SESSION 1: Introduction - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

SESSION 1: Introduction to Peace and Conflict Theory

Dr. Roddy Brett

University of St. Andrews

October 2017Slide2

1. INTRODUCTIONS2. EXPECTATIONS – WHAT THE COURSE ADDRESSES / IS ABOUT – this morning is taster – look at concepts that will be central to this course3. YOUR PARTICIPATION (NO WRONG QUESTIONS)

4. BRIEF INTRO THEN TALK ABOUT CONTEXT / END OF AUTHORITARIANISM / EMERGENCE OF NEW AGENDA FOR PEACESlide3

Paris:Start of 20th century, approximately 90 percent of war victims were soldiers; during the 1990s estimated 90 percent of those killed in armed conflicts were civilians. Civil wars accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts fought in the 1990s

FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE

Attacks and atrocities against noncombatants became widely employed as deliberate strategies of warfare; including such tactics as systematic rape, mass executions, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide;

premodern

forms of fighting that dispensed with customary constraints on the waging of war??? – NEW WARS THEORY…

Not sure this was as new as certain authors (

Kaldor

) would want us to believe

(drugs, crime,

polviol

) –

take a long historical perspective and we see that this is the case

(English)

– atrocities against civilians have always been a part of warfare

Nevertheless –

CERTAIN CHANGES

IN BOTH HOW WAR IS WAGED AND HOW CONFLICT IS RESOLVED OR TRANSFORMED DID ACCOMPANY THE END OF THE COLD

WAR- civil war

spiralsSlide4

30 percent of all civil wars that started between 1988 and 1999 represented recurrences of prior civil wars that had ended in the previous ten years IN THIS CONTEXT, LEVELS OF UN INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT ESCALATED, AS DID THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS RESOLVED THROUGH PEACE NEGOTIATIONSBUT – 30-40% of negotiated settlements collapse within 10 YEARS

Suhrke

and

Samset

– 25% chance of recurrence of civil war after negotiations – IN SHORT, NEGOTIATIONS ARE CLEARLY NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS WOULD LIKE LIKE TO BELIEVE

Collier et al - countries with a recent history of civil violence had an almost 50 percent chance of slipping back into violence, PARTICULARLY AFTER FIVE YEARS

So

failed

POST-CONFLICT

RECONSTRUCTION IS A prevalent

practical problem – that’s what this course is about (understand the theory and comparative cases)Slide5

BUT A CLEARLY URGENT QUESTIONS TO ASK IS HOW DO WE KNOW WHEN PEACE HAS FAILED AND WHEN IT HAS SUCCEEDED? WHAT ARE THE INDICATORS IS NEGATIVE PEACE ALL WE EXPECT???DO YOU HAVE TO HAVE A RECURRENCE OF ARMED CONFLICT OR CIVIL WAR FOR PEACE TO

FAIL (

ELSAL AND GUATEMALA)

SHOULD THOSE INVOLVED HAVE PUSHED FOR + PEACE?Slide6

CENTRAL peacebuilding challenge: How, in the wake of bloody war, can WE foster a society that can resolve its conflicts without recourse to mass violence? QUESTION OF

EXPECTATION

? INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTORS??

WHAT FACTORS GENERATE THE CONDITIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE TO CONFLICT?

CALL –

NO SINGLE FACTOR OR VARIABLE WILL ACCOUNT FOR AND GUARANTEE SUCCESS IN BUILDING

PEACE

–

BUT

POLITICAL INCLUSION IS KEY, AS IS

LEGITIMACY

State

legitimacy – opinion that the political order is appropriate, moral, proper

AND

Regime

legitimacy – is about the norms, rules, principles, values, procedures (can include process and performance legitimacy)

VOGEL - INCLUSION

OF CIVIL SOCIETY

FEARON

+ LAITIN

–

POVERTY AND INSTABILITY

MACGINTY

–

PEACE

DIVIDEND

MUST BE WIDELY

SHARED

BRETT

–

the above

–

but also ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF

CONFLICT

AND WHO SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES (local / international)Slide7

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT, WAR AND AUTHORITARIANISMSlide8

InterestsAnd how that violence and conflict are transformed and overcome…Internal Armed Conflict

