1 The Case for Quality CQSDI 2011 PowerPoint Presentation, PPT - DocSlides

1

The Case for Quality

CQSDI 2011

14 March 2011Mr. Thomas BulkActing Director, Quality, Safety and Mission AssuranceMissile Defense Agency

Today’s Missile Defense Threat

Egypt

Scud

SS-1

Yemen

Scud

SS-21

Libya

Scud

Iran

Fateh-110, CSS-8

Shahab

1 & 2

Shahab

3

Shahab

3 Variant

Ashura

/

Sejil

Pakistan

Ghaznavi

,

Shaheen

1

Ghauri

,

Shaheen

2

North Korea

Toksa

, Scud

ER Scud

No Dong

New IRBM

Taepo

Dong-2

India

Prithvi

1 & 2

Dhanush

, Agni 1

Agni 2,

Agni

3

Sagarika

Ukraine

Scud

SS-21

Syria

Scud

SS-21

Turkmenistan

Scud

Kazakhstan

Scud

SS-21

Belarus

Scud

SS-21

Vietnam

Scud

Sources: NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009; DIA, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14

APR 10

; DIA, Annual Threat Assessment 2008; MSIC, e-mail, RE: Unclassified Force Level Numbers, 8

APR 10

Case number: 0410-MS0391; DNI, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1

JAN

to 31

DEC 29

,

2010 Ballistic Missile Force Levels Not Including U.S., China, Russia or NATO

SRBM

5,500

MRBM

350-450

IR/ICBM

<50

Totals

5,900-6,000

Threat

Real

Growing

Unpredictable

Threatens regional stability

Enables asymmetric threats

Iranian Salvo Launch

Taepo

Dong-2

Launch

April

2009

Iranian SRBM,

20 August 2010

Missile Defense Attributes

Provides extended deterrence

Devalues missile proliferation

Dissuades ballistic missile investment

Enables international cooperation for regional defense

Missile Defense Agency Focus

Missile Defense Agency (2001-Present)

Focus on developing and fielding integrated ballistic missile defense systemAgainst multiple threats and increasing ballistic missile proliferationMaintain current level of protection, while developing future, proven capabilities

Today’s Mission

To develop and deploy a layered BMDS to defend

the United States,

its deployed

forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile attacks of all ranges and in all phases of flight

Layered Ballistic Missile Defense

THAAD Fire

Units

(2011)

Patriot Fire

Units

(2003)

Aegis Ships

SM-3 IA (2011)

SM-3 IB (2015)

SM-3 IIA (2018)

SM-2

(

2008)

Ground-based

Interceptor

(2008)

Vandenberg

Air Force Base

C2BMC

(2011)

Early Warning

Radars

(2010)

Aegis

Ashore

(2015)

Beale,

Shemya

,

Thule,

Fylingdales

SRBM

Defense

ICBM Defense

Sea-based

X-band

Radar

(2011)

Ft. Greely

Ground-based

Interceptor

(2010)

NATO

ALTBMD

(2011-2018)

IRBM / MRBM

Defense

AN/TPY-2

(2009)

Israel

Shariki

, Japan

SM-3

IIB

(2020)

Space Based

Infrared

(2007)

Includes European

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles

MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles

IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

SRBMs

< 1,000 km

IRBMs

/MRBMs

1,000-5,500 km

ICBMs

>

5,500

km

Precision Tracking Space System

(2018)

Airborne Infrared Sensors

(2018)

U.S. Phased

Adaptive

ApproachContributes To NATO Missile Defense

Phase 4 (By 2020)

Phase 1

(By 2011)

Aegis BMD 3.6.1 with SM-3 IA

AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

C2BMC AOC Ramstein

Phase 3

(By 2018)

Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3 IB/IIA

(two sites)

Phase 2

(By 2015)

Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0

with

SM-3 IB

Aegis Ashore 5.0 with SM-3 IB

(one site)

C2BMC Updates

ALTBMD Lower Tier

THAAD

Initial capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, enhanced homeland defense

Robust capability

against IRBMs

Robust capability

against SRBMs and

MRBMs

ALTBMD

Interim Capability

THAAD

ABIR

PTSS

THAAD

ABIR

PTSS

Potential EPAA

Enhancements

AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA

C2BMC Updates

ALTBMD Upper Tier

AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3

IIB

(two sites)

Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA

Enhanced C2BMC

AN/TPY-2 (FBM)

Early intercept capability against MRBMs and IRBMs; and ICBMs from today’s regional threats

Potential EPAA

Enhancements

Potential EPAA

Enhancements

Successful engagement of threat missile depends on quality, highly reliable systems and sub-systems

- First time, every time level of reliability- Detection, tracking and interceptor launch require precision timing

