1 2 Varieties of descriptivism 3 21 Cluster descriptivism 3032 6167 3 22 Meaning vs reference64257xing 53 5760 3 23 Circular an ID: 76350
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1.Wehavebeentalkingthroughoutthisclassaboutthereferenceofpropernames.Wehavebeenassumingthat`Je Speaks'referstome,thatthename`Aristotle'referstoAristotle,thatthename`Hesperus'referstotheplanetVenus,andsoon.Andthisiscertainlycorrect:thesenamesdorefertothesethings.Butthiscanseemkindofamazing.Thinkaboutthename`Hesperus'.Itreferstoanenormousobjectoutinspacethatwecanoccasionallysee.Howdidthisseriesofsounds,orthisbunchofmarksontheboard,getlinkedupwiththisobject?Noone ewoutthereandputalabelontheplanet.Andjustthink:peoplecanlearnthisname,anduseittorefertothisfarawayobject,eveniftheyhaveneverseenit,andknowhardlyanythingaboutit.Soevenforthesepeople,whoseeminglyhavenocontactwiththeplanetitself,thereissomeimportantconnectionbetweenthiswordandtheplanet.Thisisdeeplypuzzling;howdidthislinkgetsetup?Or,asKripkeputsit,howdoesthereferenceofanamegetxed?AsKripkepointsout,itisanimportantstrengthfortheclassicalpictureofnamingthatithasastorytotellaboutthis.Accordingtotheclassicalview,weassociatedescriptionswithnames,andthereferencesofnamesarexedbythosedescriptions.Inthecaseof`Hesperus',weassociatewithitthedescription`thesecondplanetfromthesun',or`thebrighteststarintheeveningsky',orsomethinglikethat.It'snotsopuzzlinghowwecanassociatethesedescriptionswithnames;wejuststipulatethatwearegoingtouse`Hesperus'asanameforthesecondplanetfromthesun,forexample.Andthisisenoughtomakethisdescriptionthemeaningofthename,andenoughtoxthereferentviathedescription.Sotheclassicalpictureseemstosuccessfullydissolvethispuzzleaboutreference.2.ThesecondmotivationbehindtheclassicalviewmentionedbyKripkeechoesFrege'sconcernwithidentitystatements.Itseemsclearthat,whenonesays`HesperusisPhosphorus',oneisnotjust,trivially,assertingtheidentityofanobjectwithitself.Rather,oneissayingsomethingsubstantive,sayingsomethingwhichcouldbetheresultofadiscovery.Thedescriptiontheoryagainhasanaturalandelegantsolution:insuchcases,weassociatedi erentdescriptionswiththetwonames,anditisoftenasubstantivediscoverythatthesameobjectsatisesthetwodescriptions.3.ThelastmotivationforthedescriptiontheoryisrelatedtoRussell'sproblemofnegativeexistentials.Kripkeaskshowwearetoanalyzeaquestionlike,`DidAris-totleexist?'Itseemsclearthattheanalysiscannotbethatweareaskingofsomeindividualwhetherthatindividualexists|asKripkesays,\oncewe'vegotthething,weknowthatitexisted."Again,theclassicaltheoryisreadywithanaturalanswer.Whatwearereallyasking,saystheclassicaltheory,iswhetheransomeoneexistedwhowasthelastgreatphilosopherofantiquity,whowrotesuchandsuchbooks,whowastheteacherofAlexandertheGreat,andsoon.Despitethesestrengthsoftheview,Kripkesays,\Ithinkit'sprettycertainthattheviewofFregeandRussellisfalse."2 Thediscussionofthestandardmeter;thedistinctionbetweenusingthelengthofasticktoxthereferenceof`onemeter',andusing`thelengthofStickS'asadenitionof`onemeter.'Kripke'sapplicationofthisdistinctiontothecaseofpropernames:\Fregeshouldbecriticizedforusingtheterm`sense'intwosenses.Forhetakesthesenseofadesignatortobeitsmeaning;andhealsotakesittobethewayitsreferenceisdetermined.Identifyingthetwo,hesupposesthatbotharegivenbydenitedescriptions."Thedistinctionbetweentwokindsofdescriptivism:theviewthatthereferenceofanameisxedbythereferenceofitsassociateddescription,andtheviewthatthemeaningofanameisthesameasthemeaningofitsassociateddescription.Thefalsityofthesecondkindofdescriptivismwouldnotentailthefalsityoftherstkind;descriptionsmightxthereferenceofnameswithoutgivingtheirmeaning.2.3Circularandnon-circularversionsofdescriptivism(68-70)Aconstraintonthedenitedescriptionsofwhichthedescriptivistcanmakeuse:thedescriptionsusedmustnotmakeuseoffactsaboutthereferenceofthename.E.g.:`Socrates'justmeans`themanreferredtobythename\Socrates".'Whythesupposi-tionthatthisdescriptioneitherxesthereferenceorgivesthemeaningofthenameisincoherent.3Kripke'sthreeargumentsagainstdescriptivism3.1Themodalargument(48-49,71-77)Onpp.48-49,Kripkeintroducesatechnicaltermwhichwillhavegreatimportanceinwhatfollows:thatofarigiddesignator.Hesays:\Let'scallsomethingarigiddesignatorifineverypossibleworlditdesignatesthesameobject."(48)Someexamplestoillustratethis:`therstpresidentofCanada',`thetalleststudentinthisclass',`thesumof3and5.'Somedescriptions,butnotmost,arerigiddesignators.Nowconsideranamelike`Aristotle.'Isthisarigiddesignator?Kripkethinksthatordinarypropernamesarerigiddesignators:\OneoftheintuitivethesesIwillmaintaininthesetalksisthatnamesarerigiddesignators.Certainlytheyseemtosatisfytheintuitivetestmentionedabove:althoughsomeoneotherthantheU.S.Presidentin1970mighthavebeentheU.S.Presidentin1970...nooneotherthanNixonmighthavebeenNixon."(48)Kripkeishererelyingonanintuitivetestfortherigidityofasingularterm:4 There'safurthertwistontheargument.Sometimesspeakersnotonlydonothaveuniquelysatiseddescriptionstoassociatewithaname,butalsoassociatethewrongdescriptionswiththename:descriptionsthatareinfactnoteventrueofthereferent.TheexampleKripkegivesis`AlbertEinstein.'EvidentlylotsofpeoplethinkthatEinsteinwastheinventoroftheatomicbomb,andthisisthedescriptiontheymostassociatewiththename.Butofcoursejustbecausetheyassociatethisdescriptionwiththename,theydonotusethenametorefertoOppenheimer.TheexampleofPeanoandDedekind.Theseexamplesareallwaysofmakingthesamepoint:thedescriptionsspeakersassociatewithnamesoftendonotevenhavethesamereferenceasthename.3.3Theepistemicargument(86-87)Thereisanotherpowerfulargumentagainstthedescriptiontheory,onwhichKripketouchesonlybrie y.Considerasentenceoftheform,IftheFexists,thentheFisF.Thisappearstobeknowableapriori.Ifso,thenitseemsthateverysentenceofthefollowingformistrue:ItisknowableapriorithatiftheFexists,thentheFisF.Butnowsupposethatnissomenamewhosemeaning,accordingtothedescriptiontheoryofnames,isgivenbythedescription`theF.'Thenourprincipleofreplacingsynonymswithoutchangeoftruth-valueleadsustotheclaimthatthefollowingsentenceistrue:ItisknowableapriorithatiftheFexists,thennisF.Butformanyname/descriptionpairswhichmightbeemployedinadescriptivisttheory,thiswillnothold.Compare:Itisknowableapriorithatifthegreatestphilosopherofantiquityexists,thenthegreatestphilosopherofantiquityisthegreatestphilosopherofantiquity.Itisknowableapriorithatifthegreatestphilosopherofantiquityexists,thenAristotleisthegreatestphilosopherofantiquity.Doesthisworkagainsttheviewthatthereferenceofanameisxedbyitsassociateddescriptionaswellasagainsttheviewthatthemeaningofanameisgivenbyitsassociateddescription?6 Adi erenceinkindbetweenKripke'sexplanationofreferenceandthatofthedescriptivist:oneisgivenintermsoffactsaboutlinguisticcommunities,andoneintermsoffactsaboutthepsychologiesofindividuallanguageusers.Howthisleadstoexternalism.Twomolecule-for-moleculeduplicatescouldmeandi erentthingsbytheirwords.Thisseemstoimplythattheycouldalsohavedi erentthoughts.Isthispuzzling?Notethatwecandothesamethingwithpredicates.Theexamplesof`Arthritis'and`tharthritis.'8