A Mechanist Perspective Stuart Glennan Butler University The singularist and generalist view of causation The generalist view Particular events are causally related because they fall under general laws ID: 691680
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Slide1
Singular and General Causal Relations: A Mechanist Perspective
Stuart Glennan
Butler
UniversitySlide2
The singularist and generalist view of causation
The
generalist view: Particular events are causally related because they fall under general laws
The singularist view: Causal relations obtain between particular entities, and causal generalizations are true, to the extent they are true, in virtue of generalizing over singular causal facts.Slide3
Talk Outline
Productivity
, Relevance and Singularism
The grounds of the Singularist Intuition
Three “mechanistic “theories
Process theories
Mechanical theories
Manipulability theories
The character of fundamental interactions and the case for singularismSlide4
Productivity & Relevance
Sober, Elliott. 1984. Two concepts of cause.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Hall, Ned. 2004. Two concepts of causation. In
Causation and counterfactuals.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2010. Causal pluralism. In
Oxford handbook of causation
Glennan, Stuart. forthcoming. Mechanisms, causes and the layered model of the world.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
. Slide5
Productivity and Relevance
Sometimes we have production without relevance (difference making): e.g. – overdetermination cases like firing squads
Sometimes we have relevance without production: e.g., omissions like the failure to break at a stop light.
Generalist or type level causal theories focus on relevance, while singularist theories focus on production – but there
are exceptionsSlide6
The Singularist Intuition
The Nature and Observability of the Causal Relationship
C.J. Ducasse, 1926
Causality and Determination
Elizabeth Anscombe, 1971Slide7
The Singularist Intuition
… [T]he cause of a particular event [is defined] in terms of but a single occurrence of it, and thus in no way involves the supposition that it, or one like it, ever has occurred before or ever will again. … And recurrence becomes related at all to causation only when a law is considered which happens to be a generalization of facts themselves individually causal to begin with.
Ducasse 1926Slide8
The Singularist Intuition
Causality consists in the derivedness of an effect from its causes . This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes. … Now analysis in terms of necessity or universality does not tell us of this derivedness of the effect; rather it forgets about that.
Anscombe 1971Slide9
Three Theories of Causality
Process
Theories
Wesley Salmon, Phil Dowe
Manipulability
Theories
Jim Woodward, Judea Pearl, also
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines
Mechanical Theories
Glennan,
MDC, BechtelSlide10
Process Theories
Causal
p
rocesses are understood as world-lines of objects that propagate
causal influence
through
space-time.
When causal processes intersect they may interact, changing the properties of each process.
Causally related events must be connected by a continuous network of intersecting causal processes.
Process theories are clearly singularistSlide11
Problems for Process Theories
Process theories provide
an analysis of productivity, but have problems with relevance, including:
Irrelevant interactions
Relevant negative causes (omissions, preventions)
Reductive character of analysis of interactionsSlide12
Mechanical Theories
Mechanisms are systems consisting of a set of parts, entities, components.
Activities of and interactions between parts of mechanisms are regular -- characterized
by
counterfactually
invariant generalizations
Mechanisms are hierarchical in the sense that the parts of mechanisms may
themselves be partsSlide13
Advantages of Mechanical Theories over Process Theories
Mechanical theories seem to address the causal relevance problem, in part because of their reliance on counterfactual-supporting generalizations in describing relations between parts.
Because mechanical theories are hierarchical, they seem better suited than process theories to handle the fact that higher level properties are often the causally relevant ones.Slide14
Manipulability Theories
Causal relations are represented by directed acyclic graphs. Direct Causal Relations between nodes are characterized by functional relations
If X causes Y then an intervention on X will cause a change in Y in accordance with these functional relations.Slide15
A MechanismSlide16
DAG for a toiletSlide17
The character of fundamental interactions and the case for singularismSlide18
Some important points about generalizations, counterfactuals and mechanisms:
Interactions
between parts of mechanisms “can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations” (Glennan
2002)
These generalizations support counterfactuals.
Outside of fundamental physics, these generalizations are mechanically explicable, meaning that the truth makers for these generalizations are further mechanisms
But eventually we bottom out and have to wonder what the truth maker of the generalization
is.Slide19
A Quick apology to modern physics
This picture of mechanisms presupposes a “classical” view of the fundamental physical entities and interactions
Entities must have definite properties and must be distinct from other entities. Interactions must in some sense be local.
Quantum mechanics tells us this is wrong
Somehow classical entities and properties emerge at some level of organization, and this is our “fundamental” level.Slide20
Psillos’ asymmetry thesis:
Because of this, Psillos (2004)
argues that there is a certain asymmetry between
counterfactual and mechanistic approaches
Counterfactuals are needed to underwrite fundamental interactions between mechanisms, but mechanisms can’t always be the truth-makers for counterfactuals.
A genuine case for the priority of counterfactuals over mechanisms would require us to have a reductive account of the truth makers for counterfactuals, but we (or Woodward at least) doesn’t have that.Slide21
Our key question
What in the hell does it mean
that, an interaction between fundamental parts of a mechanism “can be characterized by change relating generalization”?Slide22
Fundamental Interactions
Humean
Lawlessness
The interaction is nothing more than an instance of a pattern that is described by a generalization
Nomological
Determination
The interaction is governed by the generalization (law)
Singular Determination
The interaction is a singular case of causal determination and any generalizations describing interactions are true in virtue of there being a general pattern of such singular instances.Slide23
Taking the Positivist Route
One option here is to simply reject the question of which interpretation is right, since it is empirically
undecidable
.
This is mechanisms sans metaphysics, which is good if metaphysics is nonsense.Slide24
Against Humean Lawlessness
Humean
lawlessness is antirealist about laws and causes.
There are no genuine modal relationships.
Singular counterfactual claims are not really claims about what would have happened in a single case.
Manipulation, like other forms of causing, is a fiction.
The view is, as Mumford claims, “irrefutable, but neither compelling, appealing, nor intuitive.”Slide25
Against Nomological Determination
The main argument for the nomological determination view is that it explains why there are fundamental level regularities.
The singularist responds that the fact that an interaction at one place is productive should not depend upon what happens elsewhere.
It does not follow from the fact that we live in a world in which fundamental interactions fall under patterns that it is in virtue of these patterns that the productive relationship holds.
We could live in a higgledy-piggledy worldSlide26
For singular determination
The singularist view of determination that is consistent between the fundamental and higher-levels.
Laws are typically understood to be relations that hold in virtue of the properties of the things related.
But the properties of complex things are not basic facts about those things, but are mechanically explicable. Higher level properties and laws depend upon particulars
Consequently, it would be good if the same held at the fundamental level.