Dr Vincent Charles Keating Center for War Studies University of Southern Denmark 31 January 2017 Introduction The use of social trust theory in international relations and political science more generally ID: 574640
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Social Trust in International Relations
Dr. Vincent Charles KeatingCenter for War StudiesUniversity of Southern Denmark31 January 2017Slide2
Introduction
The use of social trust theory in international relations (and political science more generally)Four current projects (at varying stages of completion)Social trust and NATOSocial trust and the relationship between small and large states
Social trust and norms in the GCC
Social trust and the NGO/donor relationship
Each project attempts to apply different elements of social trust theory
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What is Social Trust?
Clusters around a four ideasSocial factors are important for developing trusting relationshipsTrust as a response to preexisting norms of reciprocityTrust in relation to other preexisting norms
Trust itself as a type
of habitual
normDifferent fromRational trust: observationally calculative
Psychological trust: emphasizes instead:
P
sychological propensities to trustIndividual emotional states
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Trust and NATO
Alliance literature presupposes mistrust among alliesAlliances generally formed under conditions of heightened security concerns, so possibility of betrayal looms largeCan formal alliances help to build trust, and how?Focus on two problems in particular
Trust that the allies will not turn on them
Trust that the allies will not defect in a joint venture
Focus on implementation/removal of hedging mechanisms as indicators of distrust/trust
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Research Design
Historical study of seven bilateral relationshipsFrance-GermanyGermany-PolandGreece-Turkey
Hungary-Romania
United Kingdom-Norway
USA-GermanyUSA-United KingdomTwo research questionsHas the alliance helped the states to build trusting relationships?
Does building a relationship in one area help to build relationships in other areas?
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Contributions to Trust Literature
Development of relationships, not just formation (Rathbun)What is the effect of long-term exposure to the alliance?Highlights importance of particularized trust – different things can be entrusted at different times.
Empirical results suggest that agent-driven ‘leap of faith’ model is rarely if even encountered
Emphasis instead on constant decisions to engage, particular in times of crisis
Hedges are both suggestive of distrust, but are part of the trust-building process
Move from realist to liberal hedges
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Contributions to the Alliance Literature
Alliances do not just alleviate external security concerns, but can transform internal relationshipsHelps to explain theoretically why the emphasis on reputation (rational trust), obligation (social trust), and support for out-of-area operations (extended reciprocity) appears in the current literatureCreates structural condition that makes violence between allies more difficult
Creates basic new relationship between distrusting states
Disadvantage of
exiters: have alliance set against them
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Contributions to Liberal Institutionalist Literature
Alliances do not just have ‘institutional’ effects due to interaction and knowledge-sharingState agency: states must want to engage in trust-building in order for the alliance to have an effectDifference in trust-building between states that see alliance as
Independent institution
Proxy for the United States
An additional role of institutions is that they ‘create the past’ of successful crises management, which can be used in trust-building
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Summary
Social trust offers possibility to see development of trusting relationships within an international environmentMoves beyond focus on alliance formation with psychological trustTops-up rational trust models with the addition of social variablesBrings together
disperate
theoretical ideas in existing alliance literatureBrings back in agency to the liberal alliance literature
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Previous IR Literature on Security in the GCC
RealismAlliance to counter influence/threat of Iran/IraqSocial Constructivism (security communities)Limited defense cooperation
History of internal interference
On the face of things, limited possibilities for trust from a security perspective
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Our Argument
Trusting relationships exist, but require a focus on Internal securitySocial normsInternal security
Security of regime from insurrection at least as much of a threat as external invasion
Social norms
Different from most institutions, but focus of trust relationships
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Identifying Trusting Relationships
Rooted in social trust theory based on two criteriaChanges in hedging relationshipsEvidence of betrayalProblems with purely emotional stance
Conflates
the characteristics of an independent causal variable with the characteristics of the phenomenon
itselfFocuses on an intermediary variable less important than the causes of that variableDistinct one-sided bias in opposite casual pattern: betrayal
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GCC Crisis Over the Arab Spring
Falling out between Qatar and Saudi ArabiaArab Spring brings possibility of internal instability to the Gulf regionGCC states clamp down on potential domestic threatsQatar breaks from the pack in supporting anti-regime revolts in Libya, Syria, and Egypt
Saudi sees Muslim Brotherhood as ideological competition
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The Trusting Relationship
Strong social norm of maintaining face in the GCCSupported by norms of informal mediation, advice-making, and particularly consensusAlmost no hedging strategies employed against defectionGCC has very low levels of institutionalization, relying instead on these norms
States had relative freedom to pursue goals even with Saudi hegemony
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The Betrayal
Qatar supports Islamist forces in the Arab spring, particularly Muslim BrotherhoodSaudi Arabia sees this as a betrayal of the core values of preserving internal security and face-savingEvidence of betrayal: ‘shocking’ moves by Saudi in responding publically to defection
In coalition with UAE and Bahrain, withdraws ambassadors
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Rebuilding Trust
Move from habitual to calculative trustImportance of betrayer to demonstrate trustworthinessSaudi aggrieved party: incumbent on Qatar to make amends
Does not retaliate in recalling diplomats
Engages in confidence-building measures such as recalling Egyptian ambassadors
Follows Saudi in recalling envoy to Iran
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Summary
Potential of linking trusting relationships to particular social normsMoves it beyond ‘norms of reciprocity’Reinforces the importance of particularized trustPotential of identifying security concerns that IR might otherwise ignore: internal security
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Social Trust and Small States in Alliances
Small states are at an immense disadvantage in alliancesTheir need for alliance protection is greatTheir ability to provide reciprocally is poorSmall states need large states much more than the other way around
One option: to overcommit to the large state’s foreign policy
Example: Danish bellicose foreign policy since 9/11
Subsumed under “informal influence” in literatureBut why does it work?
