PPT-The “Taint” Leakage Model

Ron Rivest Crypto in the Clouds Workshop MIT Rump Session Talk August 4 2009 Taint Common term in software security Any external input is tainted A computation with a tainted input produces . Union. History. , state of affairs and challenges for the years to come. Gé . Backus. Amsterdam, November 30, 2011. Contents presentation. Castration. Setting the stage. Castration . practices. in the EU. Mohammad Sharifkhani. Reading. Text book, Chapter III. K. Roy’s Proc. of IEEE paper. Introduction. What is leakage?. I. OFF. (drain current when transistor is supposed to be off). Including gate leakage. . Cryptography. Stefan. . Dziembowski. University. . of. . Rome. La Sapienza. Krzysztof. . Pietrzak. CWI Amsterdam. Plan. Motivation and introduction. Our model. Our construction. these slides are available at. About Dynamic . Taint . Analysis & Forward . Symbolic . Execution (. but might have been afraid to ask. ). Edward J. Schwartz, . ThanassisAvgerinos. , David . Brumley. Presented by: . Vaibhav . Rastogi. Data tainting and analysis. Roadmap. Background. TaintDroid. JavaScript. Conclusion. Background. In smartphone, we. . use third-party applications such as . - Google map, Angry bird … . etc. More than 10Billion Apps. Yinzhi Cao. Reference: . http. ://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~. omertrip/pldi09/TAJ.ppt. www.cs.cmu.edu/~. soonhok/talks/20110301.pdf. 2. Motivating Example. *. * Inspired by . Refl1. in. SecuriBench Micro. Taint Flow #1. Linda F. Bisson. Department of Viticulture and Enology. UCD. Management of S-Taints. Diagnosis of Taint. Taint Prevention. Taint Mitigation. DIAGNOSIS OF SULFUR TAINTS. . Correct Diagnosis of Fault Is Important. Edward J. Schwartz, . Thanassis. Avgerinos, David . Brumley. Presented by: . Haitao Xu. 1. The Root of All Evil. Humans write programs. This Talk:. Computers Analyzing Programs Dynamically at Runtime. Ron Rivest. Crypto in the Clouds Workshop, MIT Rump Session Talk. August 4, 2008. Taint . Common term in software security. Any external input is . tainted. . . A computation with a . tainted. input produces . . Zvika. . Brakerski. . Weizmann Institute. Yael Tauman Kalai. . Microsoft. . Jonathan Katz . University of Maryland. . Vinod. Vaikuntanathan . IBM. . Crypto with . Leakage.  . Yinzhi Cao. Reference: . http. ://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~. omertrip/pldi09/TAJ.ppt. www.cs.cmu.edu/~. soonhok/talks/20110301.pdf. 2. Motivating Example. *. * Inspired by . Refl1. in. SecuriBench Micro. Taint Flow #1. Dynamic Taint Analysis. Track information flow through a program at runtime. Identify sources of taint – . “. TaintSeed. ”. What are you tracking?. Untrusted input. Sensitive data. Taint Policy – . App Sets. Will Klieber*, Lori Flynn, . Amar Bhosale , Limin Jia, and Lujo Bauer . Carnegie Mellon University. *presenting. Motivation. Detect malicious apps that leak sensitive data.. Meeting the challenges of the route map will require collaboration and innovation within the UK on an unprecedented scale.. There are limited opportunities to adopt knowledge and innovation from outside the UK due to specific UK requirements on...