Presentation on theme: "Rethinking Armageddon Planning Scenarios for the"— Presentation transcript
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Rethinking Armageddon
Planning Scenarios for theSecond Nuclear AgeAndrew KrepinevichJacob Cohn
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Presentation Roadmap
Project Overview
Why Scenarios?
Five Scenarios
Selected Observations and Insights
Next Steps
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Project Overview
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Project Objectives
How can scenarios support efforts to craft policies designed to
reduce the chances of nuclear use
?
What would constitute a
representative set of scenarios that are characteristic of the Second Nuclear Age
, rather than the preceding age? Given these scenarios, what are some of the
first-order implications they raise with respect to nuclear policy, strategy, and force posture?
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Why Scenarios?
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Scenarios
Scenarios
: A tool for helping us plan in an uncertain world; an antidote to “willful
ignorance”
A need
for
effective strategic
thinking is most obvious in times of accelerated
changeWhile the future is fundamentally unpredictable; it is not wholly uncertain
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Why Scenarios?
Do not “predict” the future; rather, they help us to think about the future
Help
identify what factors will most shape the future
Understand
how the environment might changeRecognize
when the environment is changingKnow how to
respond
when change is detected
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“Drivers”
Geostrategic: Multipolar regional and global competitions
Geopolitical: Regime characteristics; external sources of influence
Geographic: Proximity and “interspersing
”
Cultural: The Human Condition; differing perspectives on cost, benefit and risk
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“Drivers”
Military-Technical:
Advanced design nuclear weapons
The maturation of the precision-guided weapons regime
Advanced air and missile defenses
Cyber munitions
Military Capabilities: Size and composition of
strategic
forces
Proliferation Dynamics: Static, linear or non-linear?
Temporal: Mobilization, early warning, command-and-control
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Five Scenarios
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Scenarios
Iran, Israel and the Crisis Neither Sought
An “N-Player” Middle East Confrontation
Russia’s “Escalate to De-escalate” threat
North
Korea’s “Rational” Option
China and the Long-Term Great Power Competition
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Middle EastSlide13
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Iran and Israel to the Brink
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Scenario (2016 – 2020)
Economic:
Joint Agreement unfreezes Iranian assets and ends many economic sanctions
Proxies:
Tehran’s “slow squeeze” of Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Israel
Crisis:
Third Lebanon War expands to direct conflict between Israel and Iran; both sides concerned about preemptive nuclear attack
Destabilizing Factors
Geographic proximity and limits of Early Warning/C2
Predelegation of authority
Nuclear doctrineSlide14
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The “N-Player” Problem
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Scenario (2016 – 2020)
Excursion from previous scenario focusing on the “N-Player” problem
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE expect same nuclear freedom as granted to Iran
Saudi Arabia jumpstarts nuclear program with Pakistan’s assistance
September 2018, Pakistan deploys nuclear IRBMs to Saudi Arabia
Destabilizing Factors
Attribution problem
Will the U.S. protect its allies equally?Slide15
Eastern EuropeSlide16
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Sub-Conventional Aggression in Latvia
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Destabilizing Factors
Alliance management
Deterring the “escalate to deescalate” threat
Ability of non-nuclear weapons to fill nuclear missions
Gaps
in the escalation ladder
Scenario (2016 – 2018)
Economic:
Falling oil and gas
prices,
continued economic
sanctions
Security:
Increasing
insecurity as
ISIS attributed terror
attacks
mount
Timing
:
Low
domestic approval and weakening internal control
near election
Crisis
:
Creeping aggression in Latvia, incorrectly assuming NATO would not intervene, Russia backed into a losing conventional positionSlide17
North KoreaSlide18
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North Korea
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Destabilizing Factors
(Mis)perceptions of leaders
Alliance management
Vulnerability of missile defenses to Haystack tactic
Vulnerability of small arsenals to missile defense
Scenario (2016 –
2021)
Economic
:
Economic reform backfires, by 2019 the situation is desperate
Nuclear:
Believed to have nuclear capable Taepodong-3s and Nodongs
Arms Control:
Concessions viewed as a path to regime change
Crisis
:
Nuclear strike on Japan as last ditch effort to stave off regime collapseSlide19
Long-Term Competition with China and RussiaSlide20
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Long-Term Multipolar Competition
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Scenario (
2017
–
2020)
Economic:
Economic slowdown leaves regime reliant on nationalism
Geopolitical:
Setbacks in South China Sea/East China Sea stress last pillar
Military-Technical:
U.S. CPGS development and Russian violation of INF treaty raises concerns over vertical escalation vulnerability
Nuclear
:
Fissile material is the principal near-term barrier to growing China’s arsenal; decision made to seek balance with U.S. and Russia
Destabilizing Factors
What force structure is needed for a multipolar competition?
Avoiding an arms race & the role of arms control
Effect of geographic proximity – nuclear overflightSlide21
Selected Insights
and Observations21Slide22
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Selected Insights and Observations
The “Nuclear Balance” is now the “Strategic Balance”
Wide range of capabilities; many non-nuclear
New vertical and horizontal escalation ladders
The Bipolar structure is transitioning to a Multipolar structure
Global and regional competitions
Strategies for deterring one rival may weaken deterrence with another
A nuclear “great game”
Potential for non-nuclear powers to play
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Selected Insights and Observations
The Challenge of Extended Deterrence
What is reassuring for one may not be for another
Need to review along with revised escalation
ladders
The Death of “Rational Strategic Man”
Single, rational unitary actor model long discredited
Crises lead to thinking “fast,” not “slow”Prospect Theory suggests coercion strategies may be a “dead end”
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Selected Insights and Observations
The Erosion of Crisis Stability
Geographic Proximity, Early Warning, Command-and-Control, Pre-delegation Authority and Human Cognitive Limitations
Cyber Munitions and Catalytic War
Problems with Prompt Attribution
Blurring of Strategic and Non-Strategic Strikes
Undeclared Arsenals
Multiple Extended Deterrence CommitmentsHaystack Attacks1914 Redux: The Mobilization of Missile Defenses
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Selected Insights and Observations
Arms Control
From New START to the Washington Naval Treaty
“Multidimensional” Problems
“Multipolar” Problems
Enforcement and Verification
Challenges
Implications for the U.S. Strategic PostureOld metrics may no longer applyMore options needed
Position matters in a mobilization racePotential gap between commitments and capabilities (extended deterrence)Which scenarios
are accorded priority?
A need to think long term
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Next Steps
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Selected Next Steps
Undertake Strategic Net Assessments on global, regional and functional aspects of the competition
Comparative assessment of strategic doctrines
Identify strategic planning issues that emerge
across
scenarios
Develop a set of the “missing” scenarios (e.g.; India-Pakistan; nuclear war termination)
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Selected Next Steps
D
evelop a revised set of metrics to guide efforts to assess the strategic force balance(s)
Update horizontal and vertical escalation ladders
Assess prospects for regulating the strategic
c
ompetition (such as a contemporary version of the Washington Naval Treaty)
Examine ongoing efforts among the competitors to enhance their strategic forces, identifying major asymmetries in doctrine, forces and their implications
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Questions?
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