The Path to Open Contracting - PDF document

The Path to Open ContractingA Learning
The Path to Open ContractingA Learning HistoryGOVERNANCE FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIESWorld Bank InstitutePeter W. PruynIndependent ResearcherJANUARY 20132TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................................1 ...................................................................3 ............................................................................4 5 4The Global Context of Extractives Industries: 2005-2012 5The Organizational Context of the World Bank Institute (WBI) 6The Team Context of Governance for Extractive Industries (GEI) 8 .10 The Change Lab Process 15 Present-Day 18 Lessons Learned .....................................................................23 8Lessons Learned for WBI 23 8Lessons Learned for Civil Society Organizations 25 8Lessons Learned for the Global Citizen 26 .........................................................................2710 28Resources 313LIST OF FIGURESFigure 1: The global context of the World Bank and the World Bank Institute (WBI). ..................6Figure 2: Characteristics of traditional World Bank organizational culture. ..........................7Figure 3: Characteristics of the emerging WBI organizational culture of innovation. ....................7Figure 4: The organizational context of the Governance for Extractive Industries (GEI) team within WBI . ....9Figure 5: Timeline of events relating to WBI and open contracting, 2009-2012. ....................10Figure 6: African countries involved in the Liberia and Uganda regional conferences on open contracting. . ..13Figure 7: Four ways of talking and listening that are utilized in a Change Lab. ......................16Figure 8: A representation of the evolution of the Change Lab process over time. . ...................17Figure 9: The GOXI (Governance of Extractive Industries) Community of Practice homepage. ............19Figure 10: The Pro-Act.org Community of Practice homepage. .................................20Figure 11: A current conception of the Open Contracting process for in-country coalitions. .............21Figure 12: A ctional national coalition made up of representative me

mber organizations from the public, pri
mber organizations from the public, private and civil sectors. ..........................................................22Figure 13: The four-part man and donkey sculpture in the lobby of the World Bank Institute. ...........294EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOver the last several years, the global community has become increasingly aware of the need for greater transpar-ency and accountability in government contracting for oil, gas and mining. In July of 2009 the World Bank Institute (WBI) formed a Governance for Extractive Industries (GEI) team whose purpose was to develop innovative solutions for better governance of the sector. Responding to the needs around contracting issues soon became a core focus. Over the next two and half years, GEI facilitated a series of events with multiple stakeholders from the public sector, the private sector and civil society. Working in collaboration with the consultancy Reos Partners, these multi-stakeholder events utilized a group process known as a Change Lab. A Change Lab leads a diverse group of participants through three distinct phases of complex problem-solving and action: divergence, emergence and convergence. Some of the Change Lab events WBI convened over this period of time included:a rst-of-its kind global design meeting in Wilton Park, U.K. from which the concept of contract monitor-ing emerged as a shared solution,regional meetings for national coalitions in West and East Africa to develop each nation’s open contract-ing agenda, andcapacity-building workshops for these national coalitions.As a result of applying the Change Lab process on an iterative basis with diverse groups of stakeholders, the main innovation that emerged to generate “a better deal for Africa” in oil, gas and mining was the notion of “open con-tracting.” Open contracting is dened as the norms, practices and methodologies for increased transparency and monitoring in public contracting including contract award, disclosure and implementation. Open contracting is a means for strengthening procurement outcomes and service delivery, resulting in a more effective use of public resources on a global basis. WBI and a growing network of partners are now leading a global open contracting

effort, bringing together key stakeholde
effort, bringing together key stakeholders working on this issue, facilitating the development of global norms, and providing country-level capacity development assistance.This document is a learning history about how the concept of open contracting evolved to become an on-going collaborative effort across governments, the private sector, and civil society. Based primarily on interviews with World Bank staff, it is designed to document:successes so that they may be repeated,failures so that they may be avoided, andthe process that gave rise to innovation so that it may be replicated in other contexts.As a learning history, it is not intended to be a program evaluation nor is it an attempt to be comprehensive. In-stead, it chronicles the essential events, individuals and processes necessary to create a narrative and provide a context for lessons-learned. Some of these lessons-learned include:the critical importance of an effective group process.the importance of supportive management that is willing to nurture an entrepreneurial culture that “pro-vides a safe space to fail.”the challenge of navigating a culture clash between WBI’s emerging culture of innovation and the tradi-tional programmatic culture of the World Bank.the importance of supporting multi-stakeholder in-country coalitions to continue the work at the local level. Supporting such coalitions requires a long-term (5-7 year) commitment in order to build their capacity to take ownership of the work and carry it forward. the value of applying aspects of the collaborative Change Lab approach not only with clients but inter-nally within the World Bank itself, including the creation of cross-sectoral “hot teams.”5the challenge of not being able to predict specic outcomes when using multi-stakeholder approaches, requiring a gentle balance between a convening organization facilitating a Change Lab event versus try-ing to control it thereby stiing innovation. Such emergent processes also make it difcult to measure progress using quantitative metrics. the importance of humility and an open mind. As one WBI staff member put it, “Sometimes you stick to old ideas because they’re what you’ve always done and always tho

ught, but if you challenge it, you may
ught, but if you challenge it, you may nd that you need to change your idea to be consistent with your values.”The use of the multi-stakeholder Change Lab process to develop Open Contracting serves as an example of a potential way forward in an increasingly inter-dependent globalized world, a way forward that reframes complex problems using collaborative solutions. By sharing this story, it is hoped that it may further inspire others tackling tough social problems that are beyond any one of us to solve alone.6The Big ConversationOn June 2, 2010, forty-ve men and women sat in an irregular circle of chairs around the outside of a large ornate room at Wilton Park, a conference center for global dialogue in West Sussex, U.K. They had come at the invitation of the World Bank Institute, the capacity building arm of the World Bank, and the African Development Bank for the broad purpose of discussing “Getting a better deal for Africa” in mining and petroleum contracting.In addition to representatives from the World Bank and the UN, it consisted of representatives from the private sector, seven African and European governments, and sixteen civil society organizations (CSOs) including two universities. The event had been named, “The Big Conversation.” This was the rst time stakeholders from such diverse organizations across public, private and civil society sectors were in the same room together to discuss this topic, each with their own agenda. Some civil society organizations regarded African governments as corrupt and untrust-worthy. On their part, governments sometimes saw such non-prots as “noise-makers,” getting in the way of critically needed economic development. Meanwhile, the private sector felt apprehensive about what economic demands might be made of them in a competitive marketplace. While participants were curious, there was a great deal of wariness in the room. What exactly was this gath-ering? Was the World Bank trying to come up with its own new contracting standard, another initiative in an already crowded eld? What the participants didn’t know was that World Bank Institute (WBI) management had its share of skepticism about this gathering, too. The agend

