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Presentations text content in 1 The Case for Quality CQSDI 2011
Slide1
1
The Case for Quality
CQSDI 2011
14 March 2011Mr. Thomas BulkActing Director, Quality, Safety and Mission AssuranceMissile Defense Agency
Slide2
Today’s Missile Defense Threat
Egypt
Scud
SS-1
Yemen
Scud
SS-21
Libya
Scud
Iran
Fateh-110, CSS-8
Shahab
1 & 2
Shahab
3
Shahab
3 Variant
Ashura
/
Sejil
Pakistan
Ghaznavi
,
Shaheen
1
Ghauri
,
Shaheen
2
North Korea
Toksa
, Scud
ER Scud
No Dong
New IRBM
Taepo
Dong-2
India
Prithvi
1 & 2
Dhanush
, Agni 1
Agni 2,
Agni
3
Sagarika
Ukraine
Scud
SS-21
Syria
Scud
SS-21
Turkmenistan
Scud
Kazakhstan
Scud
SS-21
Belarus
Scud
SS-21
Vietnam
Scud
Sources: NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009; DIA, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14
Case number: 0410-MS0391; DNI, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
JAN
to 31
DEC 29
,
2010 Ballistic Missile Force Levels Not Including U.S., China, Russia or NATO
SRBM
5,500
MRBM
350-450
IR/ICBM
<50
Totals
5,900-6,000
Threat
Real
Growing
Unpredictable
Threatens regional stability
Enables asymmetric threats
Iranian Salvo Launch
Taepo
Dong-2
Launch
April
2009
Iranian SRBM,
20 August 2010
Missile Defense Attributes
Provides extended deterrence
Devalues missile proliferation
Dissuades ballistic missile investment
Enables international cooperation for regional defense
Slide3
Missile Defense Agency Focus
Missile Defense Agency (2001-Present)
Focus on developing and fielding integrated ballistic missile defense systemAgainst multiple threats and increasing ballistic missile proliferationMaintain current level of protection, while developing future, proven capabilities
Today’s Mission
To develop and deploy a layered BMDS to defend
the United States,
its deployed
forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile attacks of all ranges and in all phases of flight
Slide4
Layered Ballistic Missile Defense
THAAD Fire
Units
(2011)
Patriot Fire
Units
(2003)
Aegis Ships
SM-3 IA (2011)
SM-3 IB (2015)
SM-3 IIA (2018)
SM-2
(
2008)
Ground-based
Interceptor
(2008)
Vandenberg
Air Force Base
C2BMC
(2011)
Early Warning
Radars
(2010)
Aegis
Ashore
(2015)
Beale,
Shemya
,
Thule,
Fylingdales
SRBM
Defense
ICBM Defense
Sea-based
X-band
Radar
(2011)
Ft. Greely
Ground-based
Interceptor
(2010)
NATO
ALTBMD
(2011-2018)
IRBM / MRBM
Defense
AN/TPY-2
(2009)
Israel
Shariki
, Japan
SM-3
IIB
(2020)
Space Based
Infrared
(2007)
Includes European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles
MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
SRBMs
< 1,000 km
IRBMs
/MRBMs
1,000-5,500 km
ICBMs
>
5,500
km
Precision Tracking Space System
(2018)
Airborne Infrared Sensors
(2018)
Slide5
U.S. Phased
Adaptive
ApproachContributes To NATO Missile Defense
Phase 4 (By 2020)
Phase 1
(By 2011)
Aegis BMD 3.6.1 with SM-3 IA
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
C2BMC AOC Ramstein
Phase 3
(By 2018)
Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3 IB/IIA
(two sites)
Phase 2
(By 2015)
Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0
with
SM-3 IB
Aegis Ashore 5.0 with SM-3 IB
(one site)
C2BMC Updates
ALTBMD Lower Tier
THAAD
Initial capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, enhanced homeland defense
Robust capability
against IRBMs
Robust capability
against SRBMs and
MRBMs
ALTBMD
Interim Capability
THAAD
ABIR
PTSS
THAAD
ABIR
PTSS
Potential EPAA
Enhancements
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA
C2BMC Updates
ALTBMD Upper Tier
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3
IIB
(two sites)
Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA
Enhanced C2BMC
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
Early intercept capability against MRBMs and IRBMs; and ICBMs from today’s regional threats
Potential EPAA
Enhancements
Potential EPAA
Enhancements
Slide6
Successful engagement of threat missile depends on quality, highly reliable systems and sub-systems
- First time, every time level of reliability- Detection, tracking and interceptor launch require precision timing
Demand For Reliable, High Quality Components and Software
Typical Commute
Threat Destroyed
Create Track
Initiate Weapons Task plan
Detect Launch
Launch Interceptor
Defended Area
+3 min
+6 min
+8 min
+20 min
Slide7
Ongoing Quality/Mission Assurance Activities
Peer Reviews
Surface correctable problems early
Identify riskEnsure best practicesCONTRACT
System Functional Review
Software Specification Review
Evaluate human interfaces, controls, displays
S/W safety issues & audits
Preliminary Design Review
Critical Design Review
