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Yet systemic and leadership-based explanations inadequately address tw Yet systemic and leadership-based explanations inadequately address tw

Yet systemic and leadership-based explanations inadequately address tw - PDF document

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Yet systemic and leadership-based explanations inadequately address tw - PPT Presentation

inherent in gargantuan bureaucraciesThese factors increased economic andtechnological gaps between the Soviet Union and the capitalist WestTo bridge thisgapsystemic reforms were neededThese reform ID: 174973

inherent gargantuan bureaucracies.These factors

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Yet systemic and leadership-based explanations inadequately address two key setsofquestions.First,why did the physical break-up begin towards the end ofthe1980s and the Soviet Union Þnally collapse in 1991? Why only in the mid-1980s didthe Soviet leaders acknowledge the impossibility ofsustaining their economic andforeign policies? Though the Soviet economy had deteriorated in the 1980s,it wasnot on the verge ofan immediate breakdown.Moreover,in the 1970s and 1980s,theSoviets were,for the Þrst time,on military parity with the United States.Second,why did the Soviet leaders tolerate the non-Russian secessionistmovements? Why did they not employ the Soviet Army to suppress these movementsas they had done in Czechoslovakia (1968),Hungary (1956),and East GermanyTilly attributes the breakdown ofempires to major external or internal wars.Heobserves that between 1986 and 1992,the Soviet Union went through:[O]ne ofEuropeÕs more peculiar revolutions:the shattering ofan empire and the dismantlingofits central structure without the direct impact ofa war...the costly stalemate inAfghanistan,itselfa product ofa hugely expensive Cold War with the United States,provided the closest equivalentto those earlier empire-ending wars..Yet,Tilly does not explain the etiology ofthe breakdown.We begin where Tilly leftoff.Most scholars typically have viewed the Afghanistan war as a minor andcontainable conßict that had minimal impact on the basic institutions ofthe Sovietsystem.However,we view this war as one ofthe key causes,along with systemic andleadership-based factors,in the disintegration ofthe Soviet Union.The repeatedfailures in this war changed the Soviet leadershipÕs perception ofthe efÞcacy ofusing force to keep non-Soviet nationalities within the Union (perception effectsdevastated the morale and legitimacy ofthe army (military effects),disruptedlegitimacy effects),and accelerated glasnost glasnost effectsThese effects operated synergistically.War failures weakened the military andconservative anti-reform forces and accelerated glasnostperestroika.Import-antly,these failures demonstrated that the Soviet army was not invincible,therebyencouraging non-Russian republics to push for independence with little fear ofaThis article has three parts.First,we brießy review the literature on the SovietUnionÕs breakdown.Next,we outline the role ofthe Afghanistan war in the break-down ofthe Soviet Union and provide evidence in support ofour contention.Finally,we present the conclusions ofthis essay.Existing explanations ofthe Soviet UnionÕs breakdown According to systemic explanations,the Soviet system ofthe 1970s was facing asevere crisis due to inefÞcient central planning and principal-agent problemsRafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashThough Soviet leaders did view the Star Wars programme as threatening this parity.Charles Tilly,European Revolutions,1492Ð1992(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),p.231.On principal-agent problems leading to governmental failures,see Charles Wolf,Jr.,ÔA Theory ofNon- Market FailuresÕ,Journal ofLaw and Economics,22 (1979). inherent in gargantuan bureaucracies.These factors increased economic andtechnological gaps between the Soviet Union and the capitalist West.To bridge thisgap,systemic reforms were needed.These reforms,once initiated,spun out ofcontrol and led to the breakdown ofthe Soviet Union.Fukuyama asserts that the collapse ofthe Soviet Union was inevitable given theinherent superiority ofdemocracy over totalitarianism and ofcapitalism and freemarkets over communism and centralized planning.Others argue that in the 1980s,the Soviet economy had stopped growing almost entirely and that economic impera-tives led to its collapse.Since the Soviet economy could not meet the demand forconsumer goods from the rising urban middle class,it began losing their support.Incremental economic and political reforms were sabotaged by an alliance ofcorrupt central and regional leaders.Perestroika,a large-scale systemic reform,wasinitiated to overcome these obstacles.However,it turned into a Frankenstein,causing the breakdown ofthe Soviet Union.Other systemic explanations emphasize the high costs that the Cold War imposedon the Soviet Union.For example,Ikle argues that the ÔSoviet system,in harnesswith communism,destroyed the Soviet economy and thus hastened the self-destruction ofthe Soviet empireÕ.Other scholars argue that the Soviet Empire wasoverstretched,emphasizing the large military forces required to hold it,the economicburden associated with subsidizing the Eastern European economies,the cost ofcurbing unrest in Eastern Europe,and the Þnancial support provided to third worldcountries.Finally,some scholars attribute the collapse to internal ethnic tensions.glasnostpermitted some freedom,secessionist voices grew stronger.Secession-ists perceived MoscowÕs attempts to accommodate their demands as a sign ofMoscowÕs weakness,and choosing to exploit this weakness,they demandedindependence.The Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionFor example,Dallin and Lapidus observe that Ôthe [Soviet] system was [already] on the threshold ofmajor crisis.ÕSee,A.Dallin and G.Lapidus,ÔThe Roots ofPerestroikaÕ,in A.Dallin and G.Lapidus(eds.),The Soviet System in Crisis:A Reader ofWestern and Soviet Views(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1991),p.9.For the role ofinternational factors see,Jack Snyder,ÔThe Gorbachev Revolution:A Waning ofSoviet Expansionism?