And

Authoritarianism

And Political Violence employedSlide9

What makes a conflict into a war?A State of armed conflict between different nations or states, or different groups within a nation or state– Oxford English Dictionary

1,000 battlefield fatalities within a 12-month period

– COW [Correlates of War Project, University of Michigan, founded 1963

]

War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will

– Carl Von

Clausewitz (1780-1831),

On War

(1832), page oneSlide10

Dance of the dictatorsSlide11

https://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=rVcqSc12H4wSlide12

Generals Pinochet (CHILE: 1973-1990) and Videla (ARGENTINA: 1976-1981)

General Francisco Franco (SPAIN: 1939-1975)

General Idi Amin (UGANDA: 1971-1979)

Kim

Jong-il

(NORTH KOREA: 1994-2011)

Dictators; leaders of authoritarian regimesSlide13

W. H. AudenEpitaph on a Tyrant“Perfection, of a kind, was what he was after…

When

he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter, And when he cried the little children died in the

streets”Slide14

Characteristics of Authoritarianism / IAC:POLITICAL EXCLUSION:- the informal and unregulated exercise of political power (often by individual, junta, regime)

- self-appointed leadership (sometimes elected); extensive personal power

- no free

choice among

competitors

SOCIAL CLOSURE:

- arbitrary

deprivation of

civil

liberties

and exercise of law / judiciary

- little

tolerance for meaningful

opposition

- social control

(closure of

civil society

)

REPRESSION:

- political

stability

maintained by control

over and support of the

armed

forces

; bureaucracy

staffed by the

regime; creation

of

networks of

allegiance

(through

socialisation

and

indoctrination)

- use of violence (threat; attack; torture; disappearance; homicide; massacre) against ever increasing circle of regime enemies – ‘not just the bomber but the ideologue’ (

Videla

) (

CaH

; genocide)Slide15

Objectives?Dynastic rule (Somoza, Nicaragua; Kim Jong-Il, NK)Combat subversion and bring back order (Pinochet, Chile; Suharto, Indonesia; Rios

Montt

, Guatemala)

Economic

modernisation

(Pinochet, Chile;

Videla

, Argentina)

Nation-building / social engineering

(

Videla

, Argentina)Slide16

CharacteristicsMilitarisation of state apparatusWeakening of institutions (no rule of law)Entrenched corruption (Suharto; Pinochet; Montt)

Consolidation of

clientelist

networks (military; party – national + local)

Closure of civil society spaces

Imposition of a culture of terror and fearSlide17

Juan Linz (1964)Authoritarian regimes defined as political systems

characterised by

four qualities:

(

1)

‘limited

, not responsible,

political

pluralism

’ (constraints

on political institutions and groups

(

legislatures

,

political

parties

, civil society

,

interest

groups

)

(

2)

basis

for

legitimacy

based on

emotion (regime represents a

necessary evil to combat

societal problems – underdevelopment or subversion (Argentina: cancer)

(

3)

absence of ‘intensive /

extensive

political

mobilization

’

and constraints on the mass public

(

4)

‘formally ill-defined’

executive power, often shifting or

vagueSlide18

Linz differentiates between:(i) Traditional authoritarian regimes –ruling

authority

(single person - caudillo) maintained

in power

‘through

a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy,

patron-client ties

and

repression (by apparatus loyal to leader)

(ii)

Bureaucratic-military

authoritarian regimes

- governed

by

coalition

of military officers

and technocrats

(pragmatic rather

than

ideological)Slide19

BA states – governed by military, but relying heavily on three core social classes: (i) the military (order

and domination of other social

classes)

(ii) the

business elites

(liberalise economy)

(iii) the

technocrats

(formulation

of pro-market economic policy and managerial capabilities for achieving better structural

transformation

+

to rationalize and develop

economy

into modern capitalist

econ.Slide20

O’Donnell: Violence under Bureaucratic AuthoritarianismIncreasing capacity of state to institutionalise coercion and suppression of political dissidents / civil society

Dissidents effectively controlled, excluded from

political participation

and depoliticised

De-politicisation: through

killing, suppression and

kidnapping

Terrorising - an

entire political class

(extended to

those

suspected

of

harbouring

resentment

against the regime)Slide21

Societal ImpactConformitySurveillance (East Germany, Anna Funder)Organised

hatred

- common enemy (internal or external)

