Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophycouk Michael Lacewing Substance dualism Substance dualism minds are not bodies not parts of bodies nor properties of bodies but distinct substances ID: 644496
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Slide1
Substance dualism: can mind and body interact?
Michael Lacewingenquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk
© Michael LacewingSlide2
Substance dualism
Substance dualism: minds are not bodies, not parts of bodies, nor properties of bodies, but distinct substancesCartesian dualism: Minds can exist independent of bodies
Mental
properties are properties of a mental
substanceThe mind is just thought, not in space; matter is just extension, in space
© Michael LacewingSlide3
Mental causation
Mental causation: thoughts, desires and other psychological states cause both other mental states and changes in the body (e.g. movement)
The problem:
could the mind/mental states causally
affect the body, and vice-versa, and if so, how?
© Michael LacewingSlide4
The conceptual interaction problem
Given that the mind is not in space and has no physical force, how is it
possible
that it could affect the body, which is in space and is moved by physical forces?
Princess ElisabethPhysical things only move if they are pushed.
Only something that is extended and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force.
But the mind has no extension, so it can’t touch the body.
Therefore, the mind cannot move the body
.
© Michael LacewingSlide5
Development
Reply: This isn’t an accurate account of why things moveE.g. force of gravity doesn’t need contact
The
movement of a physical object is only initiated by some physical force, exerted at some point in space.
If dualism is true, then the mind is not in space and cannot exert any physical force.Therefore, if dualism is
true,
the mind cannot cause (any part of) the body to move
.
The mind can cause the body to move.
Therefore, dualism is false
.
© Michael LacewingSlide6
The empirical interaction problem
Does the claim that the mind causes physical changes be made compatible with what we know empirically?
The
law of the conservation of
energy:
in any closed system, the total amount of energy in that system remains unchanged.
The universe is a closed system.
Therefore,
total amount of energy in the universe remains unchanged.
© Michael LacewingSlide7
Conservation of energy
If the mind, as a non-physical substance, could move the body, the total amount of energy in the universe would increase.Therefore, if the mind could move the body, the law of the conservation of energy would not apply to the universe, and the universe is not a closed system.
Therefore, because
the mind, which changes the physical energy in the universe, is not itself physical, physics cannot give us the complete, correct account of physical energy in the universe. Physics is
not only wrong about what exists, it is wrong about what exists physically! It is wrong
to think that physical movement can only be caused by a physical force
.
© Michael LacewingSlide8
Neuroscience
Objection: Movements of the body are caused by physical events in the brain.We have no evidence of the mind changing what happens in the brain.
Reply: we have no evidence that the mind does
not
change what happens in the brainIf dualism is true, then some brain events have no physical causeThe empirical evidence is not against dualism© Michael LacewingSlide9
Epiphenomenalist substance dualism
Perhaps substance dualism is true, but there is no mental causationThis is epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is
very
counterintuitiveEpiphenomenalism can’t explain self-knowledgeI know I am in pain, because my belief that I am in pain is caused by my pain.If epiphenomenalism is true, my pain causes nothing.If epiphenomenalism is true, I will believe that I am in pain if my brain processes are the same, even if I am not in pain.
So if epiphenomenalism is true, my belief that I am in pain is unreliable, and not knowledge.
© Michael Lacewing