Subsystem and functional issues
Design Performance
Producibility and risk areas
System Verification ReviewJoint Services IM Munition WGDesign Certificate ReviewSafety Hazards AssessmentDevelopment Test for Risk Reduction
FMECA, Sneak Analysis
DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCTIONINTEGRATED TEST &
EVALUATION
Test Design Reviews (TDR)
Voting Member
Mission Operations ReviewInterface Control WGInterface integration activitiesEnsures integration and compatibilityResolve technical issues
Interoperability and/or Integration TestBMDS System Safety Working Group
Mission Assurance AuditsAverage six MA audits annuallyPre-shipment ReviewsBMDS Parts & Materials Control Board (PMCB)Element PMP Control Boards (PMPCB)
Stakeholder InitiativesIntegrated Product Teams (IPT)
LAUNCH ACTIVITIESPedigree Review
Flight Operations ReviewPre-Flight Readiness ReviewLaunch Readiness ReviewMission Readiness ReviewFour to six weeks prior to launch
Voting MemberBMDS Safety Officers (BSOs)Six BSOs at Colorado SpringsMDA Executive Level Flight Test ReviewsSeries of four flight test reviews leading to launchVoting Member
AF
AF
AF
AF
AF
Award Fee Board
Voting Member
Flight Readiness Review
Voting Member
Slide8
Recent Process & Workmanship Failures:
Improper rigging of a lanyard pull connector –
Target failed to deploy and negated testMissing lock wire on onboard thruster– Caused a test failureSub-tier supplier cork installation process not adequately controlled –
Caused delamination/ voids on target vehicle Refurbished memory devices used in mission computer – Caused excessive reworkFailure to follow process (Heat treat certification) – Caused multiple lot failures & lost production of E-Bolts Lack of process controls (Supplier manufacturing process not proofed/qualified) – Caused strake bonding failuresSoftware (Radar algorithm) design validation and under-estimated input demands of “real-time” system – Caused performance, timing and processing errors
Slide9
‘B
ody of knowledge’ created over decades (configuration management, process discipline, workmanship) codified in QS quality and mission assurance plans
Incorporated Industry ‘best practices’ and explicit quality clauses in development and production contractsConducting QS “audits” to evaluate suppliers and eliminate inconsistent compliance Focusing on supplier producibility assessments where increased throughput /schedules have resulted in manufacturing and fabrication problems
Current focus is on determining supplier capability to deliver quality production units (yield)
Responses to Quality Issues
Slide10
Recent QS Initiatives
Critical production readiness reviews to ensure manufacturing
producibility
Manufacturing and fabrication assessmentsOn-site distribution audits Dedicated Parts,
Materials and Processes Team
Emphasis on preventing faulty
and counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain
Obsolescent parts now identified and tracked
In-plant inspections for manufacturing workmanship
Rigorous
facility checklists
Independent technical assessments of supplier facilities and production processes
Provides insight on production risks for “complex” and mission “critical” components
Slide11
Facility Assessment Checklist
14 Sections
Electrical, Electronic, Electromechanical (EEE) Parts
Software
Design & Workmanship
Work Instructions
Manufacturing & Tooling
Clean Rooms
ESD, FOD, Safety, Training & Operator certification
Critical lifts & moves
MRB and Configuration Management Processes
Metrology
Safety (Work hazards & Ordnance) Assess suppliers to a common set of objective, industry-standard criteria
Weighted system for each criterion
Slide12
Final score presented in a ‘report card’ format
Highlights Production-risk areas:
Deficiencies Score
Observations Score
Identifies areas for future sub-tier supplier assessments
Facility Report Card
Facility Assessment Checklist Display
Slide13
SUMMARY
Focus on “first time, every time’ reliability
Prevent counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain and their use in mission critical components
Drive Supply chain to focus on workmanship standardsResolve ‘producibility issues, i.e., schedule and throughput
Use the Facility Checklist as a catalyst to:
Raise the level of compliance among all suppliers
Provide common framework for evaluating mission-critical component productivity risks
Identify weaknesses within individual supplier’s production processes
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DownloadNote - The PPT/PDF document "1 The Case for Quality CQSDI 2011" is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.