Demand For Reliable, High Quality Components and Software

Typical Commute

Threat Destroyed

Create Track

Initiate Weapons Task plan

Detect Launch

Launch Interceptor

Defended Area

+3 min

+6 min

+8 min

+20 min

Ongoing Quality/Mission Assurance Activities

Peer Reviews

Surface correctable problems early

Identify riskEnsure best practicesCONTRACT

System Functional Review

Software Specification Review

Evaluate human interfaces, controls, displays

S/W safety issues & audits

Preliminary Design Review

Critical Design Review

Subsystem and functional issues

Design Performance

Producibility and risk areas

System Verification ReviewJoint Services IM Munition WGDesign Certificate ReviewSafety Hazards AssessmentDevelopment Test for Risk Reduction

FMECA, Sneak Analysis

DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT

PRODUCTIONINTEGRATED TEST &

EVALUATION

Test Design Reviews (TDR)

Voting Member

Mission Operations ReviewInterface Control WGInterface integration activitiesEnsures integration and compatibilityResolve technical issues

Interoperability and/or Integration TestBMDS System Safety Working Group

System Requirements Review

Continuous Activities

Mission Assurance Reps (MARs) on-site(Gov. & Industry sites)Mission Assurance AuditsAward Fee BoardsIndependent Readiness Review TeamsMission Readiness Reviews

Acquisition Strategy Panel

MAP / PMAP on contract

Mission Assurance Criteria

Award Fee Requirements

Mission Assurance AuditsAverage six MA audits annuallyPre-shipment ReviewsBMDS Parts & Materials Control Board (PMCB)Element PMP Control Boards (PMPCB)

Voting MemberTests and Inspections

FOD Prevention, NDT, Acceptance InspectionMandatory Gov. Inspections (MGIs)Failure Review BoardMaterial Review BoardSupplier Road Maps

Stakeholder InitiativesIntegrated Product Teams (IPT)

LAUNCH ACTIVITIESPedigree Review

Flight Operations ReviewPre-Flight Readiness ReviewLaunch Readiness ReviewMission Readiness ReviewFour to six weeks prior to launch

Voting MemberBMDS Safety Officers (BSOs)Six BSOs at Colorado SpringsMDA Executive Level Flight Test ReviewsSeries of four flight test reviews leading to launchVoting Member

AF

AF

AF

AF

AF

Award Fee Board

Voting Member

Flight Readiness Review

Voting Member

Recent Process & Workmanship Failures:

Improper rigging of a lanyard pull connector –

Target failed to deploy and negated testMissing lock wire on onboard thruster– Caused a test failureSub-tier supplier cork installation process not adequately controlled –

Caused delamination/ voids on target vehicle Refurbished memory devices used in mission computer – Caused excessive reworkFailure to follow process (Heat treat certification) – Caused multiple lot failures & lost production of E-Bolts Lack of process controls (Supplier manufacturing process not proofed/qualified) – Caused strake bonding failuresSoftware (Radar algorithm) design validation and under-estimated input demands of “real-time” system – Caused performance, timing and processing errors

‘B

ody of knowledge’ created over decades (configuration management, process discipline, workmanship) codified in QS quality and mission assurance plans

Incorporated Industry ‘best practices’ and explicit quality clauses in development and production contractsConducting QS “audits” to evaluate suppliers and eliminate inconsistent compliance Focusing on supplier producibility assessments where increased throughput /schedules have resulted in manufacturing and fabrication problems

Current focus is on determining supplier capability to deliver quality production units (yield)

Responses to Quality Issues

Recent QS Initiatives

Critical production readiness reviews to ensure manufacturing

producibility

Manufacturing and fabrication assessmentsOn-site distribution audits Dedicated Parts,

Materials and Processes Team

Emphasis on preventing faulty

and counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain

Obsolescent parts now identified and tracked

In-plant inspections for manufacturing workmanship

Rigorous

facility checklists

Independent technical assessments of supplier facilities and production processes

Provides insight on production risks for “complex” and mission “critical” components

Facility Assessment Checklist

14 Sections

Electrical, Electronic, Electromechanical (EEE) Parts

Software

Design & Workmanship

Work Instructions

Manufacturing & Tooling

Clean Rooms

ESD, FOD, Safety, Training & Operator certification

Critical lifts & moves

MRB and Configuration Management Processes

Metrology

Safety (Work hazards & Ordnance) Assess suppliers to a common set of objective, industry-standard criteria

Weighted system for each criterion

Final score presented in a ‘report card’ format

Highlights Production-risk areas:

Deficiencies Score

Observations Score

Identifies areas for future sub-tier supplier assessments

Facility Report Card

Facility Assessment Checklist Display

SUMMARY

Focus on “first time, every time’ reliability

Prevent counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain and their use in mission critical components

Drive Supply chain to focus on workmanship standardsResolve ‘producibility issues, i.e., schedule and throughput

Use the Facility Checklist as a catalyst to:

Raise the level of compliance among all suppliers

Provide common framework for evaluating mission-critical component productivity risks

Identify weaknesses within individual supplier’s production processes