performing a typeidentical action fully endorsing the same motives and make the kinds of judgments necessary to support Sider ID: 169058
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3 one may motivate an epistemicist response to this problem,4 or one may argue that Òwhimsical generosityÓ is not objectionable.5 Though we think each of these responses plausible, we judge that our response is stronger than any of these re-sponses because our argument retains all the original premises of SiderÕs argument.Our arguments works like this: We maintain that God can satisfy the requirements of justice described by (DJ) and (P) within the constraints of the targeted doctrine of Hell. This may be done by ensuring that (BL) has no teeth. That (BL) has no bite is ensured by the falsity of (E).On the Existence Thesis performing a type-identical action fully endorsing the same motives and make the kinds of judgments necessary to support SiderÕs smear thesis. We conclude that SiderÕs ÒsmearÓ thesis is thus a dubious and unargued assumption.There is, however, another reply to our argument that only invokes the possibility of S-gappiness. Sider thinks that the mere possibility of S- Š™™’—ŽœœÈ±’œÈ±œžÄŒ’Ž—ȱ˜È±ž—Ž›–’—ŽÈ±Ž’‘Ž›È±‘ŽÈ±›Š’’˜—Š•È±Œ˜—ŒŽ™’˜—ȱ˜È±One . . . wonders what happens in the possible worlds in which gaps are absent. My opponent might claim that gaps are metaphysical-ly necessary, or, more plausibly, claim that in worlds without gaps admit of borderline cases. If I am to distribute medicine to large groups of people and I use a criterion that gets the actual cases right then the possibility of that criterion leading to morally objectionable distributions in other non-actual situations is just not relevant to the actual morality of my action. This is especially obvious when I know that it will get the actual cases right. We judge that a similar case applies to GodÕs use of a criterion based ˜—ȱŠÈ±–˜›Š•È±–ŠÄ´Ž›È±˜È±Ž›ŽŽÇ¯È±œÈ±•˜—ȱŠœÈ±‘Ž›ŽÈ±Š›ŽÈ±—˜È±ŠŒžŠ•È±Ÿ’˜•Š’˜—œÈ±˜È± hristian BeliefǰȱǻDZȱÅÅÅÅǼǰȱÅÅÅÄǯȱŽŽÈ±Žœ™ŽŒ’Š••Â¢È±‘ŽÈ±™Š™Ž›œÈ±›ŽŽ›Ž—ŒŽÈ±at 466n.10.10. For a recent defense of Òskeptical theismÓ see Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea, ÒIn Defence Of Sceptical Theism,Ó Australasian Journal of Philoso-phy Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 241Ð51.11. For a fairly detailed investigation of this, see James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibilityȱǻ˜Â –Š—ȱŠ—ȱ’Ä´•ŽÄŽ•Ç°È±ÅÅÅÅǼǯ12. Sider, pp. 64Ð65.ÅÅǯȱ˜’ŒŽÈ±‘ŠÈ±‘Ž›ŽÈ±Š›ŽÈ±•˜œÈ±˜È±‘’—œÈ±‘ŠÈ±–’‘ȱŠÈ±Ä›œÈ±‘ŠŸŽÈ±Š™™ŽŠ›ŽÈ±