to terrorism Prof Amado Mendoza Jr Political Science 178 Definition of terms Communist insurgency armed antistate movement aiming to establish CPled regime Separatism armed antistate movement aimed at establishment of separate state on an ethnoreligious basis ID: 744607
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Internal armed conflicts in Southeast Asia: from communism to separatism to terrorism
Prof Amado Mendoza Jr
Political Science 178Slide2
Definition of terms
Communist insurgency: armed anti-state movement aiming to establish CP-led regime
Separatism: armed anti-state movement aimed at establishment of separate state on an ethno-religious basis
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Inventory of armed internal conflicts in Southeast Asia I
Location
Nature of anti-state forces
Duration of conflict
Result or current status
Vietnam
communist insurgency
late 40s-1975
insurgent victoryLaoscommunist insurgencylate 60s-1975insurgent victoryCambodiacommunist insurgencylate 60s-1975insurgent victoryMalaysiaEthnic-based communist insurgencylate 40s-late 50sinsurgent defeat; ceasefire in 1989Philippinescommunist insurgency (HUK)late 50s-mid 60sinsurgent defeat
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Inventory of armed internal conflicts in Southeast Asia II
Location
Nature of anti-state force
Duration of conflict
Result or current status
Philippines
communist insurgency (NPA)
1969-present
ongoing armed conflict; on-and-off peace talksThailandcommunist insurgency (PLAT)1960s-1980sinsurgent defeatPhilippinesMuslim separatist(MNLF)1971-19961996 peace agreementPhilippinesMuslim separatist(MILF)1977-presentceasefire; on-and-off peace talks2/3/2015Mendoza--Internal armed conflicts in SEA4Slide5
Inventory of armed internal conflicts in Southeast Asia III
Location
Nature of anti-state force
Duration of conflict
Result or current status
Indonesia
Timor secessionist movement
1975-2001
independent Timor stateIndonesiaAceh secessionist movement1976-2005peace agreement; Aceh autonomyIndonesiaPapua secessionist movement1965-presentuncertainThailandMuslim separatism1940s-1980sinsurgent defeat or waningThailandMuslim separatism or terrorism?late 90s-presentongoing conflict
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Armed conflicts within Burma
Nature of anti-state force
Duration of conflict
Result or current status
Muslim separatist
(Arakanese or Rohingya)
late 40s-present
uncertain; links with al-Qaeda?
non-Muslim separatist (Shan, Kachin, Mon, etc.)late 40s-early 90sunstable ceasefire agreementsNon-Muslim separatist (Karen)Late 40s-presentContinued defiance by Karen insurgents2/3/2015Mendoza--Internal armed conflicts in SEA6Slide7
Inventory of ‘terrorist’ groups in Southeast Asia
Area of operations
Name of group
Nature of operations
Current status
Philippines
NPA
guerilla warfare; taxation
On-and-off peace talks; terrorist classification by US & EUPhilippinesAbu Sayyafbombings, bank robberies, KFR relatively weakenedMalaysiaKumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)bombingsuncertainIndonesiaLaskar Jihadwarfare with Christian militiasdormant; links with TNI/aQ?SEAJemaah Islamiyahgeneric terrorists actsuncertain; weakened by arrests
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Civil wars in SEA: 1993-2004
15-20 dyads (pairs of combatants) have been actively fighting in a given year
Conflicts are protracted; comparative lack of or unsuccessful initiatives for conflict management
Average duration is 8.3 years compared to world average of 3.9 years; conflicts tend to recur
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Sources/causes of internal armed conflict
Ethnicity
Nationalism
Religion
Globalization/end of Cold war: led to failed states and warlord politics in some localesExternal intervention
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Newer explanatory paradigms
The ‘weak state’ paradigm
The ‘greed-grievance’ paradigm
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The ‘weak state’ paradigm
Internal conflict is a ‘normal’ aspect of weak state politics. The causes of internal conflicts are located in the structures of weak states and the actions of weak state elites, who may deliberately engender conflict as a rational response to the difficult demands of globalization (Jackson 2001)
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Weak state politics and internal conflict
Weak state rulers (and rivals) see great benefits in creation & maintenance of ‘war economies’
In Africa, elites profit from unregulated diamond/hardwood trading, secret deals w/ MNCs re natural resources, international aid, & military assistance
Loss of Cold War patrons intensified pressure for new sources of revenue—’war economies’ or direct military control of resources
Internal conflict could also be the unintended result of risky strategies by weak states elites to hold on to power
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Revisiting the ‘weak state’
REALM
ATTRIBUTES
Security Realm
Inability to maintain monopoly on use of force
Political Realm
Lack of legitimate and effective institutions
Economic Realm
Inability to spur economic growth and investmentSocial RealmInability to meet basic needs of citizens in health, education & other services2/3/2015Mendoza--Internal armed conflicts in SEA13Slide14
The weak state and internal conflict in Southeast Asia
Inability to provide ‘political goods’ that enable full participation for all regardless of ethnicity, etc.