Õ,12 (Winter,1987Ð8);Jack Snyder,ÔInternationalLeverage on Soviet Domestic ChangeÕ,World Politics,41 (October,1989);and Daniel Deudney andG.John Ikenberry,ÔThe International Sources ofSoviet ChangeÕ,,16 (Winter1991Ð2).For domestic factors see,S.Bialer,ÔDomestic and International Factors in the Formationson GorbachevÕs Reforms,Õin A.Dallin and G.Lapidus (eds.),The Soviet System in Crisis,A Reader ofWestern and Soviet Views(San Francisco,CA:Westview Press,1991).Francis Fukuyama,The End ofHistory and the Last Man(New York:Free Press,1992).M.Kort,The Rise and Fall ofthe Soviet Union(New York:Franklin Watts,1992).Timothy Colton,The Dilemma ofReform in the Soviet Union(New York:Council on ForeignRelations,1986).Casper Weinberger,Fighting for Peace:Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon(New York:Warner,1990);Richard K.Herrmann,ÔSoviet Behavior in Regional ConßictsÕ,World Politics,44 (April,Charles Ikle,ÔComrades in Arms:The Case for RussianÐAmerican Defense CommunityÕ,National Interest,26 (Winter,1992),p.28.Bunce,ÔThe Soviet Union under GorbachevÕ,pp.224Ð5,Bialer,ÔGorbachevÕs ReformsÕ,pp.34Ð5,Miller,ÔRealizing PerestroikaÕ,pp.242Ð3,Franzke,J.ÔAn Empire Under the Red Banner:Considerations About the End ofthe USSRÕ,WeltTrends,6 (1995),pp.55Ð75.Helene Carrere dÕEncausse,The End ofthe Soviet Empire:The Triumph ofthe Nations(New York:Basic Books,1993);Miller,ÔRealizing PerestroikaÕ;Daniel Klenbort,ÔOn Soviet CommunismÕ,National Interest,32 (Summer,1993),p.107. Leadership-based explanations focus on the roles ofGorbachev and his team inthe breakdown.The crux ofthis argument is that the Soviet system was basicallystable and could have lasted for a longer time,were it not for the policies ofSovietleaders.As the former US Secretary ofState James Baker put it,this transformationÔwould not have begun were it not for him [Gorbachev]Õ.Some leadership-basedexplanations also focus on the roles ofnon-political elites such as Soviet epistemiccommunities,which,in a symbiotic relationship with political leaders,contributed tokey policy changes.However,as suggested previously,such explanations are under-speciÞed in that they fail to address two critical questions.First,why did thedisintegration ofthe Soviet Union begin towards the end ofthe 1980s? Second,whyonly in the mid-1980s did the Soviet leaders acknowledge the impossibility ofsustaining their economic and foreign policies?The Afghanistan war and the Soviet collapse Major wars critically impact domestic politics by producing durable social changesand by redistributing political power among groups.An established literatureexplains how major wars may make as well as break states.Surprisingly,the extantexplanations on the Soviet breakdown underemphasize the impact oftheAfghanistan war.The Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979.In retrospect,it wasunthinkable in 1979 that the Soviet empire could collapse,let alone fall apart almostwithin a decade.Though the Afghanistan war initially was visualized by Sovietleaders as a small-scale intervention,it grew into a decade-long war involving nearlyone million Soviet soldiers,killing and injuring some tens ofthousands ofthem.Rafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashHannes Adomeit,ÔGorbachev,German UniÞcation,and the Collapse ofEmpireÕ,Post Soviet Affairs10 (1994),pp.197Ð230.Quoted in Charles W.Kegley Jr.,ÔHow did the Cold War Die? Principles for an AutopsyÕ,MershonInternational Studies Review,38 (1994),p.23.Mendelson,ÔInternal Battles and External WarsÕ.Jack Goldstone,ÔTheories ofRevolution:The Third GenerationÕ,World Politics,32 (1980),pp.425Ð53;Robert Higgs,Crisis and Leviathan:Critical Episodes in the Growth ofAmerican Government(Oxford:Oxford University Press,1987);Theda Skocpol,Protecting Soldiers and Mothers:ThePolitical Origins ofSocial Policy in the United States(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1992);William R.Thompson,ÔThe Consequences ofWarÕ,International Interactions,19 (1993),pp.125Ð47;Bueno De Mesquita and D.Lalman,War and Reason(New Haven,CT:Yale UniversityPress,1992).Bueno De Mesquita,B.R.Siverson,and G.Woller,ÔWar and the Fate ofRegimes:A ComparativeAnalysisÕ,American Political Science Review,86,pp.638Ð46.J.DeNardo,Power in Numbers:ThePolitical Strategy ofProtest and Rebellion(Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1985);A.The Price ofPower:Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain France and GermanyUnwin Hyman,1991);Tilly,ÔEuropean RevolutionsÕ;Bruce D.Porter,War and the Rise ofthe State:The Military Foundation ofModern Politics(New York:The Free Press,1994).Some scholars have compared this war to the Vietnam war.See O.L.Sarin and Lev Dvoretsky,Afghan Syndrome:The Soviet UnionsÕVietnam(Presidio,CA:1993).However,few,ifany,haveidentiÞed it as one ofthe key causes for the breakdown ofthe Soviet Union.Noorte Haal,January 24,1989,the newspaper ofthe Estonian Komsomol estimated 50,000 dead and150,000 injured.See also V.Konovalov,ÔLegacy ofthe Afghan War:Some StatisticsÕ,Radio LibertyReport on the USSR 1,(#14,1989),p.3.Konovalov notes that Soviet ofÞcial statistics report 15,000dead,37,000 wounded,and 313 missing.The number ofSoviet casualties is debated.R.B.Rais,WarWithout Winners:Afghanistan Uncertain Transition After the Cold War (Oxford:Oxford University During the early 1980s,the ofÞcial Soviet media maintained that the AfghanistanGovernment had requested Soviet military assistance for humanitarian and non-combat tasks.Notwithstanding the media censorship,as the conßict escalated,andwell before Gorbachev became the General Secretary ofthe Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU),stories about combat casualties and the problems ofdisabled soldiers began appearing in spite ofcensorship.Gorbachev,as the Secretary for Ideological Affairs under General SecretaryChernenko,probably was not a participant in the decision processes leading to thisintervention.He became General Secretary ofthe CPSU in 1985,roughly halfwaythrough the Afghanistan war.We identify two phases in GorbachevÕs policiestowards the Afghanistan war and systemic reforms.In the Þrst phase (summer 1984to summer 1986),Gorbachev appeared to follow the policies ofhis predecessors onAfghanistan.To turn the tide