Understanding childbearing in Europe - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Understanding childbearing in Europe

ICS Conference “Problematics of natality in Portugal”, Lisbon, 15 January 2014

Tomáš SobotkaVienna Institute of Demography (Austrian Academy of Sciences), Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human CapitalSlide2

European fertility ups and downs

Distinct period “waves” in European fertility after 1990The 1990s: Fertility declines to record-low levels

2000s: Fertility reversal, increasing period TFRs (ex. In PT)After 2008: Mostly declining fertility after the onset of the recession, especially in Southern EuropeShift towards later childbearing: strong influence on fertility trendsEconomic uncertainty closely linked to fertilityInterrelated changes in values, family, gender relations, educationWorries about too low birth rates, diverse policy responsesThe return of pro-natalism in policy debates

Jacques Chirac (1984): “In demographic term, Europe is vanishing. Twenty years or so from now, our countries will be empty” (Teitelbaum, 2000).

Pritchett and Viarengo (2012: 55): Large parts of Europe committing “gradual demographic suicide”Slide3

Agenda

European fertility trends and the shift to delayed childbearingThe “Great Recession” and fertilityReproductive preferences

Government responses to low fertility & policy debatesDiscussion: Low fertility in Portugal in a (Southern) European contextData: Eurostat, Human Fertility Database, national statistical offices, VID, own computations, surveys (GGS, FFS, EVS, other)Regions: following main geographic, cultural, economic, welfare and demographic divisions - Western, Northern (Nordic), Southern Europe, “German-speaking” countries - Central, South-eastern, Eastern Europe (EU regions in blue, except NO, ICE, CH)Slide4

European fertility trends and the shift to delayed childbearingSlide5

Period Total Fertility:

North & West vs. South & Centre & East?

Source: own elaboration based on European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014), Eurostat and National Statistical Offices DataSlide6

Period Total Fertility:

Parallel trends in Portugal and Spain

Source: own elaboration based on European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014), Eurostat and National Statistical Offices DataSlide7

The shift to a later childbearing:

Mean age at first birth in selected countries

Source: Sobotka 2013; computations from the Human Fertility Database, Eurostat and data from national statistical offices Slide8

The „postponement transition“:

Key driving factors and consequences

Key driving factors:

Expansion of university education, especially among womenEnrollment in education not compatible with parenthood

Women with tertiary education aged 30-34 in Portugal: 13% in 2001-> 31% in 2011 (OECD Education at a Glance 2014)Economic uncertainty: unemployment, job instability, low wages

Particularly prominent in Southern and Eastern EuropeUnaffordable housing, limited rental marketEfficient contraception, available abortion and “morning after” pill

Delayed partnership formationChanged family values and preferences; higher acceptance of childlessness, preference for non-family lifestyles Slide9

Why does delayed childbearing affect period fertility?

The “tempo effect”

: Shifting age at childbearing the most important factor influencing short-term shifts in period total fertility rate (TFR) in EuropeAlso “explaining” extreme low TFR levels (<1.3) (Sobotka 2004, Goldstein et al. 2009)Why? Births “postponed” in 2010 are simply not realised in that year

This may not affect generation’s (cohort) fertility rateHowever, late age at childbearing also increases the risk of infertility and of not realising the “delayed” birth later in life

Demographic analysis: Two ways to address tempo effects 1) Computing alternative fertility indicators aiming to control for it 2) Looking at the “real” (completed) fertility of women aged over 40Slide10

Fertility in selected European countries, 2009-11: conventional and tempo-adjusted TFR

Data Source:

European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014)Slide11

Cohort fertility trends and variation

Considerably higher completed fertility (CTFR) than the period TFR In most countries, a stabilisation or slight increases projected in the 1970s cohorts (Myrskylä et al. 2013, Prioux et al. 2013, European Demographic Data Sheet 2014) Earlier cohort fertility decline in Europe overshadowed by falling family size in East Asia

Expected European CTFR range, 1975 cohort: 1.4 in Spain, 1.46 in Italy

vs. 2.1 in Ireland, 2.04 in Norway and 2.02 in FrancePortugal: shifting from a higher-ranking fertility to one of the lowest-fertility countries in EuropeTrend Portugal, alongside Spain, resembles a fast fertility fall in East AsiaSlide12

Cohort fertility trends and variation

Observed and projected completed cohort fertility in selected regions in Europe, East Asia and in the United States,

women born 1960-79Myrskylä, M., J. Goldstein, and Y. Alice Cheng. 2013. “New Cohort Fertility Forecasts for the Developed World: Rises, Falls, and Reversals.” Popul. Dev. Rev.