a for this three-day conference was spar
a for this three-day conference was sparse, lacking the multiple expert presen-tations typically expected for World Bank consultations. Even more unsettling was the absence of specic desired outcomes. Instead, the three days were described by the organizers as a collaborative “Change Lab”—without participants really understanding what that meant. Management wanted to know: would all these important people feel like it had been worth coming?Over the next three days something shifted. People opened-up. They spoke frankly of their struggles. Participants got to know each other not just as representatives of various organizations but as people. As one participant put it, the Change Lab process “created this bubble, a moment in time where people were locked up with each other and with their ideas, the ideas that people always carry around but never have the opportunity to bring out.” They began to engage more creatively. Gradually the group began to piece together a shared understanding—an understanding not only of the whole picture and its complexity but also of a shared sense of possibility. Out of this complexity a rallying point emerged that served all their agendas, a way forward that appeared to bring everyone closer to “a better deal for Africa.” That way forward would eventually come to be known as “open contracting.” With governments, private sector and civil society in the room, there was no one raising any real objections. The only concerns were around how to do it, not whether to do it. Over these three days, participants came to see that they were actually better aligned than they thought they were. As one WBI staff-member put it, “This was not the World Bank telling anybody how to do anything; it was bringing people together to discuss these topics and then see where it would go.” In the end, an idea whose time had come was brought to the surface, an idea that reected the changing economic and political conditions in which tha participants operated. Perspectives had shifted, and all the while the solution lay within the group, not any one party. As one African participant put it, “I’ve never seen a World Bank like this.”7OverviewThi

s is the story of how the concept of ope
s is the story of how the concept of open contracting evolved to become an on-going collaborative effort across governments, the private sector, and civil society. This is the story of how a relatively small but committed team of WBI staff and consultants strived, struggled, and succeeded in facilitating this process over the course of more than two years and how they are still learning the way forward in collaboration with coalitions of diverse stake-holders. This is also the story of the Change Lab process that not only created the initial space for such innovation to occur but has permeated successive efforts, all supported by an organizational culture of innovation.This learning history is based primarily on interviews with ten World Bank staff conducted during the sum-mer of 2012, as well as making use of evaluations and interviews with a range of stakeholders that were already captured at key events. To make this inquiry as widely applicable as possible, four overarching ques-tions have guided its creation:Where does innovation come from?Where does social—as opposed to purely technological—innovation come from?Where does social innovation come from in a globalized world?Can large organizations or governments “do” social innovation?As a learning history, this document is not intended to be a program evaluation nor is it an attempt to be compre-hensive. Instead, it chronicles the essential events, individuals and processes necessary to create a narrative and provide a context for lessons-learned. It’s purpose is to document:successes so that they may be repeated,failures so that they may be avoided, andthe process that gave rise to innovation so that it may be replicated in other contexts.This is the story of a potential way forward in an increasingly inter-dependent globalized world, a way forward that reframes complex problems using collaborative solutions. By sharing this story, it is hoped that it may inspire others to tackle tough social problems that are beyond any one of us to solve alone.8CONTEXTThe Global Context of Extractives Industries: 2005-2012In 2005-2006, world commodity prices began to rise. By 2007, many developing nations began to question the contracts they had made previ

ously with corporations in the mining, g
ously with corporations in the mining, gas and oil industries, known collectively as extractives. Prior to that, the focus of these nations had been on simply getting the investments in the rst place. Now the concern was, “Are these deals fair?” In addition, corporations were sometimes seen as taking advantage of political instability in contract negotiations. Some governments reacted to these market changes by raising corporate taxes in order to capture a greater share of the prots. Others experimented with renegotiating contracts, often with positive results. Then in 2008 the global nancial crises caused commodity prices to drop. Suddenly countries that had wanted to be more aggres-sive towards investors now feared losing them. During this time, members of the World Bank considered their role. Many felt the traditional mechanisms of con-tracting were unfair and needed to be changed. Meanwhile many in the extractives sector were more fatalistic: once a deal is done, it’s done and can’t be changed. Prices go up and down, and that’s life. In 2009, the civil society organization Revenue Watch published a groundbreaking report, “Contracts Conden-tial: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries”, which spotlighted the role that contract condentiality played in these dynamics. Gradually, a consensus emerged in the World Bank community: “You can’t defend a deal that isn’t fair. Flexibility needs to be built-in to contracts, somehow.” That left the details of “how.” The GEI team recognized that enhancing disclosure, understanding and monitoring of the deals could empower country stakeholders to help ensure that contracting parties for existing deals would be held to account to meet those terms, inform the debate on the contracting process with a view to better future deals for governments, private sector and citizens alike.9The Organizational Context of the World Bank Institute (WBI)The World Bank was founded in 1944 for the purpose of reducing global poverty by providing loans to developing nations for capital programs. The World Bank Institute (WBI) is traditionally the capacity development branch of the World Bank committed to it

6;s role as a connector to global knowle
6;s role as a connector to global knowledge and learning. Originally founded in 1955 as the Economic Development Institute, WBI provided learning programs, policy advice and technical as-sistance to policy makers, government and non-government agencies. It was renamed the World Bank Institute in 2000. Figure 1 represents the global context of WBI within the World Bank and the geographic regions that will be most involved in this story. Throughout this document, such circle diagrams will be used to depict the boundar-ies of global, regional, national, and organizational systems and sub-systems.The World BankAfrica RegionWest AfricaThe World Figure 1: The global context of the World Bank and the World Bank Institute (WBI).East AsiaSoutheast Asia10At the time the World Bank was founded, the paradigm of development was seen more simply: provide funds to gov-ernments and advise them on projects. The resulting organizational culture that supported this paradigm is charac-terized in Figure 2. Working within this culture, WBI initially focused its efforts on capacity-building through training. TRADITIONAL WORLD BANK CULTUREgovernment-focusedlending programsprescriptivetask-focusedemphasis on operations/executiontechnical expertisesiloed departmentsrisk-averseshorter-term focus (3 years) to accommodate budget cyclesFigure 2: Characteristics of traditional World Bank organizational culture.In 2008, Sanjay Pradhan was appointed Vice President of WBI. By then the role of the Bank had signicantly evolved. Money was no longer seen so denitively as the primary instrument of development. As a result, Pradhan refocused WBI’s efforts on knowledge-sharing, collaborative governance and social innovation. WBI’s traditional training and capacity-building role was recast as an incubator for social and economic change. Figure 3 summa-rizes characteristics of this new start-up culture of innovation. EMERGING CULTURE OF INNOVATIONmulti-stakeholder/tri-sector/system-focusedcoalition-focusedfacilitating coalition-driven agendasrelationship-focusedemphasis on innovationaction-learningpractices and collaborative clustersentrepreneuriallonger-term focus (5-7 years) to allow for capacity-buildingFigure 3: Characterist