ofthe war militarily,he named General MikhailZaitsev,one ofthe most illustrious Generals,to oversee the Soviet war efforts.the domestic level,while Gorbachev mentioned the need for reforms,he did notWe view 1986 as the turning point in the Afghanistan war and,accordingly,asmarking the second phase ofGorbachevÕs reform agenda.In 1986,the Mujaheddin(Afghan freedom Þghters),now well armed with US-supplied surface-to-air missiles,rockets,mortars,and communication equipment,won many confrontations with theSoviet army.As successful ambushes ofSoviet convoys became a daily pheno-menon,the number ofSoviet casualties mounted,the number ofdisabled soldiersseen in Soviet cities grew substantially,and the war veterans (Afgantsyincreas-ingly became part ofthe Soviet urban landscape.Since many Afgantsythe non-Russian nationalities,opposition to the war from citizens in non-RussianSoviet republics increased.Since their presence often was not acknowledged by theauthorities,who wished to play down Soviet involvement in Afghanistan,theseAfgantsybecame bitter and openly critical ofthe Soviet leaders.The Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionPress,1994),pp.116,lists 30,000 dead in January 1986.D.Tripathi,ÔAfghanistan:the last episode?ÕThe World Today,48 (1992),pp.10Ð12 lists 30,000 casualties.A.Heinamaa,L.Maija and Y.Yurchenko,The SoldierÕs Story:Soviet Veterans Remember the Afghan War(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCalifornia,IAS,1994),pp.ix,mention 100,000 dead.Sarin and Dvoretsky,p.146 report 13,833dead,330 missing,and 49,985 wounded.T.Rogers,The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan:Analysisand Chronology(Westport,CT:Greenwood Press,1992),p.55,lists 15,000 dead.W.L.Grau (ed.),The Bear Went Over the Mountain:Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (London:Frank Cass,1998),pp.xiv,lists 15,000 dead and 469,685 sick and wounded.On Afghan casualties,see also ÔCongress Discusses Afghan WarÕ,Moscow Television Service,June2,1989,translated in FBIS-SOV 89Ð106Ðs,June 5,1989;Edward Shevardnadze,ÔStatement by SovietForeign Minister Edward Shevardnadze at the International Conference,Vladivostok,September 4,International Affairs(November,1990).Kamrany and Killian report that one million Afghanswere killed and refugees numbered six million,p.146.See Nake M.Kamrany,and David T.Killian,ÔEffects ofAfghanistan War on Soviet Society and PolicyÕ,International Journal ofSocial Economics19 (1992),pp.129Ð51.Stories about the war appeared in the army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezdaon March 12 and 23,1983,and about war casualties on January 7 and 8,1984.See Oliver Roy,ÔThe Lessons ofthe SovietAfghan WarÕ,Adelphi Papers,259 (London:The Institute for Strategic Studies,1991).Cynthia Roberts,in Soviet Foreign Policy:Setting the Record Straight? Report on the USSR1,(#50,1989).Washington Post,April 17,1988,p.A 30.Selig Harrison,ÔInside the Afghan TalksÕ,Foreign Policy,72 (Fall 1988);Washington Post,April 17,1988,p.A 30;November 16,1992,p.A1;Mendelson,fn.26Ð31.Note that AfganetsAfgantsyis plural. By late 1986,the Afghanistan war had signiÞcantly impacted on Soviet domesticpolitics.Anti-militarism became strong in the non-Russian Soviet republics.Fornon-Russians,the war became a unifying symbol oftheir opposition to MoscowÕsrule.The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan signalled Soviet military weaknessand demonstrated that the army was vulnerable.By 1988,the war had changed theperceptions ofSoviet leaders regarding the efÞcacy ofusing military force to holdthe disintegrating country together.This war also discredited the Soviet army.Since the Soviet army was the glue thatheld the diverse Soviet Republics together,its defeat in Afghanistan had profoundimplications for the survivability ofthe Soviet Union.Corruption,looting,andplundering by Soviet soldiers destroyed the armyÕs moral legitimacy.The ethnic splitin the army was accentuated when non-Russian soldiers,particularly those fromAsian regions,displayed ambivalence toward Þghting Afghans,deserted,and evenrevolted.Drug abuse was rising and,worse still,soldiers sold equipment to theMujaheddin to obtain drugs,food,and electronic goods.We categorize the warÕs effects into four types:(1) Perception effects;(2) Militaryeffects;(3) Legitimacy effects;and (4) effects.These categories are notequally important in explaining the impact ofthe Afghanistan war on Soviet politicsand hence on Soviet breakdown.We consider the Perception and Military effects asbeing most important followed by Legitimacy effects,and Þnally effects.The Perception and Military effects refer to the discrediting ofthe Soviet army,perhaps the most important institution for holding the diverse country together,andto the changed Soviet leadershipÕs perception on the efÞcacy ofemploying the armyto quell secessionist movements in non-Russian republics.In particular,the Afgantsyplayed a key role in discrediting the army.Legitimacy effects describe the weakeningofthe armyÕs and the countryÕs internal cohesion.Finally,effects refer tothe impact ofthe war on accelerating glasnostby emboldening the media to reportnon-ofÞcial war stories,thereby widening cleavages among various organs oftheSoviet state.Perception effectsSoviet leaders before Gorbachev believed that they could,and should,employ themilitary to hold together their diverse country.In early 1983,while defending theSoviet UnionÕs military involvement in Afghanistan,Andropov,CPSUÕs GeneralSecretary,observed that:Ôit took almost the entire Red Army Þfteen years to subduethe rebellious khanates in the Soviet republics ofUzbekistan,Tajikistan andKirgizstanÕ.The Afghanistan war changed the Soviet leadershipÕs perception oftheefÞcacy ofholding their diverse country together by using military force.Rafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashDaria Fane,ÔAfter Afghanistan:The Decline ofSoviet Military PrestigeÕ,The Washington QuarterlySpring 1990;A.Alexiev,ÔInside the Soviet ArmyÑAfghanistanÕ,Report No.3627,The RandCorporation,Santa Monica (1988).Michael Dobbs,ÔThe Afghan Archive:Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End ofWarÕ,Washington Post,November 16 (1992),p.A16. From 1979 to 1986,the war was