November 1219 2009 What is emotion Communication mechanisms that maintain social orderstructure Behavior learned through operant or classical conditioning or nonassociative learning not involving deliberate cognitive mediation ID: 246183
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Slide1
Cognition and Emotion
November 12-19, 2009Slide2
What is emotion?
Communication mechanisms that maintain social order/structure
Behavior learned through operant or classical conditioning or nonassociative learning, not involving deliberate cognitive mediation
Appraisal of biopsychosocial situation
Complex physiological response
Integrated, three-response system construct
Motor behavior
Physiological activity/arousal
Cognitive appraisalSlide3
Areas of Inquiry
Effect of emotion on performance
(e.g., memory, perception, attention)
Information processing characteristics of emotional disorders
(e.g., anxiety, depresion)
Emotion and social learning
Cognitive neuroscience of emotions
cognitive structure of emotion
neuropsychological studies
cognitive aspects of emotion (e.g., appraisal)Slide4Slide5
Introduction & History
James-Lange theory
Cannon-Bard theory
Schacter & Singer studies (2-factor theory)
Facial feedback hypothesis
Neurobiological contributions (Davis, LeDoux)
Neuropsychological perspectives
Somatic markers
Emotional signal processing
Information-processing theoriesSlide6Slide7
James-Lange
"My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, and angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect ... and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble ... Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or angry"Slide8
Cannon-Bard
We feel emotions first, and then feel physiological changes, such as muscular tension, sweating, etc.
In neurobiological terms, the thalamus receives a signal and relays this both to the amygdala (a limbic structure) and the cortex. The body then gets signals via the autonomic nervous system to tense muscles, etc.Slide9
Two-Factor Theory (e.g., Schacter & Singer)
When trying to understand what kind of person we are, we first watch what we do and feel and then deduce our nature from this. This means that the first step is to experience physiological arousal. We then try to find a label to explain our feelings, usually by looking at what we are doing and what else is happening at the time of the arousal. Thus we don’t just feel angry, happy or whatever: we experience feelings and then decide what they mean.Slide10
Cognitive Appraisal Theory (e.g., Lazarus)
In the absence of physiological arousal, we decide what to feel after interpreting or explaining what has just happened. Two things are important in this: whether we interpret the event as good or bad for us, and what we believe is the cause of the event.
In
primary appraisal
, we consider how the situation affects our personal well-being. In
secondary appraisal
we consider how we might cope with the situation.Slide11
Somatic Marker Theory
Bodily states play a role in decision-making and reasoning
“Somatic markers” link memories of experience (cortex) with feelings (limbic)
Attempts to account for ‘automatic’ or ‘unconscious’ biasesSlide12Slide13Slide14Slide15
Personality Traits
Mood States
Emotional Processing
Personality Traits
Mood States
Emotional Processing
Mood States
Personality Traits
Emotional Processing
TRADITIONAL MODEL
MEDIATOR MODEL
MODERATOR MODELSlide16
Limbic SystemSlide17
Fear ConditioningSlide18Slide19Slide20
Davis: Cortical influences on basic startle pathwaySlide21
Davis: Role of the amygdala in conditioned fearSlide22
Amygdala
activation in Anxiety disordersSlide23
LeDoux: direct thalamo-amygdala connections, bypassing cortexSlide24
Preattentive Perception of Threat: Öhman
Distinction between automatic v. controlled information processing
Draws on animal work (LeDoux) - direct thalamic-amygdala connection
Threat: biological and ‘derived’
Data:
responses to masked stimuli
slowed RT to threat words in shadowingSlide25Slide26
Ohman’s Information-Processing Model for Fear and AnxietySlide27
Emotion and MemorySlide28
“Bambi” (1942) named #20 in Time’s list of the Top 25 Horror Movies of All Time
“Kids were so frightened by these films that they wet themselves in terror. Bambi has a primal shock that still haunts oldsters who saw it 40, 50, 65 years ago.”Slide29
Flashbulb Memories
Distinct, vivid, recollections of shocking events, and associated personal activities
Long-lasting? Accurate? Special?
Brown & Kulick (1977): special encoding mechanism (NOW PRINT!)