ics of the emerging WBI organizational c
ics of the emerging WBI organizational culture of innovation.11The Team Context of Governance for Extractive Industries (GEI)WBI is organized into broad capacity-building Practices. Examples of WBI Practices include Public-Private Part-nerships, Growth & Competitiveness, Health Systems, Climate Change, and Innovation. The programming co-vered in this history is housed in the Open Government Practice. During the reorganization of WBI, Pradhan and the Vice President of Africa Region agreed to create a WBI team that would focus on innovation relating specically to the governance of extractive industries. Beyond suggesting the use of coalitions and multi-stakeholder approaches, WBI management did not direct this team as to how it should go about its work, only to attempt to do so in a more holistic, creative way. Supported by Randi Ryterman, Director of Governance, Innovation, & Fragile & Conict Affected States, the intention was to create a safe space for this team to experiment, fail, and learn while simultaneously being mindful of others in the global community who were already working in this arena. With this one-sentence mandate, in July, 2009 the Governance for Extractive Industries team (GEI) was born. Initially the team was just its team leader, Michael Jarvis, with support from Kathrin Frauscher and Cindy Kroon. As a relatively young candidate for this position, Jarvis was deliberately chosen by Pradhan and Ryterman in the belief that he would be able to develop new stakeholder relationships unencumbered by older management para-digms. Inherent in GEI’s experimental formation was a team structure in which staff roles were largely undened. While sometimes creating its share of anxiety, this lack of denition also gave GEI staff enormous exibility that was unusual for a more traditional Bank department. Figure 4 depicts the organizational context of the Governance for Extractive Industries (GEI) team within WBI including a sampling of other teams whose work touches on contracting in different economic sectors.ProcurementPublic-Private ose work touches on contracting in different economic sectors. 12CHRONOLOGYThe Big Conversation at Wilton Park occurred twelve months into a two-and-a-half-ye

ar long process. A timeline of events r
ar long process. A timeline of events relating to WBI and open contracting between 2009 and 2012 appears in Figure 5, below. Some of these events were convened by GEI, others by other parts of WBI, still others by civil society organizations. Here we provide a brief overview of some of these events and the impact they had on the development of the concept of open contracting.July, 2009GEI Global Consultation Round-Table, Washington, DCNov.Publish What You Pay Conference, Montréal, CanadaNov.Open Doors, Asia Procurement, Hong Kongfollowed by a similar meeting in Daka, Bangladesh for South AsiaDecGEI Regional Africa Consultation, Accra, Ghanapractitioners pinpointed the need for a forum for innovation and collaboration across stakeholders groups, countries and initiatives, resulting in the creation of the GOXI Community of PracticeSpring, 2010Consultations around procurement monitoring for Africa, Nairobi, Kenyaconvened by Robert Hunja, Cluster Leader, Open GovernmentJune, 2010The Big Conversation, Wilton Park, UKConvened by GEI, focus on extractivesNov.Regional Contract Monitoring Meeting for West Africa, LiberiaFirst common meeting of extractives and procurementMay, 2011Regional Contract Monitoring for East and Southern African, UgandaJuly, 2011Ofcial launch of collaborative WBI “Hot Team” on Open ContractingIncludes Extractives, Procurement, Pharmaceuticals, Climate Change/Forestry and Public-Private PartnershipsNov.Capacity Building Workshop for coalitions in East and West Africa, KenyaMay, 2012Open Contracting Design MeetingFramed Open Contracting as a cross-sectoral issue relevant to the global agendaOctober, 2012First Global Meeting of Open Contracting in Johannesburg, South AfricaLaunched Open Contracting and established the key progress frontsMarch, 2013Upcoming meeting of the Open Contracting Steering Group in London, EnglandUpcoming meetings on the Open Contracting Principles and Open Data StandardsFigure 5: Timeline of events relating to WBI and open contracting, 2009-2012. 13In July of 2009, GEI convened a Global Consultation Round-Table in Washington, DC. This was the rst time GEI sought input on what should be the focus of its work. For the CSOs who attended there was a larg

e amount of suspicion regarding the Ban
e amount of suspicion regarding the Bank’s engagement in extractives. Meanwhile some WB staff were unsure about the Bank’s role in the extractives sector. The general feedback for WBI from this event was: “Go back to the drawing board”; go back to Africa, consult, and rethink the Bank’s value-add to governance in extractives. In November of that same year, a global conference of CSOs was convened in Montréal by Publish What You Pay, an international coalition of CSOs from around the world working on the issue of revenue transparency in the extractives sector. An unprecedented 200 participants representing 65 countries attended. At this conference Michael Jarvis and Kathrin Frauscher from GEI presented. They outlined the need to build accountability in the extractives sector and proposed GEI as a potential convener and facilitator of multi-stakeholder approaches to try and do so. They then asked the audience for feedback on whether this proposal met their needs on the ground and solicited input on how multi-stakeholder approaches might work in their own countries. For many in attendance, this was the rst time they had heard the World Bank say, “We are willing to do more in governance in extractives.” They also heard, “We are committed to learn from our failures; we are trying to facilitate, and in the end it is your work.” This was something new for the CSO community to hear. It prompted simultaneous reactions of “Wow!” and “We’ll see…” fueled by skepticism of the Bank’s long-term political will to do this work. CSOs, government and industry representatives were invited to continue this conversation at a follow-up consulta-tion convened by GEI in Accra, Ghana in December, 2009. The Accra consultation conrmed an accountability gap in contracting that merited greater focus. This inspired the topic of what would become the Big Conversation. Accra also highlighted the need for a shared space for those working on governance issues in oil, gas and min-ing to connect across stakeholders, countries and initiatives. This led to the creation of a community of practice around Governance for Extractive Industries or “GOXI”. GOXI would be of&#