portrayed by the Soviet media and leadership asan Ôinternational dutyÕ,and exercise in Ôgood neighborlinessÕ.OfÞcially,the war inAfghanistan did not exist.February 1986 marks a turning point in the ofÞcialportrayal ofthe war.Gorbachev,in his address to the CPSUÕs Twenty-SeventhCongress,characterized the Afghanistan war as a Ôbleeding woundÕ.Later thatyear,Shevardnadze referred to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a ÔsinÕ.As the full story ofthe war unfolded,Soviet political leaders began distancingthemselves from the decision to intervene in Afghanistan.They tried scapegoatingthe army and Ôthe geriatric leadership ofthe previous regimeÕ.In January,1988,Shevardnadze told Pravda:Ônot having chosen this legacy for ourselves [but]accepting it for what it is,we are also obliged to take decisions as to how to dealwith it from here onÕ.In October 1989,in a speech to the Supreme Soviet,Shevardnadze,for the secondtime,argued that Gorbachev and he Ôhappened to be togetherÕwhen Soviet troopswent into Afghanistan and that they Ôlearned about it from radio and newspaperreportsÕ.In a signiÞcant move,in December,1989,the Congress ofPeopleÕsDeputies condemned both the intervention in Afghanistan and the leaders whomade that decision.In January 1990,Shevardnadze most clearly linked thewithdrawal from Afghanistan (and unveiling the fallacy ofusing military force) toperestroika.He noted:Ôthe deliverance ofour country from the oppres-sive moral and material burden ofinvolvement in the Afghan war is one ofthebiggest international achievements ofperestroikaÕ.In an interview in 1992,hemost explicitly linked the start ofSoviet reforms to the Afghanistan war:ÔThedecision to leave Afghanistan [taken on November 13,1986] was the Þrst and mostdifÞcult step ...everything else ßowed from thatom thatThe Soviet state had always brutally suppressed secessionist movements,irres-pective ofthe material and human costs.Prior to the Afghanistan war,pro-secessionleaders in the non-Russian Soviet republics perceived the Soviet leadership as havingthe will and the ability to employ the military to crush them.The Afghanistan warchanged this perception.Since both the will and the ability ofthe leadership wereunder a cloud,non-Russian movements were emboldened to openly preachsecession.In July 1988,Bennigsen observed that:It would be demonstrated that Soviet might was not invincible and that resistance is possible.What are the Afghans for Central Asia? It is a small,wild and poor country.So then,iftheAfghans could inßict a military and political defeat,then that makes anything possible.Andeveryone in Central Asia knows that.I think that in Soviet Russia they know it too.The Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionA.Trehub,ÔSoviet Press Coverage ofthe War in Afghanistan:From Cheerleading toReport on the USSR,1 (# 10,1989),p.2.Ibid.,p.2.Kamrany and Killian,ÔEffects ofAfghanistan WarÕ,p.129.Ibid.,pp.129.T.H.Rigby,ÔThe Afghan Conßict and Soviet Domestic PoliticsÕ,in J.W.Lamare (ed.),Crisis and Domestic Politics:Major Political Conßicts in the 1980s(Westport,CT:Praeger,1991),pp.137Ð149,at p.144.Roberts,ÔGlasnostÕ,p.4.Edward Shevardnadze,ÔTo International AffairsReadersÕ,International Affairs,January 1990,p.12.Dobbs,ÔThe Afghan ArchiveÕ,1992,p.A16.Zhores Medvedev,ÔOne More Year ofPerestroikaÕ,International Affairs(August 1990),pp.76Ð7;Fane,ÔAfter AfghanistanÕ,p.9.Radio Liberty Research,ÔPamiati A.Bennigsen (1913Ð1988)Õ,58/88 (July 5,1988),p.6. And indeed,a few weeks after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in February1989,the Lithuanian democratic movement,Sajudis,declared that its goal was fullindependence from Moscow.The Afghanistan war also accentuated ethnic unrest within the Soviet Army.Evenin the early 1980s,the reliability ofCentral Asian soldiers was questioned and theywere often removed from active combat duties in Afghanistan.When they servedcombat duties,the Generals perceived them as being soft on Afghan civilians.Forexample,on September 12,1985,following the execution ofan Afghan civilian,there was an ethnic mutiny in the Dasht-I Abdan base near the city ofKunduz inthe northern part ofAfghanistan.The Central Asian troops Þred at the Russiansand Ôsome 450 people from both sides ...[and] 500 military vehicles were entirelydestroyed.ÕMoreover,the Soviet army was not a volunteer army,and the bulk ofits soldierswere draftees.Though draft-dodging was a serious crime in the Soviet Union,war-inspired anti-militarism and draft resistance became common across the non-Russian Republics.For example,Usmankhodzhaev,the Uzbekt party chief,toldreporters in 1987 that hundreds ofKomsomol members in Uzbekistan had beenprosecuted for draft-dodging.In December 1987,Petkel,the local KGB Chief,addressing the Central Tajik Committee,labeled the Tajik radical Muslims as agentsofthe enemy from Afghanistan and identiÞed them as the main cause ofdraftavoidance.Other incidents ofanti-militarism were reported as well.In Lithuania,manyrefused the autumn 1989 call-up;in Georgia,the 1989 call-up resulted in massprotests;and in Latvia,groups regularly staged protests outside army bases,carry-ing posters with slogans such as ÔUSSR armed forces are occupation forcesÕ,andÔOccupiers out ofLatviaÕ.To summarize,the Afghanistan war changed the Soviet leadersÕperceptions aboutthe efÞcacy ofemploying troops to suppress non-Russian secessionist movements.Itaccentuated ethnic strife within the army,especially the resentment ofAsiannationalities towards their being used to suppress their ethnic kin in Afghanistan.Asa result,Soviet leaders no longer considered their army to be reliable for suppressingsecessionist movements.Military effectsIn the Soviet Union the security forces,particularly the army,were key players indomestic politics.Due to its heroic role in World War II the Soviet army was acherished institution.It was a microcosm ofthe Soviet society,drawing soldiersRafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashBohdan Nahaylo,ÔWhen Ivan Comes Marching Home:The Domestic Impact ofthe War inAfghanistanÕ,,20 (1987),p 15.T.Kuzio,ÔEthnic Problems in the Soviet ArmyÕ,Soviet Analyst,4 December (1985),p.2.Bohdan Nahaylo,ÔWhen Ivan Comes Marching Home:The Domestic Impact ofthe War inAfghanistanÕ,,20 (1987),pp.15Ð18.Rigby,ÔThe Afghan ConßictÕ,p.146.