39 (1): 31–56Slide13

Contrasting patterns of family building, selected countries

Number of children ever born, female birth cohorts ca. 1968

Data based on Human Fertility Database and ONS (for England and Wales)

.

no systematic difference in childlessness between the countries with higher and lower completed fertilitySlide14

The “Great Recession” and fertilitySlide15

COMMON PRECONDITIONS FOR FAMILY FORMATION in contemporary Europe

Completing education

Achieving relatively stable employmentAccumulating resources (including sufficient housing)(Own housing: especially Southern Europe)Having a stable partner (marriage no longer necessary)Feeling ready for parenthoodNot only support for families, but also living conditions and choices of young adults in pre-family stage matter >2008: Economic position of young adults deteriorating rapidly in most countries; potentially negative effects on family formation and fertility Slide16

The economic recession in Europe

Main pathways how the recession affected partnership formation and fertilityUnemployment, employment instability: loss of resources, inability to accumulate resources, uncertainty about future, inability to make binding long-term decisions

“Frozen” housing market, construction & mortgage lendingGovernment cuts, also in social and family-related spending often affect especially the youngStronger enrollment in university education & later home leaving?Wasted generation?EU-27: 14% young adults (age 18-24) NEETs; (Not in Employment, Education or Training) in 2013; rapid increase across Southern Europe to 29% in IT+GR, 24% in ESP, 19% in PTStrong effect of economic instability identified for first births and partnership formation (also indirect effect on first births); especially for men (Adsera 2005, 2009, 2011; Pailhe

2009; Neels et al 2012; Schmitt 2012; Sobotka et al. 2011)

Slide17

Trends in the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR),

2000-2013

(Southern Europe, EU, France)

Source:

Own computations based on Eurostat 2014 and national statistical offices data

Pre-recession:

2000-2008Slide18

Trends in the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR),

2000-2013

(Southern Europe, EU, France) Slide19

Which countries most affected?

Multiple effects of the recession (changes 2007-12)

Outside OECD: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine most affected

OECD countriesSlide20

Which countries most affected?

Multiple effects of the recession (changes 2007-12)

Outside OECD: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine most affected

OECD countries

Economically most stressed

Economically stressed Slide21

Declines in period

TFR between 2008 and 2012Slide22

Age schedule of childbearing: stronger declines among young adults

Changes in fertility rates by age, 2008-12: EU,

Portugal, and 5

economically

most stressed countries

SOURCE:

Own computations based on Eurostat database (2014)Slide23

Age schedule of childbearing: stronger declines among young adults

Changes in fertility rates by age,

pre-recession (2004-2008) compared with the recession (2008-12) periodSlide24

First births most affected – except in Southern Europe

Changes in fertility rates by birth order, in % (2008-12)Slide25

Reproductive preferences

(a joint research with Eva

Beaujouan (VID))Slide26

Fertility intentions and ideals in Europe

Remarkable lack of variation, two-child family norm almost universal

Also no systematic variation by social status, very little difference between men and women

Mean intended family size of men and women aged 25-29, selected European countries, 1990s (FFS survey) and 2000s (GGS survey)

Mean, women

1990s (15 countries): 2.18

2000s (10 countries): 2.16 Slide27

Fertility intentions and ideals in Portugal

Mean intended family size of

women aged 25-29 in 10 European countries in 2000s (GGS survey): 2.16

Portugal, 2013, women aged 18-29Mean desired family size: 2.20Mean expected family size: 1.94(Source:

Inquérito à Fecundidade 2013, INE 2014, Figure 2.9)Slide28

A convergence in two-child family size ideal in Europe?

Share of women aged 15-49 stating that an ideal family size is two (%);

Summary of different surveys across Europe

SOURCE:Sobotka, T. and É. Beaujouan

. 2014. “Two is best? The persistence of a two-child family ideal in Europe.” Population and Development Review 40(3): 391-419.Slide29

Portugal: Increasing small family size ideal?

Ideal family size in Portugal and Spain, 1981-2011; women aged 15-49 (different surveys)

Source: Sobotka &

Beaujouan

2014Slide30

Government responses to low fertility & policy debates

Source:

somatosphere.netSlide31

Family policy agenda in Europe

1990s and 2000s: Strong interest of governments in family policies and potential effects of policies on birth rates

Also clear from the regular UN survey on government views Increased spending in most OECD countries European Commission 2005: return to “demographic growth” one of three essential priorities EU: policies aiming to support combination of employment and family life and realisation of reproductive desires Also promoting gender equality Explicit policy goals (e.g., public childcare coverage for children below age 3) Eastern Europe: explicitly

pro-natalist policies, also linked to conservative agenda and nationalistic ideology2008: cuts in government spending on families in some countries

Slide32

Many governments think fertility is too low

Government view on fertility level and government policy on fertility in 22 countries ever reaching a period total fertility rate of 1.40 or below

Source: UN reports, UN World Population Policy Database; http://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/about_database.aspx Slide33

Public family policy discussions: different ideological underpinning (stylised versions)

The “gender equality” or “feminist” discourse

Gender inequality seen as an unfair obstacle for women, but also to fam. life and fertility (accentuated by Green + Soc. Dem. Parties) Policies improving early childcare provision, employment of women, equal pay, equal opportunities, and stronger involvement of fathers (including dedicated paternity & parental leaves)

