Explanatory regress and mechanistic explanation of the - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Explanatory regress and mechanistic explanation of the Small by theBig

Phyllis McKay

Illari

University of KentSlide2

1 The usual problemExplanatory RegressSlide3

Gap-o-phobiaSlide4

Gap-o-phobiaSlide5

Gap-o-phobiaSlide6

Gap-o-phobia

?Slide7

Gap-o-phobia

?

HELP!

I fell out of the bottom of the world!Slide8

Problem of explanatory regressWe cannot seem to evade the possibility of just such ‘gaps’ at the fundamental level.

?Slide9

Problem of explanatory regressWe cannot seem to evade the possibility of just such ‘gaps’ at the fundamental level.Physical theory might even be telling us that such ‘gaps’ actually do exist.

?Slide10

Glennan ‘some interactions between parts cannot be explained by the operation of mechanisms. For instance, two electrons might interact with each other, but there is no mechanism connecting them. If mechanical interactions are truly causal, the fundamental interactions on which they ultimately depend must be causal as well, so a complete causal theory requires a theory of fundamental causal interactions.’ Routledge

Encyclopaedia 2008Slide11

Stathis throws down the gauntlet!‘I take this to be a crucial problem of the mechanistic approach. In a sense, this approach fills in the 'chain' that connects the cause and the effect with intermediate loops. But there is still no account of how the loops interact. Here, it might well be the case that the most general and informative thing that can be said about these interactions is that there are relations of counterfactual dependence among the parts of the mechanism.’ (Psillos 2004 p314-5.)Slide12

2 What Explanation?Explanatory RegressSlide13

Epistemic and OnticWell-known distinction:Ontic mechanistic explanation about the worldly producer of the phenomena.In this sense the mechanism itself explains.

Epistemic

mechanistic explanation about the phenomenon being rendered intelligible to an

inquirer.

In

this sense

the

description

or the act of describing

the mechanism explains.Slide14

Epistemic and Ontic‘Productive continuities are what make the connections between stages intelligible. ... A missing arrow, namely, the inability to specify an activity, leaves an explanatory gap in the productive continuity

of the mechanism

.’

(MDC p3.)

Unfortunate mingling

of

ontic

and epistemic.Slide15

‘Where are the little bits?’We want explanations in terms of little bits.Psychologically, we like them.But this is no reason to believe little bits will always be available.

Particularly not

in mind-bending fields such as QM.

(Effective explanations will still require attention to epistemic

aspects

such as effective diagrams, equations, models.)Slide16

Want ontic explanationKeep clearer that we are attempting to describe how the world is.Worldly production of phenomenaMight not fit our idea of what counts as a fundamental explanation, or cause.If there aren’t

littler bits in some cases, then there

aren’t

. And wishing won’t make it so.Slide17

Ontic explanation: the competitors

?Slide18

Ontic explanation: the competitorsCapacitiesBlob has a capacity to produce blob

?

CapacitySlide19

Ontic explanation: the competitorsCapacitiesBlob has a capacity to produce blobLawsIt’s a law of nature that says blob then blob

?

CapacitySlide20

Well-known problems

Objections

‘

Dormitive

virtue’

Laws

It’s a law of nature that says blob then blob

Capacity

Capacities

Blob has a capacity to produce blobSlide21

Well-known problems

Objections

‘

Dormitive

virtue’

Laws

It’s a law of nature that says blob then blob

Capacity

Capacities

Blob has a capacity to produce blob

‘I don’t care what’s happening

elsewhere

!’Slide22

Really do want a mechanismActivities and entitiesOrganized so as to produce the phenomenonBroadly involves bothThings and their properties

Generalisations describing their interactionsSlide23

Really do want a mechanismActivities and entitiesOrganized so as to produce the phenomenonBroadly involves bothThings and their properties

Generalisations describing their interactions

‘Together we’re better!’Slide24

3 What Regress?Explanatory regressSlide25

Traditional conception of mechanistic explanationReductiveBehaviour of higher-level explained by behaviour of partsLocally supervenientBehaviour of whole supervenes on that of local parts

Big by small

Little bits explain the bigSlide26

Traditional conception of mechanistic explanationReductiveBehaviour of higher-level explained by behaviour of parts.Locally supervenientBehaviour of whole supervenes on that of local parts.

Big by small

Little bits explain the big.

Undermined by emergence, autonomy.

Undermined by importance of context – system biology.

I will examine this.Slide27

Bechtel (2008) and Craver (2007)In constructing a mechanistic explanation, you look for the working parts.Not everything in the area counts as a working part.You look experimentally:Briefly, you wiggle putative components, look for alteration in phenomenon, and vice versa.

To an extent it is

arbitrary

what you treat as

part

of the mechanism, what you treat as external. (Craver’s part-whole criterion.)Slide28

Darden (Phil Sci 2008)‘Often biologists engage in much investigative work to discover the level at which a given mechanism operates. Geneticists worked to find

the

operative

level for genetic linkage, ruling out the coupling of paired

alleles

and

the reduplication of germ cells and ruling in chromosomal mechanisms (Darden 1991). Genes are linked because they ride along on chromosomes in meiotic mechanisms. In immunology, the working entities

in clonal selection were at first hypothesized to be self-replicating protein molecules but were later found to be self-reproducing immune cells (

Darden 2006, Chapter 8). These two examples show that biologists do not always discover working entities in mechanisms by going to a smaller size

level; sometimes the operative units are intermediate or larger than at first hypothesized: not genes but chromosomes, not molecules but cells