ÔProblems ofLithuanian ConscriptsÕ,Radio Vilnius,November 10,1989 (see FBIS).Fane,pp.7Ð8.Krasnaya Zvezda,August 1989(FBIS,September 11,1989). from diverse nationalities.The army was viewed as the main defender ofcom-munism,a key function in an ideologically-charged society.Importantly,it was theglue that held together diverse ethnic groups,primarily because it was perceived asbeing invincible.The armyÕs poor performance in Afghanistan was therefore shock-ing for soldiers,generals,party cadres,and ordinary citizens.Since the military wasan important pillar ofthe anti-perestroikacamp,the reverses in Afghanistanweakened anti-reformists,hastened perestroika,and facilitated the collapse oftheSince a major focus ofperestroikaglasnostwas the demilitarization ofSovietsociety,the war emerged as a rallying point against the military.The poor perform-ance ofthe Soviet army in Afghanistan and the large number ofSoviet casualtiesfuelled demands to change the militaryÕs role.Responding to such pressures,somegenerals reluctantly accepted a part ofthe collective guilt.For instance,in mid-1988,Major General Tsagolov admitted that Ôwe became the victims ofour ownThe March 1989 elections to the Supreme Soviet demonstrated thediminished clout ofthe army;some high ranking ofÞcers failed to get elected whilesome oftheir radical critics were elected.A celebrated case was that ofVictorPodziruk,an anti-militarist,who defeated the Commander-in-chiefofthe Sovietforces in Germany.In late 1989,the Congress ofPeopleÕs Deputies established a commission toinquire into the causes and consequences ofthe Afghanistan war.Thus,thehallowed institution ofthe army now had its performance evaluated by a civilianbody.The generals,reeling under criticism,joined in this debate.This wasunprecedented because in the past the army had seldom felt the need to justify itspolicies and actions.The generals complained that the war was being used as pretextto embarrass them.General Gromov,a war veteran,and subsequently the DeputyInterior Minister,observed:Currently a number ofarticles in the central press,in the magazine Ogonek,the weeklySobesednik,Komsomolskaya Pravda,and the program ÔVzglyadÕare in general trying to drivea wedge between the Army and society.The sorest ofsore pointsÑthe war in AfghanistanÑhas been selected for this purpose [italics and quotes in original].Similarly,General Varenikov,the Commander-in-Chiefofthe ground forces andthe Deputy Minister ofDefence,and Colonel General Volkogonov,the Head oftheInstitute ofMilitary History,claimed that the army opposed the intervention inGeneral Gareyev,while defending the Soviet Army,argued:I can say,judging by my own experience in Afghanistan in 1989Ð90 (after the withdrawal ofour forces),that the chiefmilitary adviserÕs reports practically never reached the desk ofthetop political leaders who preferred to be satisÞed with the appropriately truncated informationand reports from other departments ...The political leadership must have the courage to holdthemselves responsible for their own actions,rather than pass them back to others.The Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionK.M.Tsagolov,ÔAfghanistan-PredvaritelÕnye ItogiÕ,Ogonek,30 (1988),p.25.Fane,ÔAfter AfghanistanÕ.Washington Post,ÔSoviet Use ofMilitary is CurtailedÕ,October 28,1989,p.A 18.ÔGromov Recalls Afghanistan Life,CareerÕ,Sovetskaya Rossiya,15 November 1989:4,Translated inFBIS-SOV,89Ð223,(November 21,1989),p.103.Roberts,ÔGlasnostÕ.Mahmut Gareyev,ÔThe Afghan Problem:Three Years Without Soviet TroopsÕ,International Affairs(March,1992),p.17. These developments adversely affected the army.In late 1989,a poll conducted bythe Soviet Ministry ofDefence reported a crisis-like environment and unhappinessamong army ofÞcers.Importantly,as this news was leaked to civilian newspapers,the internal weakness ofthe army became public knowledge,thereby strengtheningthe publicÕs perceptions ofthe armyÕs weakness.The Afghanistan war was very harsh for the army.Living conditions for troopswere poor.Soldiers were involved in guerrilla warfare in unfamiliar and hostileterrains.They faced constant frictions with Afghan civilians who often supportedthe Mujaheddin.Eventually,these conditions contributed to soldiersÕlost sense ofpurpose.Some soldiers observed:[The] widespread corruption and smuggling ofarmy equipment for trade in drugs and goodswas permitted.And looting among the Afghan population,killing ofnon-combatants,punitive attacks on villages,as well as torture ofprisoners ofwar was often permitted andeven encouraged by ofÞcers.And,in a typical confession which appeared in the press in 1989,one soldier noted:There were things weÕre ashamed to remember....IÕm terriÞed at the thought that ifwe writea dishonest book about the Afghan war,reading it our children would perhaps want to Þghtsomewhere else....Who are we Afghan war vets? Internationalists or people who messed upsomeone elseÕs life?The army was especially brutal towards women and children.In 1987,Watch Reportsreported that the ÔRussians systematically entered all the houses,executing the inhabitants including women and children often by shooting them inWith such reports oflooting and brutal treatment ofAfghan civilianscoming in,the army began losing its moral high ground among Soviet citizens.Another soldier observed:We were struck by our own cruelty in Afghanistan.We executed innocent peasants.Ifone ofours was killed or wounded we would kill women,children and old people as revenge.Wekilled everything,even the animals.Some soldiers compared their roles in Afghanistan to that ofthe Nazi army inWorld War II.In an interview in 1990,one soldier told Moscow Newsthat:We were supposedly equated with the participants in the Great Patriotic War,but theydefended their homeland,while what did we do? We played the role ofthe Germans.Like any other war,the Afghanistan war crippled and injured soldiers who thenhad to be sent home.Many Afgantsyreturned from this war desiring to activelyparticipate in the reorganization ofsociety.By the mid-1980s,there were alreadyRafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashÔKak Zhiviotsya OÞtzeramÕ,Izvestiya,October 