/
The Displacement of Religious Authorities from Syria and their Involvement in Aid Provision: The Displacement of Religious Authorities from Syria and their Involvement in Aid Provision:

The Displacement of Religious Authorities from Syria and their Involvement in Aid Provision: - PowerPoint Presentation

okelly
okelly . @okelly
Follow
66 views
Uploaded On 2023-09-21

The Displacement of Religious Authorities from Syria and their Involvement in Aid Provision: - PPT Presentation

Estella Carpi PhD Migration Research Unit Department of Geography University College London In the Framework of ERC project No 541123 Southernled Humanitarian Responses to Displacement from Syria Views from Lebanon Jordan and Turkey ID: 1018889

syrian faith aid refugee faith syrian refugee aid lebanon syria leaders southern local 2018 led refugees responses humanitarian provision

Share:

Link:

Embed:

Download Presentation from below link

Download Presentation The PPT/PDF document "The Displacement of Religious Authoritie..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.


Presentation Transcript

1. The Displacement of Religious Authorities from Syria and their Involvement in Aid Provision: Looking Beyond HumanitarianismEstella Carpi, PhDMigration Research Unit, Department of Geography, University College London(In the Framework of ERC project No. 541123, “Southern-led Humanitarian Responses to Displacement from Syria: Views from Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey”)Lebanese American University, March 27 2019

2. Southern-led responses to displacement from Syria: Views from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey ERC-funded Horizon 2020 project: www.southernresponses.org Grant Agreement No 715582How, why and with what effect have/do different actors from across ‘the global South’ respond to displacement? Including refugees themselves, local faith communities, diaspora organisations, ‘host’ states, Southern donor states, etc.

3. Including a particular interest in…Internationalism and Solidarity Faith-based/Faith-inspired responsesRefugee-led responses (‘refugee-refugee humanitarianism’)www.Southernresponses.org @SouthernResp

4. Main research aimsIdentifying diverse models of Southern-led responses to conflict-induced displacement;Examining the (un)official motivations, nature and implications of Southern-led responses;Examining conceptualisations of Southern-led responses, including whether people who have been displaced from Syria conceptualise these responses ‘as’ humanitarian in nature;Exploring diverse Southern and Northern actors’ perceptions of Southern-led responses;Tracing the implications of Southern-led initiatives for humanitarian theory and practice.

5. ‘North’ and ‘South’ as cultural maps and political geographiesMore efforts toward localisation of aid (2030 SDGs) unlike the 2015 MDGsUNOSSC and Triangular Cooperation since 1978 (Resolution 33/134): Traditional versus emerging donors?!South according to the HDI (UNDP definition): including donors, aid providers and recipientsDoes ‘South’ work after ‘Third World’ (from the Cold War), ‘postcolonial’, ‘non-DAC’ countries?Suggestion of ‘singularity’ and planetary difference: “A Manifesto for Incomparable Geographies” (Jazeel, 2018)

6. Outline Building on my extensive research on faith-based organizations working in the Syria neighbourhood when faith leaders are not directly involved (Lebanon and Jordan)Direct involvement of local faith leaders: My preliminary insights on Lebanese faith leaders informally assisting Syrian refugees in northern LebanonMy first engagement with Syrian refugee faith leaders in Lebanon Methodology: multisite collaborative ethnography, and reliance on self-accounts of personal experiences in aid provision to the displaced communities Summary of my first thoughts

7. My experience with FBOs – with no faith leaders directly involved - in the Middle East region: Are they better placed to lead to an effective localization agenda?De facto FBOs from the Arab Gulf in northern Lebanon assisting refugees from early 2012 (Ex. from Qatari initiative, Kuwaiti Association, and Saudi Taiba in Akkar) and Lebanese Dar al Fatwa have generated further disaffection among refugee and local communities (Eg. Sameness leads to greater anger and disappointment)Syrian refugee man in an Akkar village, October 29, 2013:“I don’t think these Arab FBOs are closer to my needs, closer to our political cause in Syria. They have come here to capitalise on our suffering. That’s why they’re no longer around. They exploited the emergency crisis, they took the money, and they left before we could collect their aid”.

