PDF-Lecture 2: Learning and Equilibrium Extensive-Form Games III. Nash Eq
Author : kittie-lecroy | Published Date : 2016-06-03
1 2 III ExtensiveForm Games Strategies are
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Lecture 2: Learning and Equilibrium Extensive-Form Games III. Nash Eq: Transcript
1 2 III ExtensiveForm Games Strategies are. Let’s start with an informal discussion of what a game is and when it’s useful…. Components of a game:. Players. . E.g., animals, people, firms, countries. . Strategies. . E.g., attack . S. . Histories and . subhistories. A terminal history is a listing of every play in a possible course of the game, all the way to the end. . A . proper . subhistory. . is a listing of every play in the course of the game up to some point before the end.. Econ 171. The Hawk-Dove Game. Animals meet encounter each other in the woods and must decide how to share a resource.. There are two possible strategies. . Hawk: Demand the entire resource and be prepared to fight for it.. Fall 2011. Constantinos Daskalakis. Lecture 11. Last. . Lecture. .... 0. n. Generic PPAD. Embed PPAD graph in [0,1]. 3. 3D-SPERNER. canonical . p. .w. . linear . BROUWER. multi-player. NASH. 4-player. Lecture 12. Constantinos Daskalakis. The Lemke-. Howson. Algorithm. The Lemke-. Howson. Algorithm (1964). Problem:. Find an exact equilibrium of a 2-player game.. Since there exists a rational equilibrium this task is feasible.. . Histories and . subhistories. A terminal history is a listing of every play in a possible course of the game, all the way to the end. . A . proper . subhistory. . is a listing of every play in the course of the game up to some point before the end.. Econ 171. The Hawk-Dove Game. Animals meet encounter each other in the woods and must decide how to share a resource.. There are two possible strategies. . Hawk: Demand the entire resource and be prepared to fight for it.. “Burn the Boats”. לעיתים אנחנו שומעים את הביטוי . “let’s burn the boats”. . מה הכוונה?. לוותר על אלטרנטיבה . B. ובכך לא להותיר ברירה ולנסות להשיג . Microeconomics C. Amine Ouazad. Who am I. Assistant prof. at INSEAD since 2008.. Teaching . Prices and Markets in the MBA . program, Econometrics A, B, Microeconometrics, in the PhD program.. Research:. Short introduction to game theory. 1. 2. Decision . Theory (reminder). (How to make decisions). Decision Theory = . Probability theory + Utility Theory. (deals with chance) (deals with outcomes). Fall 2016. Yang Cai. Lecture . 05. Overview so far. Recap:. Games, . rationality, . solution concepts. Existence Theorems for Nash equilibrium: . Nash’s theorem for general games (via . Brouwer. Brian Hu Zhang. Primarily . based on:. Zhang . and . Sandholm. . (NeurIPS 2022, to appear), . "Polynomial-Time Optimal Equilibria with a Mediator in Extensive-Form . Games. " . https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.15395. solution concepts, and . Refinements of NASH Equilibrium. Tuomas Sandholm. The heart of the problem. In a 1-agent setting, agent. ’. s expected utility maximizing strategy is well-defined. But in a multiagent system, the outcome may depend on others. solution concepts, and . Refinements of NASH Equilibrium. Tuomas Sandholm. The heart of the problem. In a 1-agent setting, agent. ’. s expected utility maximizing strategy is well-defined. But in a multiagent system, the outcome may depend on...
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