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Class 1 Antitrust, Winter, 2018 Class 1 Antitrust, Winter, 2018

Class 1 Antitrust, Winter, 2018 - PowerPoint Presentation

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Class 1 Antitrust, Winter, 2018 - PPT Presentation

An Introduction to Antitrust Randal C Picker James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law The Law School The University of Chicago Copyright 200018 Randal C Picker All Rights Reserved ID: 705334

2018 january sec act january 2018 act sec sherman trans person missouri 000 trade association standard states law notice business majority case

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Slide1

Class 1Antitrust Fall 2020An Introduction to Antitrust

Randal C. Picker

James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law

The Law School

The University of Chicago

Copyright

© 2000-20

Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved.Slide2

1888 NY Trust

Investigation

September 21, 2020

2

NY Trust Investigation (1888

)Slide3

Standard Oil as Original

Trust

September 21, 2020

3

NY Trust Investigation (1888

)Slide4

Samuel Dodd: A

Defence

of

Trusts

September 21, 2020

4New York Tribune (2 Feb 1890

)Slide5

2 Jan 1882: The Standard Oil Trust Agreement

September 21, 2020

5

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)Slide6

Full and Free Competition, Raise Cost to

Consumer

September 21, 2020

6

S. 3445 (14 Aug 1888

)Slide7

Remedies: Double Damages; Corporate Franchise Forfeiture

September 21, 2020

7

S. 3445 (14 Aug 1888

)Slide8

What of useful combinations

?

September 21, 2020

8

CR, Sen. Hoar,

25 Jan 1889,

p1167Slide9

Act brings common law of England and states to interstate

commerce

September 21, 2020

9

Sen. Sherman,

25 Jan 1889,

p1167Slide10

May 1890: Ohio Sues Standard Oil

September 21, 2020

10

New York Times (9 May 1890)Slide11

June 1890: NYT Editorial on Ohio Suit

September 21, 2020

11

New York Times (5 June 1890)Slide12

June 1890: NYT Editorial on Ohio Suit

September 21, 2020

12

New York Times (5 June 1890)Slide13

The Sherman Act

September 21, 2020

13

26 Stat 209 (2 July 1890

)Slide14

September 21, 2020

14

Sherman Act Sec. 1

Sherman Act: July 2, 1890

Every

contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,in restraint of trade or commerceamong the several States, or with foreign nations,is declared to be illegal.Slide15

September 21, 2020

15

Sherman Act Sec. 1

Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a [felony], and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $[100,000,000] if a corporation, or, if any other person, $[1,000,000], or by imprisonment not exceeding [10] years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.Slide16

Jail Time for Price Fixing

September 21, 2020

16

USDOJ (17 Sept 2020)Slide17

September 21, 2020

17

Sherman Act Sec. 2

Every person

who shall monopolize,

or attempt to monopolize,or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolizeany part of the trade or commerceamong the several States, or with foreign nations,

shall be deemed guiltySlide18

September 21, 2020

18

Sherman Act Sec. 2 (15 USC 2)

of a [felony],and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $[100,000,000] if a corporation, or, if any other person, $[1,000,000], or by imprisonment not exceeding [10] years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.Slide19

1830-1850: U.S. Railroads

September 21, 2020

19

Central Pacific RR MuseumSlide20

1860: U.S. Railroads

September 21, 2020

20

Central Pacific RR MuseumSlide21

1870: The West Opens

September 21, 2020

21

Central Pacific RR MuseumSlide22

1880: The Context for Trans-Missouri

September 21, 2020

22

Central Pacific RR MuseumSlide23

How Would You Run a Railroad Cartel?September 21, 2020

23

TTYN (1 of

4

)Slide24

Railroad CompetitionSeptember 21, 2020

24

A

B

RR2

RR1

TTYN (2 of

4

)

A

B

RR2

RR1Slide25

Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (TTYN (3 of 4))

September 21, 2020

25Slide26

“[T]he peculiar nature of railroad property.” (TTYN (4 of 4))

September 21, 2020

26

Trans-Missouri (US 1897)Slide27

September 21, 2020

27

Trans-Missouri Ver. 1

Hypo 1

Each railroad makes its own decisions regarding prices; prices are posted as required by Interstate Commerce Act (Feb. 4, 1887), but no conversations or consultation regarding rates.

