11 th of March 2013 Prepared by Christelle Gaignant Michel Decombaz Fernando B S Pedrosa Observations 12 On the 11 th of March at 1414 the UX25 and adjacent LHC sectors sirens were triggered for a Beam Imminent Warning ID: 544836
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Slide1
Beam Imminent Warning 11th of March 2013
Prepared by:
Christelle
Gaignant
, Michel
Decombaz
, Fernando B. S. PedrosaSlide2
Observations (1/2):
On the 11
th
of March at 14:14 the UX25 and adjacent LHC sectors sirens were triggered for a Beam Imminent Warning;
All people present inside UX25 and US25 access points evacuated correctly with the exception of 2 people on the US25 side;
All people that evacuated went correctly to the SY2 (assembly point);
None of the people present underground at the moment of the evacuation pressed an AUG button or opened a end of zone door;
Neither
the Fire Brigade
nor
the CERN or Experimental control
rooms
had any alarm on the alarm screens;Slide3
Observations (2/2):
There was no warning at the top of the lift to avoid people to go down;
The safety veto on the PX24 and PM25 access points was triggered;
The Fire Brigade was called by the ALICE GLIMOS;
The safety veto was removed before the Fire Brigade had the possibility to go to the PADs and check the people underground;Slide4
Feedback collected after the incident:
Fire Brigade intervention report;
Logbook entry by the CCC operator;
Deviation report;
Feedback from people present at the moment of the BIW underground.Slide5
Lessons learned:
It
is extremely
difficult to understand a Beam Imminent Warning alarm with the little information available during a
stop in the control rooms;
People don’t know how to react to a Beam Imminent Warning alarm;
Not all the people evacuate even if the sirens are quite strong;
The people that evacuate go correctly to the assembly point;
The removal of the safety veto shall be coordinated with the people on the field following an alarm;Slide6
Points under discussion:
Implement
the EIS quality assurance process (managed by BE);
Understand better the BIW evacuation matrix, the interface with the access system and identify improvements if they are needed (ex.: top of the lift sign, …);
Clarify who takes the decision to remove the safety veto and based on which conditions;
Analyze with more detail what happened on the different systems and which were the procedures applied
;
Implement in the new ALICE safety training the BIW part and discuss possible improvements on a general level;