The “conservative” discourseFamily instability and pressure on women to engage with career often seen as reasons for low fertility

Policies supporting marriage and married families with childrenThe “traditional,” “nationalistic,” or “anti-establishment” discourse

Low birth rates seen as a threat to the long-term survival of the nation; usually concerned with the dominant ethnic group, often anti-migrant. Explicitly pronatalist

policies, often targeting 2nd or 3rd births Slide34

Public family policy discussions: different ideological underpinning (2)

The “equalization” (socialist/left) discourse

Lack of resources (incl. housing) and income inequalities seen as the main obstacles to starting or enlarging a familyPromoting redistribution through taxes and benefitsThe “liberal” discoursePerceived need to broaden the choices and options of different population groupsPromoting more work and lifestyle flexibility (part-time, flexible jobs, but also childcare availability), supporting non-traditional families (gay/lesbian couples, cohabiting couples, registered partnerships). Also wider access to assisted reproduction

 In political reality, these discourses often mixed (also pragmatic “shopping around” for different ideas and concepts to appeal to the voters) Slide35

Examples of family policy trends

Expanding public childcare coverage for children below age 3 (Germany, Austria many EU countries (EU target to achieve at least 33% coverage in each country) Shorter, but well-paid parental leave, with remuneration up to 100% of the previous wage (Estonia, Germany, Poland). Also stimulating earlier return to employment Flexible leave arrangements

: more flexibility in selecting leave period, “multispeed leave” (Czech Republic, Austria, Germany), fathers and mothers can flexibly alternate (Norway) Stronger

involvement of fathers, including extra parental leave for fathers only (Nordic countries, Germany, Austria) Cash support to newborns

and children: baby bonus in Spain (2007-10), childcare allowances in Ukraine, “maternity capital” established at the time of child’s birth (second births in Russia)

Tax rebatesSlide36

Why and when are policy interventions justified?

Diverse policy motivations: Most family-related policies not motivated by pronatalist

concernsEU policies: also motivated by “enabling” people to fulfill their fertility intentions; not explicitly pronatalistIs explicit pronatalism justified? And when?Is the goal of increasing intended family size justified?Important considerationsNo unintended consequences?Increasing unwanted / unplanned / mistimed / teenage childbearing?Financially sustainable? Examples: Maternal capital in Russia, “maternity grants” in Ukraine, baby bonus in Spain (2007-10)

Causing more than a short-lived “tempo shift”?Addressing the wishes and “needs” of the people desiring to have children? (Good data & surveys needed!)

Slide37

Discussion:Low fertility in Portugal in a (Southern) European contextSlide38

Institutional conditions: The family & policy trends prior to the recession (

OECD 2011, 2014; OECD FP database)Most shared with

neighbouring SpainMost contributing to lower and delayed fertility Higher education expansion, especially among womenEconomic uncertainty, especially among young adults: high % of temporary employment (21% against 11% OECD average in 2007)Low government spending on families: Public spending on family benefits (1.7% in 2009) equal to Spain and below OECD average 2.6%The elderly-bias in social spending (Vanhuysse 2013)Relatively short parental leave (120 days with 100% income repl.)High income inequalities, rising social status stratification in fertility, lower access to childcare among low-income families?

Unequal gender division of household labour: stronger disparities than PL, ESP, comparable to IT, MEXSlide39

The r

ecession has accelerated some of the previous family trendsThe “lost generation”

of contemporary young adults?Sharp fall in fertility & marriage rates, esp. young adultsRapidly falling fertility in disadvantaged groups, including migrants (ESP)Birth postponement, declining 2nd and 3rd birth ratesMore uncertainty in intentions among the childlessLonger stay in parental home? (evidenced in the US)More NEETSSlide40

Why so low fertility in Portugal?

Period TFR in Portugal in 2013 (1.21) probably lowest in EuropePeriod TFR showing most rapid decline in Europe after 2000

Also fast falls in cohort fertility, rapid increase in one-child familiesCombination of temporary factors (education expansion, economic recession) with the long-lasting structural and institutional factors (employment insecurity, gender inequalities, limited social spending on families) Many of these factors will not go away even if the economy recoversScope for policy action; should consider not only families, but especially young adults in pre-family stage

Slide41

Worries about low fertility should not be overdone

Societies can largely adapt to low fertility(Cohort) family size of women still well above the period TFR (ca. 1.55 in the mid-1970s cohorts)

Migrants contribute to higher number of births and population replacement in most European countries (and in Portugal prior to 2010)“Optimal fertility” arguably below replacement due to increased productivity driven by highly educated workforce and high costs of education & training (Striessnig and Lutz 2014)Low fertility supports higher consumption and thus has a positive effect on material standard of living (Lee et al. 2014)Slide42

tomas.sobotka@oeaw.ac.at

Work on this presentation was funded by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Grant agreement n° 284238 (EURREP).

EURREP website:

www.eurrep.org