Niesser & Harsh (1992) Challenger study
Although FM appear to be different subjectively (they provide an intersection between personal history and “History”), they are not necessarily more accurate
Confidence is not equivalent to accuracySlide30
Flashbulb Memories of September 11, 2001
http://www.nyu.edu/about/video.spotlight.html
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=632Slide31Slide32
Challenger Disaster Study (
Neisser
&
Harsch
, 1992)Slide33Slide34Slide35Slide36
Valence and Memory
Negative events remembered in more vivid detail than positive events
Positive events more associated with memory distortion and inconsistency
Positive induced mood leads to greater “false memory”Slide37Slide38Slide39
Event Valence Affects Memory Consistency
Kensinger
&
Schacter
, 2006Slide40
Neural Substrates
of Positive
(
Fusiform
) and Negative (frontal)
rcollection
;
Amygdala
active in both
Kensington &
Schacter
, 2006Slide41Slide42
Bower’s Network Theory – a theory of emotional experience
Emotions are
nodes in a semantic network
Emotions stored as
propositions
Emotion =
activation of network
Activation
spreads in selective fashion
to associated concepts
When nodes activated above threshold level,
conscious experience
of emotion resultsSlide43Slide44Slide45
Four Predictions from Bower’s Theory
Mood-state-dependent recall
Mood congruity
: learning best when congruity between learner’s state and type of material (best supported)
Thought congruity
: thoughts, associations congruent with mood state
Mood intensity
: increases in intensity (arousal) lead to greater activation of networkSlide46
Mood Effects on Attention and Memory
Negative memory bias
found with depressed and anxious normals
not consistently found with anxious patients (active avoidance?)
Mood vs. emotion
Effects on processing capacity (resources allocated to self-talk)Slide47
Emotion and AttentionSlide48
Emotional Stroop
BOY
BLOOD
TABLE
GASH
NICE
TREE
PUS
DOG
ELBOW
LACERATE
RIVER
GUTS
CHURCHSlide49Slide50
GUILTY
CANDYSlide51Slide52
Basis of Dot Probe Results
Selective attention to threat (McLeod)
Failure to ‘disengage’ attention from threat (Koster, et al 2004)Slide53
Koster
, et al (2004)
RT to N-N trialsSlide54Slide55
Weapon Focus
Eyewitness’ inability to identify a perpetrator when a weapon is used in a crime
Easterbrook hypothesis: narrowing of attentional focus in emotional situations
Arousal and central/peripheral detailSlide56
Basis of Weapon Focus?
Simple selective attention
All items attended to equally, but weapon remembered better
Cue-utilization (threat-arousal-narrowing)
Unusualness/distinctiveness
Effect sizes: lineup
ident
< feature accuracySlide57Slide58
Attention/Memory in Anxiety and DepressionSlide59
Emotion and Performance
Performance impaired by high levels of state anxiety
Yerkes-Dodson Law
performance is optimal with a ‘medium’ level of arousal
‘optimum’ level lower for hard tasks
Cognitive Interference theory
(Sarason): worry and self-preoccupation interfere
Processing Efficiency Theory
(Eysenck): processing efficiency = effectiveness/effort; worry reduces efficiency
Performance in depression
impaired both by task-irrelevant information and poor effort/motivation
most studies are of an anologue nature, though a few patient studies are availableSlide60Slide61
Anxiety and Attention
Selective attention toward threat-related
material
(selective
attentional
bias; e.g. dot-probe, emotional Stroop)
Distractibility
(
attentional
control)
Effects on breadth of attention
(more local spotlight)
Interpretive bias
: interpreting ambiguous materials as threatening (e.g., “The doctor examined little Emily’s growth”)
Anxiety and
preattentive
processingSlide62
Depression
Little evidence for attentional bias in depression
Interpretive/recall biases in depression
Interpreting ambiguous situations as negative
Reduced predictions of success on cognitive tasks
Recall of past performance reducedSlide63
Siegle, 1999Slide64
Time Course of Attentional Bias in Depression
Siegle et al (2001)Slide65
Failure to Disengage from Negative Information in
Dysphoric
Patients (
Koster
, et al,
Emotion
, 2005)
CV=RT(invalid) – RT(valid)Slide66
Discrete v. Dimensional Theories of EmotionSlide67
Discrete Emotions Theory
Emotions are
distinct and unique
states (e.g., fear, anger, etc.)
‘Basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions
- Tomkins lists 8 (hap, sad, anger, fear disgust, surprise, interest, shame)
Search for
response patterning
in emotions (Friesen, Ekman, etc.)
Cross-cultural
comparisonsSlide68Slide69Slide70
Basic Elements of Discrete Emotions TheorySlide71
Bioinformational Theory (Lang)
Emotions as
action predispositions
Dimensional view of emotions
affective valence (appetitive-aversive dimension)
arousal (resource recruitement)
Link between emotional and motivational behavior Slide72Slide73Slide74Slide75Slide76
Activation v. Approach/Withdrawal
Activation v. Valence
A
W
P
N
Discrete v. Dimensional Models (Christie, 2002)Slide77
Neuropsychological Findings
Neuropsychological studies of affective competence (RHD)
“Modular” organization of affective systems (?)
