A study in personal identity Beaming Beaming Beaming Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming Same Matter Matter Transport Recruited Matter Information Transport Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming ID: 223734
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Slide1
To Beam or not to Beam?
A study in personal identitySlide2
Beaming:Slide3
Beaming:Slide4
Beaming:Slide5
Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming:
Same Matter,
“Matter Transport”
“Recruited” Matter,
“Information Transport”Slide6
Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming:
Delay
InstantaneousSlide7
Questions:
Which forms of transport is it rational to assume that you will survive?
Instantaneous Matter Transport
Delayed Matter Transport
Instantaneous Information Transport
Delayed Information TransportSlide8Slide9
The Closest Continuer Schema
Proposed by Robert
Nozick
(1938-2002)
Identity is a relation that moves from one time-slice of an object to another time-slice of an object based on overall similarity.Slide10
(easy) Closest Continuer Example:
T1
T2
Closest to T1
Not Even CloseSlide11
Closest Continuer Rules:
Objects at T2 are compared only to other objects at T2 to determine which is the closest continuer to the object at T1Slide12
Closest Continuer Rules:
“Closest” must be clear. The Closest Continuer must be closer than any other claimantSlide13
Closest:
T1
T2
No CLOSEST ContinuerSlide14
Closest Continuer Rules
The Closest Continuer must be close enough (share enough qualitative similarity).Slide15
Continuer:
T1
T2
No ContinuerSlide16
Do you survive transport?
T1
T2
What makes the person-slice at T2 the closest continuer of the person-slice at T1?Slide17
Theories:
Matter Matters
Body Matters (body includes brain)
Brain
MattersSlide18
Theories:
Matter Matters
Body Matters (body includes brain)
Brain Matters
- If
one of these is
your
view,
then you would survive only instantaneous matter transport.Slide19
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Body Matters:Slide20
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Body Matters:
You don’t know who you are until you examine your body (thoroughly)Slide21
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Body Matters:
You don’t know who you are until you examine your body (thoroughly)
You would not survive a brain transplant into another body (human or artificial)Slide22
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Body Matters:
You don’t know who you are until you examine your body (thoroughly)
You would not survive a brain transplant into another body (human or artificial)
You would survive gradual prosthetic replacements, but not sudden ones.Slide23
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Brain Matters
:Slide24
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Brain Matters:
You don’t know who you are until you examine your brain (thoroughly
)Slide25
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
Brain Matters:
You don’t know who you are until you examine your brain (thoroughly)
There is something important about your brain
aside from what it does
. In order to endorse this view you must have an account of what this is, or else you don’t really have a Matter Matters view, but instead…Slide26
Theories:
Mind Matters:
By ‘mind’ we mean psychology. A person’s psychology survives if their personality, memories, habits, beliefs, desires, etc. survive.Slide27
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
Matter Matters views are incorrect. Slide28
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
Matter Matters views are incorrect.
You can survive prosthetic brain
operationsSlide29
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
Matter Matters views are incorrect.
You can survive prosthetic brain operations
You can survive implantation into an android body, or no body at all
.Slide30
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
Matter Matters views are incorrect.
You can survive prosthetic brain operations
You can survive implantation into an android body, or no body at all.
You can survive (at
least instantaneous) information transport.Slide31
Psychological Continuers
When we apply the closest continuer schema to changes in a person over time, we seem to put more weight on psychological properties than outward physical properties
.Slide32
Psychological Continuers
When we apply the closest continuer schema to changes in a person over time, we seem to put more weight on psychological properties than outward physical properties.
If this view is correct, then we ought to have no objection to information transport.Slide33
Objections to Information Transport
There are three major objections to the
mind-over-matter closest
continuer
view:Slide34
Objections to Information Transport
There are three major objections to the
mind-over-matter closest
continuer
view:
The
Principle
of
Independence
Phenomenology
The Exclusion PrincipleSlide35
The Principle of Independence
Kirk body
Kirk mind
Kirk body
Kirk mind
Android body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
In this case, A is Kirk’s closest continuer because it combines Kirk’s psychological AND physical properties, but if A did not survive, then B would be the closest continuer.
A
BSlide36
The Principle of Independence
Kirk body
Kirk mind
Kirk body
Kirk mind
Android body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
In this case, A is Kirk’s closest continuer because it combines Kirk’s psychological AND physical properties, but if A did not survive, then B would be the closest continuer.
The principle of independence states that either A or B should either be Kirk or not be Kirk regardless of the existence of the other entity.
A
BSlide37
The Principle of Independence
The principle of independence only applies if we have a concept of identity, rather than just similarity.Slide38
The Principle of Independence
The principle of independence only applies if we have a concept of identity, rather than just similarity.
If the closest continuer schema is about similarity rather than identity, one might wonder if similarity after transport is enough to mean survival.Slide39
Phenomenology
Phenomenology refers to
what it is like
to have your mental states.Slide40
Phenomenology
Phenomenology refers to
what it is like
to have your mental states.
People commonly think that if they were turned into a functionally identical android, their mental states would feel different to them.Slide41
Phenomenology
Since information transport and
androidization
are no different from the perspective of the closest continuer theory, then if you don’t survive
androidization
, you wouldn’t survive information transport either.Slide42
Phenomenology
This objection sounds plausible to many, but it suffers from problems with its internal consistency.Slide43
Phenomenology
This objection sounds plausible to many, but it suffers from problems with its internal consistency.
Namely, if all of your mental states felt different, they wouldn’t BE your old mental states. Slide44
The Exclusion Principle
Since beaming looks like magic, we can accept that the same person that disappears, reappears.
Since
androidization
looks like science, we cannot accept that the same person that has their parts replaced, persists.Slide45
The Exclusion Principle
Since beaming looks like magic, we can accept that the same person that disappears, reappears.
Since
androidization
looks like science, we cannot accept that the same person that has their parts replaced, persists.
The Exclusion Principle states that we can believe in the results of magical, but not of man-made processes.Slide46
The Exclusion Principle
Obviously, Hanley doesn’t think much of the Exclusion Principle.
There seems to be no rational basis for accepting the Exclusion Principle.Slide47
Hanley’s conclusion
Since psychological properties are evidently preserved in matter transport, information transport, and
androidization
, it is rational to accept each procedure, and superstitious to refuse.Slide48
Objection to Hanley
If the mind-over-matter closest continuer schema is correct, then any kind of delayed transport poses a problem: For some length of time, there is no continuer at all.Slide49
Objection to Hanley
If the mind-over-matter closest continuer schema is correct, then any kind of delayed transport poses a problem: For some length of time, there is no continuer at all.
By analogy, this view would indicate that we do not survive periods of coma, sleep, or other unconsciousness.Slide50
Objection to Hanley
So if we do indeed survive matter or information transport, delayed or instantaneous, then it is for reasons other than psychological closest-continuation.Slide51
Objection to Hanley
So if we do indeed survive matter or information transport, delayed or instantaneous, then it is for reasons other than psychological closest-continuation.
What could those reasons be?Slide52
Wrap-up on metaphysics
The things we say, think, and base decisions on in everyday life require metaphysical assumptions. Slide53
Wrap-up on metaphysics
The things we say, think, and base decisions on in everyday life require metaphysical assumptions.
Metaphysical
problems are not isolated to philosophy class. Slide54
Wrap-up on metaphysics
Not all metaphysical assumptions are equally good.Slide55
Wrap-up on metaphysics
Not all metaphysical assumptions are equally good.
There are many things we can’t be sure of, so we must do the best we can to be creative and critical so as to at least do the best we can.