Presentations text content in 1 The Case for Quality CQSDI 2011
1
The Case for Quality
CQSDI 2011
14 March 2011Mr. Thomas BulkActing Director, Quality, Safety and Mission AssuranceMissile Defense Agency
Slide2Today’s Missile Defense Threat
Egypt
Scud
SS-1
Yemen
Scud
SS-21
Libya
Scud
Iran
Fateh-110, CSS-8
Shahab
1 & 2
Shahab
3
Shahab
3 Variant
Ashura
/
Sejil
Pakistan
Ghaznavi
,
Shaheen
1
Ghauri
,
Shaheen
2
North Korea
Toksa
, Scud
ER Scud
No Dong
New IRBM
Taepo
Dong-2
India
Prithvi
1 & 2
Dhanush
, Agni 1
Agni 2,
Agni
3
Sagarika
Ukraine
Scud
SS-21
Syria
Scud
SS-21
Turkmenistan
Scud
Kazakhstan
Scud
SS-21
Belarus
Scud
SS-21
Vietnam
Scud
Sources: NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009; DIA, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14
APR 10
; DIA, Annual Threat Assessment 2008; MSIC, e-mail, RE: Unclassified Force Level Numbers, 8
APR 10
Case number: 0410-MS0391; DNI, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
JAN
to 31
DEC 29
,
2010 Ballistic Missile Force Levels Not Including U.S., China, Russia or NATO
SRBM
5,500
MRBM
350-450
IR/ICBM
<50
Totals
5,900-6,000
Threat
Real
Growing
Unpredictable
Threatens regional stability
Enables asymmetric threats
Iranian Salvo Launch
Taepo
Dong-2
Launch
April
2009
Iranian SRBM,
20 August 2010
Missile Defense Attributes
Provides extended deterrence
Devalues missile proliferation
Dissuades ballistic missile investment
Enables international cooperation for regional defense
Slide3Missile Defense Agency Focus
Missile Defense Agency (2001-Present)
Focus on developing and fielding integrated ballistic missile defense systemAgainst multiple threats and increasing ballistic missile proliferationMaintain current level of protection, while developing future, proven capabilities
Today’s Mission
To develop and deploy a layered BMDS to defend
the United States,
its deployed
forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile attacks of all ranges and in all phases of flight
Slide4Layered Ballistic Missile Defense
THAAD Fire
Units
(2011)
Patriot Fire
Units
(2003)
Aegis Ships
SM-3 IA (2011)
SM-3 IB (2015)
SM-3 IIA (2018)
SM-2
(
2008)
Ground-based
Interceptor
(2008)
Vandenberg
Air Force Base
C2BMC
(2011)
Early Warning
Radars
(2010)
Aegis
Ashore
(2015)
Beale,
Shemya
,
Thule,
Fylingdales
SRBM
Defense
ICBM Defense
Sea-based
X-band
Radar
(2011)
Ft. Greely
Ground-based
Interceptor
(2010)
NATO
ALTBMD
(2011-2018)
IRBM / MRBM
Defense
AN/TPY-2
(2009)
Israel
Shariki
, Japan
SM-3
IIB
(2020)
Space Based
Infrared
(2007)
Includes European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles
MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
SRBMs
< 1,000 km
IRBMs
/MRBMs
1,000-5,500 km
ICBMs
>
5,500
km
Precision Tracking Space System
(2018)
Airborne Infrared Sensors
(2018)
Slide5U.S. Phased
Adaptive
ApproachContributes To NATO Missile Defense
Phase 4 (By 2020)
Phase 1
(By 2011)
Aegis BMD 3.6.1 with SM-3 IA
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
C2BMC AOC Ramstein
Phase 3
(By 2018)
Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3 IB/IIA
(two sites)
Phase 2
(By 2015)
Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0
with
SM-3 IB
Aegis Ashore 5.0 with SM-3 IB
(one site)
C2BMC Updates
ALTBMD Lower Tier
THAAD
Initial capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, enhanced homeland defense
Robust capability
against IRBMs
Robust capability
against SRBMs and
MRBMs
ALTBMD
Interim Capability
THAAD
ABIR
PTSS
THAAD
ABIR
PTSS
Potential EPAA
Enhancements
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA
C2BMC Updates
ALTBMD Upper Tier
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3
IIB
(two sites)
Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA
Enhanced C2BMC
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
Early intercept capability against MRBMs and IRBMs; and ICBMs from today’s regional threats
Potential EPAA
Enhancements
Potential EPAA
Enhancements
Slide6Successful engagement of threat missile depends on quality, highly reliable systems and sub-systems
- First time, every time level of reliability- Detection, tracking and interceptor launch require precision timing
Demand For Reliable, High Quality Components and Software
Typical Commute
Threat Destroyed
Create Track
Initiate Weapons Task plan
Detect Launch
Launch Interceptor
Defended Area
+3 min
+6 min
+8 min
+20 min
Slide7Ongoing Quality/Mission Assurance Activities
Peer Reviews
Surface correctable problems early
Identify riskEnsure best practicesCONTRACT
System Functional Review
Software Specification Review
Evaluate human interfaces, controls, displays
S/W safety issues & audits
Preliminary Design Review
Critical Design Review
Subsystem and functional issues
Design Performance
Producibility and risk areas