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Informal Influence as a Product of a Trusting Relationship
Social norms of obligation and duty that arise from a developed trusting relationshipHigher norm of obligation – greater chance that states will reciprocateSupererogatory performancesTo go behold the call of duty to demonstrate trustworthiness
Does not arise from strict duty; is put forward as something extraordinary and meritorious
Supererogatory performances can advance norms of trust, increasing small state influence over large states
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Denmark-US and the Cartoons
Denmark overcommits to all US foreign military campaigns Not fiscal, but in the form of excessive outputCumbersome military transformation, effort and casualties on the battlefield, loss of political capital among some European allies
2005-06 Mohammed Cartoon crisis
Burning of the Danish embassy in Damascus and Beirut, looting of embassy in Teheran
Danes reach out for US assistance Request outside of normal NATO commitments
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Denmark-US and the Cartoons
Copenhagen wanted US to pressure governments to help outUnited States originally not interested in getting involved in another identity conflictInternal battle within the White House with arguments based on need to support a close ally even if there is little upside and the expenditure of political capital
US eventually changes course after Denmark expresses their disappointment by
Openly supporting Denmark
Offering assistance through its embassiesCalling in ambassadors to hold them responsible for violence
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Conclusion
Small states can have leverage over larger states because of the norms of trust within their relationshipOvercommitment (supererogatory performances) on the part of the small states can lead to social pressure for the larger state to do the sameProvides detailed theoretical explanation for how informal influence works
Not a sure thing, but social environment changes the perceived payoffs if reciprocity is an entrenched value
Even in the Danish case, the Danes needed to openly complain for the US to step in: it was not automatic
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Trust, NGOs, and the Accountability Agenda
Are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) trustworthy?Increased concern of trustworthiness of charitiesFramed media reports of the suicide of Mrs. CookeSubject of recent government studies (
Etherington
Report)
Ongoing question in academic literatureRecently published article:Keating, Vincent and Erla Thrandardottir (2016) “NGOs, Trust, and the Accountability
Agenda”
British Journal of Politics and International Relations
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Accountability Agenda
Major response to the problem of trustworthiness of NGOsA set of principles adopted by government regulatory bodies and NGO self-regulationCore Humanitarian Standard (CHS)
Statements of Recommended Practice (
Sorp
)Sphere FrameworkINGO Accountability CharterClaim: The accountability agenda will increase trustworthiness so donors can safely engage with NGOs with less fear of NGO defection
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Accountability Agenda
Consists of two major featuresTransparency and access to informationThreat of external penalties for defectionNo one has analyzed whether these will increase trust in NGOs – it is simply assumed by scholars and practitioners
We argue that that the accountability agenda is based on an implicit rational trust model
Implicit because no one has consulted trust scholarship to probe their assumptions
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Is a Rational Trust Model Appropriate?
We argue that rational trust, by itself, is a bad model for the relationship between NGOs and donorsInclusion of social trust theory: trust is higher among those who Share identity or solidarity over common valuesHave similar group membership
Feel like they are working towards common goals
Creates a ‘we-feeling’ that makes people believe that reciprocity is more likely to occur
Helps people to trust when there is insufficient information to make a rational decision
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Social Trust and NGOs
Can explain why NGOs are constantly seen as the most trustworthy actors in societyOccurs even without accountability agendaBenefit for NGOsExistence of trust means that donors do not impose costly hedges against the risk of defection
Possibility of habitual trust, where donors do not even consider the possibility of defection
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Problems with the Accountability Agenda
The need for transparency and external punishment are read differently by the two theoriesRational trust: helps to demonstrate trustworthinessSocial trustA
re hedges, and therefore indications of mistrust, not trust
Can disrupt those who have habitual trusting relationships by reminding them of the possibility of defection
Experimental psychology reflects thisContracts create less trust between cooperators
When imposed on those who cooperated freely, it lessens trust to the point that contracts are needed for future cooperation
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Summary
So the accountability agenda, because it ignores the social effects of trust between NGOs and donors, misses important downsidesCreates costly hedging structures for NGOs and governments alike that might be unnecessaryCan disrupt habitual trusting relationships, making it
less
likely that donors will trust NGOs
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