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NGOs and public service quality in Russia: to resist the de NGOs and public service quality in Russia: to resist the de

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NGOs and public service quality in Russia: to resist the de - PPT Presentation

Professor Lev Yakobson Moscow June 2011 A disquieting picture 10 years after the Grefs program fewer than 40 per cent of the program objectives were achieved What is the present condition of ID: 474920

2011 higher school university higher 2011 university school national research economics

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Slide1

NGOs and public service quality in Russia: to resist the departmental approach

Professor Lev Yakobson

Moscow, June, 2011Slide2

A disquieting picture

10 years after the Gref’s program:

fewer than 40 per cent of the program objectives were achievedWhat is the present condition of:education? Good – 10%, satisfactory – 50%, bad – 36% health care? Good – 5%, satisfactory – 40%, bad – 53% Quality of public officials’ service (perception of those who have applied for certificates etc.): excellent – 4%, good – 26%, satisfactory –44%, bad – 30% Is the level of corruption high or low? High – 83%, low – 7%

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide3

To go beyond the administrative reformThe last decade: improvement of organization structures, regulations and public servants incentives – still in the agenda

The tasks are more doubtful than solutions

The state apparatus as the main

arena of interest representationDepartmental approach to:agenda settingoutputs and outcomes interpretation Do the authorities recognize and take into account the interests of such people as you?- “Yes”-20 per cent, “No”-69 per cent, “Don’t know”-21 per centSlide4

Which of the following rights and freedoms are the most important for you personally? (more than one option could be selected)

Centre

for Studies of Civil Society and Non-for-profit

HSESlide5

Which of the following human rights and freedoms are you sure to posses?

Centre

for Studies of Civil Society and Non-for-profit

HSESlide6

Do you think that associations and other non-government nonprofit organizations should or should not participate, together with the government, in providing social services in education, healthcare, culture etc

.?

6

Russian representative population survey (n = 1600),

Russian survey of NGO leaders (n= 1000),

Survey of Experts at the federal level (n = 303)Slide7

По Вашему мнению, чем могут общественные и другие негосударственные некоммерческие организации в наибольшей степени помочь улучшению ситуации в здравоохранении?

7

Результаты всероссийского репрезентативного опроса населения, проведенного ЛИГО ГУ-ВШЭ (разработка программы исследования, включая инструментарий, анализ полученных данных) и ВЦИОМ (сбор информации) в декабре 2008 года. Объем выборочной совокупности – 1600 чел.Slide8

How do you assess in general the contribution of the public and other non-government and non-commercial

organizations to addressing social issues in

our country?

8

Russian representative population survey (n = 1600),

Russian survey of NGO leaders (n= 1000),

Survey of Experts at the federal level (n = 303)Slide9

The public sector at present: nobody is happy (re

с

ent representative opinion polls)

What is the present condition of:education? Good – 10%, satisfactory – 50%, bad – 36% health care? Good – 5%, satisfactory – 40%, bad – 53% Quality of public officials’ service (perception of those who have applied for certificates etc.):

excellent – 4%, good – 26%, satisfactory –44%, bad – 30%

Is the level of corruption high or low?

High – 83%, low – 7%

Medvedev’s and Putin’s speeches

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide10

The public sector at present: nobody is happy

Typical shortcomings:

nominal equality – huge real inequality (mainly in terms of quality),

disproportions,lack of efficiency incentives,corruption Cost-efficiency could be at least 1.25 times higher(e. g. Е.Г.Ясин и др. Бремя государства и экономическая политика: либеральная альтернатива

. М., 2002)

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide11

Modernization: concentration for a jerk?

10 years after the Gref’s program

(

Стратегия 2010: итоги реализации 10 лет спустя):fewer than 40 per cent of the program objectives were achievedpublic sector is the weakest point (as compared, for instance, to financial sphere)reforms are slow and inconsistentTo narrow field of the reform for breakthrough at a few

decisive

directions?

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide12

Major obstacles: people, balance of interests, institutions?

The most typical view: a battle between good (benevolent, wise) and bad (self-interested, corrupted, short-sighted) guys

A bit less typical view: coalitions for / against modernization (INSOR) →→Shortage of “troops”? → Don’t disperse them over a wide front Let’s imagine: good guys (supporters of modernization) are free to reform the public sector radically within the existing institutions of public governance and management

The role of public governance institutions

Institutions of agenda setting in particular

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide13

Communication

Communication between the society and the authorities: speaking thickly, hard-of-hearing (

Monitoring of the Russian civil society

) → lack of information about particular needs and potential responses to reforms opinion poll (2009): Do the authorities understand and take into account the interests of such people as you? - “Yes” – 20 per cent, “No” – 69 per cent, “Don’t know” – 21 per centConsensus: poor condition of public governance and management

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide14

How did the Government act in the period of the global economic crises?