Does this violate Section 1? What if they see prices and end up with identical prices?

TTYN (1 of 3)Slide28

September 21, 2020

28

Trans-Missouri Ver. 2

Hypo 2

Trans-Missouri Ass’n formed

Rates are set through joint voting processVote of majority binds minorityDoes this violate Section 1?

TTYN (2 of 3)Slide29

September 21, 2020

29

Trans-Missouri Ver. 3

Hypo 3

Trans-Missouri Ass’n formed

Rates are set through joint voting processBut individual railroad can ignore vote and set rate separatelyDoes this violate Section 1?Which version is Trans-Missouri?

TTYN (3 of 3)Slide30

Price Fixing?Article II, Sec. 5“At each monthly meeting, the association shall consider and vote upon all changes proposed, of which due notice has been given, and all parties shall be bound by the decision of the association, as expressed”

September 21, 2020

30Slide31

Price Fixing?Article II, Sec. 5“unless then and there the parties shall give the association definite written notice that in ten days thereafter they shall make such modification, notwithstanding the vote of the association: provided, that, if the member giving notice of change shall fail to be represented at the meeting, no action shall be taken on its notice, and the same shall be considered withdrawn.”

September 21, 2020

31Slide32

Price Fixing?Article II, Sec. 5“Should any member insist upon a reduction of rate against the views of the majority, or if the majority favor the same, and if, in the judgment of such majority, the rate so made affects seriously the rates upon other traffic, then the association may, by a majority vote, ”

September 21, 2020

32Slide33

Price Fixing?Article II, Sec. 5“upon such other traffic put into effect corresponding rates to take effect on the same day. By unanimous consent, any rate, rule, or regulation relating to freight traffic may be modified at any meeting of the association without previous notice.”

September 21, 2020

33Slide34

September 21, 2020

34

1901 Report of the Interstate Commerce Comm’n

Regarding

Trans-Missouri

“It is not the business of this Commission to enforce the anti-trust act, and we express no opinion as to the legality of the means adopted by these associations. We simply call attention to the fact that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Trans-Missouri

case and the Joint Traffic Association case has produced no practical effect upon the railway operations of the country

.”Slide35

September 21, 2020

35

1901 Report of the ICC

Such associations, in fact, exist now as they did before those decisions, and with the same general effect

. In justice to all parties we ought probably to add that it is difficult to see how our interstate railways could be operated, with due regard to the interests of the shipper and the railway, without concerted action of the kind afforded to these associations.” Slide36

September 21, 2020

36

Subsequent Amendments

1920 Transportation Act

Finally gives ICC rate-setting authority

Reed-Bulwinkle Act (June 17, 1948)Gives ICC authority to approve carrier deals on ratesICC approval confers antitrust immunitySlide37

30 N.E. 279 (Oh.

1892)

September 21, 2020

37

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)Slide38

To Establish a Monopoly

September 21, 2020

38

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)

By this agreement—indirectly it is true, but none the less effectually—the defendant is controlled and managed by the Standard Oil Trust, an association with its principal place of business in New York city, and organized for a purpose contrary to the policy of our laws.

Its object was to establish a virtual monopoly of the business of producing

petroleum

,”Slide39

Void Against Public Policy

September 21, 2020

39

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)

and

of manufacturing, refining, and dealing in it and all its products throughout the country, and by

which it might not merely control the production, but the price, at its pleasure

.

All such associations are contrary to the policy of our state, and

void

.”Slide40

But Prices Have Been Dropping

September 21, 2020

40

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)

Much has been said in favor of the objects of the Standard Oil Trust, and what it has accomplished.

It may be true that it has improved the quality and cheapened the costs of petroleum and its products to the consumer.