10,1989.Quoted in Kamrany and Killian,ÔEffects ofAfghanistan WarÕ,p.130.Valery Abramov,ÔWe Should Tell the Whole Truth about This WarÕ,Moscow News(weekly) 3 (1989),p.9.Helsinki Watch,ÔTo Die in AfghanistanÕ,Helsinki Watch Reports(New York,1987).A.Alexiev,Inside the Soviet ArmyÑAfghanistan,Report no.3627 (The Rand Corporation,1988),p.58.Svetlana Aleksievich,ÔDonÕt Say You Have Been in that WarÕ,International Affairs(1990),p.133.Valerii Konovalov,ÔAfghan Veterans in SiberiaÕ,Radio Liberty Report on the USSR,1,(#21,1989),p.17. about a million Afgantsyin the Soviet Union and they had emerged Ôas a new socialforce in their own rightÕ.In the early years ofthe war,the Soviet leadership,wanting to play down Sovietinvolvement in Afghanistan,did not acknowledge the presence ofthe Afgantsy.TheofÞcial media ignored them as well.The Afgantsyoften could not Þnd jobs.Worsestill,military authorities provided them with little assistance in obtaining housingand medical care.Many Soviet citizens also had mixed emotions about them;thoughAfgantsyhad fought for the country,they had fought an unpopular war and hadcommitted atrocities on Afghan civilians.As we have previously noted,some Asianrepublics (speciÞcally,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) had ethnic and religious links withAfghans.Afgantsyfelt betrayed.Many ofthem organized into vigilante groups deter-mined to Þght the money grubbers and ÔscroungersÕwho had sent them to war andwere ignoring their existence.By the late 1980s,some Afgantsyorganizing themselves politically.In June 1988,after months oflobbying,theymanaged to erect a small monument in the Moscow Park commemorating theirfallen comrades.Such monuments eventually sprang up in other cities as well.lobby the 1989 Congress ofPeople Deputies for direct negotiation with theMujaheddins on prisoners-of-war,some Afgantsyformed the ÔCommittee for theLiberation ofSoviet War PrisonersÕ.In 1989,to defuse the AfgantsyÕspower and to win the hearts ofnewly returning war veterans,the Communist partyformed ofÞcial outÞts under the guidance ofthe Komsomols,the youth organiza-tions ofthe party.In response,the Afgantsyformed the organization ,meaningduty.Thus we Þnd emerging non-party political organizations,mainly due to theinitiatives ofthe Afgantsy,to Þght both for the rights ofthe Afgantsyas well as tostruggle for social goals.The agonies ofthe Afgantsyalso were portrayed in Þlms.In January 1989,a Þlmentitled ÔWe Paid Our DuesÕwas screened nation-wide on television.In this Þlm,agroup ofAfgantsyreturn home to Þnd corruption and crime.They organize,withoutthe aid ofthe Communist party or any other ofÞcial help,and successfully Þghtsocial ills.Similarly,the songs ofVladimir Vysotskiy such as ÔOn ne vernylcya izBoyaÕand ÔSynovya ukhodyat v BoyÕ[ÔHe did not come back from the battleÕandÔSons leave for the battleÕ] drew ofÞcial wrath.Finally,since the Afgantsyhad directly experienced the war,they played a majorrole in discrediting the military apparatus.As they also carried hostile feelingsagainst Moscow,Afgantsywere recruited in the non-ofÞcial militia organized bynon-Russian secessionist movements.To summarize:the Afghanistan war created conditions for the demilitarizing ofSoviet society.It created a division between the army and the CPSU and between thearmy and the citizens.The atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers in AfghanistanThe Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionUS News and World Report(December 1985),p.15Nahaylo,ÔWhen Ivan Comes Marching HomeÕ,p.16.Washington Post,February 14,1989,p.A1.Roy,ÔLessons ofthe Soviet Afghan WarÕ,p.47.Michael Dobbs,ÔIn Service ofthe MotherlandÕ,Washington Post,September 7,1991.However,insome regions such as Ukraine was viewed as a reactionary force against secession.We thankVladimir Pigenko for this point.Washington Post,February 14,1989.Roy,ÔLessons ofthe Soviet-Afghan WarÕ,p.47. undermined the legitimacy ofthe army as a moral institution that safeguarded theoppressed.Finally,the war created a huge mass ofAfgantsywho returned homewith accounts ofcruelty and defeat.They also formed non-party organizations thatchallenged the legitimacy ofthe CPSU.Legitimacy effectsThe Soviet Union was an extremely heterogenous country encompassing diversenationalities and religions.Many ofthese groups had histories ofwarring on eachother and with Moscow/St.Petersburg.Though the Soviet system was supposed tobe race-blind,it was not so.The non-Russian minorities,Asian as well as European,resented the Russian ÔcaptureÕofthe system.The Afghanistan war accentuated suchresentments,since the non-Russian Soviet republics perceived it as a Russian warfought by non-Russian soldiers.Moreover,they noticed the similarities between theRussian oppression ofAfghanistan and ofthe non-Russian Soviet republics.Thewar therefore seriously eroded the legitimacy ofthe Soviet system and encouragedsecession by the non-Russian republics.It alienated both elites and masses and gavethe secessionist movements a popular rallying cause against Russian domination.Afghanistan consists ofthree major ethnic groups:Pashtuns,Tajiks,and Uzbeks.Since Tajiks and Uzbeks were also present in the Soviet Union,there was signiÞcantunrest in the Asian Soviet republics about the war against people ofthe sameethnicity.Moreover,the war was perceived by these republics as a Russian war beingfought by Central Asians against other Central Asians;Ôour boys are dying for analien cause.ÕIn Tajikistan,the mullahspublicly opposed the war,claiming that theSoviets were trying to convert the Afghans into kaÞrsAs public opposition to the war increased,it began to infect the local CentralAsian party cadres.This development alarmed Moscow and resulted in wide-scalepolitical purges.Though the ofÞcial media claimed that these purges reßectedperestroikaand the campaigns against corruption,the local population ofteninterpreted them as reßecting MoscowÕs distrust oflocal party leadership.Thisperception was reinforced since ethnic Russians were often the new appointees tothese positions.It accentuated the alienation ofthe Central Asian republics andresulted in riots and civil unrest.In 1986,there was rioting in Alma Ata,the Capital ofKazakhstan,to protestagainst the replacement ofFirst Secretary Kunaev,a Kazakh,by Kolbin,aRussian.There were many other such incidents suggesting a growing cleavagebetween the Asian republics and Moscow.For example,in 1982,there were anti-wardemonstrations in Tajikistan which lead to violence and arrests.In May,1985,therewere anti-war demonstrations in Armenia.And,in June,1985,there were violentanti-war demonstrations in Astrakhan.Rafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashSallie Wise,ÔA War Should Never Have Happened:Soviet Citizens Assess the War in AfghanistanÕ,Radio Liberty Research,RL 226/88 (June 1,1988),pp.1Ð3.V.Rabiev,ÔV Klass...s Koranom?