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Understanding social performance: a ‘practice drift’ at the frontline of Microfinance Understanding social performance: a ‘practice drift’ at the frontline of Microfinance

Understanding social performance: a ‘practice drift’ at the frontline of Microfinance - PowerPoint Presentation

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Understanding social performance: a ‘practice drift’ at the frontline of Microfinance - PPT Presentation

Dr Mathilde Maitrot GCRF PostDoctoral Researcher Global Development Institute Outline of todays presentation Determinist conceptualizations and their application to microfinance Mission Drift ID: 786800

european microfinance 12th 2017 microfinance european 2017 12th june research conference 5th clients mission financial social practice asa 2011

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Slide1

Understanding social performance: a ‘practice drift’ at the frontline of Microfinance Institutions in Bangladesh

Dr Mathilde Maitrot GCRF Post-Doctoral ResearcherGlobal Development Institute

Slide2

Outline of today’s presentation

Determinist conceptualizations and their application to microfinance‘Mission Drift’ Methodology

The ‘Practice drift’

Human action and agency in microfinance practice

Conclusion

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Slide3

Determinism and Microfinance

Post 1990s: New Development Management Result-oriented management systems: Impact in questionMixed-results (Banerjee et al. 2015, Duvendack

et al. 2011; Maitrot and Niño-

Zarazúa

2015, Roodman 2011, Stewart et al. 2012)Questions raised remain unanswered (Hermes and Lensink 2007, Mersland and

Strøm 2010; Roy 2010)

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Slide4

Looking for explanations

Products? Environment? Clients?

...and institutions put under the microscope.

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Slide5

‘Mission drift’

Intentional top-down change in the social mission and institutional practicesTo solve a perceived trade-off between the pursuit of the social and the financial mission

Enhanced by dynamics of commercialisation

Cross

-subsidisation of clients MFIs move away from poorer clients in favour of less risky clients and larger loans to better off households (Copestake 2007; Mersland and Strøm

2010).

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Slide6

Methodology

Bangladesh Mixed-methodsVillage ethnography + Rapid Livelihoods Survey (490 HH)2 institutional ethnographies + Questionnaires to credit officersCase study of one MFI: ASA

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Slide7

‘Practice Drift’

It is at the margins that the trade-offs between the social and the financial mission are brokered.Without altering claims about the mission of microfinance, practices in the field can shift in a way that contradicts its social mission.

Emphasises set

of informal practices through which MFI field staff achieve financial targets

._drift in behaviour and attitudes

_opportunistic targeting and retaining of poor and vulnerable households. S

tructures and management systems can create the conditions for practices to

drift

and social performance

to suffer

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Slide8

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NGOs pursue financial autonomy (Fernando

2006) in an attempt to maintain a degree of autonomy from donor agencies

and political patronage (Lewis 2017). Development as mobilisation to development as service delivery (Rutherford 1995: 70)

ASA: The world’s leading MFI by MIX report in 2005, as the world’s best MFI by Forbes in 2007

A ‘vision unmatched in its clarity and relentlessness’ (

Morduch

in Rutherford 2009 ix)

Microfinance in Bangladesh

Slide9

ASA’s strategy for success

Standardised and low-cost human resources policies. Donor-free in 2011Disbursed

US$2.68 billion to 7.4 million clients (

ASA,

2016). Efficient monitoring system detecting fraud and default within 1/15 days. Branches are financially self-sufficient profit centres that assume HR and admin costsSanctions and penalty systems safeguard ASA’s financial performance

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Slide10

‘DM visit

branches to “motivate” us and write a review which depends on our profit. In 2008, the sir gave a good review but in 2009 and 2010 the profit was less and sir sent a circular to motivate us to improve ourselves, but this year it is better’.

Interview

, ASA regional manager, Tangail District, April 2011

.‘If the speed at which we can disburse loans is fast then we can make profits, but if it’s slow then losses are faced. Initially our total loan amount outstanding was low but now it’s about BDT1.5 crore.

[approximately US$210,000]

Interview, ASA branch manager, Tangail District, April 2011

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Slide11

Everyday ruling relations at the branches

Live at the branchesFollowing rules and regulations from the Manual Meet everyday individual financial targets: strict no repayment delay policyPersonal performance for meritocratic promotion

Spending time with clients, explaining the purpose and implications of loans is not incentivised within the institution.

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Slide12

The Practice drift in practice

Tactics:Lowering standards for selection and follow-up of clients.

Micro-collaterals for the poor (based on credit officers’ informal judgement).

Forceful top-up, hard-selling of loans, asset confiscation through

‘abusive’, ‘threatening’ and ‘publically humiliating’ tactics.Savings withdrawal.Repayment is central to their relationship ‘taka dai

khali, taka nei

… ar kicchu

nai

’.

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Slide13

‘Banks

[MFIs] give money to everyone, they don’t worry about helping anymore; they only care about interest and repayments … People misuse the money now and the officers do not check on them like they used to. The relationship was better then. … They only talk about money and instalments, before they were very light hearted. They would advise us about our mistakes but now it’s nothing like this.’

Interview

,

Parveen, former microfinance client, Tangail District, February 2011.12th June 2017

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Slide14

Conclusion

Findings challenge deterministic frameworks for understanding policies and interventions. Analysis points to the significance of human actions (everyday brokering activities)

for

performance

. No incentives or mechanisms within ASA for field officers to measure, report or represent the interest of clients. Daily client recruitment, top-up loans, follow-up procedures and repayment collection practices tacitly drift at the field level.

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Slide15

Thank you for your attention!

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