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide15

Some typical features of implemented and planned reforms

- 1

Strong bias toward specific interests of a particular ministry (governmental agency)

The recent police reform: the purpose – more safety for citizens, the essence of the law– more centralized and better funded policeReduction of a complex problem to particular concern of a ministryShortage of kindergartens and nursery schools. Ministry of education and science: shorter stay – more kids are involved in preschool education (but mothers still can not work)National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide16

Some typical features of implemented and planned reforms

- 2

Bias towards the most visible and easily administered aspects of a problem

Needs of elderly people: relatively fast growth of pensions (including those for employed pensioners) vs. dramatic shortage and low quality of services for most elderly and disabled personsExcessive unification and centralizationMedical insurance reformUnfunded mandates to regional and local authorities The new system of public employees’ salaries National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide17

The departmental approach

Federal ministries and other central agencies are principal actors in:

the agenda setting (recognition and interpretation of major problems, challenges, and opportunities),

working out of the decisions Reforms are structured in accordance with the structure of the Government Adequate treatment of a complex issue is possible if it implies broadening of responsibility of the agency initiating the reform → Usually blocked by other agenciesSocial benefits and costs are taken into account with strong bias to departmental benefits and costsNational Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide18

A case study: the public procurement reform

The System of Public Procurement in Russia:

the Road of Reform

www.hse.ruPrior to 2006: broad discretion → kickbacks as a custom → general indignation → window of opportunity for reformistsCoincidence: the most radical among influential reformists + high-principled executorsThe idea (94-FZ): eliminate any administrative discretionThe dream: almost everything is bought by electronic auctions, potential providers are completely anonymous

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide19

Success?

As a rule,

prequalification

(requirements on suppliers), negotiation and contract correction are prohibited → Unrealistic assumptions: absolutely comprehensive and detailed requirements on every product instant, reliable and costless check of qualityinstant and costless substitution or compensation 19 sets of amendments: “exceptions” instead of diversification of procedures exceptions rather for the most influential departments than for types of goods

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide20

Success?- Corruption

More than a half the cases procurements are made with technical violations of the law (

SU-HSE Monitoring of public procurement

)Selective approach to control: risk of corrupted controllersBusiness: public procurement is not less corrupted than it used to be before Law 94-FZ has been adoptedIn the procurement of COMPLEX products corruption opportunities have been SHIFTED to the stages of planning, development of specifications and order acceptanceNational Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide21

Why it tends to turn out as always - 1

Representation and reconciliation of interests mainly through executive branch → departmental division of labor and responsibility, “assembling” mainly at the very top level (it is called “political”) → departmental vision of the reform agenda as well as benefits and costs → tendencies to:

partial approach (FAS: planning is not our business) → almost inevitable shift of costs and risks

departmental political priorities (FAS : competition vs. reliability)National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide22

Why it tends to turn out as always - 2

The change should be comfortable for the reform-promoting department:

neither reduction of functions nor complication of their implementation (FAS: probably, it make sense to have sophisticated procedures for complex purchases, but one should suggest an easy way to administer such procedures)

Ministry of Finance: struggle for balanced budget → the key point: 94-FZ enables to save some money (often at the expense of quality)National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide23

How a window of opportunity looks like?

How to sell a reform if it is generated inside state apparatus without civil society requirement, advice and pressure?

Strong monopoly on interpretation, excessive role of individual vies

Simple idea linked with major troubles of superiors The Lenin’s (Napoleon’s) approach: let’s get involved into the battle and then we’ll see what to do → “Soft reputation constraint” → both “sellers” and “buyers” of the reform prefer “exclusions” to revision of basic ideas National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide24

Potential outcomes

Successful reform initiated and driven by a department:

real positive changes in the field of the department’s responsibility

strengthening of the department’s administrative powersome loss at other fields Resistance to strengthening and prevention of losses: hard, long and distorting bargaining with other departments → a racer converted into a camel

(rather to mix of different animals)

Reforms are slow and inconsequent (the public procurement reform is a rare example of “a racer”)

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide25

Is the bureaucracy the

only

culprit?

“The receivers” are quite bad, but what is about “the transmitters”?Does “the elite” of a professional community actively promote and defend common interest of the community? - “Yes”:school teachers – 24%, university professors – 13%, doctors – 18%, businessmen and managers – 14%Most people can be trusted – 18%National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide26

SPb, p. 4

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide27

Presentation - 4

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide28

Presentation - 5

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide29

Presentation - 6

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide30

Awareness of NGOs and participation in their activities

Know / heard about some types of NGOs and civil initiatives

Participate in NGOs activities, are members of NGOs

*Basing on results of all-Russian population representative polls (2007-2009)

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide31

Awareness of NGOs and participation in their activities

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide32

What can be done?

Modernization as a jerk under the present circumstances:

to strengthen the federal Government control of resource allocation and institutional development for a number of cavalry raids partially solving some of the most visible problems

The administrative reform - real and partially successful efforts:to limit the numbers of agencies and their functions,to improve regulations of officials’ activity,to strengthen accountability to the higher organs of power The key problem: agenda setting → The key factor: interaction within the Government and between the civil society and the authorities

(

selection of “agenda universe” elements for institutional agenda)

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide33

Is the dialog possible?

Is the Government hostile to the civil society?

“Civil society voices” at the federal level

(nation-wide associations and “elites of professional communities”) are not perceived as adequate representatives of wider group’s interests Факторы развития гражданского общества и механизмыего взаимодействия с государством. М., 2008Enhancing opportunities for optimal agenda setting on regional and local levels Indicators of civil society development

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide34

Russian NGOs: number of paid employees distribution

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide35

Russian NGOs: number of volunteers distribution

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide36

What kind of relationships do you have with…

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide37

Less centralized institutional development vs. standardization

Relatively high level of legally fixed social rights → Limit of diversity and competition

But

Not to accelerate standardization of institutions and concentration of administrative power at the federal levelNow just the opposite, e.g. health careTo involve private sector and NGOs in social service provisionNational Research University Higher School of Economics, 2011Slide38

ljakobson@hse.ru