David Albright. ISIS. November 3, 2013. Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century. Sponsored by the American . Physical Society Forum on Physics/Society & GWU Elliott School. Photo of Natanz, DigitalGlobe. ID: 236113
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Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations
November 3, 2013
Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century
Sponsored by the American
Physical Society Forum on Physics/Society & GWU Elliott SchoolSlide2
Photo of Natanz, DigitalGlobeSlide3
Natanz Plant, September 2002Slide4
Fordow Centrifuge FacilitySlide5
Arak Heavy Water (IR-40) ReactorSlide6
Natanz Pilot Plant IR-1 Centrifuge CascadesSlide8Slide9Slide10Slide11
3.5% LEU Production at
Fuel Enrichment PlantSlide12
Cumulative 3.5% LEU ProductionSlide13Slide14
Taking Stock, August 2013
kg* 2,877 kg
186 kg (in hex form)**
Advanced Centrifuge Deployment: Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)Slide16
Breakout to Enough Weapon-Grade Uranium for a
Estimating Breakout Timelines
plant to make
weapon-grade uranium (WGU),
based on a four
Step, Khan-Type Centrifuge Plant
24 cascades (164 P1s/cascade) make 3.5% LEU--3,936 P1s
8 cascades (164/cascade) make 20% from 3.5%--1,312 P1s
4 cascades (114/cascade) 20 to 60%--456 P1s
2 cascades (64/cascade) 60 to 90%--128 P1s
Total: 38 cascades with 5,832 P1s
Iranian cascades are not ideal and their performance and output is modeled by Houston Wood and Patrick
of Virginia’s Mechanical & Aerospace
Engineering Department in collaboration with ISIS.Slide18
Production of WGU in a Breakout at Declared Enrichment Sites
2009 Nuclear weapons capability achieved
in that Iran has enough IR-1 centrifuges and 3.5 percent LEU (about 1,500 kg 3.5 LEU hexafluoride to produce 25 kg weapon-grade uranium in a breakout in about 4,593 enriching IR-1 centrifuges. It would take longer than six months
August 2012-breakout time
only (IR-1 centrifuges being installed in
with three-step process, 9,330 IR-1 centrifuges, a stock of 91 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, and use of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride (in three-step process)
August 2013-Breakout time with enriching IR-1 centrifuges only is 1.3-2.3 months
, with three step process with 10,092 IR-1 centrifuges, 186 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, and use of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. [3.1-3.5 months with 3.5 percent LEU only, no near 20 percent LEU]
August 2013-Breakout time for scenario using all installed IR-1 centrifuges is 1.0 to 1.6 months
with three step process as above but with 18,454 IR-1 installed centrifuges and 186 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. [1-9-2.2 months with 3.5% LEU only and no near 20% LEU]
methods changed somewhat from Fall 2012 estimates to fall 2013 estimatesSlide19
Key Questions for Negotiations
How to extend breakout times?
How to cap the Iranian centrifuge program and ensure that it will not expand during the next 5-10 years?
How to increase the chance of finding a secret centrifuge
or plutonium separation plant? How to establish adequate transparency in general, including Iran addressing the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons efforts?
How to trade Iranian concessions for sanctions relief?
The United States anticipates obtaining an interim agreement followed several months later by a long-term agreement that will verifiably ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons.
What will an interim deal look like?Slide20
Minimal Goals of an Interim Agreement
Stopping production of near 20 percent LEU; mothballing or disabling 6 cascades involved in making near 20 percent LEU at
Reducing stocks of near 20 percent LEU, particularly those in hexafluoride form
Achieving the principle that Iran’s centrifuge program would be capped to below a certain size for the long term. Initially, there should be freezes in the numbers of installed and enriching centrifuges.
Cancelling the Arak heavy water reactor project
Developing a baseline of information about Iran’s gas centrifuge program, including its centrifuge manufacturing complex, a detailed declaration of any centrifuge plants under construction or planned, and Iran’s total inventory of centrifuges
Expanding IAEA monitoring, including remote camera monitoring of centrifuge plants and implementation of early notification of construction of new facilities (code 3.1)
Ensuring that Iran understands that significant sanctions relief requires that Iran address fully and cooperatively the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s alleged past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons.Slide21
Alleged Military Dimensions
IAEA has considerable evidence of Iranian work on nuclear weapons prior to 2004 and some evidence suggesting that some of that work continued afterward and may continue today.
Western intelligence agencies are united in assessing with high confidence that Iran had a nuclear weapon program prior to 2004. They are less united about any such work after 2004.
There is general agreement that the Iranian regime has not decided to build a nuclear weapon. There is less agreement whether Iran will refrain from building a
weapon in the future
Little hope of significant sanctions relief if Iran does not come clean about its past activities and address cooperatively and fully the IAEA’s concerns.Slide22
Visits Associated with Resolving Concerns about Military Dimensions
Iran will need to allow the IAEA to visit several
sites and interview a range of experts and officials
in order to address their concerns.
The IAEA has identified several sites to Iran, but so far
refused the IAEA’s requests to visit these particular sites.
involves workshops that were involved in making mock-ups of missile re-entry vehicles suitable to hold a nuclear warhead.
of those is a site at the
military complex that is alleged to have been involved in undertaking high explosive tests related to the development of nuclear weapons
the IAEA asked to visit
this site early
2012, Iran undertook extensive excavation and reconstruction at this site, compromising the IAEA’s ability to settle this issue.
Iran will need to address the
issue to the satisfaction of the IAEA, which will inevitably involve more than simply allowing a
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