Second Battle - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Second Battle of Bull Run

August 28–30,

1862

Confederate

General

Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson captured the Union supply depot at Manassas Junction, threatening

the Union’s

ability to communicate

with Washington, D.C.Slide2

Proximity to Washington,

DCSlide3

“Stonewall” Jackson at Manassas National BattlefieldSlide4

Results of Second Bull Run

Pope retreated and this

battle

allowed

Lee and his men to drive into Maryland to begin the war in the

North.

The Confederates won a decisive battle

resulting in 10,000

casualties.

The Union army was not destroyed. Pope was relieved of his command as a result of the loss,

and again

sent

to the Western territories.

Pope’s remaining troops merged with McClellan’s Army of the Potomac. Slide5

Railroad at Manassas JunctionSlide6

Outcomes of Bull Run

Pope – ordered troops to destroy

whatever economic resources of the enemy they could not take away.

An

assault upon the Confederate economy and upon the populace supporting the Confederacy was

implied by Pope's

orders to his troops.

Seizure

of civilian property as "contraband of war," formerly a punishable act, was

encouraged.

This economic assault laid a foundation for future destruction of the South’s infrastructure. Slide7

Antietam BridgeSlide8

Antietam – September 17, 1862

McClellan lost 1/6

th

of his Army, but “won” a victory, by halting Lee’s invasion of

Maryland

McClellan’s overly cautious approach cost a more decisive victory over Lee. McClellan continued to overestimate Confederate troops numbers, leading to an approach of “not losing rather than winning”

First

major battle on Union

soil

Single bloodiest day in American history with losses of 22,717Slide9

Antietam

Colonel Ezra Carman, who survived that bloody field and later wrote the most detailed tactical study of the fighting there, had it right when he observed that on September 17, 1862, “more errors were committed by the Union commander than in any other battle of the war.”

5,500 soldiers perished at Bloody Lane in three hours of fighting, with no decisive victory for either sideSlide10

Dead at Bloody Lane, AntietamSlide11

Union Strategy

B

lockading

Confederate ports to cut off cotton exports and prevent the import of manufactured goods; and using ground and naval forces to divide the Confederacy into three distinct

theaters

(or areas)

Ridiculed

in the press as the "Anaconda Plan," after the South American snake that crushes its prey to death, this strategy ultimately proved successful. Slide12

Scott’s Anaconda Plan IllustratedSlide13
Slide14

Emancipation Proclamation

I

t

speaks of emancipation as a matter of "military necessity" and only once as "an act of justice."

It

exempted the slaves of the border states and the occupied military districts of the South, and its language is

muted

and legalistic.

Lincoln

knew

that his presidential `war powers' only ran as far as actual warfare ran, and neither the border states nor the occupied districts were at war with federal authority on January 1, 1863. Slide15
Slide16

Emancipation Proclamation

Making the proclamation legally challenge-proof forced

Lincoln

to restrain "my oft expressed personal wish that all men every where could be free," as well as muting any flights of eloquence about justice.

The Proclamation

not only provided the legal title to freedom that slaves could claim once the Union armies arrived, it also opened the gates to the enlistment of black soldiers in the Union army. And once in the uniform of the Union, Lincoln could no longer keep up the pretense of denying blacks equal civil rights. "As I live," Lincoln promised a crowd of jubilant blacks in Richmond in April, 1865, "no one shall put a shackle on your limbs, and you shall have all the rights which God has given to every other free citizen of this Republic."Slide17