Analytically or Ontologically Reducible? - PowerPoint Presentation

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Analytically or Ontologically Reducible?

Lightning / Electrical DischargeTriangles / Three Sided ShapeMike Harvey / Awesome Philosophy TeacherSun / Burning ball of gasWidow / Lady whose husband has passed awayHeart / Organ that pumps blood round your bodyBachelor / Unmarried manChristmas Day / 25th DecemberSlide2

Identity Theory

Summarise what you can remember about Mind-Brain Identity Theory in 20 words or less on your whiteboards. Try to cover as much of the theory as possible in your summary.Slide3

Homework – For This Lesson

Outline the divisibility argument and

explain

one criticism.

Outline the P-Zombie argument and explain one criticism.

Outline the problem of interaction and explain how Descartes attempts to respond to this. Slide4

Even Shorter Summary:

Key Thinkers:

J.J.C. Smart

Mind and Brain are identical (they share all the same attributes – Leibniz’s Law).

Accordingly any talk of mental states is actually just referring to particular events in the brain.Mental states are therefore ontologically reducible to brain states. However the language of mental states has different meanings and purposes than the language of brain states - we can’t simply replace one with the other. They are not analytically reducible.Slide5

Arguments Supporting MBTIT

What arguments did we cover in support of Mind-Brain Identity Theory? Why might people think it is an effective theory of mind?What can physicalism offer that dualism struggles with? Give specific examplesWhy does current scientific knowledge support identity theory?

What are nomological danglers? Why are they an issue for dualism? Why does Ockham’s Razor apply here?What issues of dualism and does identity theory solve? Why does identity theory not necessarily need philosophical arguments to prove it correct? Slide6

What mistake is the writer making here?

“Identity theory is implausible since the words we use to talk about our mental states and processes do not mean the same as our vocabulary of physical states and processes occurring in the brain. When I say that I fancy a drink, I do not mean my brain is in a certain state. Similarly, if instead of saying that I have a headache I say that a certain neural pathway is being activated, don’t I lose something in the translation? Surely talking about neural pathways being activated is not the same thing as saying I have a headache.”Slide7

Common Mistake: Analytically vs Ontologically Reducible

We’ve mentioned this many times already but a common criticism of Mind Brain Identity Theory is that mental processes and descriptions simply don’t mean the same thing as brain processes.But this is a mistaken criticism – people arguing for MBTIT are not saying that the terms mean the same thing, but that they refer to the same thing. They are ontologically reducible, not analytically reducible.Slide8

Common Mistake: Analytically vs Ontologically Reducible

Smart argues that mental states and brain states have a contingent identity – mental terminology just happens to refer to the same thing as brain processes but there is no meaning in the language that automatically makes it so. We cannot interchange them.It’s for this reason neurophysiology is so key to MBTIT, as this is the only way of establishing the theory empirically!We’ve already reduced complex phenomena to material events in other sciences (lightning > electrical discharge or clouds > droplets of water) there is no reason to suggest we can’t do the same here. Slide9

Criticism 1: Dualism

In Descartes meditations he makes two key claims about the mind - intending to show that the mind is not the same thing as the body (according to Leibniz’s law). Can you remember what the claims were?Slide10

Criticism 1: Dualism

Descartes claims that the mind and body must be separate because we can conceive of the mind existing independently of the brain. According to this argument, as long as we can conceive of someone having a mental state without a corresponding brain state, then the mental states are not identical to brain states and MBTIT is not true. A similar outline can be offered for the P-Zombie argument in Property Dualism. Descartes also claims that since the body is divisible but the mind is not, they do not share a property and cannot be identical.Slide11

Responses: Conceivability

The MBTIT can claim that in actual fact we cannot conceive of a mind without a body (or an acting body without a mind – P-Zombie), for all the reasons we have listed previously in lesson. Since mental states actually just refer to brain processes, and since brain processes are bodily events, to imagine a mind without a body is impossible. It requires physical references (sense data etc.)Slide12

Responses: Divisibility

The dualist is making a mistake in assuming that the mind is in a category of “divisible” when actually it’s not. The mind is a set of mental properties (which are identical to physical properties) and there are lots of these types of properties that are physical and not divisible.Slide13

Responses: Divisibility

Temperature: The property of “being 100 degrees” is a physical property but not divisible.Colour: The property of being silver is a physical property, but it’s not divisible.It’s possible that mental states are therefore physical properties and yet still indivisible.Slide14

Criticism 2: Location

Where are your brain states?Where are your mental states?