Modality-independent affective lexicon
Valence-related asymmetriesSlide78Slide79Slide80Slide81
Emotion and the Brain: Three General Hypotheses
Right Hemisphere dominance for emotion
Hemispheric laterality for mood
Positive/approach: left hemisphere
Negative/withdrawal: right hemisphere
Automatic-controlled distinction (RH v. LH Slide82
Negative - Neutral
Positive - NeutralSlide83
Localized “Damage” and Emotion
Awakening from WADA
Right Hemisphere: crying, anxiety
Left Hemisphere: laughing, excitement
Acute Structural Lesion (stroke)
Right Hemisphere: indifference, ?secondary mania
Left Hemisphere: depression (frontal)Slide84
Neuropsychiatric Disorders
Depression
Secondary Mania
OCD
Anxiety
Aggression/disinhibition
Psychopathy/APDSlide85
Neuropsychological Manifestations of Frontal Lobe Lesions II
Inferior Mesial Region
A)
Orbital Region
(10, 11)
Lesions in this region produce disinhibition, altered social conduct, “acquired sociopathy”, and other disturbances due to impairment in fronto-limbic relationships
B)
Basal Forebrain
(posterior extension of inferior mesial region, including diagonal band of Broca, nucleus accumbens, septal nuclei, substantia innominata)
Lesions here produce prominent anterograde amnesia with confabulation (material specificity present, but relatively weak)
Tranel, 1992Slide86
Neuropsychological Manifestations of Frontal Lobe Lesions III
Lateral Prefrontal Region (8,9,46)
Lesions in this region produce impairment in a variety of “executive” skills that cut across domains. Some degree of material-specificity is present, but relatively weak.
A) Fluency: impaired verbal fluency (left) or design fluency (right)
B) Memory impairments: defective recency judgment, metamemory defects, difficulties in memory monitoring
C) Impaired abstract concept formation and hypothesis testing
D) Defective planning, motor sequencing
E) Defective cognitive judgement and estimation
Tranel, 1992Slide87
Neuropsychological Manifestations of Frontal Lesions I
Frontal Operculum (44,45,47)
A) Left: Broca’s aphasia
B) Right: ‘expressive’ aprosodia
Superior Mesial (mesial 6, 24)
A) Left: akinetic mutism
B) Right: akinetic mutism
Bilateral lesions of mesial SMA (6) and anterior cingulate (24) produce more severe form of akinetic mutism
Tranel, 1992Slide88
Phineas Gage
(1823-1861, accident in 1848)Slide89
Phineas Gage’s lesion reconstructed
(H. Damasio and R. Frank, 1992)Slide90
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex and Somatic Markers
Somatic marker “biasing signals” are regulated by VM premotor cortex; these signals help regulate decision-making in uncertainty
Support from Iowa Gambling Task; anticipatory SCR’s to selection of “unfavorable” decks
Impaired in VMPFCSlide91
Iowa Gambling TaskSlide92
Actual Body Actions
Expected Body Actions
(Internal Model)Slide93Slide94
Problems with SMT
Assertion that IGT preferences formed “implicitly” is untenable
Meaning of psychophsyiological response is unclear (response to feedback, risk indicator, post-decision emotion reaction)
Not all “normal controls” are normal
(
Dunn et al.,
Neurosci Biobehav Reviews
, 2006,
30
, 239-271)Slide95
Mirror Neuron System
Class of neurons in F5 (BA 44) and ventral premotor cortex that discharge both:
when animal performs object-directed action
when animal observes OD action in others
Subset appear to be “communicative” motor neurons
Functions
Imitation
Action understanding
Potentially important for understanding social learning and imitation effects
Being investigated in social-emotional impairments such as autism, Asperger’s disorder, and schizophrenia
May be important in “empathy”Slide96
Action Vision – Mirror Neuron System
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004Slide97
Mirror Neuron Responses to Action Observation (Umilt
á, 2001)
Full view (a,c)
Obstructed view (b,d)Slide98
Cortical-Subcortical Interactions in Emotion
General concept of limbic system as “emotional effector”
Question is, “what is the limbic system?”
Regulatory interaction between cortex and subcortical structures
Gating
Selective engagementSlide99
General Organization of Frontal cortical-striatal-pallidal-thalamic-cortical loopsSlide100
Blumenfeld, 2002Slide101
Orbitofrontal Loop
Involved in social and emotional functioning
Damage produces:
Disinhibition
Hyperactivity
Emotional lability
Aggressiveness
Reduced self-awareness