PPT-Subgames

and Credible Threats Russian Tanks Quell Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Nuclear threat USSR Dont Invade Hungary 0 1 Invade US Give in Bomb USSR 5 0 10 5 Nuclear threat strategic form. Problem 2, Chapter 13. Exploring the problem. Note that c, x yields the highest total payoff of 7 for each player. . Is this a Nash equilibrium? . . Why not?. What are the Nash . equilibria. ? . Can we sustain repeated play of c, x by . and Credible Threats. (with perfect information). Econ 171. Alice and Bob. . Bob. Go to A. Go to B. Go to A. Alice. Alice. Go to B. Go to A. Go to B. 2. 3. 0. 0. 1. . Histories and . subhistories. A terminal history is a listing of every play in a possible course of the game, all the way to the end. . A . proper . subhistory. . is a listing of every play in the course of the game up to some point before the end.. and Credible . Threats. Nuclear threat. . USSR. Don’t Invade Hungary. 0. 1. Invade. US. Give in. Bomb USSR. 5. 0. -10. -5. Nuclear threat (strategic form). . -5,. -. 10 . . 1,0. 0, 5 1,0. Problems from . Ch. 8. The OS2 story. Introduced by IBM in 1987 to compete. with MS Windows.. Faster and more reliable than Windows. but not many applications available.. A Model of Attracting Developers. and Credible Threats. Russian Tanks Quell. Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The background. After WW II, the Soviet army occupied Hungary. . Ultimately, the government came under Soviet control. . In 1956, with U.S. encouragement, Hungarians revolted and threw out the Soviet-backed government.. . Histories and . subhistories. A terminal history is a listing of every play in a possible course of the game, all the way to the end. . A . proper . subhistory. . is a listing of every play in the course of the game up to some point before the end.. 13. Problem 1: A crowded fishery. Number of boats, and payoff to fishermen . Number of Number of Own. Own Boats Other People’s PAYOFF. . Boats. 1 2 . . .