Y if A chooses X But Y is better than X if A Chooses Y

Assuming the managers cannot discuss their problem the answer is to use a mixed strategy.

Both managers do X & Y randomly at calculated probability.

Identifying Mixed Strategy Games

Identifying Mixed Strategy Games

25

MBTN | Management by the Numbers

Manager B

Manager A

Action X

Action Y

Action X

1

0

3

0

Action Y

0

3

0

1Slide26

Marketing Metrics by Farris, Bendle, Pfeifer and Reibstein,

2nd edition- And -

Game Theory for Managers Part 2 Playing the Right Game (advanced MBTN module – Available 2014). This module provides insight into types of games, such as pricing games, that exist and how best to play them. Game Theory – Further Reference26Game Theory - Further Reference

MBTN | Management by the Numbers