Internal conflict is largely a function of relationships between weak, and at times, illegitimate regimes and those most disenfranchised by the regime (Liow 2007)
Liow also argues that SEA militaries by default prefer an on-going internal war for economic and political reasons
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Distinction between state and regime strength
Regime strength—measured by capacity of ruling elites to maintain power vis-à-vis all rivals within given territory
State strength—measured by quality of governance (including legitimacy)
BURMA: a weak state under a relatively strong regime
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The ‘greed-grievance’ paradigm
Why do aggrieved citizens undertake the (seemingly irrational) risk of armed resistance vs. stronger enemies?
Identity-based grievances (ethnicity, nationalism, religion, class oppression)
Economic incentives (war may be a continuation of
economics by other means); while an armed group may be initially motivated by grievances, they continue to fight in pursuit of economic goods
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Bringing ‘power’ back in: why do
they fight and why do they continue fighting for so many years?
The diverse pursuits by armed groups can be summarized as a drive for power understood in a multi-faceted manner
Economic wealth
Military strength
Political legitimacyIndependent nation-stateRegional autonomy
Capacity to ensure survival and security
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Theoretical question re internal armed conflicts
After failing to vanquish each other (after years of trying), do the combatants settle for a
sub-optimal
(from the viewpoint of their announced objectives) but
rational ‘live and let live’ equilibrium?
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‘Sons-of-the-soil’ wars
Typically rural-based civil wars that are low-intensity but have a tendency to last a long time
Difficult to resolve because of credible commitment issues; each side expects the other to renege on any possible agreement; if the rebels become stronger, the gov’t might negotiate; but will renege on deal when it gains the upper hand; no deal enforcer
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Longevity of SOTS wars
Gov’t is unlikely to force an all-out confrontation; rebels do not directly threaten central gov’t
Elimination of rebels is militarily difficult
Small band of rebels can therefore sustain a long war
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Conceptual issues re terrorism
Can we distinguish between terrorism, insurgency, and purely criminal activity in terms of objectives?
Crime: directed toward economic gain?
Terrorism & insurgency: directed more toward non-economic ends?
Can we differentiate between the three phenomena by way of methodologies?
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Difficulties re terrorism
A trickier phenomenon for social science than other security issues
impossibility of close ethnographic research (journalists have better access than scholars)
difficulty in generating generalizable results for effective theory formulation
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Tricky classification: the Philippine case
NPA: considered terrorist; no links with al-Qaeda; does not engage in bank robberies or KFR
MILF: not considered terrorist; reported to be harboring JI operatives; reported to have offered camps as training venues for
mujahidin;
lost commands
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A better(?) definition of a terrorist
A terrorist is an armed political actor who has not yet captured state power.
But how about political actors who apparently do not seek to capture state power, at least in the medium term?
