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GAMES PEOPLE PLAY Harri Ehtamo GAMES PEOPLE PLAY Harri Ehtamo

GAMES PEOPLE PLAY Harri Ehtamo - PowerPoint Presentation

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GAMES PEOPLE PLAY Harri Ehtamo - PPT Presentation

Aalto University Espoo Finland The document can be stored and made available to the public on the open internet pages of Aalto University All other rights are reserved Without stroking babies could not survive ID: 714393

exit games emerges intercourse games exit intercourse emerges social eric berne 1964 equilibrium cooperative biological advantage sorry

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Slide1

GAMES PEOPLE PLAY

Harri EhtamoAalto UniversityEspoo, Finland

The document can be stored and made available to the public on the open internet pages of Aalto University. All other rights are reserved.Slide2

” ...Without stroking babies could not survive.

A stroke, a cry, a smile, a babble are fundamental units of social action by which babies learn to play games

.”

” The

principle which emerges here is that any social intercourse whatever has a biological advantage over no intercourse at all.”

— Eric

Berne, M.D., 1964Slide3

Do not say ’I am sorry’

” Tonight you can embarras my wife, ruin the furniture, and wreck the rug, but please don’t say ’I am sorry’.”

— Eric

Berne, M.D., 1964Slide4

The problem of the commons

Hume, D. 1739; Hardin, G. 1968

farmers graze their

goats on the village field.Problem:The total profit for farmers in Nash equilibrium is

lower

than in the joint optimum;

T

he

total number of goats in

Nash equilibrium is greater(!) than in the joint optimum.

 Slide5

Games studied in SAL

First 15 years:Optimal controller design

by game theoretic methods

Contracting in

fisheries managementCollusion in transboundary air pollution problemsCooperative incentive equilibrium in fisheries managementIntertemporal bargaining and

electricity exchange

Mechanism design of

electricity tariffs

”Pareto hunting”

Numerical methods for

pursuit-evasion gamesComputational complexity

of homicidal chauffeur gameSlide6

Last 15 years:

Strategic interaction in energy marketsConvergence of Walras

tâtonnement process

Learning models in

mechanism designCournot/Stackelberg duopoly games with cheap talk Cooperative outcomes in repeated 2x2 matrix games, their Hausdorff dimension and computational complexitySpectrum access models,

auctions

and allocation mechanisms for

cognitive radio

Cooperative and non-cooperative behavior of

pedestrians in evacuation

of a corridor Spatial games in

exit congestion

Games studied in SALSlide7

Why and when pushing behavior emerges in exit congestion

EXIT

 

 Slide8

EXIT

A polymorphic pattern of 3180 agents;

 Slide9

Matti Kujasalo, 2013Slide10
Slide11

” The

principle which emerges here is that any social intercourse whatever has a biological advantage over no intercourse at all.”

— Eric

Berne, M.D., 1964