Õ,Kommunist Tadzhikistana(January 31,1987).Rigby,ÔThe Afghan ConßictÕ,p.146.Nahaylo,ÔWhen Ivan Comes Marching HomeÕ,p.15. The war impacted the European Soviet republics as well.Anti-war protestsstarted in the Baltics as early as 1982.Ausra,the journal ofthe Lithuanian under-ground,reporting on anti-Russian demonstrations during funerals ofBaltic soldierskilled in Afghanistan,noted:Ôunder oppression themselves,Ukrainians,Estonians,Latvians,and Lithuanians Ôwere being forcedÕto obey the brutal orders oftheRussian ofÞcers,and shed both their own and Afghan bloodÕ.And in 1985,the Chronicle ofthe Catholic ChurchofUkraine depicted the war asunjust.Anti-war sentiments were so pronounced that in 1985,Catholic activists,in aletter to the defence minister,declared that ÔUkrainians do not wish to Þght,nor dothey want this unjust war.ÕBy the late 1980s,the European Soviet republics hadbegun challenging the Soviet Defence Ministry to decide on their drafteesÕplace ofservice.Instead ofbeing sent to serve in Afghanistan,they demanded that theirdraftees serve within their home republic.To summarize:the Afghanistan war accentuated the cleavages between the non-Russian republics and the Soviet state.It provided a common rallying banner for thesecessionist movements and led to many anti-war demonstrations.In effect,itseverely eroded the legitimacy ofthe Soviet system in the eyes ofthe non-Russiannationalities.Glasnost effectsThe impact ofthe Afghanistan war was so devastating that war reports challengingthe ofÞcial versions could not be suppressed.Importantly,though not surprisingly,the ofÞcial media also began showing signs ofindependence in its war reporting,thereby transforming itselffrom an outlet for ofÞcial stories to a barometer ofpublic opinion.Contrary to popular perceptions,we Þnd that glasnostdid not markthe emergence ofa relatively free press in the Soviet Union;glasnostonly acceleratedprocesses initiated earlier.And the Afghanistan war added new vigour to the forcesunleashed by glasnostWe identify four phases in the transformation ofmedia in the Soviet Union.Inphase one (1979Ð80),the central regime strongly censored the media.Accordingly,the media maintained that the Afghanistan war was being fought by the Afghanarmed forces,and that the Soviet army was only supporting them from the rear.Soviet soldiers killed in action were brought home in unmarked cofÞns.In phase two (1981-mid 1985),the media began publishing accounts ofthe armybeing actually involved in Þghting.For example,in 1981,KomsomolÕskaya Pravda(the youth league newspaper) carried a story hinting that the army was actuallyÞghting a full-scale war.The report,while describing how a Soviet tank fell into a pitwhile delivering food to an Afghan village,admitted that Ôservice in Afghanistan isdifÞcultÕ.Moreover,we Þnd that war-related stories,opposing the formal party lineThe Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionNahaylo,ÔWhen Ivan Comes Marching HomeÕ,p.15.Ibid.,p.15.Fane,ÔAfter AfghanistanÕ,p.8.Dobbs,ÔIn Service ofthe MotherlandÕ.Trehub,ÔSoviet Press CoverageÕ,p.1. (that a war was not going on in Afghanistan),began appearing in the army news-papers as early as 1983,for instance in Krasnaya Zvezda.While these war reports were not openly critical ofthe ofÞcial policy onAfghanistan,they conveyed a gloomy picture (contrary to the ofÞcial pronounce-ments) ofarmy units being routinely ambushed.1984 marks the arrival ofstories onthe plight ofthe wounded Afgantsy.Moreover,we now Þnd media reports on someparty ofÞcials reluctantly acknowledging domestic repercussions ofthis war.Forexample,on 13 March 1984,Victor Boiko,the First Secretary ofthe UkraineCommunist Party,in an interview to the KomsomolÕskaya Pravda,underlined themoral implications ofill-treating the war veterans.As the Afghanistan crisis accentuated,even key party newspapers beganpublishing stories and articles on the war.For example,on 14 February 1985 (beforeGorbachev came to power),Pravda,in a surprising shift from the Party line that theAfghanistan intervention was to defend international socialism,justiÞed the war asdefence ofthe southern border ofthe Soviet Union.In a totalitarian regime such asthe Soviet Union,where every word was supposedly scrutinized for ideologicalpurity,this was a bafßing deviation from the party line.The third phase (mid 1985Ð89) was heralded by glasnostBeginning in the late1985,we Þnd a ßood ofreports and letters to newspapers against the Afghanistanwar.For instance,in the summer of1987,Borovik,OgonekÕswar correspondent,published a three-article series portraying gloom and war weariness in the Sovietarmy.And,in November,1987,Pravdapublished letters from readers complainingabout draft-dodging by the children ofparty elites.The last stage (1989 onwards) ofthis transformation covers the time period oftheSoviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.In 1989 and the early 1990s,the press routinelycarried interviews in which Army generals blamed politicians for engaging in the warin spite ofthe armyÕs advice to the contrary.In effect,with the Afghanistan warhaving provided new fuel to glasnost,the media began playing an independent roleas a watchdog ofpublic interest,a barometer ofpublic opinion,and,more import-antly,an arena ofcontestations among the various organs ofthe hitherto uniÞedstate.To summarize:the Afghanistan war provided the supporters ofglasnost perestroika with a key opportunity for redeÞning the relationship between thecitizens and the Soviet state as well as among the various organs ofthe state itself.As Sergei Lukyanchikov,who directed ÔPainÕ,a