31;cially launched at the Big Conversati
31;cially launched at the Big Conversation and will be described in more detail below.By the spring of 2010, GEI knew that it wanted to convene a meeting of diverse stakeholders and engage in high-quality “crowd-sourcing,” that is, mining the “wisdom of the crowd” made up of diverse stakeholders to shape its efforts. While the WB engages in consultations all the time, such meetings are traditionally soliciting feedback on projects that have already been conceived. GEI aspired to something different: to co-design a way forward in extractives contracting in collaboration with a broad coalition of stakeholders. To help design and facilitate such a group process, GEI engaged Reos Partners, a consultancy that specializes in multi-stakeholder change processes with business, government and civil society organizations. Utilizing the Reos Change Lab process (detailed in the next section), Reos partner Joe McCarron and John Grifn of Grifn-Frischmuth Consulting facilitated the Big Conversation Meeting at Wilton Park in June of 2010. The immediate results of The Big Conversation were positive. What was emerging was a progression from GEI focusing on governance of extractives broadly, to focusing on the contracting stage in particular, to the monitoring of contracts, specically, as the best place for GEI to help build capacity and add value. This created a great deal of enthusiasm and furthered the central concept of open contracting. Following The Big Conversation, however, it became apparent that there was a lack of infrastructure and funding in place to follow-through on all the ideas and proposals that had been generated. This resulted in a loss of momentum for some of these proposals, some of which fell by the wayside. However, because GEI took ownership of facilitating additional conversations on open contracting, this idea survived. Simultaneously, and unbeknownst to GEI at the time, other WBI teams were beginning to engage in similar con-versations around contract monitoring and transparency in the area of government procurement. Led by Robert Hunja, these colleagues were trying to address the challenge of understanding how to enhance citizen engage-ment around these issues. It became apparent that

different parts of the World Bank were
different parts of the World Bank were meeting with the same clients around the topic of contract monitoring without knowing they were doing so. Notably, some of those invited to the Big Conversation were also invited to a procurement consultation meeting held in Nairobi just weeks before. Getting over the initial embarrassment, it was decided that WBI should work towards joint meetings on contract monitoring that would include extractives, procurement and other sectors. 14While Wilton Park identied contract monitoring as the strategy, the “how” piece still needed to be addressed. GEI therefore planned two follow-up regional meetings to co-create the “how” on a local level. To do so, GEI made the decision to partner not only with the WBI procurement team but also with the Operational Services team of World Bank Africa Region. GEI’s explicit intention to convene a mix of relevant stakeholders was designed to create diverse national coalitions to further the work in each country. This collection of diverse stakeholders would help “map out the current reality” of each country, identify opportunities to bring positive change, and then develop action plans for implementation. Over time, these country coalitions could then function as structures for on-going peer learning. It is worth noting that Africa Region agreed to adopt the Change Lab process begun at Wilton Park because they had been intrigued by the positive feedback they had heard about it and because they had previously seen the limitations of more traditional formats used. The rst of these regional meetings, focusing on West Africa, was held in Liberia in November of 2011. This was the rst meeting attended by WBI staff from both extractives as well as procurement. The second meeting, focus-ing on East and Southern Africa, was held in Uganda. (Since Zambia was the only Southern African country, it participated in the East Africa meeting.) As these meetings were the second and third time the Change Lab pro-cess had been used, the process was generally more accepted by WBI staff and participants. Each of these two meetings produced more detailed next steps for forming in-country coalitions to carry open contracting forward i

n each country. Figure 6 depicts the A
n each country. Figure 6 depicts the African nations involved in these efforts. West AfricaTanzaniaFigure 6: African countries involved in the Liberia and Uganda regional conferences on open contracting. 15As a result of these efforts, the continued use of the Change Lab process began to have an impact on WBI, inter-nally. Robert Hunja’s role as team leader in procurement shifted to a more managerial cross-cutting role for open governance work more generally. Marcela Rozo, who came from a civil society background and had attended the West Africa meeting for her coalition-building expertise, was hired to lead the procurement team. This sequence of events is noteworthy because it was a sign that WBI’s hiring process was adapting to match the Change Lab approach, as opposed to bringing in a more typical hire with experience strictly as a government ofcial in pro-curement. In addition, to further cross-sectoral collaboration around open contracting within WBI, in July, 2011 WBI launched an internal collaborative “Hot Team” on open contracting. This Hot Team included representatives from the WBI teams previously depicted in Figure 4, above: Extractives, Procurement, Pharmaceuticals, Climate Change/Forestry and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). The Hot Team was the result of a shift in WBI manage-ment to provide incentives for the creation of such teams with their own budgets. This shift was motivated in part by noticing the collaboration that had emerged organically between GEI and the procurement team. This rein-forced the belief that a cross-sectoral approach within WBI could enhance impact through greater collaboration. As these in-country coalitions began their work, it became clear that they needed capacity-building support. To better understand and address the on-going needs of the coalitions, in November, 2011 WBI hosted a capacity-building workshop for coalitions in East and West Africa in Kenya.By early 2012, WBI and partners, such as the German federal development agency, GIZ, saw the value in framing contract disclosure and monitoring as a global issue. This inter-agency collaboration was deliberate based on an important lesson-learned from earlier country engagements: in order for action

plans to be sustainable, the bur-den f
plans to be sustainable, the bur-den for follow-up and ownership needs to be shared beyond just WBI. Through widespread consultations, these partners came to dene open contracting as the norms, practices and methodologies for increased disclosure and participation in public contracting including contract award, disclosure and implementation. Open contracting was seen as a means for strengthening procurement outcomes and service delivery, resulting in a more effective use of public resources on a global basis. In May of 2012, WBI and GIZ hosted an Open Contracting Design Meeting in Washington, DC. The intention of this meeting was to bring together key experts and practitioners in the eld to further the conversation on the driving principles of open contracting. The meeting provided an opportunity for participants to map the challenges and opportunities of advancing a global open contracting agenda. This would set the stage for a public announcement about open contracting in the Fall of 2012. It is worth not-ing that this public launch followed several months of discussion about whether to refer to open contracting as a partnership, a program, or an initiative. By calling it simply “Open Contracting,” the intention was to dene it as a collectively-owned global movement, not merely a product of the World Bank. That movement was ofcially launched at the First Global Meeting on Open Contracting that brought together over 200 stakeholders from government, industry, civil society, academia and media in Johannesburg in 2012.16THE CHANGE LAB PROCESSMulti-stakeholder change processes are not new. Whether referred to as “tri-sector dialogues” (meaning across pub-lic, private and civil sectors) or as a kind of “crowd-sourcing,” many organizations have experimented with solving large-scale social problems by facilitating collaborative conversations with a microcosm of a larger social system. As just two examples, for a number of years the Kellogg Foundation has engaged in multi-stakeholder change processes in a variety of contexts. For example, its Leadership for Community Change Program formed diverse multi-stakeholder cohorts in six communities in the United States. Over two years, t