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Terrorism in a political sense
Attempts to persuade others of one’s political position by use of exemplary violence or threat of violence, instilling a state of heightened fear
Can be used to persuade others to engage in action in accordance with a particular perspective (without accepting it) such as the release of political prisoners
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Terrorism as war
Asymmetric conflict between combatants of unequal strength
Not a typical war between standing armies of nation-states
Ideological battles fought largely on the mass media battlefields and other so-called ‘force multipliers’
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The ‘business model’: how money is raised
Criminal activity
Charities (mandatory & voluntary)
Front companies and investments
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The ‘business model’: how money is disbursed
Informal (unregulated) transfer systems (
hawala
)
Bulk cash transfersUse of front companies
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Responses to terrorism
Law enforcement approach
Military approach
Combination of police and military approaches
Traditional counter-insurgency strategies (including ‘hearts-and-minds campaigns)
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Dangers of a ‘war on terrorism’
Empowerment of most unaccountable institutions (i.e. army) in the region (esp. Indonesia and Philippines)
Can be used by existing regimes against legitimate opposition
Conflation of all forms of political Islam with terrorism
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Different manifestations of political Islam in Southeast Asia
Islamic revivalist movements for cultural & spiritual renewal (
Nahdlatul Ulama
)
Islamic political parties (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party--PAS)Armed movements fighting for autonomy or secession (MNLF, PULO)
Radical Islamic paramilitary groups (Laskar Jihad, Abu Sayyaf)
Transnational terrorist networks (
Jemaah Islamiyah
)2/3/2015Mendoza--Internal armed conflicts in SEA31Slide32
Islam as political and all-encompassing
Islam is the unconditional surrender to the will of Allah
In contrast to Christianity, Islam is a way of life that encompasses all areas of human activity from theological to political
Through time, Islam developed several traditions; unity of believers but much diversity
Islamism can be seen as a recent movement towards making the state in countries with Muslim majorities more accountable to its people by stricter adherence to the Q’uran
Pan-Islamism: designed to create transnational Islamic states
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Islam and SEA politics
Limited impact of Islam in domestic affairs (even in the majority Muslim states of Indonesia, Malaysia & Brunei); lack of unity amongst Indonesian Muslims & Bangsa Moro; relative potency in Malaysia
Limited impact of Islam on SEA diplomacy and trade; Islamic issues secondary to regional concerns; minimal economic integration with Islamic world
Impact is clearly felt in the security arena given current concern over terrorism
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US hegemonic agenda?
War on terror: Bush agenda for reconstructing US hegemony in region (Glassman 2005)
Basic strategy outlined before 9/11 (PNAC, Rand, CFR reports)
Need to redress force imbalance; US forces found almost exclusively in NEA; none in SEA—despite worries about regional instability and the rise of China
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The US military in SEA after 9/11
9/11 provided convenient pretext for expanded operations (esp. in the Philippines) already stated as policy objective across the spectrum of DC elites
While the US cannot gain basing rights in Indonesia, 9/11 affords US rekindling ties with TNI (Indonesian military); condoning of TNI’s use of paramilitary groups and other forms of ‘state terrorism’ against Acehnese and Papuans
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From the PNAC report
It is time to increase the presence of American forces in Southeast Asia. Control of key sea lines of communication, ensuring access to rapidly growing economies, maintaining regional stability while fostering closer ties to fledgling democracies and, perhaps, most important, supporting the nascent trends towards political liberty are all enduring security interests for America.
No US strategy can constrain a Chinese challenge to American regional leadership if our security guarantees to Southeast Asia are intermittent and US military presence a periodic affair.
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(Un)intended consequences of the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia?
Implementation of US agenda for reconstructing regional hegemony
Reversal of democratization and de-militarization in Southeast Asia; increased foothold for Cold War style, militarist politicians and policies; easy pretext for despotic leaders to settle problems with force and minimal attention to HR concerns; a resurrection of the national security state; creation of environment hostile to political pluralism
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