The knowledge argument Michael Lacewing
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slide1. The knowledge argument Michael Lacewing
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide2. Substance and properties A substance is an entity, a thing, that does not depend on another entity for its continued existence.
It has ‘ontological independence’
Substances are what possess properties.
Properties can’t exist without substances
They depend on substances to exist.
Substances persist through changes in properties © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide3. Substance and property dualism Substance dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter
Minds can exist independent of bodies
Mental properties are properties of a mental substance
Property dualism: there is just one sort of substance, physical substance
Mental properties are properties of a material substance, but they are fundamentally distinct from physical properties © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide4. Rejecting physicalism Property dualism: Physical properties don’t form the complete fundamental nature of the universe
Physicalism claims that the physical properties of the world determine all the properties of the world – only physical properties are fundamental © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide5. Jackson’s knowledge argument The set-up: a neuroscientist, Mary, who has never seen any colour, only black and white, knows every physical fact there is to know about colour vision; she is allowed to see red for the first time
The claim: Mary learns something new about colour vision when she first sees red
The argument: Therefore, not all facts are physical facts, and so physicalism is false.
What it is like for us to see red is not a neurophysiological or functional fact about the brain © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide6. Clarification ‘All the physical facts’: Mary knows all the facts that a completed physics and neuroscience would discover
And she knows all the facts about how things function that are entailed by those facts
If the fundamental nature of the world is entirely physical, then complete physical knowledge would be complete knowledge
So Mary knows everything physical about colour vision, but she learns something new upon seeing red for the first time. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide7. Mary gains ability knowledge Objection: Mary doesn’t learn knowledge of some new fact (knowledge that), but she gains a new ability (know how), e.g. to imagine or recognise red
Reply: this is not all she learns.
You can know what it is like to see red without being able to imagine red
You can be able to imagine red, but don’t know what it is like to see red if you don’t imagine red
So new skills are neither necessary nor sufficient for the knowledge Mary gains © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide8. Mary gains acquaintance knowledge Objection: Mary doesn’t learn about a new fact, but becomes directly aware of red (acquaintance knowledge)
Suppose what it is like to see red is some property of the brain. Mary knows about this property, but her brain has never had this property, so she isn’t acquainted with it
Churchland: Knowing the neuroscience won’t help you experience or identify phenomenal properties in consciousness. Your brain needs to undergo the processes that the theory describes as constituting colour experience. But the theory is complete. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide9. Two replies Reply 1: acquaintance knowledge includes knowing a new fact – what it is like to see red
Reply 2: the argument isn’t about Mary’s experience. Instead, Mary learns something new about other people’s colour experience.
There is a fact about human colour experience that Mary doesn’t know. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide10. There is more than one way of knowing the same fact The concept of water is a different concept from that of H2O, but they are the same property.
Two ways of thinking about the same ‘stuff’
To know that there is water in the glass is not to know that there is H2O
These are different facts, counting by concepts (how we think about the world)
These are the same fact, counting by properties (how the world is) © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide11. There is more than one way of knowing the same fact Mary has a theoretical concept of red
Wavelengths of light, neurons firing, etc.
On seeing red, Mary gains a new, phenomenal concept of red
A concept based on experiencing something
Mary can think about seeing red in a new way, but she is thinking about the same physical property in the world © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide12. There is more than one way of knowing the same fact Physicalism is about what exists (properties), not about how we think about what exists (concepts)
So even if Mary learns something new, this doesn’t show that physicalism is false © Michael Lacewing<br>
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide2. Substance and properties A substance is an entity, a thing, that does not depend on another entity for its continued existence.
It has ‘ontological independence’
Substances are what possess properties.
Properties can’t exist without substances
They depend on substances to exist.
Substances persist through changes in properties © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide3. Substance and property dualism Substance dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter
Minds can exist independent of bodies
Mental properties are properties of a mental substance
Property dualism: there is just one sort of substance, physical substance
Mental properties are properties of a material substance, but they are fundamentally distinct from physical properties © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide4. Rejecting physicalism Property dualism: Physical properties don’t form the complete fundamental nature of the universe
Physicalism claims that the physical properties of the world determine all the properties of the world – only physical properties are fundamental © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide5. Jackson’s knowledge argument The set-up: a neuroscientist, Mary, who has never seen any colour, only black and white, knows every physical fact there is to know about colour vision; she is allowed to see red for the first time
The claim: Mary learns something new about colour vision when she first sees red
The argument: Therefore, not all facts are physical facts, and so physicalism is false.
What it is like for us to see red is not a neurophysiological or functional fact about the brain © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide6. Clarification ‘All the physical facts’: Mary knows all the facts that a completed physics and neuroscience would discover
And she knows all the facts about how things function that are entailed by those facts
If the fundamental nature of the world is entirely physical, then complete physical knowledge would be complete knowledge
So Mary knows everything physical about colour vision, but she learns something new upon seeing red for the first time. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide7. Mary gains ability knowledge Objection: Mary doesn’t learn knowledge of some new fact (knowledge that), but she gains a new ability (know how), e.g. to imagine or recognise red
Reply: this is not all she learns.
You can know what it is like to see red without being able to imagine red
You can be able to imagine red, but don’t know what it is like to see red if you don’t imagine red
So new skills are neither necessary nor sufficient for the knowledge Mary gains © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide8. Mary gains acquaintance knowledge Objection: Mary doesn’t learn about a new fact, but becomes directly aware of red (acquaintance knowledge)
Suppose what it is like to see red is some property of the brain. Mary knows about this property, but her brain has never had this property, so she isn’t acquainted with it
Churchland: Knowing the neuroscience won’t help you experience or identify phenomenal properties in consciousness. Your brain needs to undergo the processes that the theory describes as constituting colour experience. But the theory is complete. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide9. Two replies Reply 1: acquaintance knowledge includes knowing a new fact – what it is like to see red
Reply 2: the argument isn’t about Mary’s experience. Instead, Mary learns something new about other people’s colour experience.
There is a fact about human colour experience that Mary doesn’t know. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide10. There is more than one way of knowing the same fact The concept of water is a different concept from that of H2O, but they are the same property.
Two ways of thinking about the same ‘stuff’
To know that there is water in the glass is not to know that there is H2O
These are different facts, counting by concepts (how we think about the world)
These are the same fact, counting by properties (how the world is) © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide11. There is more than one way of knowing the same fact Mary has a theoretical concept of red
Wavelengths of light, neurons firing, etc.
On seeing red, Mary gains a new, phenomenal concept of red
A concept based on experiencing something
Mary can think about seeing red in a new way, but she is thinking about the same physical property in the world © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide12. There is more than one way of knowing the same fact Physicalism is about what exists (properties), not about how we think about what exists (concepts)
So even if Mary learns something new, this doesn’t show that physicalism is false © Michael Lacewing<br>