hese cohorts collectively cre-ated and
hese cohorts collectively cre-ated and pursued action plans to improve public education within their communities. As another example, the Boston-based non-prot Ceres works with coalitions of non-prots, corporations and nancial institutions to in-novate market-driven solutions to address climate change. While the details of the group processes used in these cases vary, the underlying mechanism is the same: getting the right people together in the same room. One Ceres ofcial characterized the power of such an approach very simply: “When all stakeholders are in one room, the conversation shifts from ‘What they should be doing is....’ to trying to guring out, ‘What should we be doing?’”The Reos Change Lab process has its legacy in the organizational learning work of Peter Senge of MIT, the dia-logue research of William Isaacs at the MIT Organizational Learning Center, and the social change work of Otto Scharmer of MIT and the Presencing Institute.Most conversations consist of people simply saying what they already know. To innovate new ideas that serve a whole group, participants need new ways of talking and listening. To do so, a central aspect of a Change Lab is taking participants through Isaacs’ model of the four phases of dialogue (see Figure 7). Scharmer refers to these sequential phases as: 1) downloading, 2) debating, 3) dialogue and 4) generative dialogue. Downloading represents the simplest way of talking: saying what you already know. Debating can be thought of as the result-ing clash between these pre-existing ideas. Dialogue, literally “the free ow of meaning,” represents a shift into collaborative conversation, where each contribution builds on what has already been said. Finally, generative dialogue employs dialogue to innovate new ideas that could not have been realized by any one party on their own. 4 ways of Talking + ListeningFigure 7: Four ways of talking and listening that are utilized in a Change Lab.17These four ways of talking and listening support three phases of a Change Lab: divergence, emergence and convergence. In the divergence phase, participants throw out all their pet topics, voice their concerns, and frequently dis-ag

ree. This stage can result in a great de
ree. This stage can result in a great deal of ambiguity and frustration on the part of participants. To assuage such anxiety it is common for facilitators to repeat the mantra, “Trust the process!” In reality, such struggle is a prerequisite for what is to come.The emergence phase can be thought of as “cooking”: what happens when all these divergent points of view and agendas are allowed to stew for a while in the same “pot”? Invariably, there is a degree of complexity that is too overwhelming to work with. Over time, this complexity acts as a lter to allow actionable ideas to bubble up to the surface, ideas that point to a collective way forward. As those few workable ideas are identied and honed, participants naturally converge around those ideas that have the most energy for the group as a whole. Through this shared struggle and eventual convergence arises a powerful sense of shared commitment. As one Wilton Park participant put it, the Big Conversation “felt like a partnership rather than a neo-colonial relationship.”Implementing a Change Lab can then be broken down into seven steps:Bring representatives of the system together. The goal is to have the right people in the room. Therefore it is critical to take the time to choose the best representatives of the larger system before proceeding. It may take many months to identify them. Present the problem area to the group. This, too, must be based on extensive, local research.Have the group map out the problem area to create a shared understanding of the system and its complexity. Prioritize which aspects the group will take on. Brainstorm solutions. Rene those solutions into those that are actionable. Some problems may be too big to address.Dene commitments around making progress on the solutions.More than simply a checklist or meeting structure, however, the Change Lab methodology has the potential to make a long-term impact that goes far beyond any one single event or even series of events. If used consistently, over time Change Labs can become a mechanism for culture change, both for the conveners as well as the par-ticipants. Each Change Lab trains those present to approach innovation from a facilitative, col

laborative stance. As a result, over th
laborative stance. As a result, over the last two years Change Lab methodologies have percolated into both team meetings within WBI as well as the work of in-country coalitions. This pattern of each Change Lab event spawning series of Change Labs elsewhere is the long-term impact of employing a multi-stakeholder approach. The resulting overall dynamic is evocative of the concept of a fractal structure, that is, a structure that looks like itself at different scales. This long-term dynamic is ultimately of far greater importance than the execution of any one single event or initiative because it has given rise to a global Open Contracting space for innovation. Figure 8 depicts the way the Change Lab process has replicated over the span of this learning history.18Small TeamWilton ParkProcurementFigure 8: A representation of the converging evolution of the Change Lab process over time. PRESENT-DAYOne might ask, “What exactly is ‘open contracting’?” In some ways it is an agenda, in other ways a partnership, and in still other ways it is a space for innovation. One might think of it as both a noun and a verb, a thing and a process. Over time, it may also become a global movement with global standards. To support the continued evolution of open contracting as well as further the learning of stakeholders, WBI is cur-rently supporting the growth of two Communities of Practice (CoP). Each CoP has an associated online presence. The rst CoP was designed to support collaboration amongst practitioners interested in governance for extractive industries, which led to its acronym, GOXI. Arising from the Fall 2009 consultation in Washington, goxi.org allows its more than 1400 members from government, industry, civil society, parliament, media, academia and think tanks to share knowledge and information through networking, discussion forums, and blog posts. Goxi.org acts as a tool for its members to keep up to speed on what is happening it the extractives sector, and its membership has grown rapidly over 2011-2012. Figure 9 is a screenshot of the GOXI homepage.19Figure 9: The GOXI (Governance of Extractive Industries) Community of Practice homepage. To provide similar support to practitioners focusing on governmen

t procurement, WBI launched the Pro-Act
t procurement, WBI launched the Pro-Act com-munity of practice at the 2011 consultation in Uganda. Pro-Act.org is a similar platform to Goxi.org, providing on online space for procurement stakeholders to share, learn and innovate around developing transparency in public procurement. Figure 10 is a screenshot of the Pro-Act.org homepage. By fall 2012, at the rst global meeting on underway to convert Pro-Act.org to the community platform for Open Contracting.20Figure 10: The Pro-Act.org Community of Practice homepage. As in-country coalitions pursue their work, building their capacity to function effectively has become a new, on-going priority for WBI and the Africa Region. Following-up on the capacity-building workshop held in November, 2011, WBI and the Africa Region continue to look for ways to support these multi-stakeholder coalitions to work sustainably. Support is seen as being needed at three distinct levels: at the country level, regionally (for example East and West Africa), and globally.Figure 11 represents the current conception of a guiding process for coalitions. This process requires an on-going dialogue between global norms and national practice, which, in turn, is informed by four pillars: 1) Principles, which need to be informed by global best practices; 2) an Evaluation & Business Case, which provides a rationale for why business and government should be more transparent; 3) the Organization who acts as convener; and 4) National Tools and Practices, which describe how to work in that particular country, for example local policies around freedom of information. 21PrinciplesNational Tools / PracticesPracticeFigure 11: A current conception of the Open Contracting process for in-country coalitions. The symbol at the top represents the on-going dialogue between global norms and national practice, which is then based on four pillars: Principles, Evaluation & Business Case, the Organization, and National Tools and Practices. The reason a dialogue between global and national practices is necessary is that each country is unique. For example, the search for ideal coalition members in each country is an iterative process that must be informed by those on the ground with local knowledge. While a theoretic