8. FBOs working with no faith leaders directly involved in JordanThe Emirati Red Crescent in Mrajeeb el-Fhood camp: the “Five Stars” Camp. No greater local literacy than global North’s NGOsSyrian refugee teenager: “I don’t even own this spoon”(High level logistics in southern FBOs)

9. Insights from Lebanon: Spontaneity of Action and Ad Hoc-ism. Greek Orthodox priest in Halba, northern Lebanon“We distribute on an ad hoc basis, there’s no real logistics. We give basic stuff, like clothes and food, also inside Syria. So we reach a limited number of people, and our beneficiaries change all the time. I only coordinate with other Greek Orthodox priests.”Humanitarianism as a “bed for the night” (Rieff, 2002)“There’s no time for bureaucracy, we need to get things done”.(Greek Orthodox priest, Halba. March 16, 2018)A humanitarianism “about them”? Not about making a career“Our help this way is not sustainable, but I’m just a person of faith. The humanitarian sector is already there. I don’t need to become one of them”.

10. Again spontaneity of aid provision, ad hoc-ismLebanese Sunni rajul din providing aid to Syrian refugees in an Akkar village, northern Lebanon. March 15, 2018Professionalization: An irrelevant question?“What characterizes us is the lack of numbers [beneficiary ID], we don’t have bureaucracy like the international humanitarian system, or official collaborations […] We’re not that active because we have few resources, but we do what we can. I’m a rajul din, it’s natural for me to help people. But I’m a believer (mu’min), I’m not an employee.Although INGOs and governments have never respected us, on a small scale we keep providing aid to the needy by relying on Syrian refugees. We primarily care about people’s respect”.International instrumentalization of FLs (echoing Kidwai, 2017)“INGOs looked for us only at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, because they didn’t know anything about the place and how to access people here. After they got our lists of beneficiaries, they disappeared”.

11. Where are the refugee faith leaders? Generally discussed as conflict drivers or reconciliation actorsWhat’s their role in local aid provision and in the rehabilitation of normal life?How does their participation in humanitarian action reshape their spiritual and social role within refugee communities in the neighbouring countries?Example from new al-Bahsa’s mosque for Syrian nationals, northern Lebanon’s rural hamlet, May 2018 (photo credits: Amal Turki Mohammad)

12. Involving (or moulding?) faith leaders: Insights from TurkeyTurkiye Diyanet Foundation aiding Syrian refugees in Turkey, and sending trucks of food, water and building shelters in Azaz, al-Bab, Idlib, and Hama, and the 2016 “Don’t let humanity die in Aleppo” campaign.According to informal conversations with Turkish NGO practitioners in spring 2018, the 81 philanthropists sent to Syria are all local.Ideological continuity: 110 mosques in Azaz, Idlib, and al-Bab repaired; salaries to 1,326 religious officials in the region; appointing 5 muftis in Syria.

13. Does refugee religious leadership simply disappear in displacement and economic/legal hardships?Syrian Sunni rajul din, director of a postgraduate school in Tripoli, northern Lebanon. March 21, 2018“As a Syrian in Lebanon I cannot open bank accounts… In theory there are 120 FBOs in the I’tilaf of FBOs in Lebanon, but almost none of them is presently working due to the lack of funding.As a Syrian, I cannot exercise my own mission. As a Syrian, I have no community mosque in Lebanon. We generally do unofficial tajammu‘at diniye (religious gatherings) but mostly in camps, never in the urban space. In camps, sometimes, we read the Holy Qur’an and we give tajwid classes. Religion, after all, is not a basic need. It’s not even easier for us to resettle elsewhere, as we still need to apply as refugees… Also, here in the region there’s no taklif rasmi (official commissioning) for rijel din. For instance, I cannot do khotbat al juma‘. The Lebanese Dar al-Fatwa no longer issues bittaqat ta‘rif diniy to Syrians. Beforehand they used to issue these cards to facilitate Syrians to apply to UNHCR as refugees, but that wasn’t done to allow them to carry out religious tasks here… Now that I even struggle to pay my rent, how can my spiritual mission be my primary concern? Forbidding us to deliver the Friday preach is an attempt to incapacitate us here in Lebanon”.

