/
The Optimal Mark-Up and Price Discrimination The Optimal Mark-Up and Price Discrimination

The Optimal Mark-Up and Price Discrimination - PowerPoint Presentation

lois-ondreau
lois-ondreau . @lois-ondreau
Follow
407 views
Uploaded On 2018-03-21

The Optimal Mark-Up and Price Discrimination - PPT Presentation

Outline The optimal markup over cost What is price discrimination Examples of price discrimination When is price discrimination feasible First second and third degree price discrimination Multinational pricing of autos ID: 660215

demand price market discrimination price demand discrimination market 000 prices foreign product quantity optimal elasticity 100 segment profit cost

Share:

Link:

Embed:

Download Presentation from below link

Download Presentation The PPT/PDF document "The Optimal Mark-Up and Price Discrimina..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.


Presentation Transcript

Slide1

The Optimal Mark-Up

and Price Discrimination

Outline

The optimal mark-up over cost

What is price discrimination?

Examples of price discrimination

When is price discrimination feasible?

First, second, and third degree price discrimination

Multinational pricing of autos

Interdependent demandSlide2

Price as the decision variable

Thus far we have assumed that quantity was the relevant decision-variable.

In reality, most firms establish a price for their product and then try to satisfy demand for their product at that price.

The price established by management is generally based on costs plus a mark-up.Slide3

The trade-off between price and profit

The firm’s contribution can be written as:

Contribution = (P – MC)Q

We assume that marginal cost (MC) is constant.

Issue: How far above MC should the firm raise P to maximize its contribution (and hence profits)?Slide4

It depends on elasticity (EP)

We can show that the optimal mark-up over MC is inversely proportional to elasticity of demand (E

P

)Slide5

The markup rule

The size of the firm’s mark-up (above marginal cost expressed as a percentage of price) depends inversely on the price elasticity of demand for a good or service.

That is, the optimal markup is given by:

[3.12]

Rearranging [3.1] we obtain:

[3.13]Slide6

Elasticities and optimal prices

Elasticity

MC

Price

-1.5

3.0

100

300

-2.0

2.0

100

200

-3.0

1.5

100

150

-5.0

1.25

100

125

-11.0

1.1

100

110-1.0100100Slide7

Students at Sherwood High in Sandy Springs, Maryland talk about things that bother themSlide8
Slide9

What is price discrimination?

Price discrimination is the practice of selling the same product to different buyers (or groups of buyers) at different prices.Slide10

Examples of price discrimination

Airlines charge full fares to business travelers, whereas they offer discount fares to vacationers.

“Sizing up their income” pricing by dentists, plumbers, and auto mechanics.

Publishers of academic journals charge higher prices for library as compared to individual subscriptions.

Senior citizen discounts.

Discounts for new buyers—e.g., magazine subscriptions.

Theater ticket pricingSlide11

When is price discrimination feasible?

The seller must be capable of identifying market segments that differ based on willingness to pay, or elasticity of demand.

The seller must be capable of “enforcing” the different prices charged to different market segments—that is, the seller must be able to prevent “arbitrage.”Slide12

1st degree price discrimination

Sometimes called “perfect” price discrimination, the seller charges each buyer their “reservation price” for every unit purchased.

Reservation price

is the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay rather than go without the last unit of the good. Slide13

Auctions

Auctions are designed to force buyers nearer to their reservations prices.Slide14

3rd degree price discrimination

This is the practice of charging different prices in different market segmentsSlide15

Examples of market “segments”

Business travelers versus tourists.

Kids versus adults

Those covered by health insurance and those not covered.

Senior citizens versus everyone else.

Mercedes Benz owners versus Chevrolet owners.

Domestic versus foreign buyersSlide16

Multinational pricing of autos

The problem for a car manufacturer is to establish profit-maximizing prices on cars sold domestically and in the foreign market segmentSlide17

The Demand Functions

The inverse demand equation for the home (H) market is given by:

Where P

H

is the price charge in the home market and H is the quantity sold in the home market

The inverse demand equation for the foreign (F) market is given by:Slide18

30,000

60

0

Quantity

Price

25,000

Home

Foreign

35.7

The demand for carsSlide19

30,000

60

0

Quantity (000s)

Price

D

H

30

Profit maximization in

the Home segment

MR

H

MC

H

10,000

20,000

20

To maximize profits in the Home segment, set MR

H

= MC

HSlide20

18,000

60

0

Quantity (000s)

Price

25,000

D

F

35.7

Profit-maximization in

the foreign market segment

MR

F

MC

F

11,000

10

To maximize profits in the Foreign segment, set MR

F

= MC

FSlide21

Summary

Notice that the price is higher in the Home market where the manufacturer faces a less elastic demand curveSlide22

Interdependent demand

Consider a microbrewery that brews lager and pilsner. The price of the lager will likely affect the demand for pilsner.Slide23

Example

Let A denote lager and B is pilsner. Let the profit function be given by:

Note:

We assume that there are no interdependencies or complementarities in production Slide24

Determining the optimal quantity

Produce up to the point in which the extra total revenue (MTR) from the sale of product A is equal to the marginal cost of A, and similarly for B.

That is:

And:Slide25

Numerical example

Let MC

A

= $80; MC

B

= $40

P

A = 280 – 2QAPB = 180 – QB – 2QA

Notice that increased sales of A adversely affect sales of B, but not vice versa.Slide26

TR = R

A

+ R

B

= (280Q

A

– 2Q

A2) + (180QB – QB2-2QAQB)

Thus we have:

Therefore:

MTR

A

= 280 – 4Q

A

– 2Q

B

And:

MTR

B

= 180 – 2Q

B

– 2Q

A

So set MTRA = MCA and MTRB = MCB and solve for QA and QB280 – 4QA – 2QB = 80180 – 2QB – 2QA = 40The result is a linear equation system with two equations and two unknownsSlide27

The solutions

Solving the equation system yields:

Q

A

= 30 and Q

B

= 40

Substituting into the price (or inverse demand) equations yields:PA = $220 and PB = $80

Contrast this outcome to the case where the brewery ignored the cross effect of A and B and simply tried to maximize profits from A.Slide28

Information Goods

Examples: Databases, video games, word processing applications, sheet music, news articles.

Properties of information goods:

High fixed costs

Zero or negligible marginal cost.

Network externalities.

Information is costly to produce but cheap (often costless) to reproduce.Slide29

Network Effects

Network externality

is defined as a change in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives from a good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good changes.

Autarky value:

Value generated by the product even if there are no other users.

Synchronization value: additional value derived from being able to interact with other users of the product, and it is this latter value that is the essence of network effects.Slide30

Phones and fax machines have zero autarchy value; whereas computers do have some.Slide31

The development of bandwidth has greatly increased the synchronization value of PCs.Slide32

Path Dependence and Lock-In EffectsNetwork industries may exhibit path dependence, so that the behavior of early adopters may have a disproportionate influence on the equilibrium outcome.

Lock-in may occur on the “wrong” technology because if, for whatever reason, the wrong technology is chosen, it may be difficult to achieve the coordinated

movement of large numbers of users required for the “right” technology to become the standard. Slide33

QWERTY: Example of an Unfortunate Lock-in effect

R

T

Y