documentary on Afghanistan,put it:ÔThe War changed our psychology.It helped perestroikaThe disintegration ofthe Soviet empire started toward the end ofthe 1980s whenEastern Europe left the Soviet bloc.The Cold War ended in 1989,and in 1991,theRafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashKrasnaya Zvezda,12 March 1983 and 3 November 1983.Gorbachev assumed the post ofthe General Secretary ofthe CPSU in March 1985.Artem Borovik,ÔVstretimsya u trekh zhuravleiÕ,Ogonek,28Ð30 (1987).Trehub,ÔSoviet Press CoverageÕ,p.3.Dobbs,ÔIn Service ofthe MotherlandÕ. Soviet Union itselfdisintegrated.This collapse ofthis particular great power wasunexpected in its timing,magnitude,and speed.The existing explanations attributethis collapse to leadership and/or systemic factors.The contributions oftheAfghanistan war have been under-emphasized,ifnot altogether ignored.We haveargued that the Afghanistan war was a signiÞcant factor leading to the breakdownofthe Soviet Union.Further,to answer the two puzzles raised in the introduction tothis articleÑwhy did the collapse take place only towards the end ofthe 1980s,andwhy did the Soviet leaders not employ the army to suppress the secessionistmovementsÑa better appreciation ofthe impact ofthe Afghanistan war on Sovietpolitics is required.That the Afghanistan war was critical in the collapse ofthe Soviet Unionresonates well with theories emphasizing major wars as key factors in the demise ofempires.Major wars among great powers reorient the domestic politics ofthewarring parties by weakening powerful groups and enfranchising less powerfulgroups.As the hitherto less powerful become more assertive,the domestic socio-political equilibrium gets disturbed,often irreversibly leading to the collapse ofempires.However,are such major wars possible in a world where the great powerspossess nuclear weapons? Ifnot,then will major wars no longer remain a key causeofempire breakdowns? Or,do we have to redeÞne major wars in terms oftheirimplications for domestic politics,and not in terms ofthe characteristics oftheparticipating actors or the scope ofthe war?While the Afghanistan war may notbe categorized as a major war involving a direct and wide-scale clash ofgreatpowers,it was certainly a major war in terms ofimpacting Soviet domestic politics.Hence,we interpret the key contribution ofthe Afghanistan war in the collapse ofthe Soviet Union as only an overlooked case,and not as an exception to thosetheories that highlight the role ofmajor wars in the demise ofempires.Clearly,our article raises several tough questions.For instance,is a major war anecessary and/or a sufÞcient condition to force a regime change? Would the SovietUnion have collapsed in the absence ofthe Afghanistan war? How do we prioritizethe contribution ofsystemic failures,leadership-based factors,and the Afghanistanwar in the breakdown ofthe Soviet Union? Can we identify the necessary and/orsufÞcient conditions for explaining this breakdown?Systemic factors were undoubtedly important in the decay,though not in thecollapse ofthe Soviet system.One can speculate that had the Soviet economy beenrobust,the Afghanistan war would have had only a minor impact on Soviet politics.A robust Soviet economy would have satisÞed the material needs ofthe non-Russianminorities and made them less sensitive to their harsh living conditions.As a result,the system would have relied less on the army and security forces for curbingdissension.Hence,the discrediting ofthe Soviet army due to its failures inAfghanistan would have been less disastrous for the stability ofthe Soviet regime.Similarly,the role ofGorbachev and Shevardnadze was important in the collapseofthe Soviet Union.The war changed their perceptions and those ofother SovietThe Afghanistan war and the breakdown ofthe Soviet UnionOn economic aspects ofthis war see Boris Pyadyshev,ÔAfghanistan in the Summer of1990 andInternational Affairs(November,1990),p.80;Dina Spechler and Martin Spechler,ÔTheEconomic Burden ofthe Soviet Empire:Estimates and Re-estimatesÕ,in Rajan Menon and DanielNelson (eds.),Limits to Soviet Power(Lexington:Lexington Books,1989).We,however,do not ÞndsufÞcient evidence to suggest that the economic impact ofthis war was critical. leaders about the efÞcacy ofemploying the army to suppress secessionist move-ments.One can speculate that another set ofleaders may have interpreted differentlythe impact ofthis war on the ability ofthe Soviet regime to hold together theirdiverse country.Again,the impact ofthe Afghanistan war needs to be understoodwithin the context ofa given set ofleaders.The Ôwhat ifÕscenarios,while veryinteresting,are difÞcult to test.Finally,should the Cold War itselfbe considered as the major war that led to thecollapse ofthe Soviet Union,as some American commentators in particular seem tobelieve? In our viewÑno.In many ways the Cold War is probably better viewed as achronic problem that was troublesome rather than threatening to the integrity oftheUSSR.No doubt it imposed a cost on the Soviet system in the form ofan ongoingarms race.Some would even argue that it was the fear ofthose costs rising in the1980s that Þrst forced the USSR to the negotiating table and then to contemplatethe reforms that ultimately led to its disintegration.But showing that the Cold Warwas costly is one thing:demonstrating an unambiguous empirical relationshipbetween this and the collapse ofthe Soviet Union is something else altogether.Thismight make it easier to justify the 40 year policy ofmilitary containment.But itdoes not necessarily make for good history.Indeed,in our view,the Soviet UnionÑin spite ofits multiple inefÞcienciesÑwas not only able to bear the costs ofthe ColdWar but had to a large degree internalized them.In the last analysis,it is onlydramatic and signiÞcant events that cause empires to collapse,not ongoingstandoffsÑand the only event that Þts this bill is the Afghan war,perhaps one ofthemost over-studied but underestimated military conßicts in the history ofthetwentieth century;one that analysts ofthe end ofthe Cold War continue to ignoreat their peril.Rafael Reuveny and Aseem PrakashEven Yelstin did not learn from the Afghanistan experience and persisted with forcing a militarysolution to Chechniya.