What do we mean by ‘mind’? Michael Lacewing
Description: What do we mean by mind? Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy.co.uk Michael Lacewing Two features of mind To have a mind is to have a point of view or perspective on the world To experience the world To exist as a subject
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slide1. What do we mean by ‘mind’? Michael Lacewing
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide2. Two features of mind To have a mind is to have a ‘point of view’ or ‘perspective’ on the world
To experience the world
To exist as a subject
Many philosophers think mind has the two features of ‘thought’ and ‘consciousness’
Mental properties: mental states (e.g. beliefs) and mental events (e.g. thinking a thought, feeling a pain) © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide3. Intentionality Mental states are ‘about’, or ‘directed onto’, something, e.g. belief about Paris, desire for chocolate, anger at the government
(Intentionality has nothing to do with intentions.)
In Intentional mental states, we conceive of something in a certain way
E.g. Oedipus and Laius: Oedipus was angry at ‘the old man’; was he angry at ‘his father’?
Intentional states represent the world in particular and partial ways © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide4. Intentionality Intentional object: what an Intentional state represents
‘Aspectual shape’: the way the object is represented
Intentional content: Intentional object + shape
The answer to the question ‘What are you thinking?’
We can take different ‘attitudes’ toward the same content
E.g. I can believe I’m arriving late, I can want to be arriving late, I can fear I’m arriving late, etc. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide5. Intentionality An Intentional mental state is a particular type of ‘attitude’ (or ‘mode’) towards a particular Intentional content
Aka ‘propositional attitudes’, since Intentional content is often described by a proposition
Are all mental states Intentional mental states?
The answer depends in part on how we understand consciousness © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide6. Phenomenal properties Phenomenal consciousness
The type of consciousness involved in perception, sensation, emotion
‘What it is like’
E.g. to see a ripe tomato, to smell coffee, to feel sad
Not comparative
Subjective qualities of experience
Almost everyone agrees there are phenomenal properties
But they disagree on what they are © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide7. Qualia Qualia are intrinsic, non-Intentional properties of experience
Intrinsic: not relational
Would the smell of coffee be the same smell if it wasn’t caused by coffee?
Intentional properties: what makes the mental state ‘about’ its object
Relational, not intrinsic
(Introspectively accessible)
Is this theory of phenomenal properties correct? Do qualia exist? © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide8. The debate Is the smell of coffee ‘about’ coffee? Is it merely caused by coffee or does it also represent coffee?
If it does represent coffee, is this all there is to the smell of coffee?
Could conscious experiences have both Intentional and non-Intentional, intrinsic properties? © Michael Lacewing<br>
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide2. Two features of mind To have a mind is to have a ‘point of view’ or ‘perspective’ on the world
To experience the world
To exist as a subject
Many philosophers think mind has the two features of ‘thought’ and ‘consciousness’
Mental properties: mental states (e.g. beliefs) and mental events (e.g. thinking a thought, feeling a pain) © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide3. Intentionality Mental states are ‘about’, or ‘directed onto’, something, e.g. belief about Paris, desire for chocolate, anger at the government
(Intentionality has nothing to do with intentions.)
In Intentional mental states, we conceive of something in a certain way
E.g. Oedipus and Laius: Oedipus was angry at ‘the old man’; was he angry at ‘his father’?
Intentional states represent the world in particular and partial ways © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide4. Intentionality Intentional object: what an Intentional state represents
‘Aspectual shape’: the way the object is represented
Intentional content: Intentional object + shape
The answer to the question ‘What are you thinking?’
We can take different ‘attitudes’ toward the same content
E.g. I can believe I’m arriving late, I can want to be arriving late, I can fear I’m arriving late, etc. © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide5. Intentionality An Intentional mental state is a particular type of ‘attitude’ (or ‘mode’) towards a particular Intentional content
Aka ‘propositional attitudes’, since Intentional content is often described by a proposition
Are all mental states Intentional mental states?
The answer depends in part on how we understand consciousness © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide6. Phenomenal properties Phenomenal consciousness
The type of consciousness involved in perception, sensation, emotion
‘What it is like’
E.g. to see a ripe tomato, to smell coffee, to feel sad
Not comparative
Subjective qualities of experience
Almost everyone agrees there are phenomenal properties
But they disagree on what they are © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide7. Qualia Qualia are intrinsic, non-Intentional properties of experience
Intrinsic: not relational
Would the smell of coffee be the same smell if it wasn’t caused by coffee?
Intentional properties: what makes the mental state ‘about’ its object
Relational, not intrinsic
(Introspectively accessible)
Is this theory of phenomenal properties correct? Do qualia exist? © Michael Lacewing<br>
slide8. The debate Is the smell of coffee ‘about’ coffee? Is it merely caused by coffee or does it also represent coffee?
If it does represent coffee, is this all there is to the smell of coffee?
Could conscious experiences have both Intentional and non-Intentional, intrinsic properties? © Michael Lacewing<br>