Why is this a problem for MBTIT?Slide15

Criticism 2: Location

Similarly to the arguments from Descartes previously discussed. Some of the other critiques of the MBTIT intend to show that the mind and body do not share properties and are therefore not the same (Leibniz’s Law).One particularly strong issue is that of location, since brain states have a very precise location (in our brains) but our mental states do not, they do not share a particular property and we can therefore say they are not identical.Slide16

Criticism 2: Location

The idea is that neuroscientists can pinpoint the exact location of our brain states. For instance, our visual experience is associated with activity in the pre-frontal and frontal cortex of our brain. We can measure the distance between different kinds of activity in different regions of our brain. But my thoughts are not two centimetres above my visual images, or to the left of my childhood memories or behind my fear of snakes. Mental states do not have any spatial location. So mental states cannot be the same as brain states.Slide17

Criticism 2: Location

If two things are identical then they must share all of the same properties (Leibniz’s law).Brain states have a precise spatial location.Mental states do not have a precise spatial location.C: Therefore

, mental states are not identical to brain states.Slide18

Response: Location

Can you think of anything physical that does not have a precise spatial location?Think back to some of the properties mentioned in the “divisibility” response.Slide19

Response: Location

There are a number of physical conditions that something might be in that have no spatial properties.If I say I am wet and running, we might say that the wetness and running are occurring in my location (as we could about mental states) but we cannot ascribe specific spatial dimensions to them, wetness is not 3cm long, nor is running square. At best they are conditions of something that does have spatial properties (me) but they are no less physical states. Why can we not say the same about the mind?Slide20

Criticism 3: Qualia and Introspection

What mental processes do you have that are not explainable through physical causes?Can you introspectively access mental states that people who cut open your brain will not be able to see?What does this suggest about these mental states?Slide21

Criticism 3: Qualia and Introspection

Introspection reveals to me a world of thoughts, sensations, emotions etc. not a domain of electrochemical impulses in an organ in my head.Mental states and properties are radically unlike neurophysiological states and processes and therefore they cannot be the very same things. In short: We have a “what it feels like” to be in a particular mental state (qualia) that cannot be explained or reduced (ontologically) to purely observable neurological processes.Which argument is this basically outlining?Slide22

Response: Same information, two ways

When you see the colour red what is actually going on physically?If you think about it really hard, are you aware of any of these physical events happening?What about sound, are you aware of the physical events happening when you hear a piece of music?What are you actually aware of?Slide23

Response: Same information, two ways

When we see a colour or hear a sound our body is actually reacting to a particular wavelength of light or a particular vibration in the air.Yet we are not aware of this when we have the “colour” or “sound” sensation. The physical information is interpreted differently through our brains and we get the “qualia” of seeing red or hearing a particular sound instead.Slide24

Response: Same information, two ways

It’s entirely possible then that observing these events in third person (as phenomena > brain processes) is entirely different to experiencing them in first person (as qualia), it does not automatically mean we are dealing with two different, distinct things.The nature of access offered to us by introspection is very different to that offered to us by observing the brain externally.Slide25

Task – Criticisms of MBTIT

Create a spider diagram showing the 3 criticisms of MBTIT we have discussed in lesson:Dualist arguments (Conceivability / divisibility)Location argumentIntrospection and QualiaAdd an extra layer to your spider diagram with any responses you can remember.Complete this for homework.Slide26

So far, so good.

Do you think MBTIT has given a successful response to each of the criticisms mentioned so far? If so, why? If not, why not?Slide27

Recap:

CriticismWhat are the responses?

1. I can conceive of the mind separately from the body…

2. The

mind is not divisible, the body is.

3. My

body and brain has a location, my mind doesn’t.

4. Qualia and introspection reveal things we can’t see physically.?????

?????