ally ideal coalition would have equal re
ally ideal coalition would have equal representation across public, private and civil sectors, sometimes this is not possible. For example, some coalitions may initially be made up largely of CSOs. Another critical choice is deciding which organizational member of the coalition is best suited to act as convener of the group’s activities. To provide a sense of the complexity of such coalitions, Figure 12 depicts a ctional national coalition with repre-sentative member organizations from public, private and civil sectors.22Public SectorPrivate SectorNATIONAL COALITIONPublic Procurement AuthorityTransparency International Revenue Watch InstitutePrivate Sector AllianceWorkers UnionFigure 12: A ctional national coalition made up of representative member organizations from the public, private and civil sectors. In this example, the CSO Transparency International functions as the convener. As open contracting evolves, WBI’s role is evolving, as well. While the World Bank will likely continue in its role as a holder of relationships with developing nations, WBI aspires to be a holder of innovation for what is com-ing to be known as “open development,” that is, development programs designed to promote greater openness, transparency and inclusiveness. Ultimately, the work of open contracting is owned by in-country stakeholders, but WBI appears to be in a place to support this work by brokering relationships—both with the WB and exter-nal actors—and by “convening the conveners” of local action. By so doing, WBI acts as a learning companion for the unfolding process. 23LESSONS LEARNEDWBI staff interviewed for this learning history were candid about still being in the early days of understanding how to do this work. While they acknowledge some positive interim results, they also own that much remains unproven. This section summarizes WBI staff’s thoughts about their lessons learned over the last two and a half years. These lessons are loosely organized for three broad audiences: 1) other WBI and World Bank staff, 2) CSOs that aspire to do multi-stakeholder work, and 3) the average global citizen who wishes to participate in such processes. These three groups were identied ba

sed on staff-member’s perceptions o
sed on staff-member’s perceptions of who will most likely be involved in furthering the work of open contracting in the future. However, it should be emphasized that these groupings of lessons learned are not intended to be exclusive as some lessons will apply to multiple audiences.Lessons Learned for WBThe rst important lesson that WB staff believe has come out of this work is the idea that innovation manifests itself from good process. Whatever successes have occurred over the last two and half years around open con-tracting appear to validate the approach of WBI convening diverse stakeholders and not providing solutions but being a facilitator around complex shared challenges. As one staff member put it, “This is not just one organiza-tion pushing an agenda because they want it.”Staff felt that open contracting emerged from trying to be as inclusive as possible of as many perspectives as possible. Such perspective-taking enhances the success and sustainability of such work because it ensures the incremental vetting of solutions by all stakeholders on an on-going basis. Staff also feel that WBI is in a unique place of relative neutrality to provide the initial convening necessary to incubate tri-sectoral change work. At the same time, someone who is reading about multi-stakeholder change efforts for the rst time should not make the mistake of regarding the Change Lab methodology as a “plug-and-play” quick x. In fact, it is clear that an extra degree of shepherding is necessary with such approaches due to their inherent complexity. For example, staff cited the disappointment following the inspiration generated at the Big Conversation in Wilton Park due to a lack of clarity around who was going to be carrying projects forward, and assumptions that World Bank involve-ment naturally came with “pots of money”. This led to taking greater care with documenting accountabilities and managing expectations in subsequent events. Staff have also noted the importance of needing to know the details of what is happening in the countries they are working with. There were times when some felt they had not “done their homework” as much as they should have in understanding nuances of

conditions on the ground. This is part o
conditions on the ground. This is part of why staff initially underestimated what it would take to sustain the work of in-country coalitions long-term. Knowing the countries well is a prerequisite for bringing the right people together to form an effective coalition. WBI is also coming to see the importance of coalitions documenting their own learning. With limited resources, sometimes there is not the opportunity to write down how coalition work happens to further collective learning. The reality is that there are no graduate degree programs in “Coalition Administration”; such learning can only be done as one goes along. Hence documenting coalition experiences is invaluable.Part of knowing a country well is maintaining awareness of what work other WBI and World Bank teams are already doing there. WBI teams learned that they must start by looking into what is happening in their sector in each country and then at other sectors to avoid duplication of effort. It became clear that different WBI teams were doing a great deal separately and could do more together.This speaks to the broader importance of collaboration within the World Bank as a whole. Staff felt they were not as collaborative as they would like to be. Some said there were times when working with colleagues felt like competition. As one staff member put it, “In theory we collaborate. Sometimes it happens; sometimes it doesn’t.” The presence of Hot Teams points to an institutional shift to address greater cross-sectoral collaboration. 24This leads to an even larger issue: pursuing social innovation through multi-stakeholder processes requires navi-gating a clash between traditional World Bank culture and an emerging culture of innovation. The reality is that administrative systems in large organizations cannot always adapt to the dynamic needs of this kind of work. Staff often feels that organizational processes need to be more exible.As one example, World Bank budget cycles are not structured to meet the dynamic and sometimes urgent needs that arise when pursuing change through multi-stakeholder country coalitions. Traditionally, the Bank works on 1 to 3 year budget cycles, but WBI staff believe that a 5-7 year cycle is more realistic for

