PPT-Condorcet Consistent Bundling with Social Choice

Shreyas Sekar Sujoy Sikdar Lirong Xia Optimal Bundle Selection Journals in a Library Many journals to choose from Limited space Users have preferences over the journals Examples Committees TV channel packages insurance policies . Administrative Policy Committee. Wesleyan Council on Student Affairs. 16 September 2014, 12:05 PM. Ranked Choice Vote. Presidential 27%. Parliamentary 31%. Hybrid 38%. Spoiled/Exhausted 4%. Condorcet Method. Compare each choice with every other choice.. A. 1. 4. 4. 4. B. 2. 1. 2. 2. C. 3. 2. 1. 3. D. 4. 3. 3. 1. Total # of voters. 8. 5. 6. 7. Begin by comparing A with B, then with C and finally with D.. Making Group . Decisions. Mechanism design: study solution concepts. 7-. 1. We vote in awarding scholarships, teacher of the year, person to hire.. Rank feasible social outcomes based on agents' individual ranking of those outcomes. Looking at a problem from the designers point of view. Voting. over alternatives. >. >. >. >. voting rule (mechanism) determines winner based on votes. Can vote over other things too. Where to go for dinner tonight, other joint plans, …. Choice, Social Welfare, and Publicfrom N+ 1 rather than N outweighed by the increase in 30When Choice Impairs Social Welfaremore occasions to choose and a larger number of options foreach decision wit Condorcet Method. Compare each choice with every other choice.. A. 1. 4. 4. 4. B. 2. 1. 2. 2. C. 3. 2. 1. 3. D. 4. 3. 3. 1. Total # of voters. 8. 5. 6. 7. Begin by comparing A with B, then with C and finally with D.. Lecture . 1: . Voting and Election Math. Voting and Fairness. The very essence of democracy? . Majority Rule.. In an election with two candidates, the candidate with more than half the votes wins. . Use election theory techniques to analyze election data such as majority, plurality, runoff, approval, the . Borda. method in which points are assigned to preferences, and the Condorcet method in which each pair of candidates is run off head to head.. Mark Wang. John Sturm. Sanjeev. . Kulkarni. Paul Cuff. Basic Background – What is the problem?. Condorcet = IIA. Survey Data. Pairwise Boundaries = No strategic voting. Outline. How to make group decisions when you must.. Bronwyn Howell, School of Management, Victoria University of Wellington. b. ronwyn.Howell@vuw.ac.nz. Law . and Economics Association of New . Zealand. Auckland, November 21 2017. THE PRESENTATION. j. Jacob Felty. Sabrea Hebb. Alexandra Hill. Shaady Ibrahim. Callie Myers. Colby Wulf. SMaC. Specific, Methodical, and Consistent. As the uncertainty, fast-changing, and unforgiving nature of your environment changes, the more SMaC is necessary . Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice . by William . Zwicker. Introduction. If we assume. every two voters play equivalent roles in our voting rule. every two alternatives are treated equivalently by the rule. Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice . by William . Zwicker. Introduction. If we assume. every two voters play equivalent roles in our voting rule. every two alternatives are treated equivalently by the rule. In voting theory, the goal is to make the largest number of people happy while allowing everyone to vote honestly.. Voting Theory. http://www.mclib.org/voting_booth.gif. http://www.hamburg.mi.us/clerk/images/vote-graphic.png.