.’ (961)Slide29

Darden Case 1‘Often biologists engage in much investigative work to discover the level at which a given mechanism operates. Geneticists

worked to

find

the

operative

level for genetic linkage, ruling out the coupling of paired

alleles

and the reduplication of germ cells and ruling in chromosomal mechanisms (Darden 1991). Genes are linked because they ride along on

chromosomes in meiotic mechanisms. In immunology, the working entities in

clonal selection were at first hypothesized to be self-replicating protein molecules but were later found to be self-reproducing immune cells (Darden

2006, Chapter 8). These two examples show that biologists do not always discover working entities in mechanisms by going to a smaller size

level; sometimes the operative units are intermediate or larger than at first hypothesized: not genes but chromosomes, not molecules but cells

.’ (961)Slide30
Slide31

Darden Case 2‘Often biologists engage in much investigative work to discover the level at which a given mechanism operates. Geneticists worked to find

the

operative

level for genetic linkage, ruling out the coupling of paired

alleles

and

the reduplication of germ cells and ruling in chromosomal mechanisms (Darden 1991). Genes are linked because they ride along on chromosomes

in meiotic mechanisms. In immunology, the working entities in clonal

selection were at first hypothesized to be self-replicating protein molecules

but were later found to be self-reproducing immune cells (Darden 2006, Chapter 8). These two examples show that biologists do

not always discover working entities in mechanisms by going to a smaller size level

; sometimes the operative units are intermediate or larger than at first hypothesized: not genes but chromosomes, not molecules but cells.’ (961)Slide32

SO:When you look for the working parts, sometimes they are not the little bits.Slide33

4 Positive storyExplanatory regressSlide34

Glennan ‘some interactions between parts cannot be explained by the operation of mechanisms. For instance, two electrons might interact with each other, but there is no mechanism connecting them. If mechanical interactions are truly causal, the fundamental interactions on which they ultimately depend must be causal as well, so a complete causal theory requires a theory of fundamental causal interactions.’ Routledge

Encyclopaedia 2008Slide35

Gap-o-phobia therapy?Interesting question:not about the fundamental levelnot about what the fundamental explainers arenot about causation (or anything else!) draining out

of the bottom of the

world

Real question is about

causal

connection

.Slide36

Glennan ‘some interactions between parts cannot be explained by the operation of mechanisms. For instance, two electrons might interact with each other, but there is no mechanism connecting them. If mechanical interactions are truly causal, the fundamental interactions on which they ultimately depend must be causal as well, so a complete causal theory requires a theory of fundamental causal interactions.’ Routledge

Encyclopaedia 2008Slide37

Gap-o-phobia therapy?Interesting question:not about the fundamental levelnot about what the fundamental explainers arenot about causation (or anything else!) draining out of the bottom of the

world

Real question is about

causal

connection

.

Now we can ask:

I

f the big can explain the small what then should we think about causal (and mechanistic) connection?Slide38
Slide39

Productive continuityMachamer, Bogen, Darden still worrying about productive continuity – which is causal connection.All mechanisms ‘...have productive continuity from one stage to the next…[such that] entities and activities of one stage give rise to the next stage…but few mechanisms have information flow through multiple stages of the [operation of the] mechanism

.’

Machamer

and

Bogen

(

CitS

volume) quoting Darden (2006

p. 283), on the issue they address.Slide40

Stathis’ gauntlet!‘I take this to be a crucial problem of the mechanistic approach. In a sense, this approach fills in the 'chain' that connects the cause and the effect with intermediate loops. But there is still no account of how the loops interact. Here, it might well be the case that the most general and informative thing that can be said about these interactions is that there are relations of counterfactual dependence among the parts of the mechanism.’ (

Psillos

2004 p314-5.)Slide41

Stathis’ gauntlet!‘I take this to be a crucial problem of the mechanistic approach. In a sense, this approach fills in the 'chain' that connects the cause and the effect with intermediate loops. But there is still no account of how the loops interact. Here, it might well be the case that the most general and informative thing that can be said about these interactions is that there are relations of counterfactual dependence among the parts of the mechanism.’ (

Psillos

2004 p314-5

.)

The most

general and informative

thing that can be said about these interactions

will be in

the relevant scientific theory – perhaps QM

.Any account of how the loops interact will

also be in QM.The surprising thing: quantum non-locality suggests we have to look UP, not down, for these stories.Slide42

Objection‘Then mechanistic explanation is really at bottom laws-explanation!’Something at the ‘bottom’ doesn’t make mechanisms ‘really’ anything!Either a) QM

theory in

some sense continuous with

mechanistic explanation:

very

interesting.

b

)

QM very different: the interface will be very important.Either way, we are now asking a more

precise, and more fruitful, question.Slide43
Slide44
Slide45
Slide46
Slide47

‘We also believe it to be likely, although we cannot argue for it here, that what we take to be intelligible is a product of the ontogenic and phylogenetic development of human beings in a world such as ours.’ MDC p22Slide48

MDC P23 ‘Higher-level entities and activities are thus essential to the intelligibility of those at lower levels, just as much as those at lower levels are essential for understanding those at higher levels. It is the integration of different levels into productive relations that renders the phenomenon intelligible and thereby

explains it.’Slide49

Machamer 2004 p31 in section discussing necessity ‘Metaphysically, activities are what do the ruling out, by connecting one entity through its actions to another entity or activity or by producing a change in another entity. In this way activities function as selective processes: they are explanations of the arrows in the cartoon diagrams, and spell out how the previous stage or situation produces

this certain result rather than some other. In other words, among all

the changes

that might have occurred at the next stage, this one did occur because of

the activity

that produced it.’Slide50

Machamer and Bogen paper for our volume: MDC ‘…exhibit productive continuity without gaps from the set-up to termination conditions. Productive continuities are what make the connection between stages intelligible. (Machamer, Darden and Craver [2000] p. 3)’Slide51