this kind of work. As one staff member
this kind of work. As one staff member put it, “This is a process, not a production line. We must build the capacity of a lot of people to build a result…. One must have a long-term view, otherwise one can give up easily because results are not fast.” Delays created frustrations in the region. There also appears to be a lack of instruments to deliver resources to coalitions. For example, current WB processes require contracting with a single legal entity as opposed to a group. This can have distorting impacts when working with coalitions of multiple entities. The WB is also sometimes seen as relatively conservative and insular: “We tend to look to our own expertise.” Meanwhile there are huge amounts of innovation and ideas outside the Bank: “A lot of what we’re doing is trying to connect up to the outside, nd ways to partner.” At the same there was acknowledgement that it’s wise for the Bank to be cautious when embracing something new. Some NGOs are seen to be “pushing really hard” that open contracting is going to “solve everything.” One staff member felt it was important for the WB to say, “Well, this is an important piece, but it’s not the be all and end all. We need to see this as one piece in a bigger picture of what needs to be done.” For example, a wonder-fully transparent contract that’s a bad deal is still not helpful. Or a wonderfully transparent deal that’s a good deal but where parties don’t know how to collect the money is also unhelpful. Such balance is an iterative process. The lesson appears to be that everyone needs to keep things in perspective and look at the whole picture. Multi-stakeholder change efforts increase the probability of being able to see the whole picture accurately because a microcosm of the whole system is in the room. Staff was grateful for the positive role of management support, which was emphasized as crucial. Managers must understand that such processes take time, patience and persistence. Management’s role was seen as “providing a safe space to fail” because “learning and adaptation are continuous in a process of creation.” As one manager said candidly, “We

46;re still not there. We’re still
46;re still not there. We’re still going to be learning lessons.” Throughout such learning manage-ment can act as a cheerleader encouraging teams to “Think big and take risks.”These lessons were underscored when GEI gave a presentation on its use of the Change Lab methodology to donors at the Rockefeller Foundation in early 2011. Donors were increasingly pushing for projects with spe-cic outcomes known in advance, allowing progress to be measured quantitatively at each step. Understand-ably, donors want to know exactly how their money will be spent before committing funds. When working with complex stuck problems, however, cause and effect can be far apart in space and time. Persevering with multi-stakeholder approaches requires the ability to adjust to constantly changing reality as it unfolds. Such approaches are therefore at odds with traditional funding mechanisms. In embarking on using the Change Lab process, the best GEI could tell management was that the results would improve contracting without being able to say exactly how. Change would occur, but management had to have faith in the process for determining exactly what form that change would end up taking. Another key lesson is that learning is enhanced by periodically pausing to reect on practice. Such reecting can fo-cus on what worked and what didn’t, on the evolving roles of individuals and the role of the organization as a whole. This learning history—both its creation as well as its longer-term dissemination—is one example of trying to do so.25Staff spoke of the importance of approaching clients with a stance of humility, in a way to share, to learn, and with a willingness to accept one’s failures, not as “the big player telling others what they should do.” This point seems best articulated by WB staff:“You’ve got to listen to your clients, see things from their perspective, and be willing to adjust your views on topics in light of changing circumstances and how your clients are seeing them.”“Sometimes we forget our counterparts in the real world are not in some nice clean ofce like this.”“Just because contracts used to be private from a competitive point of view,

maybe you can challenge that. Maybe what
maybe you can challenge that. Maybe what’s been a good reason in the past is no longer a good reason.” “Sometimes you stick to old ideas because they’re what you’ve always done and always thought, but if you Being humble does not mean being silent, however. WBI staff are realizing that they must learn to walk the ne line between the simultaneous roles of facilitator and individual stakeholder, that is, expressing their perspective without trying to dominate. Being explicit about this tension helps minimize others perceiving the Bank as being driven by a hidden agenda. It seems clear that such long-term complex work requires accepting that you will be continuously learning on the job: “That’s the price you pay for innovating.”Lessons Learned for Civil Society OrganizationsFor CSOs interested in trying to initiate global movements for social change, one lesson that the story of open con-tracting suggests is that the way to build the right campaign is to nd the right people. The right people will then nd the right things to work on. It is important to bring all stakeholders together not only to get their feedback, but because the act of doing so helps build trust between them. The goal should be to “get the system in the room.” As one WBI staff member put it, “That was when the real bonding happened. They will tell you who else should be a part—e.g. academia, media, youth—to help you broaden the scope of who is at the table.”Such convening should be done in a way to make the larger whole in the network feel like they are a part of the coalition. This helps stakeholders feel that they own the process. They will check-in with the broader network. As one WBI staff-member put it, “It’s not the Minister who is sitting at the table,” but one of his representatives who can then reach out to others. This leads to a second important point: it is important to acknowledge the role of the powerful. Many CSOs are seen as being anti-government and anti-corporation. In order to engage successfully in multi-stakeholder work, they must be open to discussions with the government and the private sector, to shift from being “antagonistic to being

tough but co-creative.” There is a
tough but co-creative.” There is a “need to be neutral” rather than “always be in advising mode” (a message equally applicable to the World Bank and other donors). Multi-stakeholder work requires that all parties make the effort to “really listen and understand” each other. At the same time, non-prots, citizens, and the powerless benet from having a coherent message to bring to the powerful. When they do so, they help the powerful realize the need to work with the powerless.Clearly this is not easy work. The contracting process, in particular, is very complex, and it can be hard for some NGOs to get involved. Specialized expertise is not always available. In addition, there is not one solution; organi-zations need to bring in others. This lesson is the same for CSOs, citizens and the World Bank: “If you go about things the right way, you’re more likely to have success.”26CSO staff members can also further such work by connecting with their management to demonstrate that multi-stakeholder initiatives can produce results as well as raise their organization’s prole. CSO management needs to understand that this work is “not just processes and meetings” but doing something on the ground that will accomplish something. Finally, WBI staff acknowledge the skepticism that CSOs have had in the past about collaborating with the World Bank. It is hoped that the development of open contracting is one example helping demonstrate that the World Bank can be an effective partner for social change. Lessons Learned for the Global CitizenThe primary lesson WBI staff hope citizens in the developing world take away from this learning history is that they have a vital role to play and that they can make a difference. Citizens can make important contributions to increasing the transparency of their government’s contacts, and they have a stake in their tax money being used well.Multi-stakeholder processes offer the possibility of opening doors for citizens to interact with their government and the private sector to achieve more that they could otherwise, to allow them to reach spaces that they wouldn’t reach with just their peers.To do, so however, involves a c

