Robotics Robotics Safety 2 Previous Accidents (From OSHA Web Site) - PowerPoint Presentation

Robotics

Robotics Safety 2

Previous Accidents (From OSHA Web Site) 3

On July 21, 1984, a thirty-four-year-old male operator of an automated die-cast system went into cardiorespiratory arrest and died after being pinned between the back end of an industrial robot and a steel safety pole. The hydraulic robot had been installed in an existing production line to remove die-cast parts from a die-cast machine and to transfer these parts to a trimmer. The victim had fifteen years' experience in die-casting and had completed a one-week training course in robotics three weeks before the fatal incident. The victim entered the working range of the operating robot presumably to clean up scrap metal that had accumulated on the floor. Despite training in the robotics course, instructions on the job, and warnings by fellow workers to avoid this dangerous practice, the victim apparently climbed over, through, or around a safety rail which surrounded two sides of the robot's work envelope. The entry point in the safety rail was interlocked. No other presence-sensing devices were operative in the system. What Can Go Wrong? 4

Configurations 5

Robots Work Envelope 6

Programmable Multi-FunctionalTransfer/Motions programmed pathANSI-RIA R15.06-2012 Robotics Characteristics 7

Maximum Space Space that can be swept by the moving parts of the robot as defined by the manufacturer plus the space which can be swept by the end-effector and the workpieceRestricted Space Portion of the maximum space restricted by limiting devices that establish limits which will not be exceeded Definitions 8

Operating Space Portion of the restricted space that is actually used while performing all motions commanded by the task programSafeguarded Space Space defined by the perimeter safeguarding Definitions (cont.) 9

A device that restricts the maximum space by stopping or causing to stop all robot motion and is independent of the control program and the task programs. Limiting Device 10

Program/Teaching Normal OperationsMaintenance Operating Modes 11

Robot’s arm functioned erratically during programming and struck the operator. Operator entered the work envelope during operations and was pinned between the back end of the robot and a pole. A fellow employee accidentally tripped the power switch while a maintenance worker was servicing a robot. The robot arm struck the maintenance worker. Accidents included the following: 12

Impact or Collision Accidents – Unpredicted movements, malfunctions, peripheral equipment. Crushing or Trapping Accidents Mechanical Part Accidents – Breakdown, release of energy, failure of end-effectorsOther – Ruptured hydraulic lines, arc flash, metal spatter, dust, tripping hazards. Types of Accidents Include: 13

Human Factor Control ErrorMechanical EnvironmentalComponent Failure Unexpected Energy Release Loss Sources 14

1910.212(a)(1) 1910.212(a)(2)1910.212(a)(3)(ii) 1910.212(b)1910.147 1910.331-.335 Section 5(a)(1) Applicable Standards 15

Risk Assessment Safeguarding Devices (limiting devices, presence-sensing, fixed barriers, interlocked barrier guards) Awareness Devices Safeguard the Teacher Operator Safeguards Attended Continuous Operation Maintenance and Repair Safety Training General Requirements Safeguarding Stages 16

Mechanical limiting devices Non-mechanical limiting devicesPresence-sensing safeguarding devices Fixed barriersInterlocked barrier guards Robot Safeguarding Devices 17

Include physical barriers that incorporate gates equipped with electrical interlocks so that operation of the robot stops when the gate is opened. Include, as a backup to electrical interlocks, motion sensors, light curtains, or floor sensors that stop the robot whenever a worker crosses the barrier. Provide barriers, as may be appropriate, between robotic equipment and any freestanding objects such as posts limiting robot arm movement so that workers cannot get between any part of the robot and the "pinch points." Provide adequate clearance distances around all moving components of the robotic system. NIOSH Recommendations (Publication 85-103) 18

Include remote "diagnostic" instrumentation as much as possible so that the maximum amount of troubleshooting of the system can be done from areas outside the operating range of the robot. Provide adequate illumination in the control and operational areas of the robotic system so that written instructions, as well as buttons, levers, etc., are clearly visible. Include on floors or working surfaces clearly visible marks that indicate the zones of movement of the robot. NIOSH Recommendations (continued) 19

Elimination or Substitution Engineering Controls Awareness Means Training and Procedures – Administrative Personal Protective Equipment Hierarchy of Controls (In Order of Priority) 20

Eliminate human interaction in envelope Eliminate pinch pointsAutomated material handling Elimination or Substitution 21

Mechanical hard stops BarriersInterlocks Presence sensing devicesTwo hand controls Engineering Controls 22

Lights, beacons, strobes Computer warningsSigns Restricted space painted on floorBeepers Horns Labels Awareness Means 23

Safe job procedures Safety equipment inspections Training Lockout/tagout Training and Procedures 24