But such is not one of the usual or general results of a monopoly; and

it is the policy of the law to regard, not what may, but what usually,

happens

.”Slide41

Importance of Structure of Production

September 21, 2020

41

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)

A society in which a few men are the employers and the great body are merely

employees

or servants, is not the most desirable in a republic; and it should be as much the policy of the laws to multiply the numbers engaged in independent pursuits or in the profits of production as to cheapen the price to the consumer

.”Slide42

Broader Consequences of Policies

September 21, 2020

42

Ohio v. Standard Oil Co. (Oh. 1892)

Such

policy would tend to an equality of fortunes among its citizens, thought to be so desirable in a republic, and lessen the amount of pauperism and

crime

.”Slide43

NYT Editorial: State Competition

September 21, 2020

43

New York Times (24 Mar 1891)Slide44

Fleeing to New Jersey

September 21, 2020

44

New York Times (24 Mar 1891)Slide45

Fleeing to New Jersey

September 21, 2020

45

New York Times (24 Mar 1891)Slide46

Nov 1906: US Sues Standard

September 21, 2020

46

New York Times (16 Nov 1906)Slide47

Nov 1906: US Sues Standard

September 21, 2020

47

New York Times (16 Nov 1906)Slide48

NYT Editorial: Prices?

September 21, 2020

48

New York Times (16 Nov 1906)Slide49

NYT Editorial: Prices?

September 21, 2020

49

New York Times (16 Nov 1906)Slide50

NYT Editorial: Prices?

September 21, 2020

50

New York Times (16 Nov 1906)Slide51

Nov 1909: US Wins In Lower Court

September 21, 2020

51

New York Times (21 Nov 1909)Slide52

Nov 1909: US Wins In Lower Court

September 21, 2020

52

New York Times (21 Nov 1909)Slide53

173 F. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909)

September 21, 2020

53

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide54

4 Judge Panel

September 21, 2020

54

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide55

Evolution of the Business: From One Refinery to Two

September 21, 2020

55

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide56

Evolution of the Business: To Forty

September 21, 2020

56

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide57

Killed Off Competition Among Purchased Firms

September 21, 2020

57

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide58

And That Violated SA1

September 21, 2020

58

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide59

SA2 Bans Only Monopolies Achieved via Illegitimate Means

September 21, 2020

59

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide60

But SA2 Was Violated Here

September 21, 2020

60

U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)Slide61

15 May 1911: Standard Oil

Decision

September 21, 2020

61

New York Times (16 May 1911)Slide62

15 May 1911: Standard Oil

Decision

September 21, 2020

62

New York Times (16 May 1911)Slide63

President Taft on Moving to Unreasonable Restraints of

Trade

September 21, 2020

63

New York Times (16 May 1911)Slide64

Big Business Happy with

Decision

September 21, 2020

64

New York Times (16 May 1911)Slide65

Not mere size, but rather price fixing and output

controls

September 21, 2020

65

New York Times (16 May 1911)Slide66

Progressives Less

Happy

September 21, 2020

66

New York Times (16 May 1911)Slide67

September 21, 2020

67

Understanding Sec. 2

Monopolization?

What is the conception of monopolization that you see in

Standard Oil?Grants from the King/Queen?Engrossing (what was that exactly?)Something else?

TTYN (1 of 3)Slide68

Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (TTYN (2 of 3))

September 21, 2020

68Slide69

No Ban on Monopoly As Such; Role of Freedom of Contract (TTYN (3 of 3))

September 21, 2020

69

Standard Oil v. U.S. (US 1911)Slide70

The Rule of Reason

September 21, 2020

70

Standard Oil v. U.S. (US 1911)

[I]t

became obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in any case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed, is

the rule of reason

… .”Slide71

What About

Trans-Missouri

?

September 21, 2020

71

Standard Oil v. U.S. (US 1911)Slide72

Limited If Need Be

September 21, 2020

72

Standard Oil v. U.S. (US 1911)