System Verification ReviewJoint Services IM Munition WGDesign Certificate ReviewSafety Hazards AssessmentDevelopment Test for Risk Reduction
FMECA, Sneak Analysis
DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCTIONINTEGRATED TEST &
EVALUATION
Test Design Reviews (TDR)
Voting Member
Mission Operations ReviewInterface Control WGInterface integration activitiesEnsures integration and compatibilityResolve technical issues
Interoperability and/or Integration TestBMDS System Safety Working Group
System Requirements Review
Continuous Activities
Mission Assurance Reps (MARs) on-site(Gov. & Industry sites)Mission Assurance AuditsAward Fee BoardsIndependent Readiness Review TeamsMission Readiness Reviews
Acquisition Strategy Panel
MAP / PMAP on contract
Mission Assurance Criteria
Award Fee Requirements
Mission Assurance AuditsAverage six MA audits annuallyPre-shipment ReviewsBMDS Parts & Materials Control Board (PMCB)Element PMP Control Boards (PMPCB)
Voting MemberTests and Inspections
FOD Prevention, NDT, Acceptance InspectionMandatory Gov. Inspections (MGIs)Failure Review BoardMaterial Review BoardSupplier Road Maps
Stakeholder InitiativesIntegrated Product Teams (IPT)
LAUNCH ACTIVITIESPedigree Review
Flight Operations ReviewPre-Flight Readiness ReviewLaunch Readiness ReviewMission Readiness ReviewFour to six weeks prior to launch
Voting MemberBMDS Safety Officers (BSOs)Six BSOs at Colorado SpringsMDA Executive Level Flight Test ReviewsSeries of four flight test reviews leading to launchVoting Member
AF
AF
AF
AF
AF
Award Fee Board
Voting Member
Flight Readiness Review
Voting Member
Slide8Recent Process & Workmanship Failures:
Improper rigging of a lanyard pull connector –
Target failed to deploy and negated testMissing lock wire on onboard thruster– Caused a test failureSub-tier supplier cork installation process not adequately controlled –
Caused delamination/ voids on target vehicle Refurbished memory devices used in mission computer – Caused excessive reworkFailure to follow process (Heat treat certification) – Caused multiple lot failures & lost production of E-Bolts Lack of process controls (Supplier manufacturing process not proofed/qualified) – Caused strake bonding failuresSoftware (Radar algorithm) design validation and under-estimated input demands of “real-time” system – Caused performance, timing and processing errors
Slide9‘B
ody of knowledge’ created over decades (configuration management, process discipline, workmanship) codified in QS quality and mission assurance plans
Incorporated Industry ‘best practices’ and explicit quality clauses in development and production contractsConducting QS “audits” to evaluate suppliers and eliminate inconsistent compliance Focusing on supplier producibility assessments where increased throughput /schedules have resulted in manufacturing and fabrication problems
Current focus is on determining supplier capability to deliver quality production units (yield)
Responses to Quality Issues
Slide10Recent QS Initiatives
Critical production readiness reviews to ensure manufacturing
producibility
Manufacturing and fabrication assessmentsOn-site distribution audits Dedicated Parts,
Materials and Processes Team
Emphasis on preventing faulty
and counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain
Obsolescent parts now identified and tracked
In-plant inspections for manufacturing workmanship
Rigorous
facility checklists
Independent technical assessments of supplier facilities and production processes
Provides insight on production risks for “complex” and mission “critical” components
Slide11Facility Assessment Checklist
14 Sections
Electrical, Electronic, Electromechanical (EEE) Parts
Software
Design & Workmanship
Work Instructions
Manufacturing & Tooling
Clean Rooms
ESD, FOD, Safety, Training & Operator certification
Critical lifts & moves
MRB and Configuration Management Processes
Metrology
Safety (Work hazards & Ordnance) Assess suppliers to a common set of objective, industry-standard criteria
Weighted system for each criterion
Slide12Final score presented in a ‘report card’ format
Highlights Production-risk areas:
Deficiencies Score
Observations Score
Identifies areas for future sub-tier supplier assessments
Facility Report Card
Facility Assessment Checklist Display
Slide13SUMMARY
Focus on “first time, every time’ reliability
Prevent counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain and their use in mission critical components
Drive Supply chain to focus on workmanship standardsResolve ‘producibility issues, i.e., schedule and throughput
Use the Facility Checklist as a catalyst to:
Raise the level of compliance among all suppliers
Provide common framework for evaluating mission-critical component productivity risks
Identify weaknesses within individual supplier’s production processes