ritical challenge: ensuring that such di
ritical challenge: ensuring that such discussions don’t become so high-level that they are beyond the issues on the ground. Some WBI staff believe the current contracting story is too high-level for the average citizen. Stakeholders can do more to connect the average citizen with “What does this stuff have to do with me?” Making contracts easy to understand is one part of doing so. Another lesson of multi-stakeholder change work for the average citizen is: “Don’t go it alone; nd partners.” One needs broad support. Citizens need to link up with like-minded people and think strategically about how to move forward. Such work is about both innovation and collaboration. In a globalized world, no one has “the” answer. The challenge for all parties remains: how do we link up?WBI staff also advise, “Do your homework”; “You will be engaging with high-level people. Make sure the claims you make are grounded in something. Make the most of your time with important stakeholders.” The average citizen sees things happening to them but sometimes may not see the larger system and why what is happening to them is happening. As a result, it is easy for populations to “blame the rst thing they see.” Citizens can benet from spending time understanding the bigger system. As one staff-member put it, “Sometimes the trap of poverty is a trap of imagination.”27CONCLUSIONSTo help make this learning history as widely applicable as possible, it was created with four overarching questions in mind, which we now revisit. Where does innovation come from?It comes from the right empty space, a global moment with an un-met need. In the case of this learning history, that moment was the recognition of the benets of greater transparency in and monitoring of government contract-ing without an understanding of how to go about achieving it. It comes from the right organizational culture, a culture that makes explicit the incubation of entrepreneurship. The evolving culture of innovation of the World Bank Institute supported the Governance for Extractive Industries team in experimenting with multi-stakeholder change work. It comes from long-term managerial support of

experimentation, failure and on-going le
experimentation, failure and on-going learning. This management support continues to allow GEI and the Open Contracting team that emerged to support the work of Change Labs going forward, including the creation and dissemination of this learning history. It comes from the right people in small, nimble teams unconstrained by prior roles and ways of working. WBI deliberately chose an unconventional team leader for GEI who carefully selected subsequent team members based on specialized expertise for evolving roles.Where does social—as opposed to purely technological—innovation come from?It comes from the right participants using the right process with conveners who understand what it means to be facilitative versus directive. GEI iteratively rened its list of stakeholders over many months in collaboration with the stakeholders, themselves. It then hired external consultants who specialize in multi-stakeholder change work and who began to mentor GEI staff in facilitating Change Labs, themselves. Where does social innovation come from in a globalized world?It comes from multiple stakeholders—who are recognized as the real problem owners—using a process that can be dynamic, be generative, manage social complexity and work across difference. The Change Lab process distills multiple perspectives into an integrated whole from which actionable solutions emerge. These solutions are then implemented by the stakeholders, themselves. Such social innovation is sustained by coalitions of stakeholders who are motivated by shared commitment and the right external support. As a result, those on the ground within each country implement the solutions. These teams, however, need on-going support as they shepherd innovations forward into the real world. 28Can large organizations or governments “do” social innovation?Yes—but they can’t do it alone nor with a deterministic stance. A structural tension will always exist: large organizations want to be collaborative but they also want to be in control. The challenge for such organizations is to hold an open space without controlling it. Fortunately, the right process structure can enable participants to “let go.” It appears that a contributing facto

r to the success of open contracting is
r to the success of open contracting is that WBI was modeling the very transparency of process for which they were advocating.Large organizations can’t do this work alone. No one can. It was not the Bank, alone; it was the Bank plus na-tional Publish What You Pay coalitions plus government champions plus Revenue Watch Institute and many oth-ers. WBI was variously convener, facilitator, partner and capacity-builder. The culture clash between traditional organizational cultures and newer cultures of innovation will likely be an on-going negotiation. This work remains an experiment. There is no silver bullet. No one has “the” answer. Would it make a difference to translate these ideas into G20 policy? Perhaps. But what seems more certain is that if open contracting and multi-stakeholder change processes became global and normative approaches, they would likely have a huge impact on Africa and the developing world.29EPILOGUEEvery day as WBI employees walk through their building’s lobby to their ofces, they pass a visitor waiting area to their left that they may rarely notice, let alone sit in. There, next to a few contemporary couches by a broad window overlooking 18th Street, is a peculiar sculpture. Sitting on four separate pedestals are four versions of the same predicament: a man struggling to get a donkey to move. In the rst sculpture, the man is pulling the donkey’s tail. In the second he is trying to push the donkey from behind. In the third, he is comically trying to ride the donkey facing backwards. And in the last and perhaps most absurd arrangement, the man is pulling on both the donkey’s front legs, making explicit their “stuckness” as an on-going dance (see Figure 13.)Figure 13: The four-part man and donkey sculpture in the lobby of the World Bank Institute. It’s hard not to be curious about who decided that this sculpture should grace the lobby of one of the largest international development organizations in the world and the message he or she was trying to send by doing so. It’s also hard not to re-interpret this sculpture’s meaning in the context of multi-stakeholder change work. If this sculpture had been placed in the center of the room at Wilton

Park, who or what would the donkey and m
Park, who or what would the donkey and man have represented to each participant?Perhaps someday a fth sculpture might be added to these original four. In this fth sculpture the man and the donkey might be depicted seated on the ground in a circle with a dozen other farm animals including a pair of oxen, a horse, some goats, some sheep, and a pig. Perhaps a few farmers and their donkeys from neighboring vil-lages might have joined the conversation accompanied by their families. One of the donkeys from down the road might be depicted gesticulating emphatically to the man across the circle as the rest of those present listen with a collection of quizzical looks and varied body language. Perhaps the most important lesson of the rst four sculptures isn’t so much what is present in that stuck problem as what is absent, that the most precious commodity for social innovation in a globalized world isn’t expertise or power. It’s perspective-taking.30RESOURCESPublicationsIsaacs, W. (1999). Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together. New York: Doubleday. Scharmer, C. O. (2007). Theory U: Leading from the Future as it Emerges. Cambridge, MA: Society for Organi-zational Learning.Senge, P., Scharmer, C. O., Jaworski, J., & Flowers, B. S. (2008). Presence: Human purpose and the eld of the future. New York: Doubleday.Rosenblum, P. & Maples, S. (2009). Contracts Condential: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries. New York: Revenue Watch Institute. Available at: http://www.revenuewatch.org/contractscondentialOrganizations and WebsitesKellogg Foundation Leadership for Community Change Program:http://ethicalleadership.org/programs/past-programs-1/kellogg-leadership-for-community-changehttp://www.iel.org/programs/klcc.htmlCeres: www.ceres.orgWorld Bank Institute: http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Governance for Extractive Industries Community of Practice: goxi.orgPromoting Innovation in Procurement Community of Practice: pro-act.orgReos Partners: reospartners.comCONTACTMichael JarvisTeam Leader - Governance for Extractive Industries & Open ContractingWorld Bank Institute1818 H St NWWashington, DC 20433mjarvis@worldbank.orgwww.open-contracting.orgPeter W. PruynIndependent Researcherp