14. SFLs’ perception of international mistrust towards faith-inspired aid/faith-inspired insurgencies “If you should choose between Angelina Jolie and Saudi Arabia as aid providers, who would you go for? I’m sure you’ll pick up Angelina, because she’s modern, she’s secular” (Syrian ex provider, Tripoli, March 2018)“The Tripoli municipality made no problems and allowed us to use a public park to organise iftar. We then distributed dates with a verse from the Holy Koran for our dining companions. Syrians are rarely allowed to do this in Lebanon” (Syrian provider, Tripoli, March 2018)

15. Meta-observations: Popular disaffection vis-à-vis today’s strong religion focus in the UK‘Local faith communities’: Risk of abusing the ‘faith’ lens (Eg. Religious people not necessarily connected to FLs; people resorting to rijal din as easily accessible and most visible points of call rather than ‘moral leaders’ for their private matters).Faith leaders used as intermediaries: in the localization of aid agenda after Istanbul 2016 (Eg. Shortcut not to localise the international humanitarian apparatus)Partnering with FLs as an instrument of ‘new humanitarianism’: transforming societies, working on the message of holy texts to meet social needs

16. Some methodological considerations…I am a woman among men ‘leaders’: easier access?Very well received research (Eg. Shukran ‘ala ihtimamik) in hard times for humanitarianism and development researchers who need detailed data and access to NGO databases Unwelcome research for Syrian friends with a secular(ist) activist profile: “This research rationale may pinkwash their filthy role in war”How to pursue a collaborative ethnography? Dissonance between FLs and myself, and among FLsMultiple faith literacy needed

17. To recapitulate…People’s mistrust toward organized and standardized forms of assistancePositive experiences with spontaneous and ad hoc forms of aid provision led by local faith leaders: Stronger social ties between refugee and local communitiesAd hoc-ism ends up being more neutral than western secular humanitarianism!Conditioned visibility of refugee FLs in Turkey and invisibility of refugee FLs in LebanonFaith leaders do not intend to professionalize aid provision in the Lebanon experience: How to work (or to not work) with them? The right to disinvolvement

18. High diversification of political orientations vis-à-vis their nuanced relationship with the Syrian regime (echoing the Ba‘th politics of ambiguity – Pierret, 2013)Feeling of moral disenfranchisement: aid provision as rehabilitation of one’s own role within displaced society Min tarak darahu qallala miqdarahu “Who left his home forcedly lessened his value” (Zaman, 2017: 165)Self-definition of social roles: fatawa (fatwas); wijaha (moral standing); and wasata (intermediation) – confirming Kraft’s study on Evangelical Churches in Lebanon (2018)Just a continuation of mosques as refuge? (Eg. 1870 Ottoman Commission for Refugees, welcoming Circassians fleeing the Crimean war – Chatty, 2017)

19. References Chatty, D. (2018) Syria: The Making and Unmaking of the Refuge State. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Jazeel, T. (2018) “Singularity. A Manifesto for Incomparable Geographies”, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography.Kidwai, S. (2017) “The Limits of Hospitality. Finding Space for Faith”, The Refugee Crisis and Religion. Secularism, Security and Hospitality in Question, ed. by Luca Mavelli and Erin K. Wilson, pp. 175-186. London: Rowman and Littlefield.Kraft, K. and Smith, J. (2018) “Between international donors and local faith communities: Intermediaries in humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon”, Disasters, online version.Pierret, T. (2013) Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Rieff, D. (2002) A Bed for the Night. Humanitarianism in Crisis. Vintage. Zaman, T. (2017) “A Right to Neighbourhood: Rethinking Islamic Narrative and Practices of Hospitality in a Sedentarist World”, pp. 157-174, in Mavelli and Wilson, The Refugee Crisis and Religion. Secularism, Security and Hospitality in Question. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

20. Thanks for listening!