Language and history systematically destroyed or rewritten to serve interests of

regime

People live in the grip of

fear

Bureaucracy (East Germany – storming of police HQ)Slide22

Violence during IAC and Authoritarian EpisodesState-led violence key to authoritarian regimes (but not only aspect of it – guerrillas?)Conflicts - own particularities shaped by social and structural formations, historical processes, demographics, geographies

Key

to violence

:

military steps up as arbiter of national order, stability and progress, closing ranks to defend the interests of the region’s oligarchies (

Kruijt

1999

)

Violence has a function - NOT

beyond comprehension and meaning, BUT

DETERMINED

BY

function

and

order

 Slide23

Violence is not only madness – follows (imposes?) rules and objectivesKalyvas: terror / violence possess an ordering functionLeiby – instrumentally violence can be used:

- to spread fear / dissuade

- to

weaken

opposition (even when committed

on

limited / targeted scale)

- to punish or eliminate specific

‘enemies

of the

state’

- to collect intelligence on the opposition

movement

Potential targets: members

of armed rebel groups, opposition

political parties, trades unions,

or

‘subversive’

community

organizationsSlide24

1984, George OrwellThe Party: “Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing”.Winston: “How can I help but see what is in front of my eyes? Two and two are four”.

O’Brien

: “Sometimes, Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes they are all of them at once”.

Restriction of thought? - “Nothing

was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your skull”.

Winston Smith, 1984 (George Orwell

)Slide25

“Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your skull”. Winston Smith, 1984 (George Orwell)Slide26

President Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989)Slide27

President Patricio Alwyn (1990-1994)Slide28

Transition from Authoritarian Rule‘Distinctive moment in the political life and trajectory of a country’Period of unknown duration and extraordinary uncertaintyGenerally initiated from dynamics within the regime (hard and soft liners)Changes precipitated often by civil society mobilisations and / or international pressure

Begins as restrictions may be loosened and some individual or group rights may be expanded at the whim of the regime –

not irreversible

Karl:

‘Modes of transition are critical junctures in the long process of institutional accumulation; they are key moments in which the fragments and parts of the new regime are constructed, with each fragment becoming ‘an incentive for the addition of another’

Authoritarian regimes often face a series of simultaneous transitions

:

WAR TO PEACE

AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY

WARTIME ECONOMY TO MARKET ECONOMYSlide29

Karl and SchmitterWho are the main actors pushing for transition? The elites or the masses?

Compromise or unilateral exercise of power?

4 Categories of Transition (not as simple as this)Slide30

Categories of TransitionPacted transition: agreement between elite actors –Spain; SAReformist

: results from mass mobilisation that is not met with systematic violence – dissolution of former Yugoslavia

Imposed

: elites push regime change from above – Taiwan; Guatemala

Revolutionary:

results from mass mobilisation despite resistance from elites - Madagascar

Collapsed:

when regime collapses due to internal or external factors -

ArgentinaSlide31

GILL:Cannot understand transition without understanding civil society (175)FIVE KEY CONTRIBUTIONS CAN BE COUNTED:1. the potential threat posed by civil society forces: what factors cause a regime to liberalize when it is in trouble – an organized civil society may be key here in persuading or

pressuring for liberalization

instead of further tightening of restrictions;

2. the

giving of democratic orientation

to the regime: it is an exception that democratization occurs when regimes are in trouble – usually they simply replace on regime with a restructured one. People saw support for democracy instrumentally, and as a means

fo

getting them space within the political democracy. But when there is unity and a force from civil society that seeks broader changes on behalf of society as a whole, this will change the democratic direction of the regime.

3. the capacity of civil society to

maintain

the direction of change toward democracy

and mobilization of supporters:: continuing pressure; public discourse; make it more difficult for an authoritarian

backdown

or reversal; public attention on elections;

4.

provision of a negotiating partner

for the regime:

5.

civil society forces provide the basic social and political infrastructure which is necessary to sustain an emergent democratic syst

em. Provides a stimulus to the process but also a constituent element of the construction of the new order –

Lederach

– peace architecture and infrastructureSlide32

The End of Transition?General acceptance of outcomes of elections‘founding elections’ (second successful election / handover of civilian power after end of regime)

Key moment:

resurrection

of civil society

Often transitions limp on, ’no war, no peace’Slide33

Liberalised authoritarian regimes (limited multiparty and electoral politics) - remarkably stable Institutions / procedures provide a site for

/ allow negotiation

of elite interests,

facilitate

the

co-optation

of potential reformers

– they do not bring about meaningful change (Mexico? Guatemala?)

