Churchill and Appeasement - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Churchill and Appeasement

“An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.”

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Churchill’s Wants

A strong British rearmament, particularly in the air force to meet any threat.

A strong understanding with France, whose army Britain would have to rely on in the event of any clash with Germany.

Support for the League of Nations as it was the only way that public opinion would accept any action against Germany and the only means of gaining international support.Slide3

Issues with a strong British rearmament

The Armed Forces were overstretched.

Japan: much bigger threat than Germany. Rising in militarism- threat to interests in China and South-East Asian empire.

Italy: much bigger threat to British possessions. Also rising in militarism- threat to British Egypt and the Mediterranean.

To rearm against Germany as well would bankrupt the

country. Slide4

Issues with air rearmament

Air rearmament may deter Germany, but would not defeat Germany alone.Unemployment high, still suffering the economic crisis of 1929-1931- which Churchill’s policy of the Gold Standard had made worse.

Churchill had also cut armed force funding under the Ten Year Rule.Slide5

BUT

The German air force was growing considerably. Britain needed to be prepared against it.

Baldwin had admitted that if he had offered rearmament before the election of 1935 he would have lost- politics coming before the needs of national defence.

Britain’s air defences became crucial in the Battle of Britain in 1940 (although the naval defences would always be the biggest defence against German invasion).Slide6

Two Sources: Two Views

Churchill: The Gathering Storm

“It would have been possible in 1933 or even in 1934 for Britain to have created an air power which would have imposed the necessary restraints upon Hitler’s ambitions... More than five whole years had yet to run before we were to be confronted with the supreme ideal. Had we acted... it might never have come to pass”.

Lord Halifax, 1935.

“Are we to judge the situation so serious that everything has to give way to military reconditioning of our defence forces? Such a conclusion in fact, seems to rest on premises not only of the inevitability but of a certain degree of certainty as to the early imminence of war which I am not prepared to accept”.Slide7

Issues regarding The Grand Alliance (with France, Russia and cooperation with the USA)

Since Britain had refused to support France in the Ruhr, France had been following a defensive policy (e.g. fortifying the Maginot Line) and would not change that for Churchill. France was also divided politically: some even preferred Hitler to their own socialist leaders.

Stalin was beginning to be feared across eastern Europe- Poland would not want Russians involved in defending them (as they signed a pact with Germany in 1934 anyway). Russia would be no help against Czechoslovakia (no common border). Also, whilst few were keen on Germany, nobody liked the Soviets.

USA isolationist, determinedly so in 1938.Slide8

Further issues?

How was Churchill going to create the Grand Alliance? He wasn’t even linking with Liberal and Labour opponents of government policy OR quitting the Conservatives to set up an independent party on this issue. He’d done more about India than he did about this conflict.

Churchill showed many signs of attempting to build a relationship with Chamberlain (wanted a job), he didn’t provide direct opposition to Chamberlain after appeasing the Anschluss- calling his plans a very fine speech.

Churchill did not cast a single vote against the government on foreign or domestic policy before the Munich Crisis (see source B, page 81).Slide9

BUT

This was (with the exception of surrendered France) the Grand Alliance that won the Second World War.

The Grand Alliance was called for as a deterrent not to reverse Hitler’s actions (e.g. Anschluss, Rhineland etc.). People (especially as the Versailles Treaty was seen as unfair would actually have not needed to protect territory in 1938 Hitler had already gained.Slide10

Two Sources: Two Views

Churchill: Speech on the Anschluss

“If they had their forces marshalled in what you might call a Grand Alliance; if they had their staff arrangements concerted; if all this rested, as it can honourably rest, upon the Covenant of the League of Nations... then I say you might, even now arrest this war”.

Chamberlain: Letter to his Sister

“The Plan of the Grand Alliance, as Winston calls it, had occurred to me long before he mentioned it... I talked about it to Halifax and we submitted it to the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office experts. It is a very attractive idea; indeed there is everything to be said for it until you come to examine its practicability”.Slide11

Should Britain have gone to war in 1938?

Yes

Strong moral case

Attempts to deal with Hitler had been unsuccessful.

Neither Baldwin nor Chamberlain liked Hitler or had anything against rearming other than the cost.

Chamberlain’s actions only made Hitler think that democracies would not fight him.

NoThe Nazi regime seemed popular in Germany therefore could not justify overthrowing it.

Neither America or Russia was on side (nor had much been done to get their support).

Churchill was outside government responsibilities and could say what he liked.

Dominions and British people against war.

Britain’s armed forces not ready.Slide12

Two Sources: Two ViewsSlide13

Issues with sources on appeasement

Remember: Churchill was a big supporter of Chamberlain- having seconded his nomination for the leadership of the Conservatives. Many of his positive relationships with Churchill are omitted from

The Gathering Storm.

Churchill intended to write history in a way sympathetic to himself. And he did.

Particularly as regards appeasement, this does show him as the ‘lone voice’ against appeasement which wasn’t true.

Others tend to follow that view, however. This is partly because of the discredit given to Chamberlain and appeasement (a policy he was very much supported for at the time) and the wish for many contemporaries to disassociate themselves from appeasement.