How aesthetics might assist a neuroscience of sensory experience Ron Chrisley Centre for Research in Cognitive Science and School of Informatics University of Sussex Neuroesthetics Where Art and the Brain Collide ID: 575655
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Painting an experience?How aesthetics might assist a neuroscience of sensory experience
Ron ChrisleyCentre for Research in Cognitive Science andSchool of Informatics, University of SussexNeuroesthetics: Where Art and the Brain CollideESF Workshop, IULM, Milan 24-25 September 2009Slide2
5 relevant areas of my research
Embodied creativityEnactive models of experienceSynthetic phenomenologyInteractive empiricism
Art works/installations
(The title of my talk concerns area 3)Slide3
My research and neuroestheticsNot a neuroscientist
Much of the work I am reporting on is trying to provide a bridge from art/aesthetics into the cognitive sciences, which then permits a connection with neuroscienceRe: this workshop:How can the models of aesthetic processes I am investigating be informed by neuroscience/aesthetics?Can the models suggest future directions for neuroscience? Aesthetics/art?Slide4
1. Embodied creativity
Goal: Design a robot/environment system likely to exhibit creative behaviour:Novel (at least for the robot)Of (aesthetic) value (for humans, if possible)Engineering approach:No direct modelling of human creativityBut exploit what is known about creativity in humans (and animals?), when expedient
Allow for possibility that insights into the human case may accrue anywayManifesto only: No implementation yet
Set of "axioms"
Assume case of musical output for examplesSlide5
Principles of embodied (aesthetic) creativity
If you make your robot pleasure-seeking, and make creativity pleasurable, you'll make your robot creativeTo be a good creator, it helps to be an appreciatorLet the robot experience output in the real world, as we do
We won’t like what the robot likes unless it likes what we like
An important motivator is the approval or attention of others
Novelty can be achieved by trying to produce outputs on the subjective edge of chaos (that lie just beyond the robot’s ability to explain/predict)
Let dynamics play a role in appreciation
Patterns in one's own states can be the objects of appreciation
The best way to make outputs in the real world is to be embodied in the real worldSlide6
Underlying architecture
CNM:Recurrent neural networkForward model of environmentLearns to anticipate/predict the sensory input it will receive if it performs a given action in a given contextIn conjunction with motivators can enable the robot to select actions that carry an expectation of "pleasure"Slide7
Underlying architecture
Key:
Recurrent Connection (Copy)
Full Inter-Connection Between Layers Of Units
Action
Expected
Sensations
Predicted
State
Previous Predicted
State
(Context Units)
D-map
T-mapSlide8
Generalisation to aesthetic experience
Perhaps the content of aesthetic experience can be understood using the same framework, with two extensions:Affective expectationsAesthetic expectationsSlide9
Aesthetic experience: affect
Just as a system can have expectations concerning its actions and resulting sensory inputs, it can also have expectations concerning its actions and resulting desirable or undesirable statesThus, affect, and in particular the affective character of aesthetic experience, may be accommodated in EBASlide10
Aesthetic experience: artifice
When we experience a visual work of art we do not just experience its visual properties (explicable in terms of expectations to receive input x if we move our eyes thus)We also experience it as a work of art: we possess expectations for how the work would change if we were to make (or the artist were to have made) this or that brushstrokeSet of all such expectations is the content of the aesthetic experience of the workSlide11
3. Synthetic phenomenology
A science of consciousness needs a way to refer to or specify the content of conscious experiencesStandard means: e.g., "Mary is having a visual experience of a red bike leaning against a white fence"Problem: Can only specify experiences with linguistic, conceptual, content
Yet several good reasons to believe that some of content of experience is non-conceptualSlide12
Do I have to draw you a picture?
An obvious alternative is to use non-linguistic, non-symbolic specificationsE.g., for the case of visual experiences, use imagesCan't just take a picture of the scene the subject is seeing (literalism)Even in the case of a robot model of experience,
can't just use the raw video camera outputFor example; the current "output" of a human retina contains gaps or
blindspots
that are not part of experience.
Furthermore, our visual experience, as opposed to our retinal output, at any given time is
stable
, encompassing
more
than the current region of foveation, and is
coloured
to the periphery
But what
alternatives
are there?Slide13
Depictive specifications of the content of visual experience
If the set of expectations determines experiential content, then displaying those expectations (in the right way) will count as a specification of that content"Filled-in" areas specify what input the robot would expect to receive if it moved its head so that it is looking in that location
Grey areas do not indicate an expectation to receive grey input; they indicate to you
the
absence
of any expectation for that location
"Absence of expectation is not an expectation of absence"
Alternative architectures (e.g., generalising neural networks) would have no such undefined regions of state spaceSlide14
DepictionsNeed not explicitly occur anywhere in the agent; are of experience corresponding to current
expected inputs, not actual inputsGenerated off-line by the theorist:Sample the action spaceFeed actions into forward model
Arrange the resulting expected sensory patterns in a spatial array according to the spatial relations of the sampled actionsTheorist's experience of the depiction (plus interpretation/bracketing instructions) is the same as (or shares crucial properties with) the experience to be specifiedSlide15
Depiction of anexpectational stateSlide16
Depictive specification and art
In a sense, content specification is what (at least some) artists have been trying to do for milleniaThus, a clear role for artistsgraphic designerssound engineersdirectors
etc.Slide17
Depictive specification and art
E.g., creating a film of a car chase in the desertNot just a matter of "objectively recording"Requires artistic insight into how film will affect viewers, e.g.:Pacing
timing, number, kinds of cuts and editswhat is in the framesteadiness
Cf Picasso's
portraitsSlide18
Problem: Subjectivity of Art?
Science strives to be objectiveBut content of a work of art is highly subjectiveYes, but artisitic insights can be objectively investigated; e.g.:
PerspectiveMoving images: “persistence of vision”Effect of colour on mood\
Et alSlide19
Problem: Subjectivity of Art?
Is subjectivity always at odds with science?Objective science is not the elimination of the scientist's subjectivityRather the negotiation of itPerhaps subjectivity of theorist can be
exploitedLessons from interactive Art?Slide20
A two-way interaction
Often, it has been thought that the interaction was one-way:cogntive scientists informing the work of designers, artists, and other "creative" typesBut the converse interaction is needed as well:Artistic input into radically different means of specifying the contents of experienceSlide21
4. Interactive empiricism
Some problems concerning (aesthetic) experience are philosophical; require conceptual breakthroughs/progressSuch breakthroughs (e.g. new concepts) may not be achievable by reason alone, but require experiential activity“…Modelling of consciousness… requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development.” (Sloman and Chrisley 2003)Sensory augmentation (e.g., work with Froese and Spiers on how using the “Enactive Torch” might alter concepts of perception)
Art works are also “artificial systems”: creation of and interaction withSlide22
5. Art works/installationsSlide23
5. Art works/installationsSlide24
Recap
Embodied (artistic) creativityEnactive models of (aesthetic) experienceSynthetic phenomenology: specifying the content of the sensory, affective and aesthetic components of experiencing art worksInteractive empiricism: changing our concepts of experience through creating or interacting with art
Art works/installations based on the aboveSlide25
5. Art works/installationsSlide26
Thank you.
Comments welcome:
ronc@sussex.ac.uk