May lead to

hybrid / schizophrenic regimes

(Karl)

Coexistence of

democratic

and authoritarian

procedures

/ norms / behaviourSlide34

The Aftermath of IAC and AuthoritarianismA&A: Indices, post-war/conflict countries are in a worse state THAN POST-AUTHORITARIAN STATES – war has had an enduring impact on their states, citizens’ perceptions, economies, political systems (is this correct?

)

Freedom House Index and LAPOP – citizens in post-authoritarian states tend to show higher levels of support for democracy

Higher levels of violence in post-conflict states than post-authoritarian states

Higher investment in

human

development

in post-authoritarian states

But both

armed conflict and authoritarianism also impose lasting legacies on the perceptions of

citizensSlide35

A&A: “citizens may still carry scars from the past and not be accustomed to engaging in dialogue to solve social and political conflicts and may have become habituated to living under authoritarian or pseudo-authoritarian governments” Who are the spoiling actors (taxis in Cali)Rebuild social fabric? Reconciliation / resignation?Slide36

The post-Authoritarian StateKEY ASPECT OF TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE IS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FUNCTIONAL STATE THAT GUARANTEES THE RULE OF LAW (LINK TO LIBERAL PEACE?)In other words, an entity that provides institutional guarantees, controls monopoly of violence, guarantees rights,

enjoys international

recognition,

institutionalises mechanisms

to facilitate and regulate international

relations (Levi / Weber)

–

THE STATE IS KEY

O’Donnell - LEGAL

SYSTEM IS

KEY to a functioning state –

a constitutive

element of the

state that

provides the regular, underlying texturing of the social order existing over a given

territory

–

RULE OF LAWSlide37

Challenges for post-Authoritarian and post-Conflict StatesStates may face crisis of three dimensions:Capacity to discharge their duties - weak or disintegrated capacity to respond to citizens’ needs and desires, provide basic services, assure welfare, or support normal economic activity

Effectiveness

of their law (strength) -

breakdown of law and order where state institutions lose their monopolies on legitimate use of force and are unable to protect their citizens

Representativeness

of the state

-

in

terms of whether

state represents

the public good in terms of equity and

equality

Post-authoritarian

states often situated along a spectrum that demonstrates these

characteristics

The degree to which these

characteristics are

manifest may

be disjunctive

/ change

over time, moving forwards and

backwardsSlide38

O’DONNELL – Post-A STATES IN LLAA CHARACTERISED BY BROWN AREAS WHERE THE STATE PERHAPS NEITHER EXISTS NOR FUNCTIONSGARRETON – AUTHORITARIAN

ENCLAVES IN POST-CONFLICT AND POST-AUTHORITARIAN STATES, WHERE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND AUTHORITARIAN VALUES COEXIST COMFORTABLY AND WHERE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY IS SYSTEMATICALLY WEAK and INSTITUTIONS

CORRUPT

Distinction – institutions/policies/laws and perceptions (prejudices)

-

Poll in Guatemala – private and public spaces

State

matters in post-conflict reconstruction – but

how

much, and

to detriment

of other factors?

It’s likely that we can build all the institutions we like, but if we don’t engage with the affective aspect of post-conflict reconstruction – what counterinsurgents refer to as hearts and minds – then we are likely not to get

anywhereSlide39

FINAL DILEMA - AN INEVITABLE TENSION BETWEEN ACHIEVING SHORTER TERM NEGATIVE GOAL OF ENDING DIRECT VIOLENCE AND PREVENTING A RELAPSE INTO WAR AND THE LONGER TERM POSITIVE GOAL OF BUILDING SUSTAINABLE PEACE HOW CAN WE ACHIEVE THIS BALANCE??

WINNING THE PEACE MAKES GREATER DEMANDS THAN WINING THE WAR

–

NO WAR, NO PEACE