Safety Glasses Ear Plugs Face Shields Gloves Personal Protective Equipment 25

Slow Moving Emergency StopsUnder Control Teaching Protection 26

Lock-Out and Tag-out Slow Moving Mode Maintenance 27

Current National Standards ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012 CSA Z434-14 (Canadian)Current International StandardsISO 10218-1:2011 Industrial robots ISO 10218-2:2011 Industrial robot systems and integration Technical Reports RIA TR R15.306-2014 – Task-based risk assessment RIA TR R15.406-2014 – Safeguarding RIA TR R15.506-2014 – Existing Applications Robot Safety Standards 28

Industrial robot (Must answer yes to all 5 bullet points) Automatically controlledReprogrammable multipurpose manipulator Programmable in 3 or more axes Can be either fixed in place or mobile For use in industrial automation applications If not yes to all 5, not industrial robot and R15.06 not required For example, warehouse retrieval systems are not industrial robots because they don’t have a multipurpose manipulator Definitions 29

Industrial robot system – System comprising: Industrial robot End-effector(s)Any machinery, equipment, devices, external auxiliary axes or sensors supporting the robot performing its task. Industrial robot cell One or more robot systems including associated machinery and equipment and the associated safeguarded space and protective measures Definitions 30

Give particular consideration to: Intended operations of the robot including teaching, maintenance, setting, and cleaning Unexpected start-upAccess by personnel from all directionsReasonably foreseeable misuse Effect of failure in the control system Hazards associated with the specific robot application Risk Assessment 31

Risks eliminated or reduced first by design or substitution, then by safeguarding and other complementary measures. Residual risks then reduced by other measures warnings,signs, training Risk Assessment – Hierarchy of Controls 32

Robot designed in accordance with principles for relevant hazards Power transmission components guarded Fixed guards attachedMoveable guards interlockedLoss or variation of power not result in a hazard Re-initiation of power not lead to motion (2-step process) Components designed so hazards of breaking, loosening, or releasing stored energy are minimized Design requirements and protective measures 33

Single fault in any of these parts does not lead to the loss of safety function Single fault detected at or before the next demand upon the safety function whenever possibleWhen single fault occurs, safety function is always performed and safe state maintained until the detected fault is corrected All reasonably foreseeable faults shall be detected Functional Safety 34

Comprehensive risk assessment performed on the robot and its intended application may determine an alternate performance is warranted Selection of other performance criteria specifically identified and appropriate limitations and cautions included in the information for use provided with the affected equipment Functional Safety Continued 35

When robot placed under local control, initiation of motion or change of local control selection from any other source is prevented Manual control using the pendant Other teaching devices Pendant is in charge Pendant Controls must have 3-position enabling device Continuously held in center to permit motion Release or fully-depressing stops motion Must be fully released before re-initiation of motion Single point of control 36

Integrator perform a risk assessment to determine the risk reduction measures required to adequately reduce the risks presented by the integrated application Risk assessment enables systematic analysis and evaluation of the risks associated with the robot system over its whole lifecycle Risk assessment included Determination of the limits of the robot system Hazard identification Risk estimation Risk evaluation The user shall be consulted to ensure that all reasonably foreseeable hazardous situations are identified Risk Assessment Needed 37

Required when design does not remove hazards or adequately reduce risks Guards and protective devices can (See RIA TR R15.406): Prevent access to the hazard(s) Cause hazard(s) to cease before access Prevent unintended operation Contain parts and tooling Limit other process hazards Guards or sensitive protective devices used for perimeter safeguarding Selection take into account all the hazards within the safeguarded space Safeguarding 38

Only removable by the use of a tool Perimeter safeguarding not installed closer to the hazard than the restricted space Openings in any fixed guard shall not allow a person to reach over, under, around or through any opening or gap and access a hazardMax opening at bottom 7 inches Minimum height at top 55 inches Moveable guards shall open laterally or away from the hazard, and not into the safeguarded space and bring any hazards to a safe state before an operator can gain access Requirements for Guards 39

RIA TR R15.306 – 2014 Information and guidance only. Not only method of doing.Integrates hierarchy of control methodology Task Based Risk Assessment Methodology 40

Barrier Protected Area 41

Example of Barrier Protection 42

Barrier Protection 43

RIA, www.roboticsonline.com www.osha.gov/SLTC/robotics/index.html STD 01-12-002 – Guidelines for Robotics Safety- www.osha.gov OSHA Technical Manual – Industrial Robots and Robot System Safety - https://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/otm_iv/otm_iv_4.html Preventing Injury of Workers by Robots – NIOSH Publication 85-103 - https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/85-103/ Resources 44

Questions? 45